Mostafa Malekian, The Requirements of Teaching and Research in Moral Philosophy in Contemporary Iran

The topic that had been assigned to me was about the educational and research requirements of ethics in general in contemporary Iran. Presumably, their intention in saying “in contemporary Iran” was not merely that, in any case, all the work being done in the field of ethics and ethical research in the world should naturally be reflected in Iran as well. Their minds were probably more focused on the fact that there may be issues specific to us, which certainly fall outside the scope of that general rule concerning the requirements of ethics and ethical research for the entire world. I take this into consideration; otherwise, the first requirement of ethics and ethical research, whether in education or research, is presumably that we ourselves transfer to Iran all the work that others have done in this field and, where appropriate, “complete,” “correct,” and “deepen” it, and “expand” it, which, of course, holds true for every country and is not specific to us Iranians. That is, in every country, this statement applies: it is good for the intellectuals of that country and society to transfer the research conducted throughout the world, for example in the field of ethics and ethical research, to their own society and then sometimes “correct,” “complete,” and “deepen” it, or sometimes “expand” it. These four tasks can be done. However, in our Iran, too, perhaps some specific tasks must be carried out, tasks that do not necessarily apply to all societies in the world, but rather apply to Iran and possibly countries like Iran. These tasks must be undertaken. I have noted down several items regarding these tasks, which I will present to you, friends. These, in the phrasing the friends used, are both educational requirements and research requirements.

Lecture

The Requirements of Teaching and Research in Moral Philosophy in Contemporary Iran[1]

Mostafa Malekian

November 12, 2016 – Lecture to a gathering of students and seminarians in Qom

Clarifying the Subject of Discussion

The topic that had been assigned to me was about the educational and research requirements of ethics in general in contemporary Iran. Presumably, their intention in saying “in contemporary Iran” was not merely that, in any case, all the work being done in the field of ethics and ethical research in the world should naturally be reflected in Iran as well. Their minds were probably more focused on the fact that there may be issues specific to us, which certainly fall outside the scope of that general rule concerning the requirements of ethics and ethical research for the entire world. I take this into consideration; otherwise, the first requirement of ethics and ethical research, whether in education or research, is presumably that we ourselves transfer to Iran all the work that others have done in this field and, where appropriate, “complete,” “correct,” and “deepen” it, and “expand” it, which, of course, holds true for every country and is not specific to us Iranians. That is, in every country, this statement applies: it is good for the intellectuals of that country and society to transfer the research conducted throughout the world, for example in the field of ethics and ethical research, to their own society and then sometimes “correct,” “complete,” and “deepen” it, or sometimes “expand” it. These four tasks can be done. However, in our Iran, too, perhaps some specific tasks must be carried out, tasks that do not necessarily apply to all societies in the world, but rather apply to Iran and possibly countries like Iran. These tasks must be undertaken. I have noted down several items regarding these tasks, which I will present to you, friends. These, in the phrasing the friends used, are both educational requirements and research requirements.

1. Two Incorrect Equations Contributing to the Corruption of Ethics
2. 1. Equating Ethics with Law; The Error of Academics

The first point that has gained immense importance in our post-Islamic Republic Iran, and has created numerous confusions, ambiguities, and errors (and it is the task of people like us to prevent these confusions, ambiguities, and errors), is that since the early years of the revolution, especially from the second decade onward when moral philosophy and ethics became known in our culture, whenever a seminar, congress, or conference on ethics is held, two incorrect equations are immediately established. In my opinion, the blame for one of these equations lies more with our academics; and the blame for the other equation is directed more at our clerics; and these two equations cause ethics to become utterly contaminated, distorted, and lost in the process. For example, suppose a congress, conference, or seminar is to be held on medical ethics as a branch of applied ethics. In my view, the first thing that happens, due to our academics' ignorance of the ins and outs of the matter, is that as soon as medical ethics is mentioned, it comes to their mind that medical ethics is the same as medical law, and therefore, in a conference and seminar about medical ethics, all discussions revolve around: should we legally grant such-and-such a right to physicians or not? For instance, if a physician performs an abortion, are they legally liable and punishable or not? Do physicians have a duty to explain the patient's illness in the fullest possible detail to the patient themselves, or should they be legally prohibited from doing so? That is, it is as if medical ethics has been equated with medical law; that is, with the country's laws concerning the medical profession, or possibly the professions of physicians, nurses, hospital administrators, and patients. In other words, ethics is immediately referred, deferred, and reduced to law. In my opinion, the jurists of our country, or rather, one should say the philosophers of law, have always been incapable of distinguishing between ethics and law. They have not realized that law and legislation are one source of social norm-setting, and ethics is another source of social norm-setting. The six sources of social norm-setting are: law, ethics, customs and conventions and habits, religious rites and rituals, aesthetics, and expediency. That is, these six sources dictate oughts and ought-nots to us, but they are six phenomena that, of course, possibly have interactions with one another. But, after all, interaction occurs between two entities, not one entity. If ethics interacts with law, it means, firstly, that ethics is other than law, and law is other than ethics. But because this distinction has not been made, medical ethics is immediately transformed into medical law and legal issues related to medicine, and as soon as medical ethics is transformed into medical law, the clerics immediately arrive and say that medical law is, of course, the same as medical jurisprudence, and they commit a second error, as if law is the same as jurisprudence.

1. 2. Equating Law with Jurisprudence; The Error of the Clerics

"Law" also differs from "fiqh" in every respect you can imagine; these two differ in terms of "subject matter," "method," and "end." My experience over these years (though I myself rarely participate in such programs, because I know what the fate of these conferences and congresses is) is that you see everything begins with ethics and ends in fiqh. Because first, ethics is equated with law, which is a grave error. Then, since we are Muslims, they think our law is the same as our fiqh. Thus, we no longer find medical ethics. We find fiqh. Then the jurists arrive and cite a number of hadiths (whose chain of transmission and degree of reliability are unclear), and then the whole story of medical ethics is transformed into a few hadiths and jurisprudential rulings; and we think we have medical ethics. Therefore, the first thing that occurs to me regarding educational and research requirements is that ethics researchers must be able to demonstrate through their educational and research work that ethics is different from law, and law is different from jurisprudential rites and rituals; just as these should not be conflated with customs, social conventions, habits, and other things. This work has not been done in our country, and it is still strange for many to say that this act has this ruling from an ethical standpoint, but a second ruling from a jurisprudential standpoint, and a third ruling from a legal standpoint. They think these cannot have multiple rulings; whereas, many times, for instance, we consider an act legally wrong but ethically right. For example: what is civil disobedience? Civil disobedience is when I, as a citizen, stand against the law in the name of ethics. So it becomes clear that sometimes ethics and law move in two different directions on a single issue. If ethics were not different from law, and law not different from ethics, a phenomenon called civil disobedience (which, for example, someone like Henry David Thoreau or Ralph Waldo Emerson advocated in the second half of nineteenth-century America) would have no meaning at all. Civil disobedience means that the citizen feels the law compels them to do something that their moral conscience says is not right. Then, in the name of ethics, in defense of ethics, and under the banner of ethics, they fight the law and commit civil disobedience. They say, I will not obey this law. Like many in America who refuse military service and go to prison. If ethics and law were one and the same, we would have to say that if such a person's act is ethical, they should not go to prison, and if their act is not ethical, they should both go to prison and be morally condemned. There is no contradiction in saying about someone who refuses military service that their act is completely ethical, yet they must go to prison. Because the ruling of law and the ruling of ethics are two different rulings, and law came for one thing and ethics for another. The scope of ethical rulings differs from the scope of legal rulings. The purpose of ethical rulings also differs from the purpose of legal rulings, and so on. Therefore, I think the first task that must be undertaken in our country is to separate the rulings of these three, and of course, the right of each must also be fulfilled. Someone who is religious and wants to perform jurisprudential rites and rituals must have it clarified for them what they should do in every matter; likewise for someone who wants to live ethically; and someone who only wants to be a good citizen of society (that is, they only want their actions to be strictly in accordance with legal rulings and regulations) must also have their situation completely clear. But to lump everything together and think that none of these three ever issue rulings contrary to one another is, in my opinion, a very great error and creates numerous confusions in our country.

2. The Necessity of Addressing the Conceptual Clarification of Ethical Topics

The second point is the conceptual clarification of the subjects of ethics, not the predicates of ethics. For centuries, moral philosophers and ethicists around the world have been researching and reflecting on what is meant when, in ethics, "good" or "bad" is used as a predicate (for example, suppose we say courage is "good" and cowardice is "bad"). Similarly, what is meant when other moral concepts such as "right" and "wrong," moral "ought" and "ought not," "duty" and "responsibility," or "virtue" and "vice," or "heroism" and "sainthood" are used. These moral concepts serve as predicates in moral propositions, and it seems that these are the only moral concepts; that is, "good" and "bad," "right" and "wrong," "ought" and "ought not," "duty" and "responsibility," "virtue" and "vice," and "heroism" and "sainthood." Extensive research has been done on these predicates in the West, and we are usually more or less familiar with this research thanks to the translations of Western ethical works into Persian. However, what is in a worse state in our culture than the predicates of ethics are the subjects of ethics; that is, what subjects these predicates are meant to be applied to. Here, there is a strange confusion in our culture. For instance, suppose we all say that self-conceit ('ujb) is morally wrong. Its wrongness is clear. But what does self-conceit itself mean? What is actually called self-conceit? Is self-conceit a kind of belief I hold about you? For example, do I believe that I am nobler, superior, more learned, more thoughtful, more philosophical, and more understanding than all of you? If I hold this belief about you, am I afflicted with self-conceit? Or is self-conceit not a belief, but a kind of feeling and emotion I have in relation to you? That is, if I inwardly feel contempt and disdain for you, think nothing of you, attach no emotional or sentimental weight to you, am indifferent, feel I am looking down on you, and feel that whenever I want to look at you I must look beneath my feet, is such a feeling called self-conceit? Someone might say this. Or perhaps self-conceit is a kind of desire. For example, my desire is that all of you be submissive, obedient, and surrendered to me, not question me, follow me, and consider me above yourselves. Perhaps if I have such a desire, I am afflicted with self-conceit. Or perhaps self-conceit is neither a category of belief, nor a category of feeling, emotion, and excitement, nor a category of desire. Perhaps a particular kind of speech is called self-conceit. If I use certain words and concepts in my particular speech with you, am I practicing self-conceit in relation to you? Or perhaps a particular action and behavior is called self-conceit. For example, perhaps if I do not stand up in front of you, I am afflicted with self-conceit. Or perhaps if I do not respond to your greeting more warmly than your greeting, I am conceited. That is, self-conceit is a type of action. Or suppose I put myself forward when entering a gathering. Perhaps this putting myself forward when entering a certain gathering or sitting at the head of the gathering is called self-conceit. This is the issue, and it is not just about self-conceit. It is the same with envy. We all say envy is a wrong act. But what does envy mean? When do I envy you? And so on; there are countless ethical subjects that we use abundantly but do not understand. I have said many times that in the Quran and Islam, hoping and having rajā' (hope) in God is fundamentally highly praised. We interpret "rajā'" as "hope," but on the other hand, in the Quran, "umniyyah" is strongly condemned, which might be translated into Persian as "wishful thinking." It has been said that "umniyyah" is reprehensible; "It is not according to your wishes, nor the wishes of the People of the Book";^[2] or "And they say, 'None will enter Paradise except one who is a Jew or a Christian.' That is their wishful thinking. Say, 'Produce your proof, if you should be truthful.'"^[3] "Umn iyyah," meaning wishful thinking, is strongly condemned. "Amal" (hope) is considered neutral, but "ṭūl al-amal" (prolonged hope) is deemed erroneous. It has been said that prolonged hope is a wrong act from the perspective of religious ethics. Suppose I go to one of the clerics and say, I am sixty years old, and the record of these sixty years of my life is completely black. I confess that throughout my life I have committed oppression, injustice, and cruelty, I have violated people's rights, and so on...; I confess to all of it. I do not absolve myself of any of it. Yet, despite all this, I believe God will forgive me. What does that cleric say to me? Does he say, "Bravo to you for having so much hope in God?"

یعنی این تلقی مرا امید به خدا تلقی می‌کند؟ آیا می‌گوید هر جنایتی هم در زندگی‌ات مرتکب شده‌ای دست‌کم یأس از رحمت خدا نداری و امیدوار به رحمت خدایی؟ یا می‌گوید با این کارنامه تو آرزواندیشی؟ تو مثل یهودیانی که در قرآن تقبیح شده‌اند که می‌گفتند: «لَن تَمَسَّنَا النَّارُ إِلَّا أَیامًا مَّعْدُودَاتٍ»^[4] و خدا به ایشان می‌گفت: با این کارهایی که شما کرده‌اید چطور چنین توقع و انتظاری از من دارید که شما را یا وارد جهنم نکنم یا چند روز قلائل (قلیل) وارد کنم؟ این «امنیه» است که من دارم؟ یا ممکن است بگوید آرزویت دور و دراز و بعید است. بالأخره درباره این تلقی من، که در عین اینکه معترفم به اینکه عمری سرشار از ظلم و جفا و ستم و درد و رنج واردکردن به خودم و دیگران گذرانده‌ام در عین حال معتقدم خدا مرا خواهد بخشود و عفو خدا بیشتر از جرم ما است و امثال آن، چه حکمی می‌کند؟ شما نمی‌توانید پاسخ بدهید. چون در فرهنگ ما این امور اصلاً ایضاح نشده است. نه به این علت که شما علمتان کافی نباشد؛ حتی اگر شما بروید پیش اعلم علمای قم و از ایشان همین سؤال و مسئله‌ای را که من مطرح کرده‌ام بپرسید و بگویید: من رجائم به خدا خیلی زیاد است؟ یا طول‌الامل دارم؟ یا امنیه دارم؟ با قاطعیت به شما می‌گویم که کسی نمی‌داند. می‌توانید بروید از بزرگانتان بپرسید و امتحان کنید. می‌بینید که اینها را نمی‌دانند. زیرا اصلاً کسی در فرهنگ ما به این چیزها التفات نمی‌کرده است. در فرهنگ ما همه چیز در ابهام به سر می‌برد. حرف‌ها در نوعی مه‌آلودگی داد و ستد می‌شود و این داستان درباره بسیاری چیزهای دیگر در فرهنگ ما وجود دارد که موضوعات اخلاقی را نمی‌دانیم. همین دروغ‌گفتن که به نظر می‌آید کاملاً وضوح مفهومی دارد در واقع ندارد. یعنی نمی‌دانیم دروغ‌گفتن دقیقاً یعنی چه؛ چه برسد به چیزهایی که فراتر از آن است. مثلاً اعتماد به نفس؛ اعتماد به نفس یعنی چه؟ چه حکمی‌ دارد؟ البته حکمش داستان دیگری است. نخست باید ببینیم اعتماد به نفس به چه می‌گویند؟ اینها ایضاح مفهومی ‌نشده‌اند. اینها موضوعات اخلاقی‌اند؛ یعنی در گزاره‌های اخلاقی موضوع قرار می‌گیرند نه محمول. گفته می‌شود: اینها خوب‌اند یا بدند؟ درست‌اند یا نادرست‌اند؟ به اینها باید اتیان کرد یا نباید اتیان کرد؟ اینها فضیلت‌آمیزند یا رذیلت‌آمیزند؟ آیا انجام‌دادنشان وظیفه ما است؟ آیا انجام‌ندادنشان مسئولیت ما است؟ قهرمان اخلاقی این کار را می‌کند یا نمی‌کند؟ قدیس اخلاقی این کار را می‌کند یا نمی‌کند؟ البته همه اینها را می‌گوییم ولی نمی‌فهمیم که چه کاری باید کرد. حکم غضب در اخلاق دینی چیست؟ ابهام دارد ولی ابهام حکمش به این دلیل است که خود غضب را هم نمی‌دانیم یعنی چه؟ ما هنوز نمی‌توانیم احساسات و عواطف و هیجاناتمان را که این همه مشمول احکام اخلاقی‌اند بازشناسی کنیم. چون اینها اصلاً معلوم نیست. مثلاً در قرآن گفته می‌شود: «أَلا إِنَّ أَوْلِیاءَ اللَّهِ لا خَوْفٌ عَلَیهِمْ وَ لا هُمْ یحْزَنُونَ؛^[5] اولیاءالله نه خوف دارند و نه حزن». اما در نهج‌البلاغه در صفت متقین گفته می‌شود: «بُشْرُهُ فِی وَجْهِهِ وَ حُزْنُهُ فِی قَلْبِهِ» یا «بِشْرُهُ فِی وَجْهِهِ».^[6] متقین از نظر علی ابن ابی طالب عالی‌ترین مقام است؛ به قرینه‌ای که در همین خطبه علی ابن ابی طالب راجع به متقین می‌گویند: «لَوْ لَا الْأَجَلُ الَّذِی کتَبَ اللَّهُ عَلَیهِمْ لَمْ تَسْتَقِرَّ أَرْوَاحُهُمْ فِی أَجْسَادِهِمْ طَرْفَةَ عَینٍ ابدا».^[7] ایشان اوج تعالی انسان را توصیف می‌کنند و می‌گویند: «اگر نبود که خدا برای هر کدام از اینها سرآمد و عمر مشخصی در نظر گرفته بود ارواحشان در اجسادشان لحظه‌ای آرام نمی‌گرفت. اوج می‌گرفت و می‌رفتند و می‌مردند. اما خدا بالأخره اجلی برایشان مقرر کرده است. همین انسان‌های بزرگ را علی بن ابی طالب می‌گوید: «بُشْرُهُ فِی وَجْهِهِ وَ حُزْنُهُ فِی قَلْبِهِ»؛ «حزنش در دلش است و شادی و شادمانی‌اش در چهره‌اش». پس در دل حزن دارد. این حزن با آن حزن چه فرقی می‌کند؟ چرا در آنجا گفته شده است: «أَلا إِنَّ أَوْلِیاءَ اللَّهِ لا خَوْفٌ عَلَیهِمْ وَ لا هُمْ یحْزَنُونَ»^[8] ولی اینجا گفته می‌شود حزن دارند و در قلبشان هم هست. عمیق‌ترین نوع احساس در اسلام به قلب نسبت داده می‌شود. متقی کسی است که حزنش در قلبش است. چرا؟ باز نمی‌دانیم «حزن» دقیقاً یعنی چه. در حالی که اینها تفکیک‌هایی است که در غرب به دقت هرچه تمام‌تر صورت می‌گرفته است.For example, in moral philosophy and more so in moral psychology, in the West, you see that they have made conceptual distinctions between "fear," "anxiety," "dread," and "terror." Thus, we do not make errors and confusions in identifying their instances. But in our culture, such discussions do not exist, and no one knows these distinctions at all. In the Islamic context, if we ask someone, "What is Islam's view on happiness?" they say, of course, Islam has no objection to "farah," but it objects to "marah." It is as if speaking Arabic solves the problem. Like Molière in his excellent play, which recounted the philosophy of the Christian Middle Ages, where someone asks a clergyman of the Christian Middle Ages: Why does opium put a person to sleep? He says because opium contains a "dormitive virtue." Well, what does that mean? "It has a dormitive virtue" means there is a power that puts us to sleep. That is the same question, only we have turned it into Arabic. Of course, he says it in Latin. It is often like this. For instance, I ask someone, ultimately, what is Islam's ruling on happiness? They say, of course, "farah" has no problem, but woe to "marah." It is as if by turning the word into Arabic, they have solved the problem. We cannot think we are answering a question by translating it into a foreign language. Then they say, of course, worse than "marah" is "batar." While we understand neither what "marah" is, nor "farah" and "batar." These are, in fact, tasks that we have not done and must do. In our culture, such things occur abundantly. For example, we say: Why is human feces not expelled involuntarily, and this act is voluntary? They say because humans possess a "retentive faculty." This is the same Arabic rendering of my question. The discussion is about where this retention comes from. For example, we ask: Why is human food digested? Until the early twentieth century, we did not know what process existed that caused food to be digested in the stomach. But our scholars knew beforehand. They said food is digested because we have a "digestive faculty." What does "digestive faculty" mean? It means the same question has been turned into Arabic. But the problem is not solved with "digestive faculty." We must see what happens that food is digested in the stomach.

In any case, my point is that the second task that seems necessary is the clarification of these concepts. In my view, for the conceptual clarification of the concepts that are the subjects of moral propositions, the division of the domains of personality and character is very important. If we accept this division—that everything that takes place in the domain of my personality and character falls into one of the five categories of "belief," "feeling and emotion," "desire," "speech," and "action"—and then, for each moral subject about which we make moral judgments, we first determine which of these five domains it pertains to, this categorization will be very useful in conceptual clarification. For instance, does self-admiration ('ujb) pertain to the domain of our beliefs, or is it a specific feeling or emotion that, if it arises in me, makes me self-admiring? Or is it, for example, a specific desire? Or a specific manner of speech? Or a specific manner of action? This fivefold division of the domains of our personality and character is very useful for the conceptual clarification of the subjects of moral propositions. Before asking what positive or negative moral judgment is made about something, it is better to ask what kind of thing it is in itself. To which of these five categories does it belong? Sometimes a moral subject may depend on two domains. For example, someone might claim that envy depends on two domains of human existence; it depends both on the domain of feelings and emotions and on the domain of desires. That is, I am displeased that you are enjoying a blessing—which pertains to the domain of my feelings and emotions—and I also want to diminish your wealth in some way. That is, I also have a desire. It is not at all unlikely that some of these moral subjects do not belong solely to one domain but belong to two domains; just as regarding love, which appears in the Quran with the terms "ḥubb" and "wudd," some believe that love does not relate to just one of the domains of our existence. It is both a kind of feeling and emotion and a kind of desire. Some have even said that speech and action are also involved in the very concept of love. When we love someone, we have a specific feeling and emotion toward them, which we refer to as the component of passion. Passion belongs to the category of feeling and emotion. The second component of love is intimacy, which is a desire I have from my beloved. It also has a third component, which is commitment, and this belongs to the category of speech and action. If we accept that love is a combination of the three elements of "passion," "intimacy, confidentiality, becoming transparent," and the element of "commitment," then it seems to relate to three of our domains, and a combination of these three qualifies me for the title "lover" to be applied to me, or disqualifies me from it. My point is that these tasks must be undertaken in our culture, which have not been done, and most of us merely repeat general statements and do not understand what we should concretely say to an interlocutor who asks us.

3. The Necessity of Explaining the Criterion and Standard of Ethics in Our Own Ethical Culture

As friends know better than I, three major schools have emerged throughout history regarding ethics:

1. Deontology, whose main representative is generally considered to be Kant.
2. Consequentialism, which is also sometimes translated as teleologism. Despite the subtle semantic differences between the two, this view is often attributed to John Stuart Mill, James Mill (his father), Jeremy Bentham, and others.
3. Virtue ethics; the history of this school goes back to ancient times, both in the East—that is, in China, Japan, and India—and in the West—that is, in Greece and Rome.

These three major schools exist. In my own view, the enumeration of these three schools is rational, not inductive. Of course, I do not insist dogmatically on this point. Ultimately, we have had these three schools up to now, even if their enumeration is inductive rather than rational. In our culture, to which of these three schools is ethics related? That is, for instance, is Islamic ethics deontological, consequentialist, or virtue-oriented? We see that in our sacred religious texts, i.e., the Qur'an and the Sunnah, and in the works of our religious scholars such as theologians, ethicists, philosophers, and mystics, there is an astonishing dispersion on this matter. Sometimes we see verses and hadiths in which deontology seems to be the focus. Sometimes we see verses and traditions that seem to affirm virtue ethics, and at other times, consequentialism. This permeates our entire culture. This issue has caused us Muslims to accept whichever of these three our interests dictate at any given time. That is, their acceptance depends on what my interest requires, and we do not know that these three are not mutually compatible, or at least their current versions are not compatible. For example, one of the things constantly said in our theology, jurisprudence, and principles of jurisprudence is that God's commands and prohibitions are contingent upon real benefits and harms. That is, if it is said that a certain act is good or evil, real effects and consequences follow from it. This view leans heavily toward consequentialism; it is as if, in fact, it is by virtue of the consequences of actions that an act is said to be right or wrong, good or evil. At other times, we have expressions suggesting that the very principle of consequentialism is erroneous and one must only look at virtue; that is, one must look at the inner state of the agent. For instance, there is a very famous hadith narrated by Thaqalayn. It is said that before the Hijra, a Meccan man went to Medina. There he saw that there was a great price difference between Mecca and Medina. He said, "It would be good for us to buy cheap goods from Mecca, bring them to Medina, sell them there, and make a great financial profit." Also, he proposed to a woman, and that woman said, "The harsh climate of Mecca does not suit me; if you come to Medina and settle there, I will marry you; otherwise, I am not one to come to Mecca." Later, when the story of the Hijra occurred, this man said to himself: "How good! I will now emigrate and be counted among the Emigrants, the trade I had in mind will be facilitated, and the marriage I wanted will happen." In the hadiths, it is said that on the very first day, apparently for the encampment they made, the Messenger of God gave a sermon and said things, the famous sentence of which is: "Whoever emigrates for the sake of God and His Messenger, his emigration is for God and His Messenger; and whoever emigrates for worldly gain to enjoy it or for a woman to marry, his emigration is for that for which he emigrated. Actions are but by intentions, and every person shall have only what he intended." A good intention leads to a good action, and a bad intention leads to a bad action. This seems very virtue-ethical. In the Qur'an, there are numerous examples where the inner state of the doers is pointed out. The hypocrite and the believer are alike in speech and deed. But because they have two different inner states, two types of moral evaluation apply to their actions; otherwise, the speech and deed of the hypocrite are exactly like those of the believer. If they were not exactly like the believer's, he would not be a hypocrite. He is a hypocrite precisely when he is playing the role of the believer, but something else is inside him. In Islam, there is also deontology. When it is said, "What Muhammad made lawful is lawful until the Day of Resurrection, and what he made unlawful is unlawful until the Day of Resurrection," it no longer concerns itself with circumstances and consequences. What is lawful is lawful, whether a positive effect follows from it or not. What is unlawful is unlawful. This is different from consequentialism, which says that even lying has no inherent ugliness; that is, lying, by virtue of its effects and consequences, is sometimes ugly and sometimes good. If it produces more good than evil, it is good, and if it produces more evil than good, it is ugly. That is, in fact, according to consequentialism, no specific action ever has a specific ruling. One must only look at its consequences; a preponderance of good consequences makes the act right, and a preponderance of bad consequences makes the act wrong. In our culture and in our books on ethics, you see that judgments fall into all three categories. Sometimes we are directed to the effects and results; they say, "Know that if you do this, such and such will happen, and if you do that, such and such will happen." This dispersion exists in our culture.

I think we must, once and for all, first create a defensible molecular compound ourselves from these three schools—which are the atoms of schools—and say that we fundamentally defend this molecular compound, and then say that our religious culture also points to this same molecular compound, which sometimes speaks this way and sometimes that way. And if we find that mixing these three schools together does not yield a coherent molecular compound and we are forced to choose one of the three, then we must undertake a comprehensive revision in ethics—both in the ethics of the religious exemplars and in our own ethics throughout our culture. We must say that if their school is this, then that behavior of theirs was not correct; and if their school in ethics is that, then that behavior of theirs was not correct; and ultimately, judgment must be based on a criterion and standard. The result of lacking a criterion and standard is that even in the political sphere, they resort to one of these three schools for their own benefit. From the statements and reactions of our politicians, it becomes clear that they want to co-opt us into such-and-such an ethical school or some other school. The same is true in the world of economics. In the very bazaar of Tehran, you see our pious and sanctimonious merchants, depending on the situation they find themselves in, sometimes behave one way and sometimes another. Because each of these modes has a basis in their culture. In our own culture, we the people—who have neither political power nor economic power, and live a kind of second-class citizenship—behave the same way with one another. That is, when I have a dispute with you over something, depending on which of these three schools my interest lies in at that moment, I adopt that one; but another day, when I have a dispute with someone else, I adopt a different school. This, in my view, is a kind of moral schizophrenia among us and must be eliminated. Ultimately, what position does our religion take in ethics, and what position do we ourselves consider defensible and wish to hold in ethics? Depending on whether a person wants to live a philosophical life or a faithful and religious life, their position will differ.

4. The necessity of research into the four types of ethics present in Islamic culture, and creating harmony among them

The ethical books written in Islamic culture have employed four methods. On all of these methods, God knows how many books, treatises, and pamphlets have been written in our culture. These methods are:

1. The philosophical method; usually, the books that propose the philosophical method in ethics have Aristotelian philosophy as their philosophy. These are typically those ethical books that say every virtue is a mean, and its extremes of excess and deficiency are vices. For example, they say "wisdom" is the mean between "foolishness" and "cunning." Thus, "foolishness," meaning simple-mindedness and credulity, is a vice, and "cunning," meaning skepticism and distrust, is also a vice, but "wisdom" in the middle is a virtue. Various ethical books, including Taharat al-A'raq by Ibn Miskawayh, al-Sa'ada wa al-Is'ad by al-Amiri, and Akhlaq-e Naseri and Akhlaq-e Mohtashami by Khajeh Nasir al-Din Tusi, which are books of philosophical ethics, have viewed the whole of ethics based on virtue and vice, and the mean and the extremes of excess and deficiency. A series of our ethical books are like this, and the philosophy of all of them is Aristotelian philosophy; otherwise, we also have Stoic philosophical ethics, but it appears very little and faintly in our books.
2. The mystical method; some ethical books in our culture are mystical; such as Sad Meydan and Manazil al-Sa'irin, which were usually written by mystics on the mystical wayfaring. Mystical wayfaring is another expression for mystical ethics. In these books, virtue and vice, the mean and excess and deficiency, and the like are no longer discussed at all. If you have noticed, these works begin ethics with awakening. They say first comes awakening and vigilance. After that, they create ten stages, and sometimes they divide each of these ten stages into ten more stages, which makes one hundred fields. Sometimes their number is less. For example, it is seven. The main number of the division and those subcategories are not all necessarily in sevens either. But in any case, in all of them, there is a kind of mystical ethics.
3. The transmitted and dogmatic method; we also have a third type of ethics, which is transmitted and dogmatic ethics. That is, concerning an ethical subject, it says: "Al-Sadiq said" or "It came in the Book," "It is stated in the Quran that...", or Ali ibn Abi Talib said this and the Prophet said that; meaning, on every ethical subject, when they want to state its ethical ruling, they suffice with the Quran and the narrations of the Infallibles or the Prophetic narrations (in the case of Sunnis) and add no word beyond that. It is even very interesting that in this recent era, the late Mirza Javad Agha Tehrani, in a book called Lessons of Life, which was published by the Dar Rah-e Haqq Institute before the revolution, despite being written in the twentieth century, had such a style. On the subject of envy, he cites "Al-Baqir said" and "Al-Sadiq said" and the Quran, and that is all. Or, for example, he says about miserliness, Imam Baqir said this and Imam Sadiq and Ali ibn Abi Talib said such and such. Another example of transmitted ethics is the book Kashf al-Mahajja li-Thamarat al-Muhja by Sayyid Ibn Tawus, which he wrote addressing his son Muhammad. Each section begins with this phrase: "O Muhammad! Know that..."; Muhammad, know that, for example, envy is such and such. Why is envy such and such? Because God has said this; the Messenger of God has said this; Ali ibn Abi Talib has said this. These books are also purely transmitted ethics. Similar to Nur al-Thaqalayn or Burhan, which are transmitted commentaries; that is, they quote the verse and bring a few hadiths beneath it stating that such-and-such Imam said this in the interpretation of this verse, and nothing more; no less, no more. Westerners call this type of ethics "transmitted or dogmatic ethics." Dogmatic ethics also exists in Christian culture.
4. The Prudential Method; The fourth category of ethics and ethical books has nothing to do with mysticism, religion, or philosophy. I call these prudential ethics. In these ethics, it is never said that if you want to reach God, do this or don't do that; if you want to become annihilated in God and subsist through God, do this and don't do that; if you want your life to be rational, do this and don't do that. Rather, they ask: Do you want your family not to fall apart? We say yes. They say, then treat your wife this way and your children that way. They ask: Do you want your army not to rebel against you? The king, sultan, or emir says yes. They say, then act this way. In fact, they take the purposes that all of us humans have according to our common understanding as desirable, and say if you want to achieve these purposes and not lose them, behave this way and not that way. All the *Siyar al-Muluk* (Mirrors for Princes) and *Nasihat al-Muluk* (Advice for Kings) are like this. The ethics of Sheikh Ajal Saadi in the Golestan and Bustan and his gatherings, as well as in that treatise of 153 sections, are generally prudential ethics. Where he says, O king, if you do not want your ministers to conspire against you and your courtiers to become spies for your rivals, treat them this way. If you do not want the army to protest and rebel, behave toward them in these ways. These are prudential ethics. These ethics erase the sanctity of ethics, but they clearly demonstrate the necessity of ethics, and for this reason, they can be extremely effective. For someone like Timur the Lame, the first, second, and third types of ethics are of no use, but the fourth type is. Usually, they would tell emirs or even the wealthy, if you do not want your partner to betray you, treat him this way. If you do not want your customers to scatter from your trading house and buy goods from your rivals, treat them this way. In fact, ethics loses its sanctity. Why does it lose its sanctity? Because everything is placed in the service of my worldly interests, but of course, its necessity becomes very firm. Because without it, my life simply falls apart. So it is necessary for me to behave this way.

We have these four types of ethics in our culture, inductively speaking. We also have numerous ethical treatises. For example, although Ghazali, in the Ihya' Ulum al-Din and also Kimiya-yi Sa'adat, promotes a completely mystical ethics, there is a treatise attributed to him called Nasihat al-Muluk which is entirely prudential from an ethical standpoint. Or, for instance, al-Adab al-Wajiz lil-Walad al-Saghir has a completely prudential ethical view. For example, it says: "My young son! Do you want to be successful in your life and be able to have a good marriage? Or, for example, become wealthy? If you want these things, do this." This is prudence and to some extent brings ethics closer from Ethics to etiquette. In fact, it is as if it is the ethics of social interaction, and perhaps it is not ethics in the precise sense of the word. My point is that these four categories have also created confusion in our culture, and we still do not know what we are doing. Among us, some favor mystical ethics, and some philosophical ethics. Some favor transmitted and devotional ethics. Of course, the dominance of jurisprudence over our seminaries since the beginning of the Safavid era (which, in my opinion, was the greatest calamity for the Shia world, this very Safavid rule) has caused our ethics to take on more of a transmitted ethics character. But in any case, these different cultures, for example, the ethics of chivalry, *futuwwa*, and *muruwwa*, which are a subset of mystical ethics, are very important and meaningful to us, and therefore we even praise that neighborhood tough who brawls but does not violate anyone's honor. He drinks his alcohol too, but we say, with all these characteristics, if I ever need to travel, I would certainly entrust my daughter to him. This is very appealing to us; a kind of ethics of *futuwwa*, *fityan*, and chivalry, which is a subset of mystical ethics. In any case, our ethics is like this and has confusion from this perspective as well. Creating harmony among these four types of ethics, if we are to create harmony, requires very serious research work. I think there are strengths and weaknesses in all four ethics. It would be good if, in the ethics we have, the strengths of none of these four types of ethics were lost, and the weaknesses of none were present either. This is also one of the tasks that must be done.

5. The necessity of research in the field of particular ethics (applied ethics)

The fifth task we must undertake in our country is what has come to be called “applied ethics.” Of course, in one sense the term “applied ethics” or “practical ethics” (Practical Ethics/Applied Ethics) is not an appealing phrase. Because, in principle, ethics always deals with action, and we do not have non-applied ethics. How could ethics be non-applied? All ethics are concerned with application and action. Nevertheless, this term has appeared in works published in the West, and we have translated it as “applied ethics.” All ethics are applied, but what is meant by applied ethics is “particular ethics,” which is distinct from “general ethics.” We have a set of general moral precepts; for instance, that “every human being should tell the truth,” “every human being should be humble,” “every human being should be sincere,” “every human being should fulfill trusts and not betray them,” “every human being should keep their promises,” and the like. Usually, the ethics that all human beings—whether man or woman, rich or poor, educated or uneducated, urban or rural, in any place, at any time, and in any situation—encounter and that are common and shared among all of us are not called “applied ethics.” However, the ethics that some people encounter due to their particular situation, and that others do not encounter, are usually called “applied ethics” or “practical ethics.” According to an induction I myself have carried out, applied and practical ethics can be divided into five categories:

1. Age-related applied ethics; We go through developmental stages over the course of our lives; whether our developmental stages are the eight stages that, for example, Erik Erikson proposed, or the stages that Jung or, say, Freud proposed. Ultimately, there is a consensus among all psychologists that from the time we are born until the time we die, we pass through different developmental stages and are never in a constant state. A child differs from an adolescent, an adolescent from a youth, a youth from a middle-aged person, a middle-aged person from an elderly person, an elderly person from a senior, and a senior from a decrepit person. One part of what is called applied or practical ethics is devoted to these particular stages; that is, adolescent ethics is a kind of particular ethics. Hence, we have adolescent ethics, youth ethics, old-age ethics, middle-age ethics, and so on. Apart from the commonalities shared among all human beings, there are also non-common parts that distinguish the particular ethics of that age and stage. For example, my ethics as an elderly person, compared to that gentleman who is a youth and that other person who is an adolescent, is, in this respect, sectional and local. Therefore, this type of ethics is defined for a specific social class and grouping. For another social grouping that has a different age and falls into a different age class, this ethics is different. Today, such applied ethics exist. Especially since the branch of moral psychology emerged within psychology—that is, roughly from 1960 onward—the more moral psychology has developed, the more it has become clear that we have ethics for different ages; that is, there is a series of encounters that belong to adolescent ethics but are not seen in middle-age ethics, and vice versa.
2. Applied ethics related to occupation and profession; A merchant in the bazaar, by virtue of being a merchant, encounters a series of moral precepts more frequently, and a physician, university professor, livestock breeder, and farmer each encounter a different series of moral precepts. The point is that there are issues that are meaningful for one occupation and not for another. For example, suppose a university professor is never exposed to usury. Therefore, the precepts related to usury are not a problem the university professor faces. Nor are they a problem for the livestock breeder and farmer who are active in the countryside. But the merchant in the bazaar is very much confronted by it. Similarly, physicians and nurses encounter issues that a university professor never encounters. However, the issue of cheating, as well as the manner of teaching—whether stingily or fairly—is also a moral problem that the university professor encounters. The question of whether grading is morally right or wrong in the first place never arises for the merchant. But does the professor have the right to grade students themselves or not? This is a moral issue. Whether the answer is positive or negative, ultimately this is not a problem for the livestock breeder and farmer. The question of 'Can I, as a teacher, morally corporally punish my student?' or 'Can I, as an instructor, corporally punish my trainee?' is a problem the merchant in the bazaar does not face. With this division of occupations and professions, we can have as many diverse ethics as the diversity we recognize in occupations and professions; for example, nursing ethics, ethics of education, business ethics, livestock breeding ethics, agricultural ethics, and so on. A person working in a service profession, such as a restaurateur, encounters a series of problems and must know their moral ruling, problems that I, as a farmer, never encounter. Because I am a farmer and they are providing a service. Similarly, employment ethics, management ethics, and so on are applied ethics, but they are contingent upon occupation and profession.
3. Applied ethics related to social roles; For instance, I am a father, and as a result of being a father, I encounter a series of problems. I am also a spouse. Being a spouse and a father is not an occupation or profession; nor is it related to age, but by virtue of being a father, a spouse, and a neighbor, and by virtue of all the roles I have in social life, I find myself needing the ethics of friendship, the ethics of cooperation, the ethics of love, and so on. I find these roles in the six institutions of family, economy, politics, education, law, and religion. These are a series of applied ethics that are not related to occupation, profession, or age. As many titles as are placed upon me in social life, that many diverse ethics become relevant to me.
4. The ethics of social services or social volunteerism; Our social volunteerism may differ. Your social volunteerism might be, for example, going and providing dowries for dowerless girls through various means; or going and taking street children under your wing. Your social service might be going to a hospital every Friday afternoon and finding a patient's bed whom no one has visited and sitting by this patient's bedside for an hour. This is also a kind of social service. All social services, in the precise sense of the word, meaning social volunteerism, have various types, and depending on their type, we encounter different moral problems. If your social service is organizing free university entrance exam preparation classes for poor students and teaching them mathematics, physics, and so on, you encounter a certain set of problems there, but if you visit patients in hospitals who have no visitors, you encounter another set of problems there. These are, in fact, social services carried out in various social arenas, and each one necessitates specific moralities; specific moralities in the sense that specific problems arise for you there for which you must know the moral ruling.
5. Ethics of Particular Afflictions; sometimes we face particular afflictions. For example, when you deal with people with mental or physical disabilities, or those suffering from Alzheimer's, or a bankrupt person, the ethical issues involved differ. If I have a friend who has gone bankrupt or suffered a calamity, my ethics in how I behave toward them is a kind of applied ethics. When I encounter someone with Down syndrome, I deal with issues that I do not face when encountering someone who has fallen into prostitution or addiction. That is, if someone is afflicted by life's hardships, my behavior toward that afflicted and stricken person differs from when I deal with someone afflicted or stricken by another kind of blight.

This, in fact, was an induction that we greatly need today.

6. The Necessity of Research on Classical Ethical Texts

The final area is research on classical ethical texts. The ethical books translated into Persian, whether transmitted or analytical ethics, normative ethics, or so-called applied and practical ethics, amount to no more than two or three classical ethical books, and we are not informed about these works. Usually, the ethical books translated in various fields are not classical works. We have classical works such as the Critique of the Metaphysics of Kant's ethics—a serviceable translation of it, that is—Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, and Hume's Ethics. But classical ethical works remain untranslated. It seems this task is also of great necessity.

These were the points and areas that occurred to my mind.

Wassalam

• Question and Answer

Question: How do your discussions of practical wisdom, such as living in the present, the authentic life, etc., differ from applied ethics?

Answer: They are not applied ethics in the sense of being intended for everyone. Because living in the present, with its specific constraints and conditions, is recommended for all human beings. It is not specific to a particular job or profession. Therefore, those topics under the title of "practical wisdom" do not seem to be part of applied ethics in this sense. Of course, as I said, I do not like the term "applied ethics" at all. We should say that ethics are of two kinds: particular ethics and general morality. Otherwise, there is no ethics that is not applied. Is ethics not a practical science? All normative ethics are applied; however, we have general normative ethics and particular normative moralities.

Question: Why do you focus more on practical wisdom instead of the branches of applied ethics?

Answer: There are various reasons for this. One is that I am not versed in those areas. Another is that I should not have to do all the work. Can I do everything single-handedly? I beg your pardon. They say there was a homosexual man. He would kiss every beautiful boy he saw. They told him not to do this; it is not right. He would say, "These are descendants of the Messenger of God. I can tell from their countenances. Out of devotion to the Messenger of God, I kiss them." So they brought a Sayyid of authentic lineage, with a documented family tree, but extremely ugly and ill-favored, and said, "This one is definitely a descendant of the Messenger of God." He replied: "Yes. But I shouldn't have to reap all the rewards in the world. You should do something in this world too."

Question: In applied ethics, what is the duty of ordinary people? That is, in ethical matters, must they necessarily engage in their own ethical ijtihad, or should they imitate the great moral philosophers, like Peter Singer?

Answer: Neither. They should neither imitate nor do everything themselves. I think they should do exactly what we do in other matters. What do we do in matters other than ethics? When we want to make a decision, we consult a few people. If the advice we receive is incompatible, we turn to our own reason to decide which of these suggestions to accept and act upon. It is the same here. There is no imitation. Ultimately, different ethical perspectives are presented to us, and we act upon whichever our reason finds acceptable. But the question mentions "ordinary people"; probably ordinary people means those who cannot do these things and do not have the time for it. If we want to judge realistically, they inherit their morality as well, just like everything else, and no one should prescribe for them at all. If they receive a good moral inheritance, they live morally well. If they receive a bad moral inheritance, they live morally badly. They truly live by imitating their predecessors, the elders of the tribe, and their ancestors, and through deference to them. The correct method, of course, is what I said. We must become acquainted with these different perspectives and then turn to our own reason and see which seems more acceptable to us; then act upon that one. But not imitation.

Question: What is the reason that the great figures, and even the Imams themselves, did not concern themselves with resolving ethical ambiguities? Even the Stoics and the Greeks generally paid no attention to conceptual clarification.

Answer: I do not know why they did not, but I do know that this work has not been done in our culture. The evidence for this is the Quranic commentaries and the books of ethics that have been written; they merely tell us "umniyah" is bad, absolutely; "hope in God (raja')" is good, absolutely; "amal" is neutral, but "tul al-amal" (prolonged hope) is bad. But the question of how these differ from one another is not an issue they have paid attention to. Amal means wish, raja' means hope, and umniyah means wishful thinking. If we ask what the difference is between "wish," "hope," and "wishful thinking," translating it into Persian does not solve the problem. Because it makes no difference, and nothing is resolved by mere words. Regarding why the Imams and scholars did not do such work, I must say that concerning the Imams, I have no information. As for the scholars, perhaps they had more important things to do!

Question: What potential problems could the molecular combination of ethical schools have?

Answer: The potential and very significant problem is that inconsistency may arise within it; meaning its components may become incompatible and develop contrariety, contradiction, or conflict. One of these three types of inconsistency is possible. I am not saying it is impossible for any molecular combination to emerge without inconsistency, but usually, where these combinations have been formed, inconsistencies have arisen among their components; inconsistency of the category of contradiction, contrariety, or conflict. In my opinion, the best approach is precisely to provide a kind of consistent combination. Because there is none of these three ethical schools that does not have strengths or weaknesses. If a consistent and eclectic combination could be created, it would truly be excellent. Sometimes attempts have been made; for instance, some have said that virtue ethics can be combined with consequentialism. Some have said that deontology can be combined with consequentialism. Especially in the twentieth century, attempts have been made, but inconsistencies have usually arisen. Critics have said that this component of this thought is not consistent with that component of that other thought. For example, some of those who adhere to the views of David Ross, particularly his intuitionism (in epistemological terms) and his deontology, and who also wanted to have the benefits of consequentialism, have been unsuccessful in combining Ross's deontology with Jeremy Bentham's consequentialism. Such efforts are made, but it must be noted that the ideal is to be able to assemble a set that possesses the strengths of all and the weaknesses of none, and of course, the first condition for such a set is that it be consistent.

Question: Given that religion has fundamentally raised many ethical issues, what source other than religion exists for defining ethical issues?

Answer: I do not understand how religion has raised moral subjects. One can say that religion issues one distinct moral judgment about a particular moral subject, and philosophy—that is, philosophical ethics—issues another. But religion does not define moral subjects. Moral subjects are one of these: my voluntary actions, my free actions, my voluntary-free actions, my psychological states, my personality and character, and so on. These are the subjects of moral judgments, and their construction is not within religion's purview. Religion can only impose judgments upon them. For instance, usury might be considered wrong in one religious ethical system and right in another. This is only in the judgment. But I do not understand that religion has created the subject of our voluntary or free actions or our psychological states as human beings. Of course, there is one thing, and that is that in the psychology of religion there is a point worthy of attention, namely that there are certain psychological states that do not arise for a person at all until they enter the domain of religion. For example, as long as you are not within the domain of religion, something called faith has no meaning. Faith only arises within the religious domain. But religion has not brought this into existence either. If we enter the sphere of mysticism, a series of psychological states arise in us that can, of course, in terms of rightness and wrongness, also be subject to moral judgments. If we enter the sphere of faith as well, another series of psychological states arise in us that can be subject to moral judgments. But I do not understand how religion can create a subject.

Question: What do you consider to be the prerequisites for the realization of ethics in society?

Answer: It is not just one factor. There are several factors that cause people in a country, society, or historical period to live more ethically than other people. It is not the case that I would say there is one factor that does this. The factors are very numerous and complex, and I have not made any induction at all and know nothing about it.

Question: In 2011, Derek Parfit published an important book called On What Matters, on which he had worked for thirty years. In it, he made a remarkable effort to show that three ethical schools (Kantian, consequentialist, and contractarian) converge from three paths to one conclusion and method. Have you read this book, and if so, what is your opinion?

Answer: He did not say that in this book. He only says that whichever of these three ethical schools we adopt, we arrive at a series of judgments that are the common denominator of all of them, which he calls Common Morality. It is true that whether you are a virtue ethicist, a consequentialist, or a deontologist, you arrive at a series of common judgments, and these are the very ones we call universal morality, universal ethics, common morality, or global ethics. How many are they? The Universal Declaration of Ethics has said one thing about their number; Pojman, the English scholar, has stated the number of these common moralities differently; Gensler has stated it one way in his books and articles. Many people have mentioned a number as the common denominator and lowest common denominator of all ethical schools. Parfit places great emphasis on this point in this book. But this is different from saying that they started from three places and arrived at one place. They have not arrived at one place. There are only common elements among them, but as we move from these common elements toward the non-common elements, endless differences arise between them.

Question: In our society, which seems to face a theoretical and practical deficiency in ethics, is the general dissemination of discussions in moral philosophy—which creates the suspicion of the relativity of moral judgments in minds—in the interest and benefit of society?

Answer: First, I do not think one can say that as moral philosophy becomes more widespread, moral relativism becomes more widespread. This is not the case at all, absolutely not. We have very serious moral philosophers who advocate for moral absolutism; that is, they are moral absolutists. So it simply cannot be said that moral relativism runs parallel to the growth of moral philosophy. There have always been moral relativists, and there have always been moral absolutists, and it is simply not the case that moral relativism is truly the mainstream of moral philosophy. There are still very serious moral philosophers who advocate for absolutism. However, there is a series of other things that may, through a psychological passage—and not a logical one—lead people to subscribe to moral relativism. Of course, I do not mean that everyone who subscribes to moral relativism has necessarily undergone a psychological passage. Perhaps some of them have been drawn to moral relativism through reasoning, and some on the other side have been led to moral absolutism through reasoning. But what I want to say is that among the people of a society, and for example among our young generation today, this moral relativism is not the result of studies and reflection. It is not the result of reading arguments for and against that they have reached this conclusion. It is a series of other matters that cause people, and especially the young generation, to be drawn to moral relativism through psychological passages, and their passages are indeed psychological passages.

One point is that one of the errors is that people often think every

Another point is that people see others who live by different moral norms and yet seem to have good and happy lives. They say, therefore, it turns out that one can have good and happy lives with different moral precepts. This too, in my view, is a kind of psychological transition and is not a proof for relativism. Of course, seeing conflicting moral precepts in society naturally leads to relativism. Once, Dr. Ghaninejad, the renowned economist, told me something similar in the field of economics. He said that in the early days of the revolution, we economists were very opposed to Islamic economics and said there is no such thing as Islamic economics; there is free-market economics and socialist economics, but Islamic economics does not exist. He said we were very insistent back then, but now we have realized how mistaken our words were. Up to this very moment, I have seen thirteen types of Islamic economics in this country: the economics of Mr. Engineer Mir-Hossein Mousavi; the economics of Mr. Hashemi Rafsanjani; the economics of Mr. Reza Esfahani; the economics of Mr. Hassan Tavanaian-Fard, and so on. He said we have seen thirteen types so far. If you arrive at thirteen types of economics, then you actually reach the conclusion, through a psychological transition, that even if we have Islamic economics, it is a relative matter. That is, because they have seen so much plurality, they say it is relative. Now, it is the same with ethics. For example, in a society, they first say our revolution is not economic at all, but cultural; our problem is fundamentally culture, otherwise the Shah's economy was good and his economic relations were such and such. Our problem is cultural. Then they say history is the struggle between poverty and wealth, which is exactly Marx's words, and in the context of Marx's thought, there is nothing strange about it. But this was said by Mr. Khomeini, that is, a Twelver Shia Muslim jurist, which does not seem logical. If it is the struggle between poverty and wealth, then it turns out the problem is not cultural and is actually an economic discussion. One day they said we have come to make water, electricity, gas, etc., free. So it turns out they had economic concerns too. Whenever we suffer a cultural defeat, we turn to economic issues, and whenever we suffer an economic defeat, we say our work was never about these things; rather, we wanted to do cultural work. These things push a person toward a kind of relativism; but through a psychological transition, not a logical one. Logically, relativism does not follow from these statements. But you see, from the beginning of the revolution until now, the grandees of this country have not offered a unified opinion on whether our revolution is ultimately cultural or economic. When they want to pressure Mr. Khatami, they say, sir, go pursue economic issues, and do not talk so much about this and that. As if economic issues are very important. At another time, when they want to do something else with someone else, they say something else. These things truly prescribe psychological transitions for the youth: what happened in the end? Relativism surges. Regarding music; how many opinions have been issued from the beginning of the revolution until now? Does this plurality not lead one to relativism, to say either Islam has no opinion on music or it has a relativistic one? Once they said Ghazali was right. Another time they said Fayz Kashani was right. Once they said Mr. Golpayegani, who considered even the pendulum of a clock forbidden, was right. Once they said Mr. Khomeini stated the middle ground. And once they say it differs from city to city. I do not understand: if an act is ugly, it must be ugly everywhere, and if it is not ugly and is good, it must be good everywhere. Does this not necessitate that we become relativists? What have they said about women's hijab? Once they say it must be the chador. Once they say no, the chador is not necessary, Islamic hijab is sufficient. Once they say this garment is fundamentally our religious garment. Once they say no, it is our national garment; after all, we are Iranians and must have our national garment. In short, on various subjects, they express completely different viewpoints; and so on and so forth, and the like, and so forth, and so on ad infinitum. These relativisms are the result of psychological transitions, not logical ones. Relativism is not logically deduced from any of these. In another instance, they said we have no usury. Do you know that currently, the most usurious banking system in the world belongs to our country? God is my witness, I tell you this with precise research. There is no banking system in the entire world more usurious than ours. But here, it is not called usury; it is called a service charge. Does relativism have horns and a tail? You used to say there should be no usury at all. So now, what is this?

شما ببینید در کشورهای غربی سود بانکی چقدر است و در کشور خودمان چقدر است. به همین ترتیب، شما راجع به هر چیزی نسبی‌گرایی را می‌بینید. مثلاً در انگلستان گاهی چهار سال متخصصان درباره موضوعی کار می‌کنند تا صورت قانونی پیدا کند ولی وقتی صورت قانونی پیدا کرد ممکن است هشتاد سال صورت قانونی‌اش به هم نخورد. من در کشور خودمان ‌دیدم قانونی را که تصویب شد و یک هفته بعد همان مجلس و همان ترکیب ردش کرد. اینها همه نسبی‌گرایی است.

Question: In your view, what is the relationship between ethics and psychology? Can the field of ethics, alongside psychology, pursue therapy and provide therapeutic services to society? In fact, can ethics, like psychology, yield practical and applied results in treating moral and psychological problems?

Answer: Even if we were to accord it such a status, it would belong not to ethics but to moral education. Ethics is very different from moral education. Because Ethics is other than Morality and also other than Moral Education. This task, even if therapeutic, belongs to specialists in moral education, not to scholars of ethics. Moral education is a branch of education that discusses education from the moral aspect. But the connection between psychology and ethics, in my view, is so close that no two disciplines, despite one being prescriptive and the other descriptive, are so intertwined.

Question: In the theory of rationality and spirituality, the world has a spiritual nature. In the secular ethical view, the world has a moral nature. What is the relationship between a world that has a spiritual, not religious, nature and a world that has a moral nature?

Answer: I think because both "moral" and "spiritual" have multiple meanings here, it is quite difficult to answer this question, but at least I can say what pertains to myself. First, when I speak of spirituality, I do not mean ethics alone. Ethics is a part of spirituality, but it is not the whole of spirituality. In my own terms, every spiritual person is moral, but not every moral person is spiritual. Because spirituality is a particular attitude toward the world from which living morally emerges, but someone may live morally without having that attitude. In other words, that attitude is not a necessary condition for living morally, and those who lack that spiritual attitude can also live morally, but living morally is certainly a requisite of being spiritual. That is, if someone is spiritual, they necessarily live morally.

The second point concerns secular ethics; if we take secular ethics to mean non-religious ethics, as secular sometimes means non-religious, there is no contradiction in someone being secular and also being spiritual. But if we take secular in the sense that is roughly meant by "laïque" in European languages, that is, someone who is entirely opposed to religious teachings and, among other things, holds a materialist view of the world rather than a view that affirms the supernatural, it is there that the rift between secular ethics and spiritual ethics becomes more serious. I think it is good to use the term "laïque" for that type of ethics that opposes religious teachings and truly negates any kind of transcendence, whether in the form of God or otherwise. Spiritual ethics cannot be compatible with a materialist outlook. That is, spirituality is not compatible with materialism. I am aware that religion is also not compatible with materialism, but a human being can be secular, that is, not religious, and still be spiritual. That is, still not subscribe to materialism, physicalism, and naturalism.

Question: Regarding civil disobedience, you said that the confrontation between the civil sphere and the citizen indicates the distinction between ethics and law. It seems that civil disobedience may arise from the enforcement of law or the comparison of law with an ideal mental law; or even, in the age of communication, from comparing laws with other laws. Thus, civil protest takes place.

Answer: They have wanted to say that civil disobedience is not only what you say it is. What they mean by civil disobedience is in fact negative resistance. They are right. Negative resistance has various types. One type is civil disobedience. I was speaking specifically about civil disobedience. By definition, since Emerson and Thoreau introduced civil disobedience, it has meant that when someone cannot reconcile their conscience with the content of a law, they stand against the law in the name of morality. But civil disobedience is one of the types of negative resistance. The other types are the two other kinds that they also mentioned. Sometimes negative resistance is not an objection to the law. It is an objection to the way the law is implemented, which of course is not civil disobedience. We should not, in fact, take the two concepts of civil disobedience and negative resistance as synonymous. We have several types of negative resistance, one type of which we call civil disobedience; that is, standing against the law in the name of morality. Standing against rulers in the name of morality or in the name of expediency, or deeming the method of implementing the law ineffective, can also be negative resistance, but it is not called civil disobedience.

Question: What is your assessment of the course of ethical studies, that is, the research being done in the field of ethics in Iran? Is it in harmony with the needs of society or not? Are you satisfied overall or not?

Answer: The reality is that I am not very well-informed. Because I am not present in universities. A major part of these works, such as master's theses, doctoral dissertations, the lessons professors teach, and the work students do, takes place in universities, and I have no connection with them. I also do not read academic journals, which are a reflection of these, and I am not aware of the situation. But one thing my experience tells me is that the people who refer to me, and perhaps refer to other friends as well, very often truly intend to live ethically, but they simply do not know what the ethical requirement of living is right now. This shows that this research has, at the very least, not served to meet the needs of society. Either it has remained at a very high level and has not been simplified, or no research has been done at all. Simplification is a very important art. Of course, in our society, writing papers is of great importance. After all, individuals want positions; academically, they want their assistant professorship to become an associate professorship, their associate professorship to become a professorship, to become a full professor, to become an emeritus professor. So they must write those papers. But someone who has a social concern must, either instead of that work or alongside it, say that the benefit of all this is for society to be more ethical, and therefore I must simplify what I have arrived at in my academic research or what I have studied in the academic research of others so that it is understandable to my father, Mostafa, as well. So that they too can understand and derive some enjoyment from this ethical living. At least they would have the necessary condition for ethical living, which is ethical awareness, although ethical awareness is not a sufficient condition for ethical living. But writing complex statements in papers and having a bibliography twice as long as the paper itself, and so on, serves the very purposes they have. The work of ethics is not a kind of academic work. Ethics is different from understanding how many mosques existed in Cairo in the fourth century AH. That work has no practical benefit for us. Our entire purpose in ethical research is for us to become more ethical ourselves, and for society to become more ethical through our way and form of living. Perhaps speaking of these matters in a complex way might earn you points in a competition with your colleagues, or put you ahead in a comparison between yourself and your colleagues, and lead to you being interviewed, but for that for which ethics fundamentally came into being, it is not worth a penny. I truly sometimes look at many of the books and writings and say, if this research had been done about the number of mosques in fourth-century Cairo, it would have been of just as much benefit to society. Because it is written in terminology that is of no use to anyone. We must learn that simplification is a kind of great cultural service. Let us not think that uneducated people simplify, and that it is beneath the dignity of educated people to simplify material to bring it to the threshold of public awareness. With these things we do, we might create a society in which we have three hundred ethics specialists, but the society has no awareness of ethics and does not even know the basics of ethics. As in the examples I mentioned earlier, for me, as someone who is a point of reference, and for other friends to whom people refer, it is very clear that there are truly women and men who intend to live ethically but simply do not know what ethical living is. There are not a few people who say to me: 'What does "intention" mean?' What does it mean when they say 'do this for the sake of God'? What does this 'for the sake of God' mean? Ask yourself, what does it mean when they say do something for the sake of God? Have you ever been able to conceptually clarify for yourself what 'for the sake of God' means? If you and I, who have, for instance, studied seminary lessons, do not know, from whom do we expect them to know? People tell me, we do not understand what 'for the sake of God' means. We understand the negative aspect of the matter. We understand that we did not do this deed for the acquisition of wealth, power, social prestige, status and rank, fame, popularity, and so on. We understand its negative aspect. If 'for the sake of God' only means negating these things, and that when we do something for the sake of God, we have not done it for wealth, power, social prestige, fame, popularity, and so on, then why do we say 'for God'? Let us state its negative aspect.

اما اگر وقتی کاری را برای خدا می‌کنیم علاوه بر اینکه برای این اغراض نمی‌کنیم برای چیز دیگری می‌کنیم که آن وجه ایجابی تقرب الی الله است، آن وجه ایجابی را چطور در ذهن تصویر می‌کنیم؟ چه انگاره ذهنی‌ای از آن داریم؟ یعنی وقتی نیت تقرب الی الله می‌کنیم در واقع نیت چه چیزی می‌کنیم؟ این مثالی بسیار ساده است که در عبادات هم پیش می‌آید، چه رسد به قلمرو اخلاق فضیلت.

Question: Given the dominance of jurisprudence in our society and the prevalence of a juridical mentality (compared to an ethical mentality) among audiences, to what extent do you think those working in the field of ethics have been able to strengthen the ethical concern and moral sensitivity of their audiences?

Answer: Probably what they mean by the dominance of jurisprudence refers to audiences who engage with jurisprudence. I don't know the extent of it. The practical treatises (Risalah Amaliyyah) apparently haven't changed from before. I mean, I don't think they have changed. Some who have added an ethical section to their practical treatise—it's worth reading! Go read it and see what they have actually said in the name of ethics in that ethical section they added! I, for one, haven't seen anything.

.

---

.

[1] . Published on the Telegram channel of Professor Mostafa Malekian

[2]. An-Nisa: 123.

[3]. Al-Baqarah: 111.

[4]. Al Imran: 24.

[5]. Yunus: 62.

[6]. Nahj al-Balagha: Saying 325.

[7]. Nahj al-Balagha: Sermon 193.

[8]. Yunus: 62.

.

---

.

Audio of the lecture on The Requirements of Teaching and Research in Moral Philosophy in Contemporary Iran

PDF file of the lecture on The Requirements of Teaching and Research in Moral Philosophy in Contemporary Iran

.

---

.

Title: The Requirements of Teaching and Research in Moral Philosophy in Contemporary Iran

Speaker: Mostafa Malekian

Date: Aban 1395 (October/November 2016)

.

---

.