اندیشهفلسفهخردگفتگوحکمتمعناپرسشفرهنگ
Mujahedi critiques the narrative of Hasanain's barefootedness and Malekian's view on the livelihood of rulers. In his opinion, structures are more important than the conduct of rulers, and he sees welfare as the result of systematic services, not self-impoverishment.

In this affecting lecture by Mr. Malekian, that account of Hasanayn (peace be upon them) going barefoot during the caliphate of Ali (peace be upon him) cannot be correct/precise due to the historical inconsistency of the narrative’s elements. Lady Fatima had passed away 25 years before Ali assumed the caliphate. During Ali’s caliphate, Hasanayn were also well advanced in years. Therefore, the core of this historical account either pertains to the lifetime of Lady Fatima, perhaps even before the Prophet’s passing—in which case Ali was not caliph at the time of the incident—or the incident occurred during his caliphate, in which case it has nothing to do with Hasanayn and Lady Fatima, and likely relates to Ali’s other wives and children after Lady Fatima—peace be upon them all.
But aside from the problem with this historical account, there is a more fundamental problem in his method of analysis, or in other words, in the understanding of this account, which is that it seems, in his view, the form and mold of political and religious behaviors and acts in communities (Gemeinschaften / communities) prior to the formation of modern society and the modern state can be exactly replicated in the modern era, within the modern state and modern society (Gesellschaften / societies), and the latter can be both understood and explained, and organized and administered, based on the patterns and logic of the former. In other words, it is as if, for example, the governance patterns of early Islamic society are replicable within the framework of modern nation-states, whether for understanding and explanation, or for administration, organization, and changing trends and procedures.
Unfortunately, a common presupposition is prevalent among many of our scholars—whether they are traditional or modernist, guardians of traditional religiosity or its critics, religious intellectuals or otherwise—which is the root of these misunderstandings of the matter of politics and governance: for many of us, society, politics, governance, and their affairs, now in the second decade of the twenty-first century, are still an unbroken extension of the same society, politics, governance, and their affairs in the pre-modern era, and that too according to historical accounts or theological reconstructions of the tribal life of the Arabs of Mecca and Medina during the few decades before and after the Prophet Muhammad’s (peace be upon him) mission.
This incorrect presupposition has unfortunately become so internalized, settled so heavily at the foundation of the political and social vision of many of us, and governs our understanding of the world within and around us, that recognizing it and critically rethinking it has become very difficult.
If we overlook this analytical error of equating the difference in the living standards of members of society (which is neither eradicable nor necessarily reprehensible) with discrimination (which is both eradicable and reprehensible), and if we again overlook the internal inconsistencies of this historical account regarding Hasanayn (peace be upon them) going barefoot during Ali’s (peace be upon him) caliphate, which Mr. Malekian has recounted, the main message of his speech appears to be no more than one emphatic and repeated point: the living standard of rulers and their close associates must be equal to the living standard of the poorest members of society, so that the poor, by looking at their standard of living, may find psychological solace and more easily endure the suffering of the difference between their own living standard and that of others.
Well, this prescription might have been somewhat effective in a tribal “community” with very primitive relations, especially with the understanding they had of justice as meaning equality, but the reality is that in the structure of modern “society” and the modern nation-state, with the separation of powers, division of duties and functions, and the flow of affairs through the channels of political and social institutions, the form, style, manner, and standard of the private lives of rulers (including their appearance, clothing, mount, and dwelling) has become a highly marginal, secondary, and unimportant matter. Even in the most egalitarian forms of democracy (such as those prevailing in the Netherlands and the Scandinavian countries), alongside the provision of a system of public services and social welfare (especially through progressive taxation, providing high-quality education in diverse life skills, and ensuring financial transparency and discipline), the remaining differences among the living standards of various groups of people are “covered” or bridged not by encouraging the rich to feign poverty, but through a logical, reasonable, and facilitated way of frugal living.
Unfortunately, this ruler-centric view of politics and government has not only paved the way for the emergence of individual-centered political ideas, but has also provided the ground for many demagogic abuses, from corrupt governments like that of Chávez to his counterparts across the globe who ate bread and cheese, slept on reed mats, and simultaneously reduced the people to ashes.
Dwelling on the attributes, deeds, and behaviors of ancient rulers and modeling them, whether to critique today's rulers or to replicate those models, is more of a hindrance than an illumination. One cannot, and should not, draw analogies between Yazid and Mu'awiya when criticizing contemporary rulers. Just as one cannot, and should not, expect the methods and character of today's rulers to be legible or explicable within the behavioral and action frameworks of Solomon, David, the Prophet, and Ali, peace be upon them.
We must still constantly remind ourselves and our companions that the fundamental question of politics, for centuries now, is no longer "who" should govern and what individual and social qualities and characteristics the ruler should possess, but rather "how" those responsible for administering political and social affairs should govern. And this "how" of governance, in turn, is not a description of the deeds and behaviors of officials, but a description of the institutions, structures, and procedures that produce, protect, constrain, distribute, and direct power, within which "officials" are employed, and whose behavior, conduct, and actions are measured and evaluated by the organizing standards of those institutions, structures, and procedures.
Mr. Malekian's point and my own are not at all about "superior, extra-legal privileges." His point concerns what the correct path is to alleviate that unpleasant "feeling." My submission is that the self-impoverishment display of the wealthy in modern societies not only absolutely lacks such a function, but can easily be classified under pretense, which is a vice contrary to transparency, and transparency is one of the most central values of modern politics. In the Scandinavian countries or the Netherlands, officials riding buses and subways or commuting by bicycle is absolutely not out of sympathy with the poor or a display of self-impoverishment. The urban transportation system in some Northern and Western European countries is engineered in such a way—meaning the urban planning system is such—that in most cases, using public transportation or a bicycle is one of the most rational (safest, fastest, cheapest) possible ways to commute, for everyone. These subway-riding, bus-riding, and bicycle-riding officials were the same before and after their tenure, and this action of theirs is not for self-impoverishment, but a sign of treading the very path I mentioned: "Making a frugal way of life logical, rational, and easy."
People in these countries fully recognize the "difference" in living standards. But they do not feel "discrimination," and this is not because their officials ride scooters, bicycles, subways, or buses, but because of the efficiency of the social welfare system, transparency, accountability, and other democratic mechanisms within a welfare state.
Therefore, the point of contention, firstly, is not the desirability of eliminating or reducing that painful feeling or making it acceptable. The point of debate is the method of achieving these. Secondly, in my opinion, this statement is correct insofar as it pertains to difference. Uneliminable difference must be accepted, but one should not suffer from it. Rather, one must act so that it does not cause suffering for others either. Thirdly, I disagree with Mr. Malekian that "discrimination" must be tolerated or made tolerable for the people. This discrimination is the very pain that all the human and social sciences after Marx have mobilized to cure. Discrimination must be eliminated. Discrimination must be brought to people's remembrance. Discrimination must be placed at the center of social and political attention and sensitivity. Discrimination is the mother of all vices. If people are heedless of it, they must be made aware of discrimination.
Nietzsche's critique demonstrated that such an understanding of morality—that is, making suffering, weakness, and pain, including that arising from discrimination, bearable—is rooted in a Christian, intensely individualistic, and introspective conception of morality. Morality in this sense means the morality of the weak, a morality that nurtures the weak and fosters the oppressor. Modern political and social morality, founded particularly through the efforts of Marx, Nietzsche, and Weber, is entirely a negation of this conception of the ethical. Discrimination must be eradicated; it should not be tolerated or made tolerable. Making discrimination tolerable is the greatest injustice. It is part of that very opiate of the masses.
I have not the slightest doubt about Mr. Malekian's benevolent intentions and humanitarian approach. There is an emphasis on poverty and discrimination in his speech, but not on difference. Poverty and discrimination are forms of difference. His remarks up to the middle of this audio file focus on poverty and the suffering it causes, and he argues that rulers can reduce the suffering arising from the poor's feeling of poverty by not flaunting their wealth, and that they must do so.
It must be noted that poverty can result from various forms of oppression, including from the mother of all oppressions, namely discrimination. In this case, it should not be concealed, nor should the suffering arising from it be soothed. Rather, people must be made aware so they can consciously take action to eliminate discrimination. Poverty can, of course, result from other factors, such as laziness and irresponsibility, or from psycho-social deviations like addiction, or from disability and factors beyond the individual's control. The ruling for each of these, again, is different.
From the middle of this audio file onwards, however, his remarks shift from the axis of poverty to the axis of discrimination, yet he still argues that by feigning poverty oneself, the feeling of discrimination among the poor can, and indeed should, be eliminated. This statement, too, in my opinion, is incorrect for the reasons I have presented.
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Discussion1 comments
سلام اولین باری است که نقدی به سخنان آقای ملکیان میشنوم که آنرا وارد می یابم. البته گمان نکنم آقای ملکیان اکنون نیز اینگونه فکر کنند. احتمالا فاصله حدود ربع قرن آن سخنرانی تا امروز رمز فهم این خطای فکری استاد است.