Seyyed Hassan Eslami Ardakani's Article on the Dossier of the Book *Shahid-e Javid*

Dossier of the Book Shahid-e Javid[1]

Seyyed Hassan Eslami Ardakani

One of the most widely discussed books of recent decades, which provoked diverse and contradictory reactions in Iranian religious circles, was Shahid-e Javid, published in the 1960s and still controversial today. While the dominant interpretation among Shias regarding the motive for the uprising of the Lord of Martyrs (AS) was seeking martyrdom, Ayatollah Salehi Najafabadi, in this book, offered a different interpretation of the cause of the uprising, claiming that Imam Hussein (AS) rose up not with the intention of martyrdom, but with the intention of forming a government. However, for various reasons, this goal was not achieved and he was martyred. Those who considered this interpretation to be in conflict with theological beliefs or historical facts criticized it and produced works in this field. In his subsequent works, he responded to these criticisms and completed his theory. The present article provides an analytical report on the main claims of this book and the works written in its criticism, and attempts to clarify the background, dimensions, repercussions, and consequences of this viewpoint and determine the place of this book in Ashura literature.

The news of Hussein's murder and the massacre of the men of his family and his companions first stunned the Muslims. It then turned into a deep and incurable wound in the body of Islam, which the passage of time made more painful, to the extent that today a part of the Muslims, namely the Shias, have tied their identity to this event and consider Shiism to be nothing but the commemoration of this unparalleled event, and in sorrow and joy they speak in remembrance of that martyr, and with every sip of water they bring to their lips, they recall his oppression and repeatedly recount the cruelty of his enemies who did this in the name of religion. If we consider the commemoration of the martyrdom of that brave champion of freedom as the most characteristic cultural-religious behavior of contemporary Shiism, we may be justified in considering the book Shahid-e Javid as the most important bibliographic event concerning this affair; a book that is, in fact, a symbol of the life and reflection of several generations and, more than forty years after its publication, is still controversial. This technical book, whose audience is not the general public, had been printed at least seventeen times by 2005, and this reception itself speaks to its standing. While the dominant interpretation among Shias regarding the motive for the uprising of the Lord of Martyrs (AS) was seeking martyrdom, Ayatollah Salehi Najafabadi, in this book, offered a different interpretation of the cause of his uprising, claiming that Imam Hussein (AS) rose up not with the intention of martyrdom, but with the intention of forming a government. However, for various reasons, this goal was not achieved and he was martyred.

A Storm on the Way

One of the serious debates of recent decades among Shias has been a reconsideration of the motive and goal of the uprising of the Lord of Martyrs and its dimensions. This debate, in addition to its key importance in understanding Shia thought, has also been of particular sensitivity, such that the identity of Shiism is practically tied to it, and based on the interpretation given of this uprising, one can expect a specific Shiism with specific teachings and behaviors to take shape and create a particular culture. These interpretations have had a diverse range; in one interpretation, the Imam undertakes this uprising out of necessity, and his uprising is considered an imposed one, while in another interpretation, this uprising is carried out freely, consciously, and knowledgeably; in one interpretation, the goal of the uprising is considered to be gaining governance, and in another interpretation, the goal of the Imam's uprising is nothing but martyrdom.

In opposition to the dominant view that Imam Husayn (peace be upon him) rose up with the intention of martyrdom and with knowledge of his own fate and that of his family, the late Ayatollah Nematollah Salehi Najafabadi published the results of his seven-year research under the title Shahid-e Javid; Husayn ibn Ali (peace be upon him) in 1968 and offered a different interpretation of the reason for the Imam's uprising. At the beginning of his book, cautioning readers against any prejudice, he sought a fresh interpretation of the uprising of the Lord of Martyrs, elaborated on various views regarding the Imam's uprising, and specified that there are two extreme views on this matter: one is the view put forward by some Sunnis, according to which it is claimed that the Imam's uprising was premature and ill-considered and that the Imam erred in his calculations. The other view, expressed by a number of Shiite writers, suggests that the Imam's uprising was not subject to common, rational calculations; rather, His Holiness rose up in obedience to a divine command, and no one has the right to question or scrutinize it. Neither of these two interpretations, especially the second, was acceptable to Salehi, and throughout this book, he endeavored to offer an alternative view by analyzing historical texts and casting doubt on certain common assumptions. Thus, by laying out preliminaries, he concludes that after Mu'awiya's death, a groundwork for forming an Islamic government had been prepared, and at this time, the Imam felt a greater responsibility and deemed it necessary upon himself to take action to revive Islam, and by forming a strong government, to change the existing situation and deliver Islam and Muslims from the clutches of oppressors. This book carried two commendations from renowned religious scholars who had defended the book's content, although one of them later retracted his commendation.

This interpretation conflicted with the traditional and common interpretation among Shiites for two main reasons: first, it inevitably raised a theological issue. According to Shiism, the Imam possesses divinely inspired knowledge (ilm-e ladunni), and through this non-acquired knowledge, he sees the future just as he sees the past. Consequently, if we claim that the Imam rose up with the intention of forming a government, the implicit meaning of such a belief is that he did not know what fate awaited him; that is, a denial of the Imam's knowledge. The second problem with this view was that, according to the content of numerous narrations, Imam Husayn was destined to be martyred in Karbala. Supporting these narrations is a statement that the Holy Prophet (peace be upon him and his progeny) made to Imam Husayn in a dream: "Indeed, God has willed to see you slain.". For this reason, the book Shahid-e Javid had a widespread repercussion that continues to this day. Referring to the historical background of this book's view, Sehati Sardrudi assesses its importance as follows: "In the field of Ashura studies, it created a revolution that is undeniable."^[2] But before pointing to the internal repercussions of this book, it is not amiss to refer to the external judgment of Hamid Enayat, a contemporary scholar, and his analysis of this book.

Enayat and Shahid-e Javid

The book Shahid-e Javid was published at a time when a broad re-examination of the philosophy of Imam Hussein's (AS) uprising had also begun among Sunnis. The late Enayat, when discussing Shia modernism and the issue of martyrdom and new perspectives and interpretations of the Husseini uprising, points to this matter well. Analyzing the views of Sunni scholars, he concludes that in the opinion of most of them, especially Abu Bakr ibn al-Arabi, the jurist and judge of Seville (not the famous mystic and author of al-Futuhat al-Makkiyya), and Ibn Khaldun, Imam Hussein should not have risen against Yazid. The difference being that Ibn al-Arabi considered Yazid a righteous man, whereas Ibn Khaldun acknowledged his unrighteousness but believed that Imam Hussein did not have the power to overthrow him. Nevertheless, the Imam confused the issue of his own righteousness with his power, and his error lay precisely in this. According to Enayat, in recent years radical tendencies have formed among Sunnis, and writers such as Mazini, Khaled Mohammad Khaled, Aqqad, and especially Abd al-Rahman al-Sharqawi in his play Al-Hussein Tha'iran, Al-Hussein Shahidan, have tried to justify his uprising and present a revolutionary and "leftist"^[3] interpretation of the Karbala event. They refute Ibn al-Arabi's view on Yazid's righteousness and also consider Ibn Khaldun's conservative and politically-oriented perspective incorrect, believing that Imam Hussein rose out of sincerity, to defend religion, and perhaps for religious perfectionism. However, Enayat concludes: "None of these writers base their discussion and argument on a critical analysis of historical texts with the aim of discovering their contradictions and inaccuracies. Rather, what they write is based on personal reflection, and they simply find their new opinions to be in harmony with the old official sources."^[4]

After examining the course of change in attitudes toward the philosophy of the Husseini uprising among Sunnis, Enayat analyzes the new perspective of some Shia scholars on this matter and recounts its problems, including the dilemma of the Imam's knowledge. Among the works published among Shias in recent decades: "the boldest and most influential of all is Shahid-e Javid," which was published in 1968 and immediately had a widespread impact. However, following the killing of the late Shamsabadi in Isfahan in 1976, the ideas of this book were raised in public circles and became a topic of the day. According to Enayat, what distinguishes this book from similar works is: "its more or less scholarly method."^[5]

The author of Shahid-e Javid freely uses Sunni sources, and “Najafabadi’s unfettered interpretation of historical sources stems from his definite intention to test every minor detail and subsidiary episode related to this event against what he himself calls ‘the course of rational actions and natural processes’ of affairs,” and to offer a human and comprehensible interpretation of this incident.^[6]In this book, he seeks both to refute the view of critics of the Imam’s uprising among Sunnis, who considered it an ill-considered act, and the view of those Shiites who attributed the uprising to a desire for martyrdom or the fulfillment of a dream the Imam had seen beforehand. For example, he recounts seven stories and rejects them one by one using historical criteria.^[7] He also succeeds in making his view appear plausible by criticizing second-rate hadiths and stories about the Imam’s awareness of his fate. However, he does not realize that this theory of his conflicts with the authentic narrations that ascribe prior knowledge to the Imam, with which reliable Shiite sources are replete. Nevertheless, his aim is not to invalidate the Imam’s knowledge, but to prove the rationality of his uprising. From this perspective, he undertook the uprising in a measured way, observing matters that ought to be observed, and his victory was logically probable.^[8]Enayat interprets the nature of this book as political and maintains that clearly: “The main purpose of Shahid-e Javid is to politicize an aspect of Shiite Imamology that until recent times was conducted entirely with mystical, poetic, and emotional interpretations.”^[9]But the Shiite clergy interpreted this book differently and attacked two of its aspects: first, excessive reliance on non-Shiite sources and the failure to authenticate and examine their strength, and second, the denial of the Imam’s knowledge of the unseen.^[10]

Despite all the precision Hamid Enayat employs in his analysis, he makes a claim that is historically indefensible. He maintains that Salehi Najafabadi’s interpretation of the uprising of the Lord of Martyrs is a modern interpretation lacking a historical place within Shiism. Consequently, he assesses his work as an “unprecedented and heretical theory in Shiism,”^[11] whereas this interpretation is, in a sense, the most ancient interpretation of the uprising of the Lord of Martyrs. In fact, the dominant view among the majority of Shiites emerged later. Incidentally, this is a point that Salehi himself repeatedly relies upon to defend his view, drawing support from ancient sources.

It suffices to refer to a few ancient fifth-century sources on this matter to grasp the weakness of Enayat’s judgment. In response to the objection that Husayn’s uprising was a form of casting oneself into destruction and endangering oneself, and for this reason was considered contrary to God’s command, Sayyid Murtada replies that he in fact rose up based on a precise calculation of the conditions of the time, that the possibility of victory existed for him, and that he exercised independent judgment: “It was not in his calculation that the people would betray one another, that the people of truth would weaken in supporting him, and that the strange events which occurred would come to pass.”^[12]Then Sayyid Murtada provides evidence of the Imam’s possibility of military victory and adds: “We only intended by mentioning this point that the means of triumph over the enemies were [apparent], manifest, and attainable, and that the unfortunate coincidence reversed and overturned the matter until what happened, happened.”^[13]For this reason, the Imam sent Muslim, and when he heard the news of his killing and the matter of returning was raised, the Banu Aqil opposed it and said: “By God, we will not turn back until we exact our revenge or taste what our brother tasted. So he, peace be upon him, said, ‘There is no good in life after these people.’” And when Hurr blocked his way, he took the road to Syria, “proceeding towards Yazid ibn Mu‘awiya, because he knew, peace be upon him, that he would be more compassionate towards him than Ibn Ziyad and his companions.” But Umar ibn Sa‘d came and blocked his way. At that point, he made three proposals to Umar, who, after seeking instructions from Ibn Ziyad, accepted none of them, and the matter led to war and the Imam’s martyrdom.^[14]

Shaykh Tusi also quotes Sayyid Murtada's exact words approvingly, using them in response to objections concerning casting oneself into destruction.^[15] Thus, Salehi's view is not new among the Shia, and contrary to Enayat's impression, it does not represent a kind of modernism in thought, but rather the revival of a forgotten idea.

Internal Repercussions

The central idea of the book Shahid-e Javid is that Imam Husayn (AS) pursued three objectives: first, establishing a government; second, and as a subsequent stage, securing peace; and third, preserving dignity and enduring martyrdom. The Imam initially sought to form a government, and when circumstances changed, he sought peace, and finally, he refused humiliation and accepted martyrdom. Therefore:

Military victory was the Imam's first-order preference. Honorable peace was his second-order preference, and martyrdom was his third-order preference. The difference being that His Holiness first worked for military victory and later for peace, but he undertook no activity whatsoever to be killed; rather, it was the agents of the anti-Islamic government who killed the Prophet's descendant and inflicted such a great loss upon the Islamic world.^[16]

In his view, hadiths with the purport "Inni la ara al-mawt illa sa'adah; I see death as nothing but happiness," which are used to prove the Imam's martyrdom-seeking perspective, essentially refer to this stage. From this perspective, Imam Husayn, considering the different stages of his uprising, uttered different statements that must be interpreted based on this change of objectives. From this viewpoint, martyrdom is not one of the religious obligations and is not the subject of a religious duty. Rather, in Islam, we have the command of jihad, which may result in victory or martyrdom. This idea continues from the book Shahid-e Javid to the article Tatbiq-e Qiyam-e Imam Husayn ba Mavazin-e Feqhi (Applying the Uprising of Imam Husayn to Jurisprudential Standards),^[17] and becomes more developed over four decades. In the book Shahid-e Javid, it is stated: "If someone says: Being killed in the way of religion is desired by God, the answer is that being killed is not desired by God; rather, defense and protection of religion is desired by God, which sometimes leads to being killed. So what is desired and what God has willed is the defense of religion, not being killed."^[18] From this perspective, martyrdom is "a passive, coercive state that is not within the control of the holy warrior [...] Therefore, it is impossible for God's command to pertain to martyrdom, for God to tell the holy warrior: 'You have a duty and are commanded to become a martyr.'"^[19] The goal of the holy warrior is victory, but he may not achieve this goal, and "therefore, martyrdom is a death that is imposed upon the martyr."^[20]

In opposition to this stance, to critique and refute the view of the book Shahid-e Javid, its opponents would sometimes turn to historical texts and demonstrate the shortcomings of this opinion, sometimes raise the issue of the Imam's knowledge, and sometimes point out the internal contradictions of this theory. Ayatollah Safi Golpayegani, in his critique of the book Shahid-e Javid, published the book Husayn (AS): The Aware Martyr and the Redemptive Leader of Islam in a volume of nearly five hundred pages, writing in it: "The foundation of the book Shahid-e Javid is invalid."^[21] Reviewing the relevant narrations, he concluded: "According to the explicit text of these reports, the program of Imam Husayn (AS) was not to rise up and establish an Islamic government. Rather, his program was uprising and martyrdom, and the Imam was aware of this program."^[22] In his view: "What fruit does engaging in discussions such as debating the contents of the book Shahid-e Javid bear, other than adding fuel to the fire of disagreements? And what pain does it remedy?"^[23] Nevertheless, there are reasons for this, including that: "Regarding the subject of the Master of Martyrs (AS), everyone possesses a loving devotion, and the uprising and movement of His Holiness during the year draws the attention of the general Shia populace, and no one can remain indifferent to a book like this and place the lock of silence upon their tongue."^[24]

The late Ayatollah Ali-Panah Eshtehardi also, in his critique of *Shahid-e Javid*, wrote the book *Why Did a Seven-Year Book Make a Noise?* in over four hundred pages, with this observation: “If the author of ‘Shahid-e Javid,’ instead of spending seven years of his precious life, had reflected for seven hours—or even seven minutes—on what he was writing, its publication would not have been accompanied by the revulsion of the general body of scholars.”^[25] According to the author, the aim of this book is not to prove the Imam’s knowledge of the unseen and such matters: “but rather to make it known that, fundamentally, the interpretations in ‘Shahid-e Javid,’ besides being incorrect, are wrong in several other respects,” including: “inappropriate condemnations, unwarranted insults, praise of enemies coupled with falsehoods, misplaced excuses for the murderers of the oppressed one of Karbala, betrayal in the transmission of hadiths and historical accounts, and the mention of a series of matters contrary to the explicit doctrine of the Shiites.”^[26] Mr. Seyyed Mohammad Mehdi Mortazavi endeavored to expose the internal contradictions of *Shahid-e Javid* and for this reason published the book *His Answer from His Book, or the Doubts of Shahid-e Javid on the Subject of the Uprising of Husayn ibn Ali, Peace Be Upon Them* [sic] in 284 pages. This book, in addition to its content and tone, contained two overt jabs at the book *Shahid-e Javid*: first, that Salehi had written “a profound study” on the cover of his book, and Mr. Mortazavi, in response, had inscribed this phrase on his own book: “a more profound study.” Salehi had adorned his book with two endorsements. In response, Mr. Mortazavi wrote in a piece titled “On the Endorsement”: “We could have obtained endorsements for this book from some of the eminent Shiite sources of emulation, but we did not. You will ask why? Because one must smell one’s own perfume, not have the perfumer tell of it.”^[27]

The late Mohammad Ali Ansari also published the book *Defense of Husayn the Martyr: A Refutation of the Book Shahid-e Javid* in a volume of nearly five hundred pages. This book has an introduction of over one hundred pages, which also addresses the background of the book *Shahid-e Javid* and an analysis of its author’s motives. According to the author, before the publication of this book, its publisher had distributed a notice announcing its imminent release, in which it briefly reported the book’s content in ten points, but: “those ten points were contrary to the material in Shiite books concerning the uprising and action of His Holiness Aba Abd Allah al-Husayn (AS) against oppression and tyranny.” As a result: “sentiments were stirred and waves of discontent arose in religious and clerical circles and the gatherings of the eminent preachers”^[28] and three of the sources of emulation read the book *Shahid-e Javid* and advised its author to refrain from publishing it. But: “the inner fire and heartfelt grudge”^[29] prevailed over their advice, and he published his book: “Yes, for an individual who believes in the ideas of the Nasibis and is anti-Shiite, who in his book, like a judge sitting behind the bench, has put the son of the Prophet and the child of the Purest Fatima on trial with utmost harshness and severity and fabricates hundreds of objections against His Holiness [...] what fear does he have of sneering at the scholars of Islam and not accepting their counsel? One who treats the oppressed Husayn, peace be upon him, in such a way and introduces great scholars and heads of the faith like Allama Majlisi and Sayyid ibn Tawus as simple-minded, superficial, impious, and without faith in the Resurrection, it is then clear how much value and respect he holds for the scholars of the present day.”^[30] He then addresses Salehi’s statements, quoting and critiquing them so that: “people may recognize him and understand his thoughts, and not suppose that, God forbid, we are making statements without evidence based on personal motives or other reasons.”^[31]

Three scholars from Qom—Messrs. Mohammad Hossein Ash'ari, Hossein Karami, and Seyyed Hassan Al-e Tahe—also published a critical book, A Brief Examination of the Sacred Uprising of the Immortal Martyr Hussein ibn Ali, Peace Be Upon Them, in 120 pages, which included an article by the late Allameh Tabatabai on the Imam's knowledge. Originally, Haj Mirza Abbas Ansari Esfahani, from the bazaar of Isfahan, had posed a question about the Imam's knowledge and sought an answer from Allameh Tabatabai. The Allameh replied in about four pages, and this question and answer were printed as an appendix to the book. The aim of the authors of this book is not to point out the errors of Shahid-e Javid, but rather: "to prove that the Imam, peace be upon him, was fully aware of his fate, knew that he and his companions would be killed and his family taken captive on this journey, and with all this knowledge, for the sake of social interests, he moved from Medina to Mecca and from Mecca to Iraq."^[32]

Salehi raised objections to Allameh Tabatabai's response and sent them to him; according to Ayatollah Ostadi, he later included those same objections in his book Asa-ye Musa. In summarizing these objections, he divides them into two groups: first, the Imam's knowledge, and second, the Imam's plan of action. He casts doubt on the absolute and unlimited knowledge of the Imam, considering it contrary to established transmitted proofs, and regarding the Imam's plan of action, he believes that Allameh Tabatabai's words are unclear and it is not evident what view he actually holds, and it cannot be determined from this treatise: "1. Did the Imam intend an armed offensive? 2. Or did he set out with the intention of being killed? 3. Or did he first intend an offensive uprising and later decide to be killed? 4. Or did he first go from Medina to Mecca with the intention of defense, and after Muslim's favorable report, the Imam's movement toward Kufa had both a defensive aspect and was aimed at conquering Kufa with a national force of one hundred thousand, and after encountering enemy forces that cut off his connection with Kufa, he adopted a defensive posture and was martyred in the course of defense? None of these four possibilities is clearly understood from this treatise. However, the book Shahid-e Javid has chosen the fourth possibility and explained it thoroughly."^[33]

The Allameh again responded to those objections, which is recorded in the book Sargozasht-e Shahid-e Javid. In this treatise, he responds to Salehi's criticisms in detail, including regarding the ultimate ambiguity of the Allameh's position and which analysis he finally accepts, he answers: "This very fourth possibility is confirmed at the end of the treatise."^[34]

Others also took up the pen and wrote critiques of the book Shahid-e Javid, including Seyyed Mohammad Nouri Mousavi in Partow-e Haqiqat, Mohammad Taqi Seddiqin in Hussein va Paziresh-e Da'vat, Ali Kazemi in Rah-e Sevvom dar Mowzu'-e Qiyam-e Moqaddas-e Shahid-e Javid-e Hussein ibn Ali, Mirza Abolfazl Zahedi Qomi in Maqsad al-Hussein, Seyyed Ahmad Fahri in Salar-e Shahidan Hussein ibn Ali, and Shahab al-Din Eshraqi and Mohammad Fazel Lankarani in Pasdaran-e Vahy. Ayatollah Reza Ostadi, reviewing the works published in this field, lists nineteen books and treatises critiquing the book Shahid-e Javid.^[35]

The matter did not remain confined to written polemics, and efforts were made to involve the leading jurists of the time regarding this book and to seek their rulings on its misleading nature. A group of seminary students wrote a letter to Ayatollah Meshkini, asking: "Are all the contents and details of the book 'Shahid-e Javid,' for which you have written a commendation, affirmed and believed by you?"^[36] He replied that writing a commendation is mostly concerned with the good choice of subject and the manner of its exposition and composition, and: "It by no means entails the affirmation of all the contents presented."^[37] He then emphasized that what is presented in this book is merely an expression of opinion and a hypothesis.

Ayatollah Rafi‘i Qazvini, in response to a group of preachers, also wrote about this book: “I have carefully studied the book in question. There has been negligence in two instances.”^[38] One instance concerned the Imam’s knowledge, and the second was the failure to distinguish between legislative and ontological will in the book Shahid-e Javid.^[39] Ayatollah Mohammad Taqi Borujerdi considered this book: “detrimental to the world of Shi‘ism, misleading, and filled with unwarranted accusations”^[40]. The late Ayatollah Seyyed Mohammad Reza Golpayegani gave a general response to an inquiry on this matter, and when asked again, he wrote: “The ruling on books of misguidance is known. Do not read this book.”^[41] The late Ayatollah Mar‘ashi Najafi, criticizing some of the sources cited by Shahid-e Javid, namely Tabari, Ibn Sa‘d, and Zubayr ibn Bakkar, concluded: “Anyone, any writer, who seeks to excuse by supposition or relies on such aforementioned individuals has strayed from the right path…^[42] and his book is contrary to the fundamental beliefs of the Shi‘a, and religious brothers should not refer to such writings.”^[43] Of course, Salehi continued to defend his view and critique his rivals, and in this context wrote the book Asa-ye Musa (The Staff of Moses), which was not published.

Gradually, this issue moved beyond a purely scholarly debate and turned into a political stance. The late Dr. Ali Shariati, as an observer from outside the seminary, wrote about this book:

In one of the books published recently, which has become very famous and has been attacked by many—and the book’s value lies more in those attacks made upon it—I, for my part, found it to be the only book among the mass of books written by our learned men that is a work of research. It has brought all the documents, presented both opposing and agreeing views, analyzed and critiqued them, and even had the audacity to refute and prove, audacity in the sense of presenting a new scholarly opinion, and it has undertaken extensive study and examined a great many sources, engaging in a scholarly research endeavor. These are the values I attribute to this book and to its author, whom I do not know, but as a man of serious scholarship, research, analysis, innovation, and intellectual independence, I hold him in esteem, for in this climate of hue and cry, prattle, demagoguery, imitation, and the repetition of platitudes, such pens are valuable. However, I have a scholarly disagreement with him, and unfortunately, a fundamental one.^[44]

He then critiques Salehi’s view from another perspective and emphasizes the theory of the Imam’s uprising aimed at martyrdom as the only option for preserving the religion in that Yazidi chaos. This theory, in turn, was criticized and published in a pamphlet titled Regarding the View of Dr. Ali Shariati, the Warrior Scholar, on the Book Shahid-e Javid, which stressed: “Since the late Dr. Ali Shariati’s view on the uprising of Imam Husayn (AS) is that His Holiness moved with the intention of martyrdom, not with the intention of overthrowing Yazid’s government and establishing an Islamic government [...] it has discussed and analyzed the words of the great teacher Dr. Shariati.”^[45]

The scope of this debate gradually extended beyond Qom to other cities, and there was even talk of donning shrouds in opposition to the book.^[46] The affair spread to such an extent that it was said the Shah's intelligence and security organization (SAVAK) was involved in promoting and exploiting it. Both proponents and opponents of the book Shahid-e Javid advanced this claim to their own advantage and to the detriment of their rivals. Regarding his opponents, Salehi believed: "These people stirred up public opinion with inhumane methods and created a tense and tumultuous atmosphere. One example from this group is the author of the book Haft Saleh, and another is the author of the book Defa az Hossein; these two incited more sedition than others and poisoned the religious environment. Of course, invisible hands were also at work, fanning the flames of discord."^[47] And in a footnote to this matter, he added: "Documents have been obtained showing that the 'Shahid-e Javid' war was created by SAVAK of Iran with the aim of weakening Imam Khomeini's front. These documents will be published."^[48] Opponents of the book also made a counter-claim, writing, based on SAVAK documents, that SAVAK had issued an order to print and distribute twenty thousand copies of the book Shahid-e Javid to create division among the people.^[49]Apparently, the central SAVAK supported the reproduction of such a book and considered it a good means to deepen the differences between traditional Shiites and supporters of Imam Khomeini, but since the book was gradually being welcomed, this action could have been contrary to SAVAK's intention and goal. Hence, the Qom SAVAK opposed this plan, supported the rival front, and even prevented the publication of the book Asa-ye Musa, confiscating its forms at the printing house. The documents that both fronts present in their favor can be justified in this way: that SAVAK's original aim was to sow discord, whether through the book Shahid-e Javid or the books published in its critique. The result was that SAVAK apparently played a serious role in spreading this issue and fueled the war between the two sides.^[50] Citing such documents and the issue of mutual exploitation, Ayatollah Reza Ostadi reminds us: "Any scholarly issue that takes on a political color becomes afflicted with such injustices and misrepresentations."^[51]

The late Ayatollah Motahhari, who had a long-standing friendship with the author of Shahid-e Javid, did not agree with his analysis and interpretation of the episode of the uprising of the Lord of Martyrs and conveyed this disagreement to him orally. In his view, the fundamental flaw of the book Shahid-e Javid was that it had relied too heavily on the role of the people of Kufa, as if, had it not been for the invitation of the Kufans, he would not have risen up, whereas the Imam's sermons become more impassioned after despairing of the Kufans' support.^[52] Consequently, he emphasizes the element of enjoining good and forbidding evil in the Husseini uprising and maintains that: "Imam Hossein is an assailant against the corrupt government of the time; he is a revolutionary and an insurgent."^[53]

Nevertheless, he did not write an independent critique of Shahid-e Javid; rather, he presented his criticisms during various lectures and occasionally addressed the issue in his notes. Later, when the book Hamaseh-ye Hosseini was published and the master's critiques were reflected in it, the author of Shahid-e Javid responded to them in his interviews and conversations. This prompted the Supervisory Council for the Publication of the Works of Master Shahid Motahhari to publish the master's critiques in a single, independent booklet of 94 pages in pocket size. The introduction to this booklet states that Master Motahhari's critiques angered the author of Shahid-e Javid and that devils, aiming to strike at Shahid Motahhari and Imam Khomeini: "have, since the publication of the book Hamaseh-ye Hosseini, incited this naive old man to give newspaper interviews and write articles."^[54] Consequently, in order to clarify public opinion, the council undertook the independent publication of the master's views. However, this action was not very effective, and Salehi published the book Negahi be Hamaseh-ye Hosseini-ye Ostad Motahhari^[55]. In this 460-page book, organized into four parts and a conclusion, the author, from his own perspective, addressed and exposed the master's "elementary interpretations," "contradictions," "historical errors," and "reliance on unreliable sources." He also published the book Asa-ye Musa ya Darman-e Bimari-ye Gholovv^[56] in 2001 in response to the critiques of opponents of his view. In this 238-page book, the views of Messrs. Rafi'i Qazvini, Allameh Tabatabai, Zahedi Qomi, Mohammad Fazel and Shahab Eshraqi, Seyyed Ahmad Fahri Zanjani, Seyyed Mohammad Mehdi Mortazavi, Reza Ostadi, and Safi Golpayegani are examined and criticized. The author mentions in the introduction to this book that it was originally written and printed in the early 1970s and was supposed to be published under the pseudonym Abdullah Mazloum, but SAVAK agents: "took the printed forms of the book from the printing house by force of arms."^[57]

Ayatollah Reza Ostadi, who himself had published the book Barrasi-ye Qesmati az Shahid-e Javid in 107 pages in the 1970s as a critique of Shahid-e Javid,^[58] provided a detailed report of the background and consequences of this book over 608 pages in the book Gozaresh-e Ketab-e Shahid-e Javid, in which he included excerpts from various books, to which one can refer for further detail. Of course, this book was also criticized by Ayatollah Salehi Najafabadi, and in an eight-page article titled Naqdi Kam-Hajm bar Ketabi Por-Hajm, he enumerated seven weaknesses of this book and took issue with Mr. Ostadi's manner of citing Imam Khomeini's position on the philosophy of the uprising of the Lord of the Martyrs.^[59] It is worth noting that Ayatollah Ostadi, in his book, dedicated a section to quoting Imam Khomeini's views on the philosophy of the uprising of the Lord of the Martyrs and had tried to show that his view aligned with the dominant perspective and opposed the view of the book Shahid-e Javid. However, Salehi, by quoting another statement from the Imam in 1971, sought to offer a different interpretation of the Imam's view.^[60]

Imam Khomeini himself did not enter this dispute and from the outset opposed such a process and its consequences, expressing this on various occasions. In a letter to his son, Seyyed Ahmad, he wrote: "Do not involve yourself in the disputes between the students and the preachers concerning the book or anything else."^[61] Also, in a letter to Ayatollah Mohammad Yazdi, he wrote: "What has recently caused me regret are the disputes that have arisen, I know not by whose hand, in the seminary of Qom and among the preachers, indeed even the prayer niche, and in the same manner among the scholars of Tehran and the preachers there [...] Today, when the very foundations of the rulings are under assault by foreigners and their lackeys, instead of unity of purpose, this kind of division, mutual insult, and excommunication is a source of the utmost regret and reveals a lack of maturity in the community."^[62] In his view, this entire affair was nothing but a squandering and waste of the Shiites' energies: "What a commotion they stirred up over the book *Shahid-e Javid*? Disputes among themselves. The preachers, the prayer leaders, the merchants, and so on. One pulled from that side, another pulled from this side [...] All energies were spent on the book *Shahid-e Javid*."^[63] Elsewhere, he referred to this issue as follows: "Qom itself spent all its time on *Shahid-e Javid* until it was finished."^[64] Overall, his analysis was that this was a game whose ultimate winner was the Shah's regime, and it caused a waste of time and energy for the people of Iran.^[65]

A New Formulation of *Shahid-e Javid*

During this time, Salehi Najafabadi continued to develop his theory, respond to objections, and seek new evidence in his favor. Thus, in the article Matching Imam Hussein's Uprising with Jurisprudential Standards, by recounting the views of others, he restated and defended his main theory from *Shahid-e Javid*. In this article, he begins from the point that Imam Hussein's (AS) conduct at all stages, from refusing allegiance to his martyrdom, was completely understandable by human logic and, at the same time, in accordance with Islamic precepts, which can be encompassed in a single goal: enjoining good and forbidding evil. He holds that there is serious disagreement about the cause of the Imam's uprising and its interpretation, whereas, for example, no such disagreement is seen regarding the Battle of Uhud or the Battle of Siffin. He then sets out to find the cause of this disagreement and identifies seven viewpoints among Shia scholars:

1- Imam Hussein's goal in the uprising was to form a government. This is the view of the great ancient Shia scholars such as Sheikh Mufid, Seyyed Murtaza, and Sheikh Tusi.

2- The Imam's goal from the very beginning was martyrdom. This statement belongs to Seyyed ibn Tawus, who first presented it in the seventh century in the book *Luhuf*.

3- The Imam's goal initially was to form a government, but after learning of the martyrdom of Muslim ibn Aqil, he resolved on martyrdom. This is the view of the late Motahhari in the book *Hamaseh-ye Hosseini*. He first judges the two distinct viewpoints as follows:

The enemies have said that Imam Hussein intended to rule and was killed; he had a personal goal and did not achieve it. The ignorant friends have said he was killed so that the sins of the community might be forgiven; they gave the matter a heavenly and imaginary aspect, saying what the Christians said about Christ.^[66]

But in the professor's view, neither that position is correct nor this one; rather, the Imam: "saw his being killed as beneficial; he felt the situation was such that if he were killed, it would not be in vain."^[67] Because the logic of Imam Hussein is the logic of a martyr, who records his message only with his blood.^[68] At the same time, he accepts that acting upon the letters of the Kufans and sending Muslim is a sign that: "the Imam was seeking to seize governance and leadership."^[69]

4- The Imam's aim was not to establish a government, and he did not consider his resources sufficient for this task; rather, he wanted the people to rise up against Yazid and transform the existing situation. The late Seyyed Morteza Askari defends this view in the introduction to Mir'at al-Uqul.

5- The aim of Imam Hussein was nothing other than saving his own life and preventing his being killed. This is the view of Ayatollah Ali-Panah Eshtehardi, who wrote: "The Shi'a say: essentially, Imam Hussein did not rise up, he had no intention of jihad [...] therefore, attributing the intention to establish a government to Imam Hussein conforms neither with the view of moderate Sunnis nor with the view of the Shi'a. Indeed, it is the view of the Kharijites and the Nasibis."^[70] He also emphasizes: "Essentially, Imam Hussein's (a.s.) departure from Medina towards Mecca and from Mecca towards Iraq was to save his life (not an exodus, nor an uprising, nor a war with the enemy, nor the establishment of a government, which is more fanciful, baseless, flimsy, and unfounded than all fantasies)."^[71]

6- The Imam knew he would be killed in this uprising and rose up with the knowledge that he would be killed, but not with that as his intention. This is the opinion of Ayatollah Reza Ostadi. According to this view, because the Imam saw the very foundation of Islam in danger and did not deem silence permissible, he "rose up and, knowing that he would be killed on this path and his family taken captive, stepped into the arena of struggle and said: 'Whoever among us is ready to sacrifice his life and has prepared his soul for meeting God, let him depart with us.'"^[72]

7- The Imam's aim was ostensibly an uprising to establish a government, but in reality, it was with the intention of martyrdom. This view appeared in the book Pasdaran-e Vahy (Guardians of Revelation), written by the late Eshraqi and Fazel Lankarani. The title of the fourth section of this book clearly expressed its content: "The Awareness of His Holiness Seyyed al-Shuhada of the Event of Karbala." According to the authors of this book, doubting the Imam's knowledge of his own martyrdom is like doubting whether "the world-illuminating sun has the power to shine through a certain aperture or not."^[73]

The first view initially had its proponents, and in contemporary times, figures like Imam Khomeini believe in it. The second view originates with Seyyed ibn Tawus, and today, it is primarily these two views that are controversial.

Salehi Najafabadi, by recounting these views, critiques the opinions of his opponents and weakens the evidence they have presented. He maintains that the martyrdom of Imam Hussein occurred within the context of history and is a historical event, and if we take historical texts as our arbiter, we realize that within the historical text there is no dispute about the course of events; and if it were just us and history, a clear conclusion emerges, which is that the Imam's uprising was with the intention of establishing a government.^[74] In his view, the Imam's uprising had four stages: 1. Refusal to pledge allegiance, 2. Moving to establish a government, 3. Attempting to cease hostilities and find a middle-ground solution, and finally, 4. Refusing humiliation and preferring martyrdom with honor over a degrading death. In the first stage, after refusing allegiance, the Imam goes to Mecca. In the second stage, upon receiving the letters from the Kufans and with the intention of establishing a government, he sets out for Kufa. The arrival of Hurr's army and the prevention of entry into Kufa marks the beginning of the third stage, and in this stage, the Imam seeks to cease hostilities and head towards a destination other than Kufa: either Syria or another location. In the fourth stage, after Ibn Sa'd's army blocks all paths to ceasing hostilities, the Imam initiates the fourth stage, during which he prefers an honorable death to a humiliating pledge of allegiance or a degrading death. Salehi Najafabadi maintains that the historical text on this matter is clear and explicit, and there is no ambiguity in it. But if this is so, what gives rise to this diversity of views?

In his view, it is these narrations that have caused conflict and disagreement regarding the cause of the Imam's uprising, and the second view—namely, uprising with the intention of martyrdom—has largely been formed on their basis. The evidence for the second view, or "uprising with the intention of martyrdom," consists of two narrations. According to one narration, attributed to Imam al-Sadiq (AS), a heavenly letter was brought to the Prophet by Gabriel, stating: "Fight, so kill and be killed, and go forth with groups for martyrdom, for there is no martyrdom for them except with you."^[75] However, citing the judgment of Allamah al-Hilli regarding one of the narrators of this hadith, namely Abu Jamilah al-Mufaddal ibn Salih, Salehi considers this hadith unreliable.^[76] In his book Khulasat al-Aqwal fi Ma'rifat al-Rijal, Allamah evaluates Abu Jamilah al-Asadi Mufaddal ibn Salih al-Nakhkhas as a liar and states that he fabricated hadiths in the name of Imam al-Sadiq and Imam Musa al-Kazim (peace be upon them).^[77]

According to another narration, based on which Sayyid ibn Tawus identifies the motive for Imam Husayn's uprising as a quest for martyrdom, Imam Husayn says to Muhammad ibn al-Hanafiyyah, who was preventing him from leaving Mecca: "After I parted from you, the Messenger of God came to me and said: 'O Husayn, go forth, for God has willed to see you slain.'"^[78] In Salehi's view, this narration does not exist in sources prior to the book Luhuf (or Malhuf) and became widespread from the seventh century AH onwards.^[79] Of course, Ibn Tawus claims to have transmitted this narration from a narrative book that was later referred to, along with similar books, as an "asl" (source text), and which may well have been lost.

Salehi Najafabadi raises numerous questions about the authenticity of this report and maintains that such narrations were fabricated by the Ghulat (extremists). Since they considered the Imam's knowledge to be absolute and infinite, and the issue of striving to gain governance and unawareness of martyrdom was incompatible with this knowledge, they were compelled to deny the role of seeking governance in Imam Husayn's case.^[80] They even went so far in this direction as to claim: "Any Imam who does not know what will befall him and what his fate will be is not God's proof over His creation."^[81] But when they saw that this claim was incompatible with the explicit Quranic verse stating: "And I do not know what will be done with me or with you,"^[82] they said that this verse is not from the Quran and that heretics fabricated it and inserted it into the Quran. They then cast this new claim in the form of a hadith and attributed it to Imam Ali (AS). Salehi then quotes from al-Tabarsi's al-Ihtijaj that a heretic came to Imam Ali and asked questions, including why such a verse exists in the Quran that negates the Prophet's knowledge. The Imam replied that this verse is among the additions of the hypocrites and enemies of Islam. They tampered with the Quran, adding to and subtracting from it, and: "They added to it that whose incompatibility and dissonance has become apparent."^[83]

After a detailed critique of these narrations and the views of his opponents, Salehi continues to defend the position he advanced in the book Shahid-e Javid, presenting the Imam's departure first as a refusal to pledge allegiance, then as an effort to seize governance, and finally as an avoidance of a life or death of humiliation, considering it a rational, comprehensible, and defensible stance based on jurisprudential standards.

Is the View of Shahid-e Javid Unique?

Salehi Najafabadi employed a difficult task in proving his theory and: “In the present era, the only person who nurtured the theory of forming a government and endeavored to make it reasoned and documented,” was him^[84]and this book thereafter is still considered the sole monograph in this field.^[85]Nevertheless, the effort towards a precise examination and analysis of historical texts and challenging rival viewpoints was not without result, and today, alongside that martyrdom-seeking view attributed to Imam Hussein and upon which his uprising is analyzed, we are gradually witnessing the formation and strengthening of a different perspective. At the very least, no one can simply bypass Salehi Najafabadi’s theory and ignore it. He revived the ancient Shiite theory on this matter and sought assistance from figures such as Sheikh Mufid, Seyyed Murtada, and Sheikh Tusi, and today we also witness that this theory is more or less defended.

It should not be forgotten that Sheikh Mufid also defends the theory of forming a government and holds that after receiving the letters from the people of Kufa, the Imam “called for jihad and prepared for battle, and set out with his children and household from the Sanctuary of God and the Sanctuary of His Messenger towards battle to seek victory over the enemies with the help of those of his followers who had invited him; so he, peace be upon him, called for jihad and prepared for battle and set out with his children and household from the Sanctuary of God and the Sanctuary of His Messenger towards battle to seek victory over the enemies with the help of those of his followers who had invited him.”^[86] He also doubts Imam Hussein’s knowledge of the Kufans’ breach of covenant and claims: “We do not assert this with certainty, for there is no rational or transmitted proof for it.” Furthermore, even if he knew the end of the affair, he would say that God had asked him, in that case, to endure the calamity with patience.^[87]

Seyyed Murtada and Sheikh Tusi also have clear statements regarding the government-seeking nature of the Husseini uprising. In the contemporary era, others also support this view. For example, Imam Khomeini holds that Imam Hussein (AS) sent Muslim ibn Aqil to take allegiance from the people of Kufa in order to “form an Islamic government.”^[88] At the same time, he believes that it was evident from the circumstantial evidence who would be the military victor in this battle, and due to the imbalance of forces, there was no possibility of confronting the government’s forces, but he rose up in pursuit of fulfilling his duty.^[89] Also, according to Ayatollah Makarem Shirazi, Imam Hussein’s refusal to pledge allegiance to Yazid and his sending of Muslim to Kufa “is a clear proof that his uprising was for the formation of a just Islamic government.”^[90]

Sehati Sardroudi, who does not accept Salehi Najafabadi’s view on Imam Hussein’s uprising, considers it an old theory and holds that: “He, in truth, expanded upon the few pages of statements by Sharif Murtada Alam al-Huda and presented it in a considerable book, but his book created a revolution in the field of Ashura studies, which is undeniable.”^[91]In contrast, Esfandiari uses Salehi Najafabadi’s findings as the basis for his work in the book Ashura Research to prove the same view in greater detail. By reporting and critiquing other views, he conveys Salehi Najafabadi’s accepted view and provides numerous historical evidences in its favor.

Who is the judge? History, theology, or culture?

A uniform and comprehensive analysis of the Husayni uprising has yet to be offered, and this rare movement continues to inspire Shiites and provoke them to reflection. However, it seems that for a more sound scholarly engagement with this issue, three aspects of the Husayni uprising must be considered: the historical aspect, the theological aspect, and the cultural aspect. The reality is that a bloody event befell the grandson of the Messenger of God (PBUH), which history has recorded for us. Subsequently, various interpretations of this incident have been made, and now the dominant interpretation appears to be inconsistent with historical evidence. Following that rare event and based on this dominant interpretation, a culture and attitude have taken shape among Shiites, and rituals have been formed around it. Depending on which of these three aspects we take as our point of departure, we apparently arrive at different conclusions. Salehi begins with history and, based on historical documentation, concludes that the Imam's intention was to form a government, although he was later compelled to alter his intention. Most of his opponents, citing certain narrations and in fact based on certain theological presuppositions, start from the point that the Imam was already aware of all the events that were to occur in the future. The general Shiite populace, regardless of these historical and theological disputes, holds a particular perception of the martyrdom of the Lord of Martyrs, and it does not appear that these controversies have any impact on their social practice, the performance of Ashura rites and rituals, or the symbolic role of the Imam's martyrdom.

Here, it is necessary first to clarify our position on history and its credibility. In Salehi's view, if we correctly piece together the historical fragments and reports, only one conclusion will follow: the Imam's uprising was intended to form a government, not to achieve martyrdom. But opponents of Salehi's view disqualify history in this specific case. For example, regarding the motive for the Imam's uprising and his knowledge of his martyrdom, and whether he intended martyrdom or not, Professor Motahhari holds that one cannot seek help from history on this matter, because:

From a historical perspective, it cannot be proven that the Imam set out with the intention of going to Karbala or with knowledge of being killed; rather, according to history, which transmits the outward aspects of events, the Imam moved towards Kufa and with the intention of reaching Kufa, and as a result of the encounter with Hurr, and Hurr not allowing the Imam to leave the region of Iraq, and the Imam's unwillingness to go to Kufa under Hurr's guard, they took a route towards the west and to the left of the road until they reached Karbala, and later, as a result of Ibn Ziyad's letter, they were stopped at that location. And regarding knowledge of being killed, history does not prove anything beyond the perilousness and unreliability of this journey.^[92]

Nevertheless, he holds that the Imam, on a spiritual level and at the level of his Imamate and spirituality, had knowledge of his martyrdom in Karbala and knew that he would be martyred there. Of course, Professor Motahhari does not deny that the Imam desired governance, but he believes that the conditions and groundwork for this were not prepared.^[93]This is where two issues must be clarified. First, to what extent can history be brought into such matters? Second, is history truly so ambiguous on the issue of the Husayni uprising that one cannot seek help from it, or by reforming some of our theological presuppositions, can we open history's mouth and allow it to speak?

Here, there is a specific conflict between historical data and certain Shiite theological beliefs, namely the Imam's knowledge, and if we grant primacy to theology, Salehi's position is weakened and he cannot use history to his advantage. But if, in such matters, we consider history as an arbiter acceptable to both sides, Salehi appears to be in the right. The issue is that Shiites believe in the Imam's knowledge and regard it as part of their core beliefs. According to one account of the Imam's knowledge, he is aware in advance of everything that will occur. If this account is accepted, Salehi's effort to divide the stages of the uprising into four phases fails, because it is based on the Imam's ignorance of the future or his non-involvement of his knowledge in such affairs. Of course, among Shiite scholars, after a consensus on the necessity of the Imam's knowledge and an emphasis that the Imam must be the most knowledgeable of the entire community, there are discussions and differences of opinion regarding the scope of this knowledge. A number of scholars limit the scope of the Imam's knowledge solely to religious matters and what pertains to the essential issues of Imamate. According to Seyyed Morteza, reason dictates that the Imam be knowledgeable in the domain entrusted to him and whose management is demanded of him, and no more.^[94] Mohaqqeq al-Hilli also holds that the Imam is the most knowledgeable only in religious affairs, and when the objection is raised that if the Imam is knowledgeable in religious laws, he must also be knowledgeable in crafts, he replies: "That which pertains to religious rulings, it is obligatory for the Imam to be more knowledgeable about it than others, not beyond that."^[95] Whereas some greatly expand the scope of this knowledge and even consider knowledge of other languages to be included in it. ^[96] In this context, Ibn Maytham al-Bahrani attempts to specify the scope and type of the Imam's knowledge.^[97]

Therefore, before attempting to find other historical evidence in favor of this or that position, one must strive to clarify the scope of the Imam's knowledge and its theological dimensions. We see an example of such an effort in Allameh Tabatabai. He is asked whether Imam Hussein rose up with the intention of martyrdom or to form a government. In his treatise The Imam's Knowledge, he enters into this discussion in detail and emphatically states that the Imam has knowledge of the unseen, but this knowledge is not duty-imposing, and he acts according to outward appearances. On the other hand, the conditions of Yazid's era compel him to refuse allegiance, and in fact, he rises up due to this refusal of allegiance, the logical result of which at that time was being killed. But this killing is not because of that prior knowledge; rather, the intention here is God's legislative will for the Imam to be killed, because: "God's existential will has no effect on will and action."^[98] Finally, he explains:

When we say the Imam's (AS) aim in rising up was martyrdom, and God willed his martyrdom, this does not mean that God asked him to refuse allegiance to Yazid, then to sit idly by and inform Yazid's men to come and kill him, thus fulfilling his duty in a ridiculous manner and calling it an uprising. Rather, the Imam's (AS) duty was to rise up against the sinister caliphate of Yazid, refuse allegiance, and carry out his refusal—which would lead to martyrdom—by every possible means.^[99]

As a result, the Imam: "decided on a movement and a bloody uprising"^[100] and first sent Muslim ibn Aqil to Kufa. But when he heard the news of his martyrdom, "he changed the method of uprising and offensive war to a defensive uprising, proceeded to purify his group, and keeping only those who would not cease supporting him until the last drop of their blood, set out for his place of death."^[101]

Is this analysis not the same as Salehi Najafabadi's, with the difference that it emphasizes the Imam's knowledge, while simultaneously setting it aside in the outward analysis of affairs? Perhaps it is a little early to judge. With the calming of the impassioned emotions that had erupted over the book Shahid-e Javid, one can expect that in the coming years this discussion will proceed in a more scholarly manner, the contribution of each element in this eternal movement will be acknowledged, and a comprehensive theory will be derived from it.

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Ḥamāsa-yi Ḥusaynī (The Husayni Epic), in the Collected Works, Murtaḍā Muṭahharī, Tehran, Ṣadrā, 1378 [Solar Hijri], vol. 17.

Khulāṣat al-Aqwāl fī Maʿrifat al-Rijāl, Abū Manṣūr Ḥasan ibn Yūsuf Ḥillī, edited by Javād Qayyūmī, Qom, Nashr al-Fiqāha, 1422 AH.

Dāʾirat al-Maʿārif-i Fiqh-i Muqāran (Encyclopedia of Comparative Jurisprudence), under the supervision of Nāṣir Makārim Shīrāzī with the collaboration of a group of researchers, Qom, Madrasa-yi Imām ʿAlī ibn Abī Ṭālib, 1385 [Solar Hijri].

Difāʿ az Ḥusayn-i Shahīd Radd bar Kitāb-i Shahīd-i Jāvīd (Defense of the Martyr Husayn: A Refutation of the Book Shahid-e Javid), Muḥammad ʿAlī Anṣārī Qummī, [Tehran?, Islāmiyya?, 1350? Solar Hijri].

Sarguzasht-i Kitāb-i Shahīd-i Jāvīd bih Ḍamīma-yi Dū Risāla dar ʿIlm-i Imām az ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī (The Story of the Book Shahid-e Javid, with an Appendix of Two Treatises on the Knowledge of the Imam by Allameh Tabatabai), Riḍā Ustādī, Qom, Quds, 1382 [Solar Hijri].

al-Shāfī fī al-Imāma, al-Sharīf al-Murtaḍā ʿAlī ibn al-Ḥusayn al-Mūsawī, edited by Sayyid ʿAbd al-Zahrāʾ al-Ḥusaynī al-Khaṭīb, Tehran, Muʾassisa al-Ṣādiq, 1410 AH.

Shahādat (Martyrdom), ʿAlī Sharīʿatī, Tehran, Ḥusayniyya-yi Irshād, [n.d.].

Shahīd-i Jāvīd (The Eternal Martyr), Niʿmat Allāh Ṣāliḥī Najafābādī, Tehran, Rasā, 1361 [Solar Hijri].

Ṣaḥīfa-yi Imām, Tehran, Muʾassisa-yi Tanẓīm va Nashr-i Āthār-i Imām Khumaynī, 1378 [Solar Hijri].

ʿĀshūrā Pazhūhī bā Rūykardī bih Taḥrīf-shināsī-yi Tārīkh-i Imām Ḥusayn (Ashura Studies with an Approach to the Study of Distortions in the History of Imam Husayn), Muḥammad Ṣiḥatī Sardrūdī, Qom, Khādim al-Riḍā, 1384 [Solar Hijri].

ʿĀshūrā-shināsī (Ashura Studies), Muḥammad Isfandiyārī, Qom, Ṣaḥīfa-yi Khirad, 1387 [Solar Hijri].

ʿAṣā-yi Mūsā yā Darmān-i Bīmārī-yi Ghuluww (The Staff of Moses, or the Cure for the Disease of Exaggeration), Niʿmat Allāh Ṣāliḥī Najafābādī, Tehran, Umīd-i Fardā, 1380 [Solar Hijri].

Qaḍāvat-i Zan dar Fiqh-i Islāmī Hamrāh bā Chand Maqāla-yi Dīgar (Women's Judgeship in Islamic Jurisprudence, with Several Other Articles), Niʿmat Allāh Ṣāliḥī Najafābādī, Tehran, Umīd-i Fardā, 1384 [Solar Hijri].

Kitāb-i Haft Sāla Chirā Ṣadā Dar Āvard (Why the Seven-Year-Old Book Made a Noise), ʿAlī-Panāh Ishtihārdī, Qom, Chāpkhāna-yi ʿIlmiyya-yi Qom, 1391 AH.

Majmuʿa-yi Rasāʾil (Vol. 2: Risālat al-Wilāya, ʿIlm, Burhān wa ʿIlm-i Imām), Sayyid Muḥammad Ḥusayn Ṭabāṭabāʾī, edited by Sayyid Hādī Khusrawshāhī, Qom, Būstān-i Kitāb, 1387 [2008].

al-Maslak fī Uṣūl al-Dīn wa Talīhi al-Risāla al-Māniʿiyya, Najm al-Dīn Abū al-Qāsim Jaʿfar ibn al-Ḥasan ibn Saʿīd Ḥillī, edited by Riḍā Ustādī, Mashhad, Bunyād-i Pazhūhishhā-yi Āstān-i Quds-i Raḍawī, 1373 [1994].

Muʿtaqad al-Imāma: A Persian Text on Shiʿi Kalām, Uṣūl, and Fiqh from the Seventh Century, edited by Muḥammad Taqī Dānishpazhūh, Tehran, University of Tehran, 1339 [1960].

al-Malhūf ʿalā Qatlā al-Ṭufūf, Raḍī al-Dīn ʿAlī ibn Mūsā ibn Jaʿfar ibn Ṭāwūs, edited by Fāris Tabrīziyān, Qom, Uswa, 1414 AH.

al-Najāt fī al-Qiyāma fī Taḥqīq al-Imāma, Maytham ibn ʿAlī ibn Maytham al-Baḥrānī, Qom, Majmaʿ al-Fikr al-Islāmī, 1417 AH.

Critiques of the Book Shahīd-i Jāwīd by Ustād Muṭahharī, Tehran, Ṣadrā, 1379 [2000].

A Look at Ustād Muṭahharī's Ḥamāsa-yi Ḥusaynī, Niʿmat Allāh Ṣāliḥī Najafābādī, Tehran, Kavīr, 1379 [2000].

A Brief Examination Concerning the Sacred Uprising of the Immortal Martyr Ḥusayn ibn ʿAlī, Peace Be Upon Them, from the Perspective of Narrations, Muḥammad Ḥusayn Ashʿarī, Ḥusayn Karamī, and Sayyid Ḥasan Āl-i Ṭāhā, [n.p., n.pub., n.d.].

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[1] Kitāb-i Māh-i Dīn, no. 170, Ādhar 1390 [December 2011].

[2] ʿĀshūrā Pazhūhī: With an Approach to the Study of Distortions in the History of Imam Ḥusayn, Muḥammad Ṣiḥatī Sardrūdī, Qom, Khādim al-Riḍā, 1384 [2005], p. 309.

[3] Political Thought in Contemporary Islam, Ḥamīd ʿInāyat, translated by Bahāʾ al-Dīn Khurramshāhī, Tehran, Khwārazmī, 1365 [1986], p. 319.

[4] Ibid., p. 325.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Ibid., p. 326.

[7] Ibid., p. 327.

[8] Ibid., p. 330.

[9] Ibid.

[10] Ibid., p. 331.

[11] Ibid., p. 325.

[12] Tanzīh al-Anbiyāʾ wa al-Aʾimma, Sharīf Murtaḍā ʿAlam al-Hudā, edited by Fāris Ḥassūn, Qom, Būstān-i Kitāb-i Qom, 1380 [2001], p. 270.

[13] Ibid., p. 271.

[14] Ibid., p. 272.

[15] Talkhīṣ al-Shāfī, Abū Jaʿfar Ṭūsī, edited by Sayyid Ḥusayn Baḥr al-ʿUlūm, Qom, Dār al-Kutub al-Islāmiyya, 1374 [1995], vol. 4, p. 185.

[16] Shahīd-i Jāwīd, Niʿmat Allāh Ṣāliḥī Najafābādī, Tehran, Rasā, 1361 [1982], p. 159.

[17] In the book Qiḍāwat-i Zan dar Fiqh-i Islāmī: Hamrāh bā Chand Maqāla-yi Dīgar, Niʿmat Allāh Ṣāliḥī Najafābādī, Tehran, Umīd-i Fardā, 1384 [2005].

[18] Shahīd-i Jāwīd, p. 400.

[19] Taṭbīq-i Qiyām-i Imām Ḥusayn bā Mavāzīn-i Fiqhī, in Qiḍāwat-i Zan dar Fiqh-i Islāmī: Hamrāh bā Chand Maqāla-yi Dīgar, p. 213.

[20] Ibid., p. 211.

[21] Ḥusayn ʿAlayhi al-Salām: Shahīd-i Āgāh wa Rahbar-i Nijāt-bakhsh-i Islām, Luṭf Allāh Ṣāfī, Tehran, Muʾassisa-yi Nashr wa Tablīgh, 3rd edition, 1366 [1987], p. 80.

[22] Ibid., pp. 80-81.

[23] Ibid., the book's introduction titled "To the Reader," unpaginated.

[24] Ibid.

[25] Ketab-e Haft Saleh Chera Seda Dar Avord [Why the Seven-Year-Old Book Made a Sound], Ali-Panah Eshtehardi, Qom, Qom Elmiyyeh Printing House, 1391 AH, p. 6.

[26] Ibid., p. 2.

[27] Javab-e U az Ketab-e U ya Shobahat-e Shahid-e Javid dar Mowzu-e Qiyam-e Husayn ibn Ali Alayhim al-Salam [His Answer from His Book, or the Dubieties of Shahid-e Javid on the Subject of the Uprising of Husayn ibn Ali, Peace Be Upon Them], Seyyed Mohammad Mehdi Mortazavi, Qom, Allameh, 1350 [1971/1972], p. 6.

[28] Defa az Husayn-e Shahid, Radd bar Ketab-e Shahid-e Javid [Defense of Husayn the Martyr, a Refutation of the Book Shahid-e Javid], Mohammad Ali Ansari Qomi, [Tehran?], [Islamiyyeh?], [1350?], p. iii.

[29] Ibid., p. vii.

[30] Ibid., pp. vii-viii.

[31] Ibid., p. viii.

[32] Yek Barrasi-ye Mokhtasar dar Piramun-e Qiyam-e Moqaddas-e Shahid-e Javid Husayn ibn Ali Alayhima al-Salam az Nazar-e Revayat [A Brief Examination of the Sacred Uprising of the Immortal Martyr Husayn ibn Ali, Peace Be Upon Them Both, from the Perspective of Narrations], Mohammad Hossein Ash'ari, Hossein Karami, and Seyyed Hasan Al-e Taha, [n.p., n.pub., 1350?], p. 4.

[33] Asa-ye Musa ya Darman-e Bimari-ye Gholovv [The Staff of Moses, or the Cure for the Disease of Exaggeration], Ne'matollah Salehi Najafabadi, Tehran, Omid-e Farda, 1380 [2001/2002], p. 88.

[34] Sargozasht-e Ketab-e Shahid-e Javid, be Zamimeh-ye Do Resaleh dar Elm-e Imam az Allameh Tabatabai [The Story of the Book Shahid-e Javid, with an Appendix of Two Treatises on the Knowledge of the Imam by Allameh Tabatabai], Reza Ostadi, Qom, Qods, 1382 [2003/2004], p. 560.

[35] Ibid., p. 282.

[36] Ibid., p. 181.

[37] Ibid.

[38] Ibid., p. 183.

[39] Ibid., pp. 183-184.

[40] Ibid., p. 189.

[41] Ibid., p. 190.

[42] The ellipsis is in the original text.

[43] Ibid., p. 192.

[44] Shahadat [Martyrdom], Ali Shariati, Tehran, Hosseiniyeh Ershad, pp. 35-36.

[45] Piramun-e Nazar-e Doktor Ali Shariati Daneshmand-e Mojahed dar Bareh-ye Ketab-e Shahid-e Javid [On the View of Dr. Ali Shariati, the Scholar and Mojahed, Regarding the Book Shahid-e Javid], compiled by the Association for the Investigation of Historical and Doctrinal Issues, [n.p.], Najafabad Publications, 1359 [1980/1981], p. 4.

[46] Jaryan-ha va Sazman-ha-ye Mazhabi-Siyasi-ye Iran, Sal-ha-ye 1320-1357 [Religious-Political Currents and Organizations in Iran, 1941-1979], Rasul Jafarian, Mo'asseseh-ye Farhangi-ye Danesh va Andisheh-ye Mo'aser, 1382 [2003/2004], p. 375.

[47] Ibid., p. 78.

[48] Ibid.

[49] Sargozasht-e Ketab-e Shahid-e Javid, p. 70.

[50] Haft Hezar Ruz-e Tarikh-e Iran [Seven Thousand Days of Iranian History], vol. 1, pp. 429 and 551, cited in Jaryan-ha va Sazman-ha-ye Mazhabi-Siyasi-ye Iran, p. 372.

[51] Ibid.

[52] Hamaseh-ye Hosseini [The Husayni Epic], Martyr Morteza Motahhari, in Majmu'eh-ye Asar [Collected Works], vol. 17, p. 148.

[53] Ibid.

[54] Motahhari’s Critiques of the Book *Shahid-e Javid*, Tehran, Sadra, 2000, p. 6.

[55] *A Look at Motahhari’s Epic of Hussein*, Nematollah Salehi Najafabadi, Tehran, Kavir, 2000.

[56] *The Staff of Moses or the Cure for the Disease of Exaggeration*, Nematollah Salehi Najafabadi, Tehran, Omid-e Farda, 2001.

[57] Ibid., p. 16.

[58] *The Story of the Book Shahid-e Javid*, p. 284 and other pages where parts of this book are quoted.

[59] A brief critique of a voluminous book in “Women’s Judgment in Islamic Jurisprudence, along with Several Other Articles,” Nematollah Salehi Najafabadi, p. 302.

[60] On the Imam’s view in this regard, see: *Ashura in Jurisprudence*, Seyyed Zia Mortazavi, Qom, Islamic Propagation Office, 1998, p. 81 ff.

[61] *Sahifeh-ye Imam*, Tehran, Institute for Compilation and Publication of Imam Khomeini’s Works, 1999, vol. 3, p. 18.

[62] Ibid., vol. 2, p. 341.

[63] Ibid., vol. 4, p. 236.

[64] Ibid., vol. 8, p. 533.

[65] For example, see: *Sahifeh-ye Imam*, vol. 7, p. 409 and vol. 8, p. 460.

[66] *The Epic of Hussein*, Morteza Motahhari, in *Collected Works*, Tehran, Sadra, 1999, vol. 17, p. 475.

[67] Ibid., p. 485.

[68] Ibid., p. 150.

[69] Ibid., p. 539.

[70] *Why Did the Seven-Year-Old Book Make a Sound?*, Alipanah Eshtehardi, p. 154.

[71] Ibid., pp. 193-194.

[72] *The Story of the Book Shahid-e Javid*, p. 466.

[73] *The Story of the Book Shahid-e Javid*, p. 246.

[74] “Matching Imam Hussein’s Uprising with Jurisprudential Standards,” in *Women’s Judgment in Islamic Jurisprudence*, p. 71.

[75] *Usul al-Kafi*, Muhammad ibn Ya’qub al-Kulayni, Tehran, Islamiyah, 1986, vol. 1, p. 280.

[76] “Matching Imam Hussein’s Uprising with Jurisprudential Standards,” in *Women’s Judgment in Islamic Jurisprudence*, p. 91.

[77] *Khulasat al-Aqwal fi Ma’rifat al-Rijal*, Abu Mansur Hasan ibn Yusuf al-Hilli, ed. Javad Qayyumi, Qom, Nashr al-Fiqahah, 1422 AH, p. 407.

[78] *Al-Malhuf ‘ala Qatla al-Tufuf*, Radi al-Din Ali ibn Musa ibn Ja’far ibn Tawus, ed. Faris Tabrizian, Qom, Uswah, 1414 AH, p. 128.

[79] “Matching Imam Hussein’s Uprising with Jurisprudential Standards,” in *Women’s Judgment in Islamic Jurisprudence*, p. 94.

[80] Ibid., p. 100.

[81] *Usul al-Kafi*, vol. 1, p. 258.

[82] Al-Ahqaf, verse 9.

[83] Al-Iḥtijāj, Aḥmad ibn ʿAlī ibn Abī Ṭālib Ṭabarsī, edited by Ibrāhīm Bahādurī and Muḥammad Hādī Bah, Qom, Uswah, 1413 AH, vol. 1, p. 607.

[84] ʿĀshūrāshināsī, Muḥammad Isfandiyārī, Qom, Ṣaḥīfah-yi Khirad, 1387 Sh, p. 114.

[85] Ibid., p. 117.

[86] Al-Irshād, Abū ʿAbd Allāh Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad ibn Nuʿmān, known as Shaykh Mufīd, in Muṣannafāt al-Shaykh al-Mufīd, Qom, al-Muʾtamar al-ʿĀlamī al-Alfī lil-Shaykh al-Mufīd, 1413 AH, vol. 2, p. 31.

[87] Al-Masāʾil al-ʿUkbariyya, Abū ʿAbd Allāh Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad ibn Nuʿmān, known as Shaykh Mufīd, edited by ʿAlī Akbar Ilāhī Khurāsānī, in Muṣannafāt al-Shaykh al-Mufīd, Qom, al-Muʾtamar al-ʿĀlamī al-Alfī lil-Shaykh al-Mufīd, 1413 AH, vol. 6, p. 71.

[88] Ṣaḥīfah-yi Imām, vol. 2, p. 373.

[89] Ibid., vol. 5, p. 163.

[90] Dāʾirat al-Maʿārif-i Fiqh-i Muqārin, under the supervision of Nāṣir Makārim Shīrāzī with the collaboration of a group of researchers, Qom, Madrasah-yi Imām ʿAlī ibn Abī Ṭālib, 1385 Sh, vol. 1, p. 532.

[91] ʿĀshūrā Pazhūhī bā Rūykardī bih Taḥrīfshināsī-yi Tārīkh-i Imām Ḥusayn, p. 309.

[92] Ḥamāsah-yi Ḥusaynī, in Majmūʿah-yi Āsār, vol. 17, p. 535.

[93] Ibid., p. 678.

[94] Al-Shāfī fī al-Imāmah, Sharīf al-Murtaḍā ʿAlī ibn al-Ḥusayn al-Mūsawī, edited by Sayyid ʿAbd al-Zahrāʾ al-Ḥusaynī al-Khaṭīb, Tehran, Muʾassasat al-Ṣādiq, 1410 AH, vol. 2, p. 8.

[95] Al-Maslak fī Uṣūl al-Dīn wa Talīhi al-Risālah al-Māniʿiyyah, Najm al-Dīn Abū al-Qāsim Jaʿfar ibn al-Ḥasan ibn Saʿīd Ḥillī, edited by Riḍā Ustādī, Mashhad, Bunyād-i Pazhūhishhā-yi Āstān-i Quds-i Raḍawī, 1373 Sh, p. 209.

[96] Muʿtaqad al-Imāmah, a Persian text on Shīʿī theology, principles of jurisprudence, and jurisprudence from the seventh century, edited by Muḥammad Taqī Dānishpazhūh, Tehran, University of Tehran, 1339 Sh, p. 103.

[97] Al-Najāt fī al-Qiyāmah fī Taḥqīq al-Imāmah, Maytham ibn ʿAlī ibn Maytham al-Baḥrānī, Qom, Majmaʿ al-Fikr al-Islāmī, 1417 AH, p. 67.

[98] Sarguzasht-i Shahīd-i Jāvīd, p. 538.

[99] Majmūʿah-yi Rasāʾil, Sayyid Muḥammad Ḥusayn Ṭabāṭabāʾī, vol. 2, p. 253.

[100] Ibid.

[101] Ibid., p. 254.

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