Philosophy and Scientism: The Rise of Counterfeit Culture in the Humanities

The misuse of science has affected the entirety of university curricula and makes it difficult to distinguish between genuine scientific practice and its counterfeit substitute. I want to examine the impact of the scientistic attitude on the humanities. All universities need humanities faculties. The humanities are not only appealing to young people, but also help them find their way in life. Therefore, the humanities must maintain their robustness against the threat of scientism. I will examine the ways in which we can protect the humanities.

My interest, and that of many others, in the debate between the humanities and the natural sciences was shaped by a debate in England in 1959 known as the "Two Cultures Debate." An author named C. P. Snow, who is less well known in the current era, argued in his 1959 lecture that the culture of thought suffers from a distinction between the natural sciences and the humanities, and for this reason universities have been divided into two parts. As a result of this division, two cultures have emerged. By culture, he meant a kind of specialization. At dinner parties held at universities, there were those who specialized in the natural sciences and had much to say on the subject. Likewise, there were those who specialized in the humanities and had much to say on that subject. But there was a rift between them. In Snow's view, this rift was destroying the culture of thought in Western civilization and causing a decline in epistemic standards in both groups. Snow's lecture met with a fierce response from the literary critic Frank Leavis. Leavis passionately argued that the natural sciences are not culture and deal with universal claims about knowledge, not a particular form of life. Cultures differ in different places and take different forms according to historical circumstances, whereas the natural sciences are common to all human beings and can be understood by different persons in different cultures. This debate created more controversy than it did clarity. One of the reasons for this is that Leavis was discourteous in his article. Culture is used in two senses. Culture from an anthropological perspective is a form of life. For example, we can speak of Aztec culture. Culture can also refer to what has become known as high culture. When we say in this sense that a person has culture, we mean that in their mind they can connect many issues by virtue of what they have learned. The idea of culture that anthropologists put forward is absolute: you either have a culture or you don't, you are either Aztec or you are not. But culture in the sense used in universities deals with a spectrum; some people are more cultured and some less cultured. The more fundamental question is what help these distinctions offer to this debate.

There is an older debate in the history of universities known as the conflict of methods. At the end of the eighteenth century, a conflict arose in German-speaking universities between the natural sciences (Naturwissenschaften) and the human sciences (Geisteswissenschaften). This debate was very hostile. One of the reasons for this was that people's jobs depended on it. Often, economic interest lies behind academic debates. Every university has a certain amount of funding for salaries, and if you can convince university presidents that the humanities are not genuine sciences and that you are in the natural sciences, it leads to an increase in your own salary. This is what happened at that time in German-speaking universities. Is there a method in the humanities? If the humanities have no method, perhaps the claim that the humanities are unimportant in university life is correct, and one cannot teach students anything they can use outside the classroom to examine phenomena. In this era, the hermeneutic tradition emerged, which is tied to a thinker named Dilthey. For Dilthey, the humanities have a method, but this method has nothing to do with the natural sciences. For Dilthey, there is a kind of knowledge that he called (verstehen), which means understanding, and it is the knowledge we access when we relate to one another. When I enter a room and see someone smiling, I immediately connect with their mental state and feelings. They connect with me directly. But here I am not making a scientific judgment as occurs in the natural sciences; rather, it is a relationship I enter into. We all relate to one another without forming scientific presuppositions about each other. Instead, we react to one another directly and as human beings. Dilthey believed that we understand the human world in this same way, and this is how we grasp the goals and values of humans. This kind of understanding can also be transferred from the connection between humans to the connection with human creations and works of art, and legal and governmental systems. This kind of understanding, in his view, can give us an authentic method that we can apply in all the human sciences. This method is not the same as the method of the natural sciences. The natural sciences deal with the explanation of phenomena, and the explanation of phenomena is not the same as understanding them. Suppose my spouse suffers from a physical injury, and this injury renders them unable to react and respond to me for a while. I can no longer understand them, and they can no longer understand me, and we cannot establish a relationship with one another. But when I take them to a doctor for treatment, the doctor wants to explain this phenomenon. They cannot understand in the way I understood my spouse; they can only explain what has happened by examining their nervous system or something similar. Now let us examine what scientism is. In what cases do we introduce the natural sciences into the realm of human life?

Scientism, as I understand it, pretends to apply the scientific method to questions that are not scientific. Our culture today is full of such pretenses. Just open a newspaper, and you will find a cultural expert explaining a human trait with the help of evolutionary theory. For example, sexuality has increasingly become the focus of evolutionary psychologists. Evolutionary psychologists want to explain monogamy, which is a norm in human behavior, through biological adaptation. For instance, with monogamy we provide the greatest protection for our children and thus increase the chance of passing our genes on to future generations. Such explanations are everywhere and usually serve as a substitute for the ordinary ways we deal with these phenomena. This is while monogamy is, above all, a moral question: should we be committed to monogamy or not? Is it permissible? Can we consider exceptions for it? If so, why? And so on. Examining monogamy in this way is what Dilthey calls verstehen, and through it we can examine the place of marriage in human societies and human experience in general. Scientific explanations are not a substitute for these kinds of explanations. This does not mean an illegitimate move from "is" to "ought"—a point philosophers are well acquainted with—but rather an illegitimate move from "explanation" to "meaning." Let me give an example. All of us, when we think about "beauty" and want to know what beauty is, why it is important, and what significance it has for us humans, are left wondering. In particular, the sense of beauty that we all possess—although we differ on its instances—is very important to us and is linked with periods of our lives, giving those periods a particular meaning. Evolutionary psychology has destined itself to explain beauty.

One famous explanation, rooted in Darwin's thought, is that beauty is one of the processes of sexual selection. The sense of beauty allows animals to distinguish between a mate with a stronger reproductive capacity and one with a weaker capacity. The example usually given is the peacock's tail. We all know that the male peacock has a large tail and captivates the female. In evolutionary theory, there is a major problem explaining the evolution of this large tail. Because this tail is very cumbersome, exposes the male peacock to the danger of being hunted, and hinders its escape when another animal attacks it. How could such a tail have come into being? The answer usually given is that the female peacock is attracted to the large tail, and the larger the tail, the more attractive it is to the female. A male peacock that can have such a large tail and still survive will have a stronger reproductive capacity than other peacocks. Through this process, they offer an explanation for the sense of beauty. Many evolutionary psychologists say that we have explained everything about the sense of beauty. Therefore, when men waste their time writing poetry and composing music, from a genetic perspective they are not wasting their time, because they are attracting women in order to pass this ability on to their children. This statement is very absurd because it does not explain what is so meaningful in music and poetry. This is a completely different question that deals not with the explanation of such a phenomenon, but with the importance of beauty in our lives. The same is true of the concept of the "sacred." Many anthropological explanations have addressed the question of why humans believe in the sacred. In their explanations, they do not tell us the meaning of the sacred, and they cannot explain where it leads our thoughts.

There is great pressure in universities to force the humanities into a box called “research.” This is because, in this way, more research funding can be obtained from governments and other research institutions. For this reason, people in the humanities cling to any pseudo-science that pretends to be conducting empirical research or theorizing, or creating revolutions in various disciplines. The characteristic of these theories is typically that they call the humanities into question and try to convince us that these disciplines are nothing but the tracing of power. This approach can well explain the appeal of Marxism, Foucault, and feminism in the humanities. All of these theories rely on a kind of functional explanation, a kind of explanation common in the discipline of biology. They tell us that rights do not exist and there is only ideology, and that cultural norms are merely a way of reproducing power relations. One musicologist went so far as to write a book demonstrating that Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony is merely a rape fantasy. The humanities are filled with these pseudo-scientific “interrogations.” This approach to the humanities became very famous in the 60s, 70s, and even the 80s, but now it no longer holds a special place. However, these approaches have been replaced by another approach that is equally inappropriate.

We philosophers study ethics, aesthetics, history, and other disciplines. Suddenly, all of these studies were replaced with something else: “neuroethics,” “neuroaesthetics,” “neuromusicology,” and so on. The presupposition of this approach is that we have always been mistaken in the study of ethics and aesthetics. Ethics is, in fact, nothing but the structure of the nervous system. There is even a journal called “Neuroaesthetics.” If you want to create a discipline, you must launch a journal whose articles are peer-reviewed. In this way, those journals are protected from criticism. A book titled “Neuro Art History” has been written. In this approach, questions are posed in such a way that we can find their answers through neuroscience. This is one of the results of scientism; in order to examine the humanities with your scientific method, you must first see what your method can prove, then force the subject into it. Let me give an example. One of the famous figures in neuroaesthetics is Ramachandran, who has done much research in this field. He wants to use neuroscience to answer the great mystery of the “meaning of art.” He first changes the question: “What is the purpose of art?” His answer is: It is not for depiction, but for enhancement. That is, it amplifies the neural reactions that ordinarily exist in response to objects. This is his explanation of art. His theory redefines the original question in such a way that it can be answered by neuroscience.

If you think about this question as an ordinary person, you would say there is no single purpose for all works of art, or, as Oscar Wilde said, art is useless, and that is the use of art. There are certain things in human life whose purpose is for us to be able to have no purpose, so that we can take a few steps back and admire these phenomena for what they are. Even if it did have a purpose, well-being is not a conventional part of art's purpose. Art is not always about highlighting and magnifying; sometimes it diminishes, soothes, and helps us put some distance between ourselves and other phenomena. The attempt to redefine aesthetics from a neurological perspective assumes what it needs to prove; while it must show that aesthetics is a neurological question, it presupposes it. Aesthetics belongs to the domain of the humanities. I am sure you are all familiar with what happens in the evolutionary explanation of

Now let us return to what culture really is. We all know that we are animals, but each of us is also an individual. The question of the relationship between our animal nature and our individuality is a very important one. This is a question that has been examined in various ways by different philosophies and religions. Yet this question always lingers in the back of our minds: How should I relate to my animal nature? Am I merely an animal? Or is individuality another mode of being human? One way of exploring this question is that individuals live in the "space of reasons," a phrase introduced by Wilfrid Sellars. That is, we, as beings who have reasons for the things we do, must be interpreted, not explained like animals. This interpretation is the relationship through which we connect with one another. When we talk to each other, we are not describing ourselves, nor are we trying to conduct an experiment on the other person; rather, we address one another, demand each other's reasons and purposes, and point to each other's feelings in the moment. Through these acts, others become transparent to us. For this to happen, we must express our personal perspective on matters. When we speak naturally with one another—not in an interrogative manner—your personal perspective becomes clear to me, just as my personal perspective becomes clear to you. Only humans or individuals relate to one another in this way. Other animals communicate, but they do not have this type of relationship. Once we accept that each of us has a personal perspective, we can understand why culture is important. Culture is the process that makes having a personal view possible and allows us to fully introduce ourselves to another. If a person is completely devoid of culture and cannot connect with us through a shared experience, they cannot relate themselves to the world. We are all dependent on shared meanings. What we inherit from the world around us, if we are fortunate, is precisely this. We admire the works of art that past generations loved, and this allows us to find a common framework and use it to communicate. Romeo and Juliet is part of our culture that helps us relate to one another about the concept of love and compare our feelings with the characters in Shakespeare's play. Art, in this specific sense, belongs to culture. Indeed, in this sense, religion also belongs to culture. Religion is a way we define ourselves for ourselves, giving us concepts, stories, beliefs, and rituals so that our beliefs become clear to us and we can convey them to others. I think we should look at the humanities in this way as well: disciplines in which the art of interpretation plays a crucial role.

Let me refer to a theory that attempts to call culture into question: the idea of the “meme,” introduced by Richard Dawkins. Dawkins, whom I think you are familiar with, is the author of popular science books and seeks to introduce the theories of evolution and genetics to the general public. He is well aware that not all ideas and knowledge can be accommodated within a scientific worldview, but since he believes no other worldview exists, he puts forward a theory that calls into question all rival claims to knowledge. As I said, he coined the idea of the “meme.” A “meme” is a cultural unit that reproduces itself and is like a virus: once implanted in the human mind, it uses the brain’s energy to replicate itself. A fitting example of this idea is catchy musical tunes. It is said that after the opera Rigoletto was performed, people all over the city of Milan were humming the aria “La donna è mobile,” even those who had not attended the performance. This is a common phenomenon: a catchy piece of music is performed, and we quickly see everyone humming it. In such cases, a mental category has replicated itself, using the energy of human brains and multiplying through imitation. Dawkins believes that cultural categories reproduce themselves in this way; they are like parasites, using the energy of individuals’ brains, empowering the brains around them, and thus replicating themselves. The process of natural selection causes some of them to leave the psychological space and others to remain, and this is how cultures and religions persist over centuries. In Dawkins’s view, these are the strongest parasites in existence. Well, you have surely realized why I say this theory calls culture into question. This theory is designed to destroy all the authority that we might think religion, art, music, and other categories we study in the humanities hold over our thinking. For Dawkins, interpretation and finding meaning in the humanities are not possible; all we have is a scientific theory that shows all these categories are meaningless. The metaphor Dawkins uses is appealing, but the question is: what does it lead to? The reality is that it leads to nothing, because it does not introduce a biological equivalent for the so-called “meme.” It also calls into question our ability to judge and reject ideas, to examine their validity and truth. The Milanese did not hum “La donna è mobile” merely because it was catchy; another reason was that it was a very good aria, and they were ready to make room for it in their musical repertoire. This process of evaluation is something we are constantly doing, and this process is not a scientific one. Rather, it depends on our ability to connect with phenomena. Meme theory renders interpretation completely meaningless, and since it cannot provide a biological equivalent for the meme, it is not falsifiable. There is no scientific method by which one could show this theory to be wrong or right, and therefore the “meme” remains purely metaphorical.

I have spoken of theories that call culture into question; in my view, the task of humanities departments is to protect modes of understanding. Scientism is in fact a kind of magic and a return to pre-scientific thought. It uses science to arrange human life in such a way as to control it. The neuroscientist of art history wants to gain control over this highly complex human realm and acquire a credibility greater than ours, we who can only understand it. He claims he can explain art history, and he does so on his own neuroscientific grounds. Genuine scientific thinking begins by identifying specific questions and tries to find answers to them. Science does not study all the phenomena in a domain with a theory that acts as a magic wand. Culture has a separate reality; it is a realm of artifacts connected to our ideals and aspirations. Culture exists because we try to understand the phenomena around us, and it depends on our capacity for judgment and for conveying that judgment to others. In my opinion, the humanities must teach this, must teach students how to distinguish the genuine from the fake. Since people in the humanities today have largely lost their self-confidence, they are not sure that there is any difference at all between the genuine and the fake, and this has led to the rise of counterfeit culture. Our task as humanities professors is to teach our students how to identify the 'fake.'

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Roger Scruton

Translated by Zuhair Bagheri Noaparast

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