اندیشهفلسفهخردگفتگوحکمتمعناپرسشفرهنگ
Mostafa Malekian holds that, in ordinary understanding, cause and effect pertain to events, not substances—contrary to the classical view that substances require a cause. He further argues that accepting the simultaneity of cause and effect in philosophy leads to the denial of time and the existence of the entire world in a single instant.

The first point in this discussion is that we will disregard the precise formulation of the principle of causality. For instance, some of the ancients said that the precise formulation of the principle of causality is that “every contingent being (ḥādith) requires a cause.” Some said “every contingent existent (mumkin al-wujūd) requires a cause,” and others said “every entity essentially dependent (faqīr al-dhāt) requires a cause.” There were other imprecise expressions as well, for example, “every effect requires a cause,” which is an entirely analytic proposition and of no value. Because what does ‘effect’ mean? It means that which has a cause requires a cause. Or, even more immature than that, for instance, “every phenomenon requires a cause.”
The first point in this discussion is that we will disregard the precise formulation of the principle of causality. For instance, some of the ancients said that the precise formulation of the principle of causality is that “every contingent being (ḥādith) requires a cause.” Some said “every contingent existent (mumkin al-wujūd) requires a cause,” and others said “every entity essentially dependent (faqīr al-dhāt) requires a cause.” There were other imprecise expressions as well, for example, “every effect requires a cause,” which is an entirely analytic proposition and of no value. Because what does ‘effect’ mean? It means that which has a cause requires a cause. Or, even more immature than that, for instance, “every phenomenon requires a cause.”
Second point: now let us suppose we have formulated the principle of causality; what things in the world count as instances of the principle of causality? And I think our predecessors paid no attention at all to this second point, though they were precise about the first point and had good discussions about it. With the categorization that Aristotle carried out, saying: the existents of the universe can be divided into ten categories. One category is substance and nine are accidents. From Aristotle down to our own time, the ten Aristotelian categories have been endlessly disputed, and endlessly many alternative and rival views have emerged, saying that this tenfold view you propound is wrong. But Aristotle's core point has not been refuted, which is that if someone claims that something exists and cannot determine its metaphysical category, their claim is not accepted. We must be able to determine the metaphysical category of everything. Note that "metaphysical" does not mean "supernatural." The metaphysical category is sometimes also called the ontological category. And the point is that if you want to say something exists, the first thing you must do is see in which of these categories it falls. Even if you do not accept Aristotle's ten categories—if, for example, you accept Kant's categories, Heidegger's categories, or others... Now, what are these categories? What are the categories that are accepted today? Again, we cannot answer because there is no consensus, but the ones I will now mention are consensual. 1. Material substances, such as water, a cat, a nightingale, a human being. 2. Properties: a property is anything that is sensorily perceivable from a material substance or from within ourselves. Of course, it is clear that sensory perception of material substances is external perception, and perception within ourselves is internal perception. Like the whiteness of this plate, the redness of this book's cover, or the sound I hear from the air conditioner, and likewise the sorrow I feel within myself. 3. Relations: for example, my being older than my child, my being younger than my parents, my being far from you, and so on. 4. Sets: for example, the set of Iranian Muslim chemists, or the set of employed Japanese women, and so on. 5. Events: such as the occurrence of the Iran-Iraq war, or the drawing closer of the economic relationship between two people, or the weather getting colder. Now, when I say every essentially needy being, every contingent being, and so on—what is the instance of a contingent being, the instance of an essentially needy being, etc.? Which of these (the 5 above) is it? Are events in need of a cause? Or... If you look closely, you will see that our predecessors spoke in a way as if substances are in need of a cause. They would say, who brought human beings into existence? That is, is substance in need of a cause? Or they would say, after all, who brought water into existence? Who brought these mountains into existence? If you look closely and be fair, have we ever, in our ordinary lives, attributed causality and effectuality to a substance? We say, why did so-and-so get sick? What do we want to consider the effect? The getting sick. That is, we want to consider an event as the effect. And what do we say is the cause? We say, because they ate poisoned ice cream. Eating poisoned ice cream—this, again, is an event. I want to say that in our ordinary lives, the discussion of causality is about events and processes. The principle of causality as our common-sense understanding has it is this: our common-sense understanding says that whenever there is a process or event, another process or event was its cause. Both the cause is a process and event, and the effect is a process and event. Substances never become causes. Have you ever said, what is pomegranate the cause of? You say, buying the pomegranate, squeezing the pomegranate, and so on. For instance, shall we say, what is water the cause of? Quenching thirst? No, my friend! Drinking water is the cause of quenching thirst. Water flowing is the cause of some people's houses being destroyed. Water does not destroy a house. The flowing of water destroys a house.(1)
The third point that the principle of causality has compelled us to concede is that the effect always comes after the cause. The cause precedes the effect, but the causality you wish to employ in philosophy requires that the emergence of cause and effect be simultaneous. You see, they used to say that the effect cannot lag behind the cause. That is, as soon as the cause comes into being, the coming-into-being of the cause is one and the same as the coming-into-being of the effect. Now, suppose we have an object called A, and it is an effect. It is temporally simultaneous with its cause, which we call B. So A is exactly simultaneous with its cause, B. B is exactly simultaneous with its cause, C, and since simultaneity is a transitive relation (meaning if A is simultaneous with B, and B is simultaneous with C, then A is also simultaneous with C), let us suppose the cause of C is D. So A is also simultaneous with D. Now, if we continue this chain, what does it mean? It means the entire universe came into being in a single instant. That is, the moment God came into being, you came into being at that very same instant, even if there is a gap of several billion years between you and God—but billions of years do not create temporal precedence and succession. Yet, more interestingly, when God came into being, your father also came into being at that very moment. That is, you and your father came into being simultaneously, and you and your son also came into being simultaneously. And if you want to speak of causality in this sense, it abolishes time altogether. The causality that the ancients spoke of in this sense has no time within it. That is, the entire universe must have come into being in a single instant. Even though we see that time exists, and we see that until I come into being, my grandchild does not come into being. When have I, my grandchild, my grandfather, my great-grandfather, and Adam and Eve ever been simultaneous? So it becomes clear that the causality our common-sense understanding speaks of is not this neat and tidy thing you are telling us about. The implication of this neat and tidy thing is that time does not exist.
The fourth problem that exists is that the universe has no separate ruling apart from its parts, such that we could say we know the cause of this chair, we also know the cause of the human being, we also know the cause of water—so where did the universe come from? An example Paul Edwards used to give: if five people are standing next to each other on the street, and we ask, "Why are you standing here?" One says, "I'm waiting for the bus." "Why are you standing here?" Another says, "I'm waiting for my friend." The third says, "I want to get some sun." The fourth says, "I'm standing here to look at the scenery," and so on. Well, you cannot then ask, "Why are all of them standing here?!" There is no "all." The "all" is just this. Paul Edwards says our predecessors used to say this part of the universe has its cause, that part of the universe likewise, and so on. We philosophers are discussing the universe as a whole. We have nothing to do with this part or that part.
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Discussion1 comments
سلام دوستان عزیز واقعا خسته نباشید.. زحمات شما روشنگر جامعه تاریک ماست... یه سوال داشتم: که خود منبع این درسگفتار یعنی - درسگفتار براهین اثبات و رد وجود خدا- را از کجا میتوان دانلود کرد ؟؟؟ با تشکر...