Methodology in Political Science: A Conversation with Mostafa Malekian

Thank you for taking the time to speak with us. As an introduction, we pose this question: what, fundamentally, is the difference between “attitude” and “approach”? And is attitude something personal while approach is impersonal?

Mostafa Malekian: Based on the root of the word “attitude,” I translate it as “rahyāft” and “approach” as “ruykard,” although some have translated them the other way around. On this basis, attitude is always personal, but approach is sometimes used in the sense of a historical, sociological, psychological, etc., approach, and sometimes in a personal sense.

According to one usage, “perspective” is equivalent to approach, and that is the meaning of view or viewpoint.

Therefore, “perspective” has three meanings:

1. View or Viewpoint;

2. Looking at an issue from an individual or collective viewpoint;

3. Looking at an issue from a practical or theoretical standpoint: that is, the difference in perspective in terms of being realistic and pragmatic, or theoretical and practical. For example, a proposition like “So whoever does an atom’s weight of good will see it” can be approached both theoretically and practically (psychologically, socially, etc.).

Epistemological foundations are usually contrasted with ontological foundations. Are anthropological foundations something other than these two?

Mostafa Malekian: In reality, anthropological foundations are part of ontological foundations, but they are sometimes treated as a counterpart to ontological foundations; according to the latter assumption, ontological foundations do not include anthropological foundations.

Sometimes the method of knowledge is discussed and divided into five categories: rational (philosophical), empirical (scientific), transmitted, intuitive, and historical. At other times, research method is divided into, for example, descriptive, analytical, and prescriptive. And sometimes, research method refers to methods such as hermeneutics, phenomenology, discourse analysis, and deconstruction. Now, how can these three types of research method be distinguished from one another?

Mostafa Malekian: Our discussion is about research method, not the method of study, defense, critique, and argumentation. Research comes after investigation, and study also relates to implementation. In any case, the first type you mentioned is the primary division of research method. This division refers to the five methods mentioned above. What is meant by “transmitted” here is tradition-based, like the method of the science of jurisprudence. In the following questions, we will expand on this division again.

If we want to make a secondary division for research method, we must refer to your second and third divisions. In the second division, descriptive propositions in the broad sense are contrasted with normative propositions. Normative propositions contain “oughts” and “ought nots.” Fundamentally, the division of research method into rational, empirical, transmitted, intuitive, and historical, or the division into phenomenological, structuralist, and similar methods, is not a normative division. The descriptive method in the broad sense is itself divided into three types:

1. Report or description in the narrow sense: A report is the collection of opinions and theories or the theory of a certain thinker; that is, it can be “subject-oriented” or “thinker-oriented.”

2. Analysis: In analysis, correctness or incorrectness is not the criterion or the goal, and only two issues are addressed: the discovery of all the presuppositions of an opinion or view, and the statement of the effects and consequences that follow from an opinion.

3. Critique: Here, judgment is at issue, and one can judge from two perspectives: theoretical and practical. From the theoretical perspective, the question is whether this opinion corresponds to reality or not. From the practical perspective, what matters is what effects and consequences belief in this opinion produces in the individual and society.

Phenomenological methods and the like—which we mentioned earlier—pertain to the two stages of analysis and critique, not to the stage of report (description). Critique can be historical critique (from the primary division of research method) or phenomenological critique (from the secondary division of research method).

Your primary division was into description in the broad sense and the normative method. Does the normative method also have subdivisions?

Mostafa Malekian: Yes, the normative method, which also discusses "oughts" and "ought nots," enters into two domains: concerning method, and concerning value (Evaluative)—that is, sometimes the discussion is about what the method ought to be, and sometimes we make judgments about value. The question is whether research in the human sciences can be value-free or not. Gunnar Myrdal's discussion of "objectivity in the social sciences" or Lakatos's discussions can be raised here.

In the tripartite division of description, analysis, and critique, shouldn't we also add explanation as one of their counterparts?

Mostafa Malekian: No, because description and report themselves are divided into two types:

1. Causal Description, which is also called Explanation;

2. Observational Description, which does not reach the stage of explanation and causal reasoning and merely reports observations.

(...)

What is the relationship between description and explanation? Are they relative matters?

Mostafa Malekian: Yes, every explanation is a kind of description relative to an explanation beyond itself; thus, they are relative concepts. The proposition "water boils at one hundred degrees" is a description. The question is asked, why? The answer is because "the molecular motion of water increases." This proposition is an explanation. If a question is asked about that again, this proposition becomes a description for the next explanation.

There are propositions that are undoubtedly descriptions and about which there is no dispute, such as when we say "sugar is sweet"; but regarding whether, in the realm of description and explanation, one can reach a point that has no higher level, Plato answers in the affirmative and Aristotelians answer in the negative. According to the Aristotelians, every description has an explanation. Plato said that the "Form" is a three-dimensional body, and this is a description above all descriptions.

Daniel Little apparently uses explanation in a different sense. He divides the methods of science into two general types: causal (causal analysis) and interpretive, and calls both explanation.

Mostafa Malekian: These problems arise from the poverty of translation into the Persian language. What Little has in mind is Explication, not Explanation. Explanation in his terminology and division is different from explanation in the sense of causal description.

To address Little's division, I need to mention a preliminary point: The ancients separated the context of discovery from the context of justification. The context of discovery speaks of what happened in the real world, and the context of justification concerns our understanding in the philosophy of social science. This separation is important. If the discussion is about something that happened in the real world, we are discussing the explication or the objective aspect of the event, and if we are speaking about the nature of our knowledge, the discussion of interpretation or the subjective aspect of the event comes into play. In any case, explanation in this division must be distinguished from explanation in the sense of causal description; for example, the method of understanding (Verstehen) is a type of explanatory method (Explanation), not Explication.

Sometimes the interpretive method (in the sense of the hermeneutic and phenomenological method) is also discussed. Is this method a counterpart to the descriptive, analytical, and critical method?

Mostafa Malekian: No, the interpretive method is the genus for the hermeneutic and phenomenological method and therefore enters into another secondary division of research method. We said earlier that the research method, in a secondary way, has two divisions: one was descriptive and normative methods, and the other was hermeneutic, phenomenological, structuralist methods, and so on.

I should also add here that hermeneutics has various meanings and is polysemous and ambiguous. What is meant here is hermeneutics in the sense of interpretive method, and hermeneutics in the sense of research method.

Where do methods like the inductive and deductive methods fit in?

Mostafa Malekian: The method of explanation and the method of argumentation must be distinguished from one another. As we said before, explanation and description are relative matters. When we bring a “why” to a descriptive proposition, we have inquired about its cause and explanation. Explanation can be motivational, mechanical, or linguistic; of course, the explanation of a phenomenon may not possess all the above types; for example, when we see someone climbing a mountain, we ask why? This is a question of explanation. We might say, because they want to lose weight for health (motivational), or we say, to convert food into energy (mechanical). Mechanical explanation deals with matter, work, energy, and force, but organicist explanation also relates to the concept of life and vital force. Theological explanation pertains to the supernatural (such as God, substance, and angels); for instance, we say: “Because God willed it.” In the above example, organicist and theological explanations can also be had, but a linguistic explanation cannot be made.

Where we want to show that an explanation is generally correct, the discussion of argumentation arises. Argumentation turns belief into knowledge (episteme). Knowledge is justified true belief; so the method of argumentation can also be the method of knowledge, and therefore it can be said that the methods of argumentation are: rational, empirical, transmitted, intuitive, and historical. Induction pertains to empirical methods, and deduction pertains to rational methods; of course, “mathematical induction” shares only a verbal similarity with the induction under discussion and is considered a type of rational method. Verificationism, falsificationism (Popper), and confirmationism (Hempel) also pertain to empirical methods.

Where is the place of critical rationality among the methods mentioned?

Mostafa Malekian: Critical rationality is a project, not a method. Critical rationality believes in the proposition that by using the rules of formal logic (in the direction of the structure of negations and affirmations) and with the help of common sense or Common Sense (in the direction of the content of negations and affirmations), one can progress towards knowledge; so this is a project in opposition to the project of traditionalists (who believe in intuition). A project is a general plan for the realm of knowledge or action. A project is the mother of a series of rules, meaning rules emerge from the heart of a project. Ideology has several meanings, but in the following sense, it becomes synonymous with project: “a belief that cannot be proven.” In this sense, the project of modernist rationality and the intuitive reasoning of traditionalists is an ideology. In this sense, ideology and project are an assumption without reason (unprovable).

Can it be said that methodology is one degree higher than research method, evaluating and assessing them, and examining their limitations and efficacies?

Mostafa Malekian: According to the common meaning of methodology, your statement can be accepted, because methodology has three terms:

1. Its common meaning is the assessment and critique of methods and the evaluation of their limitations and efficacies;

2. Sometimes methodology is said and the method itself is intended; for example, they say our methodology in this discussion is such and such.

3. At times, methodology is applied to the “set of methods.” The suffix “-logy” sometimes means “the study of” (like physiology) and sometimes means “collection”; for example, symbology means “collection of symbols.”

For the researcher, method is important, not methodology (in its common meaning). The researcher, insofar as they are a researcher, deals with first-order issues; of course, there is no contradiction in them also engaging in methodology from another perspective.

Is practical logic the same as methodology in the aforementioned sense?

Mostafa Malekian: Yes, it can be said that practical logic or (practical Reasoning) is the same as methodology.

In your interview with Haft Aseman magazine, you introduced three approaches in religious studies (phenomenological, psychological, and comparative). Apparently, according to the primary and secondary division of research methods you mentioned, these three approaches are not on the same level.

Mostafa Malekian: My intention was not that these are on the same level. The point is that in religious studies, these three major approaches exist, even though they are not on the same level.

In the study of religion, we divide arguments and proofs into two types: extra-religious and intra-religious. You have said somewhere that extra-religious proofs are rational proofs in the broad sense. Could you elaborate on this, if possible?

Mostafa Malekian: The two terms intra-religious—Textual (for which the term "transmitted" is more accurate)—and extra-religious—Metatextual or Posttextual—are well-established. What I mean by "rational in the broad sense" is all the ways available to humankind, which include the empirical, the intuitive, the historical, and the rational in the narrow sense. The rational method is sometimes contrasted with the empirical, intuitive, historical, and transmitted methods; in this sense, mathematics (unlike psychology) is rational. Reason in the broad sense stands in contrast to revelation, that is, all the ways that humankind has attained.

If we equate intra-religious proofs with transmitted proofs, the question arises: is reason itself not one of the four sources within jurisprudence?

Mostafa Malekian: We must distinguish between reason as a source and reason as a tool of understanding. For knowing reality, there are several sources, such as reason and revelation. Here, someone (like the Akhbaris) might hold that only revelation exists for discovering reality, but reason can be used as a tool for utilizing revealed texts; so what you referred to is reason as a tool for understanding religious texts.

Up to this point, based on the following table, we have distinguished the primary division of research method and the secondary division of research method from methodology. Sometimes other methods such as field, library, experimental, and survey are also mentioned. Do you agree that we should call these techniques of data collection, rather than research methods?

(. . .)

Mostafa Malekian: Yes, these should be considered techniques. One of the research techniques is field research, and it is used in certain sciences like sociology and psychology. Case study and survey are subsets of field research. Observation is either controlled or uncontrolled; controlled observation is when the observer themselves can arrange the conditions to observe the result. Controlled Observation is called an experiment. Some observations are uncontrollable, such as astronomy. An astronomer cannot bring planets and stars closer together or farther apart! In some geophysics topics, like earthquakes, there is also uncontrollable observation. Uncontrolled observation is called Celestial Observation.

Each of the above techniques has applications in a particular science; for example, the experimental method can be used in political sociology, whereas this is not feasible in the sociology of revolutions, because revolutions do not change at our will.

And Calculation, both can be subsets of field research, and they have greater application in econometrics. Survey is where measurement is possible, and calculation deals with qualities.

Sometimes Survey is also translated as پیمایش.

Mostafa Malekian: Yes, that is also a correct translation. Measurement is only quantitative examination, but Survey can be quantitative or non-quantitative.

What is free observation?

Mostafa Malekian: By free observation, I mean observation in nature. In the laboratory, observation has an artificial state and is not free. Free observation has many applications in the humanities.

Is the library technique the same as the documentary technique?

Mostafa Malekian: To a large extent, these two overlap, but they also differ. A document can be a book or a non-book (such as a coin); so the library technique (Libraric) is narrower than the documentary technique (Documental).

Where does the case study fit in?

Mostafa Malekian: Case study (Sampelic) is also a subset of field research. In this method, there is a presupposition that

Mostafa Malekian: "Coherence" is between several things; so one must see whether a theory has several elements within it or not. Some theories can be expressed in the form of a single proposition, like E=mc², which is one proposition. Some may have n propositions, like Darwin's theory. It is here that the issue of coherence arises and your question becomes relevant; so in response I must say that theory encompasses both coherent and incoherent theories, and even correct and incorrect theories.

Can it be said that the sciences have usually existed in the form of theories? Is science a collection of theories?

Mostafa Malekian: Some sciences have been like this. Sciences that are not observational and experimental usually begin with theories, like philosophy; but sciences that begin with observation and sensation were not previously theories. Science is a collection of theories plus a collection of presuppositions plus methodology. Some have added a fourth element called "the conventions of the people of science," which I do not accept.

What is the relationship between school, theory, science, and method? Can it be said that every theory and every school can have a method?

Mostafa Malekian: School has two meanings: the first meaning is "a series of theories within a science" (like the Ricardian and Keynesian schools in economics). In this case, the school is a subset of science. The second meaning stands in contrast to science. If someone's expression has an ideological aspect, they are said to have a school. In this sense, a school has something to say for a specific group of human beings and is only acceptable to them. For the second meaning, the term Doctrine is also sometimes used. If their discussion has generality regarding human beings, they are said to have entered "science." The chemical composition of blood is a scientific discussion, and the impurity of blood is a doctrinal discussion. Those who say "Islam does not have an economic science but has an economic school" have used "school" in this sense; therefore, Islam provides economic discussions for its believer.

Every school or every theory may have a method for itself; for example, it seems that discourse is a theory, but there is no contradiction in it also containing a method in this regard.

Can it be said that different schools may be placed within the framework of a single approach?

Mostafa Malekian: Yes, a phenomenon can be viewed from different perspectives. Each aspect can be an approach; for example, our approach to the phenomenon of revolution can be economic, international, or social-psychological. Within the economic approach, there may be different schools.

Now that the discussion has reached this point, please also provide the definition of paradigm.

Mostafa Malekian: About thirteen meanings have been given for paradigm, but apparently each of them refers back to another meaning like model, project, and so on; but a model is a mental image of a phenomenon under study, in which all the characteristics of that phenomenon are incorporated into that image.

Paradigm is usually defined as "the consensus of the scholars of an era." What term does this meaning of paradigm correspond to, and what is the problem with intending this meaning from this word? In studying a specific issue (like power), can one distinguish between a traditional paradigm, a modern paradigm, and a postmodern paradigm?

Mostafa Malekian: The consensus of the scholars of an era only occurs on the presuppositions of a science. Beyond these presuppositions, there is no point of agreement or consensus. There is no problem with calling "the consensus of the scholars of an era" a paradigm, but this is not a new meaning that has recently entered science. And if you use the word "paradigm" as the modified noun for "traditional," "modern," and "postmodern," for example, "postmodern paradigm," it is the same as "determining the intention" (Description or Assaying the Intention) and does not acquire a new meaning.

In his book Theories of Revolution, Kuhn considers “theory” to be the answer to “why,” and “model” to be the answer to “how.” In his view, “a model is the conceptualization of a group of phenomena by means of a logical basis, the ultimate purpose of which is to organize the terms and relations, i.e., the propositions of a formal system, which, if valid, becomes a theory. A model is structural and devoid of content. Every model consists of two important parts: the logical basis and the mechanism (the structure of concepts and their interrelations). A model is the mechanism by which we understand how and on what basis a logical sequence and succession of the constituent parts of a theory are related to one another.”

With this in mind, can it be said that “theory” usually pertains to thought and schools of thought, while “model” usually pertains to the field of sociology; for instance, when we speak of “models of power distribution” in the field of political sociology, we are referring to models, but when we speak of “theories of power distribution,” we are referring to their intellectual foundations—such as the schools of totalitarianism and democracy?

Mostafa Malekian: Yes, your understanding is correct. Kuhn referred to one of the meanings of model; of course, it is necessary to note that the separation of “why” and “how” is not always possible. In Aristotle’s terms, some human actions are performed to achieve another action (as an end). For such actions, both why and how are relevant; for example, I ask, why are you eating an apple? He says, to heal my stomach ulcer. I ask, how are you eating it? He says, with the peel. Eating the apple here is done for another purpose. The second category of actions are those for which another action is not their end. “Dancing” in ancient Greek culture was for achieving equilibrium from the intensity of sorrow or joy. This action is not performed for another action, or like scratching one’s hand, which is an end in itself.

Can it not be said that here, dancing and scratching are also performed for spiritual equilibrium or the comfort of the soul?

Mostafa Malekian: My phrasing was that if “another action” is its end, the why and how differ in it, as with social issues and revolution, but if we take the pleasure of the soul and the like as the goal, no action is without an end.

What is the relationship between knowledge, discipline, and science, and to which category do the rational, empirical, intuitive, historical, and transmitted methods belong?

Mostafa Malekian: Knowledge is divided into three types:

1. Propositional Knowledge: In this type (Knowing-that, knowing that something exists, such as “I know that today is Thursday”). Knowledge may pertain to a single proposition (Simple) or to a set of propositions. A set of propositions can have a single subject with multiple predicates, or neither the subject nor the predicate may be single. If the subject is single and the predicates are multiple, it is called a scientific discipline, just as if the subject and predicates are multiple, it is called information; so, it is clear up to this point that Discipline is more specific than Knowledge;

2. Skill or technique or knowledge that cannot be converted into propositions and is a type of skill. Here, knowing-how is at issue. Driving, for example, has both a science and an art; although the greater part of it is art. Regarding politics, it is also debated whether politics is a science or an art;

3. Knowledge by acquaintance (Identification), that is, the knowledge of recognizing individuals.

Discipline itself is divided into five types:

1. Rational, including mathematics, logic, and philosophy. The ancients assumed logic and mathematics to be two things, because they considered mathematics to be from primary essential and quantitative concepts, and logic to be from secondary logical intelligibles. Scholars from the nineteenth century onward have not accepted this statement, and some, like Russell, have said that mathematics is a type of logic, though some believe logic is a type of mathematics;

2. Empirical (Scientific), which includes two types: natural (physics and chemistry), and human (psychology, sociology, economics, and politics);

3. Intuitive, which includes mysticism and a part of psychology;

4. Historical, including history, historical geography, philology, and a part of jurisprudence;

5. Transmitted (in the sense of dogmatic adherence), such as jurisprudence. Sometimes “transmitted” means dogmatic, and sometimes it is also applied to the historical.

From what has been said, it can be concluded that science is narrower than discipline, just as discipline is narrower than knowledge.

(. . .)

And where does the context of justification fit in?

Mostafa Malekian: The originator of this division is Reichenbach; of course, after him it has been criticized that, first, the criterion for distinguishing them is insufficient and they overlap, and second, they are not exhaustive and a third category is also conceivable for them. In any case, the basis of their division is the methodology of the genesis of science in the sense of a scientific discipline, meaning the discussion concerns how a scientific discipline such as jurisprudence (or philosophy, or physics, or psychology) came into being.

Does “the genesis of science” refer to its initial formation?

Mostafa Malekian: No, it refers to the gradual formation of a science; for example, biology has taken shape over two thousand years, and its propositions belong either to the context of discovery or the context of justification. Every biologist, ultimately, is either engaged in discovery or justification, but the idea that comes to mind belongs to the context of discovery, not justification.

The ancients divided knowledge or wisdom into two types: theoretical and practical, and placed politics as a branch of practical wisdom. They did not discuss “philosophies of” (such as political philosophy) and had no title called “philosophy of practical wisdom.” If possible, please explain the place of “philosophies of,” so that we can get closer to terms like political philosophy and the philosophy of political science.

Mostafa Malekian: The philosophy of wisdom is broader than the philosophy of sciences that deal with values (which is called Axiology or the science of values) and the philosophy of descriptive sciences (which is broader than the rational, empirical, intuitive, historical, and transmitted sciences). Sciences that deal with values include at least four types:

1. Ethics, which discusses nine values: good, bad, right, wrong (or correct and incorrect), ought, ought not, duty, responsibility, and virtue (and vice);

2. Politics, which discusses values such as freedom, equality, fraternity, and justice. Rawls, unlike others, takes fairness to mean justice;

3. Aesthetics, which speaks of values such as beautiful, ugly, magnificent, sublime, and spirited. The philosophy of aesthetics is also called “philosophy of art”;

4. Religious jurisprudence, which discusses the five rulings (obligation, recommendation, permissibility, reprehensibility, prohibition), ritual purity and impurity, and lawfulness and unlawfulness (prescriptive rulings).

From this, it becomes clear that the philosophy of ethics is distinct from the philosophy of politics, even if their issues overlap.

Sometimes “philosophy of” (such as philosophy of history, philosophy of ethics, or political philosophy) is used in a first-order sense, and sometimes in a second-order sense. In the latter case, they are called the philosophy of the science of history, the philosophy of the science of ethics, and the philosophy of the science of politics. Where does analytical political philosophy fit in here, and do we also have a third thing called the philosophy of politics?

Mostafa Malekian: It is better to begin the discussion this way: we have a reality, such as the events of history, ethics, and politics (and the like), and a science that pertains to them, such as the science of history, the science of ethics, and the science of politics; so, for example, “history” is an equivocal term. When we say, “Two world wars occurred in human history,” we are referring to the “reality of history,” and when we say, “In history, it is said of so-and-so or Morality.” The science of politics with an empirical orientation is usually called Politics, and the sciences related to politics are called Political Science or political sciences. Science is a collective noun that can also take a plural form. Politics has at least three applications: first, politics with an empirical orientation; second, everyday politics (for example, they say he is involved in politics); and third, in the sense of policy.

The science of history, ethics, and politics are first-order. In addition to these, one must also name the philosophy of history, the philosophy of ethics, and political philosophy in the first-order sense, as well as the philosophy of the science of history, the philosophy of the science of ethics, and the philosophy of the science of politics.

(. . .)

Mostafa Malekian: Any science whose subject matter is fact is first-order, and any science whose subject matter is a scientific discipline is second-order. Chemistry, for instance, has matter as its subject, so it is first-order. The philosophy of chemistry is considered second-order. On this basis, political philosophy is first-order, and the philosophy of political science is second-order. The philosophy of a discipline is not always second-order. The philosophy of religion, the speculative philosophy of history, and the philosophy of mind are first-order, because, for example, there is no scientific discipline called religion.

If both the science of history and the philosophy of history are first-order, what is the difference between them?

Mostafa Malekian: In the science of history, all its propositions are particular: Naser al-Din Shah did such and such, and the Constitutional Revolution turned out so and so. The philosophy of history discusses general issues in history, yet it is still first-order; for example, it discusses whether the course of history is moving toward evolution or decline. The philosophy of the science of history is second-order. The philosophy of ethics is also first-order. The metaphysics of ethics has three meanings, one of which equates it with moral philosophy. Ethics discusses human dispositions themselves, and moral philosophy (Ethics or Moral Philosophy) discusses generalities on this subject. The philosophy of the science of morals (Philosophy of Morals) or Metaphysics of Morality is second-order. Political Philosophy is also first-order and issues rational judgments about political phenomena, or Metaphysics of Politics is second-order. What is meant by "the philosophy of politics" is the same as "the philosophy of political science." Strauss (in What is Political Philosophy?) discusses political philosophy (first-order), and Quinton (in Political Philosophy) discusses both first-order and second-order political philosophy. Unfortunately, in the Persian language, translations are not precise.

Sometimes, by "the philosophy of politics," they intend political philosophy.

Mostafa Malekian: Yes, but this is not a correct translation. The above terms are sometimes translated incorrectly in our language and used in this way.

Quinton also discusses analytical political philosophy, which is second-order, and it was not in your division.

Mostafa Malekian: Analytical political philosophy is a type of approach and should not be considered a counterpart to political philosophy and the philosophy of political science. We must separate the types of a science from the schools of a science. Analytical philosophy is one of the schools of philosophy, which has an analytical and second-order approach. In psychology, for example, we have eight types of approaches (developmental psychology, educational psychology, etc.), but there are three types of schools in that science, such as the psychoanalytic, behaviorist, and humanistic schools. In the third type, the discussion is about how the human psyche "ought" to be.

In any case, analytical political philosophy, as an approach, deals with the analysis of concepts and language and has three serious counterparts:

1. Critical philosophy (Critic), not criticism (Criticism), which has been successful in the direction of negation, like the Frankfurt School;

2. Phenomenological philosophy: the phenomenology of a science (not the phenomenology of a phenomenon, which is first-order);

3. Evaluative philosophy (Evaluative), which discusses to what extent value-laden discussions have entered the discussions of scholars.

In the philosophy of sciences (such as the philosophy of the science of history, the philosophy of the science of ethics, and the philosophy of political science), what issues are discussed?

Mostafa Malekian: In the philosophy of any science, three categories of issues are discussed:

1. Presuppositions: that is, the conceptual and propositional principles that the ancients placed in the introduction to a science;

2. Methodology (in the sense of method, not the study of methods);

3. The history of the development of that science: previously, the history of science was discussed within the science itself, but now, due to its growth and expansion, it is part of the philosophy of that science and deals with two types of discussion:

which discusses what issues have passed in that science, and the normative (Normative) discussion, which discusses what errors or turning points have existed in that science. Sometimes this part is referred to as "the history of the failures and successes of science."

Sometimes the word "philosophy" is also used in the sense of "purpose" and "cause," like "the philosophy of fasting."

Mostafa Malekian: Yes, it is briefly called the wisdom of legislation or existential wisdom (Reason), which is beyond our discussion.

Can it be said that the topics of political philosophy in this sense are conventional, meaning they have a source of abstraction in the external world (i.e., the subjects of political philosophy are not like the Simurgh or the Lawgiver's 'creation'), but the political thinker and philosopher posits concepts such as power and democracy to discuss them?

Mostafa Malekian: Some of the discussions and topics of political philosophy are like this, but others truly exist. Concepts such as presidency, democracy, crime, elections, and 'freedom to' belong to the first category, and concepts including equality, distributive justice, violence, 'freedom from,' and penalty belong to the second type. Presidency and elections are conventional and change with the view of those who posit them, but violence or 'freedom from' exist in themselves. Violence is a painful physical phenomenon in the social scene. The two propositions 'Mr. X is the president' and 'Mr. X is free' are different. The first may cease to exist or come into being with a new positing by those who posit, but the second proposition refers to reality.

The principle of this matter must be accepted that there are two categories of subjects in political philosophy, but there may be disagreement over the instances. Justice, according to one division in the philosophy of law, is of two types: legislative justice and distributive justice. Of course, Aristotle uses the term 'commutative justice' in contrast to distributive justice.

According to distributive justice, a person is just who does nothing contrary to the law. This meaning of justice comes after the enactment of law. In legislative justice, the discussion is whether the law itself was enacted justly or not. Distributive justice, like violence, exists in the external world, whereas legislative justice is conventional.

There is also controversy regarding democracy, but in my opinion, it is a conventional concept.

Freedom is also of two types: 'freedom to' and 'freedom from.' The first type is conventional, and the second type is non-conventional. In politics, the discussion is mostly about freedom of the first type.

Power in itself is not discussed in politics, because what is meant in politics is political power, which we refer to as 'authority.' Authority is in the realm of politics. Authority or political power is conventional, but it seems one can also conceive of non-conventional political power, which exists in itself.

What is the benefit and fruit of the above division? Is a practical benefit conceivable for dividing political subjects into conventional and non-conventional?

Mostafa Malekian: Yes, the benefit and fruit of the discussion is found in the method of verifying those two types of subjects. Conventional and non-conventional propositions have their own specific methodology, and each is verified in a manner appropriate to it. The proposition 'Mr. X is the president' is verified with conventional political documents and evidence, and the proposition 'Mr. X is free' is verified in another way.

In theoretical discussions, you believe in the 'idea of non-certainty' and do not consider any of the proofs for the existence of God to be complete. On what foundations is this idea based? And is the idea of non-certainty not raised a fortiori in political philosophy?

Mostafa Malekian: The general idea of certainty is based on the critique of practical and theoretical reason (from Kant) and the critique of empiricism (from Sellars, Quine, and Wittgenstein), and this idea is raised a fortiori in political philosophy as well.

If we pass over your arguments and foundations, this question arises: does the idea of non-certainty in political philosophy not lead to a kind of relativism?

Mostafa Malekian: When we see that we do not attain certainty in such discussions, we must submit to consensus and universal agreement. In the absence of consensus, there is no alternative but to base things on the majority vote. Its tools are referendums and the like.

Existing tendencies usually divide philosophy into two categories: Continental philosophy and Analytic philosophy. In your interview with the Entekhab newspaper (16/10/78), you said that analytic philosophy has two branches, logical and linguistic; and Continental philosophy includes branches such as phenomenology, existentialism, the hermeneutic current, currents with the prefix neo- (such as neo-Thomism, neo-Kantianism, and neo-Hegelianism), structuralism, deconstruction, and the like. Of course, you have stated that this division faces the problem of ambiguity and a lack of a clear criterion for division in some respects.

Now, if we accept this division according to the prevailing view, the question is: can this same division be applied to the types of methodology in the human sciences as well?

Mostafa Malekian: Sciences are divided into two categories: empirical and non-empirical (historical). Each of these latter two categories can also be divided into human and non-human. The division you referred to in your question applies to the empirical human sciences. That is, in the empirical human sciences, methodology can be divided into the logical and linguistic branches on the one hand, and branches such as phenomenology, hermeneutics, structuralism, and deconstruction on the other. However, this division is entirely irrelevant to the non-human empirical sciences (such as physics and chemistry). Regarding the non-empirical (historical) sciences, this division is also insufficient, because history does not deal with universals, and the aforementioned methodologies pertain to universals.

Thank you again for participating in this interview. In closing, if you have any specific recommendations, please share them.

Mostafa Malekian: My recommendation to all friends studying in the fields of human sciences is to fill the gaps in the following two areas: first, in finding a deep and philosophical perspective on the subject of their work, and second, regarding the clarification of concepts in their field. If that philosophical foundation is absent, the person becomes akin to a computer that possesses a large collection of information. The tool for this perspective consists of analytic philosophy and logic (not necessarily classical logic). Concepts in the human sciences—especially in our country—are severely confused. Each concept may have dozens of meanings, and everyone uses it in line with their own purpose. In addition to recognizing the various meanings of a term, we must "specify our intended meaning" in our discussions.

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pdf of the conversation with Mostafa Malekian "Methodology in Political Science" (New Version)

Download Part One | Download Part Two

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This conversation was conducted by the Research Institute for Islamic Political Thought, and Mr. Seyyed Sadegh Haghighat has rewritten it.

Conversation with Mostafa Malekian "Methodology in Political Science" | Political Science Quarterly, No. 14 | Summer 2001

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