Seyyed Hassan Eslami Ardakani's Article 'Sheikh Baha'i and the Question of Truth-Seeking and Misguidance'

Sheikh Baha'i and the Question of Truth-Seeking and Misguidance[1]

Seyyed Hassan Eslami Ardakani

Introduction

Sheikh Abdullah ibn Salih al-Bahrani considered Sheikh Baha'i to hold weak beliefs and asserts that he claimed that if someone falls into error on the path to reaching the truth, they are excused. He then raises objections to this statement. This writing seeks to examine this statement and the objection raised against it in its historical context and to demonstrate the strength of Sheikh Baha'i's view. To achieve this aim, the present writing is organized into an introduction and five sections. After presenting al-Bahrani's claim regarding the weakness of Sheikh Baha'i's beliefs, its accuracy is examined, and then the compatibility of Sheikh Baha'i's view with the position of Shi'i Usuli scholars is expounded. Subsequently, al-Bahrani's objection and its similarity to al-Ghazali's objection are examined. In the end, after examining the defensibility of Sheikh Baha'i's statement, the author offers two interpretations, minimal and maximal, of Sheikh Baha'i's statement, which provides a basis for further discussion on this matter.

Introduction

Baha' al-Din Muhammad al-'Amili (953-1030 AH), known as Sheikh Baha'i, is a renowned Shi'i scholar of the eleventh century who had diverse interests, which made him a polymath. His strong mystical, literary, jurisprudential, and theological tastes impelled him to create enduring works, each of which holds a fitting place among Muslim scholars. Moreover, his manner of conduct and judgment was such that rival intellectual currents usually considered him one of their own and defended him.[2] In contrast, some have tried to impugn the correctness of some of his judgments and criticize them. Among these individuals, one can name Sheikh Abdullah ibn Salih al-Samahiji al-Bahrani (d. 1135 AH), a renowned Akhbari scholar, who fiercely defended absolute traditionalism, denied logic and philosophy, and considered philosophers to be deceived infidels.[3] According to Khwansari's writings, he was a pious scholar, constantly engaged in teaching, studying, and writing, and not a day passed without one of these activities (1390 AH, vol. 4, 247). Nevertheless, his strong traditionalist inclination led him, in the book Riyad al-Jinan al-Mashhun bi'l-Lu'lu' wa al-Marjan,[4] to attack one of Sheikh Baha'i's beliefs and deem it certainly false.

Sheikh Yusuf al-Bahrani (d. 1135 AH), who is himself a renowned Akhbari scholar and a contemporary of Sheikh Abdullah al-Samahiji, quotes and refutes this statement of his (al-Bahrani [n.d.], 19. Also see: Khwansari 1390 AH, vol. 7, 67 and Kermanshahi, 1412 AH, vol. 2, 398-399). According to al-Samahiji al-Bahrani's claim, Sheikh Baha'i:

held some weak beliefs, such as the belief that if a legally responsible person (mukallaf) exerts their utmost effort in seeking proof, and errs in their belief, there is no sin upon them and they will not abide in the Fire eternally, even if they are opposed to the people of truth (al-Bahrani, 19).^[5]

This belief, in al-Bahrani's view, is unacceptable. For, according to it, it would necessarily follow that the scholars of the misguided and the leaders of disbelief, "such as Abu Hanifa and his ilk," without being followers of the people of truth, if they reached a false conclusion due to their doubts and corrupt thoughts and stood against the people of truth, would not be dwellers of Hell (ibid.)

Here, he first attributes a belief to Sheikh Baha'i and then enumerates its corrupt consequences, thus demonstrating its falsehood, and points to a provocative example. Therefore, it is necessary to analyze the course of his reasoning in the same order, meaning we must first see whether this attribution is correct or not. Secondly, whether this claim, assuming its correctness, is accepted by Shi'i scholars or not. Thirdly, whether such a belief entails corrupt consequences, and finally, fourthly, whether such a belief is fundamentally defensible or not.

1_ Examining the Accuracy of the Claim

An explicit statement of this view by Sheikh Baha'i, at least in his treatise on beliefs,[6] is not seen, and Mirza Mohammad Tonekaboni, after recounting the original claim of such a statement, also professes ignorance of it ([n.d.], 242). However, it seems that the issuance of such a statement by Sheikh Baha'i is possible and consistent with his viewpoint. Moreover, examples of this stance can be shown in his poetry. For instance, in the poem Bread and Cheese under the title Fi al-Tahqiq (On Investigation), Sheikh Baha'i defends this position decisively:

Blessed is the soul that embarked on the quest

And searched for Truth from lane to lane, with zest

In every state, kept Truth as its sole aim

Knew what was Truth, and falsehood did disclaim

If you are thus, then read whatever book

Know that, in the end, rewarded you shall look

But if not Truth you seek, O vicious one!

This very science of Hadith your proof shall stun

Go, then, and explore the array^[7] of opinions

Till you discern the places of errors' dominions (Baha'i, [n.d.], 202).

According to this account, Sheikh Baha'i believes that if someone embarks on an inquiry truth-seekingly and truth-willingly, examines various writings, becomes acquainted with different opinions, and weighs them, then ultimately, regardless of the conclusion reached, they are rewarded and have walked the path of truth, provided that their intention has always been to reach the truth, and nothing else. In the continuation of these couplets, Sheikh Baha'i supports his claim with the saying of the Commander of the Faithful, Imam Ali (peace be upon him), and adds:

Thus spoke the King of Knowledge and Creed

Guide of gnosis, the Commander of the Faithful indeed

In fact, this last couplet is an allusion to this saying of His Eminence the Commander (peace be upon him):

Whoever confronts the various facets of opinions, recognizes the sites of error (Kulayni, 1365 AH, vol. 8, 22).

He who went forth to meet opinions, recognized the places of misstep.

2. The Compatibility of Sheikh Baha'i's Stance with Shiite Scholars

If we consider the above statement, based solely on the two instances mentioned, as indicative of Sheikh Baha'i's view on truth-seeking and, on that basis, accept Samahiji's claim, Sheikh Baha'i has not expressed an opinion outside the accepted norm of Shiism. In fact, this stance is rooted in an older debate known among Shiite and Sunni Muslims as the issue of Takhti'ah and Taswib (Error and Ratification). This issue, which was initially a theological discussion in nature, later took on a predominantly jurisprudential-legal character and its scope was narrowed. The purpose of the Takhti'ah and Taswib debate is to examine the position of religious scholars in discovering God's actual rulings. According to some Muslim scholars, whatever ruling a scholar arrives at, provided they strive according to the correct method, that very ruling will be God's ruling, and from this perspective, every scholar is "Musib" (correct) and has reached God's actual ruling. These individuals are called "Musawwibah," and this theory is called Taswib. In contrast to this view, another group of Muslims believes that God's ruling in every case is specific, and the scholars' task is merely to discover it; and since this ruling is singular, necessarily, when there are multiple opinions about a ruling, only one opinion is correct and the rest are erroneous. This theory is called Takhti'ah, and its proponents are called "Mukhatti'ah." A portion of the great Sunni scholars, and all Shiites, follow this view and, in defense of their position, raise objections against the adherents of the Taswib theory.^[8]

Setting aside the theoretical disputes about the validity or invalidity of this theory, in practice, the proponents of both theories arrive at a single resu

they arrive.^[9] Proponents of taṣwīb (ratification) say that the conclusion reached by the mujtahid and striver on the path of truth is, in reality, the very ruling of God; thus, he is muṣīb (correct). From the perspective of the defenders of the theory of takhṭiʾa (fallibilism), if someone exerts his utmost effort and reaches a conclusion, either that conclusion is in reality God's ruling, in which case he is muṣīb, or, contrary to his assumption, he has not attained God's ruling and what he thought was correct is an error, in which case he is "excused" (maʿdhūr) and has fulfilled his duty (Gorji, 1382, vol. 7, 464).

It is from here that the saying among scholars has become common: "li-l-muṣīb ajrān wa li-l-mukhṭiʾ ajr wāḥid" (For the one who is correct, there are two rewards, and for the one who errs, one reward). This means that the one who strove and reached the goal has two rewards: one for striving and another for reaching the goal; and the one who strove but did not reach the goal has one reward, because although he did not attain the truth, he applied his effort. This is a principle upon which all scholars of legal theory (uṣūlīs) agree. For example, Jamāl al-Dīn Ḥasan ʿĀmilī, the son of al-Shahīd al-Thānī, briefly states the position of Shīʿī scholars on this issue and says that in religious rulings for which there is decisive proof, the muṣīb is one, and the person who errs is not excused. However, if it requires reflection and ijtihād, it is obligatory for the mujtahid to exert his utmost effort in it, "wa lā ithma ʿalayhi ḥīnaʾidhin qaṭʿan bi-ghayri khilāfin yuʿabbaʾu bih; and in that case, there is certainly no sin upon him, without any considerable disagreement" (ʿĀmilī, 1365, 242). He also believes that in the discussion of taṣwīb, the muṣīb is only one, the one who has attained it, and anyone else "is in error and excused" (ibid.). He then deems further discussion on this matter futile and moves on.

This is the prevailing view among Shīʿī scholars, and up to this point, Shaykh Bahāʾī has not uttered any extravagant statement that would indicate a weak belief.

But this discussion has another dimension that justifies Shaykh ʿAbd Allāh ibn Ṣāliḥ al-Baḥrānī's attack on Shaykh Bahāʾī. In reality, this issue reflects the deep conflict between the Akhbārīs and the Uṣūlīs. The essence of the Akhbārī view is complete submission to Shīʿī ḥadīth collections and acceptance of transmitted reports. From this perspective, the meddlesome intellect has no right to pass judgment on these narrations, and everything found in the main Shīʿī narrative sources must be accepted wholesale. In contrast, the Uṣūlīs believe that a ḥadīth cannot be accepted merely because it is claimed to be from the Shīʿī Imams; rather, it must be tested against the criterion of sound reason to distinguish the authentic from the spurious. Consequently, the intellect is given a role here and the field is entrusted to it, so that weak, fabricated, and anomalous (shādhdh) ḥadīths are identified and set aside. The classification of ḥadīths into ṣaḥīḥ (sound), ḥasan (good), muwaththaq (reliable), and ḍaʿīf (weak), which was provided by Shīʿī Uṣūlī scholars and is among the innovations of Sayyid ibn Ṭāwūs or ʿAllāma Ḥasan ibn Muṭahhar al-Ḥillī (Modir Shanehchi, 1354, 147; 1397 AH, 38), is an example of this rational approach to the sayings of the Infallibles.

The Akhbārīs' claim to the truth becomes clearer when they speak of the necessity of devotion and submission to the legacy of the Imams (peace be upon them), emphasize the tradition and practice of the early scholars, and demonstrate its difference from the tradition of the mujtahids. For example, Ḥusayn ibn Shihāb al-Dīn al-Karakī al-ʿĀmilī (d. 1076 AH), a learned Akhbārī, endeavors to show that the path of the ancient scholars was not ijtihād in derivative rulings and the application of procedural principles; rather, they accepted hadiths regardless of whether their narrators were trustworthy or not, or Imāmī or non-Imāmī. This tradition of following reports continued until the Occultation and beyond. Gradually, however, some early Shīʿa scholars, such as Shaykh al-Ṭūsī, adopted the logic of ijtihād and its principles from the Sunnīs and applied them to understanding religion and legal matters, to the point that today the notion has formed that the path of the Uṣūlī scholars is the same as that of the ancient scholars, whereas this is an erroneous assumption. Throughout his book Hidāyat al-Abrār ilā Ṭarīq al-Aʾimma al-Aṭhār, al-Karakī al-ʿĀmilī seeks to prove that there is a clear divergence between the conduct of the predecessors and that of later scholars, which can be summarized in three points. First, some of the ancients, such as al-Shaykh al-Mufīd, al-Sayyid al-Murtaḍā, and Shaykh al-Ṭūsī, explicitly stated that no legal ruling can be established by conjecture, whereas later scholars have deemed it permissible. Second, the consensus of the early scholars was that a mujtahid who errs is sinful, whereas later scholars believe that a mujtahid who errs is not sinful. Third, a group of the ancients explicitly stated that all the reports they transmitted in their books and acted upon are sound, but later scholars claim that all of these are isolated reports that yield only conjecture (al-Karakī al-ʿĀmilī, 1396 AH, 6-7). He highlights in detail the differences in viewpoints between the ancient and later scholars and concludes that the Imams (peace be upon them) permitted neither the principle of presumed innocence nor acting upon istiṣḥāb for deriving divine rulings. Yet later scholars neglected these precise matters and fell into 'negligences and errors which, were we to enumerate them, would prolong the discussion' (ibid., 308).

In response to such claims, the Uṣūlīs' answer is that it must first be established that the transmitted hadiths are indeed from those Imams (peace be upon them), and only then should one submit to them, not that any critical discussion should be halted by mere assertion. In fact, one of the fundamental differences between the Akhbārīs and the Uṣūlīs is the latter group's emphasis on the role of reason in understanding religion and verifying the authenticity of hadith transmission, to the extent that they deem it necessary to first ascertain that a hadith was issued by the Infallibles, and for this reason they employ methods that the Akhbārīs disapprove of. Khwānsārī, quoting al-Samāhījī al-Baḥrānī, enumerates forty principal differences between the Akhbārīs and the Uṣūlīs in the treatise Munyat al-Mumārisīn fī Ajwibat Suʾālāt al-Shaykh Yāsīn, and summarizes them (Khwānsārī, vol. 1, 127-130), ultimately deeming this movement to be derived from Ashʿarism (ibid., 130). This conflict has manifested itself in various places throughout the recent centuries of Shīʿa history and has sometimes yielded bitter results, which lie outside the scope of this discussion.

But one of its manifestations can be found precisely in this attack on Shaykh Bahāʾī. Indeed, before Shaykh ʿAbd Allāh ibn Ṣāliḥ al-Baḥrānī, Mullā Muḥammad Amīn al-Astarābādī (d. 1033 AH), the founder of Akhbārism, in his famous book al-Fawāʾid al-Madanīya, criticizes Shaykh Bahāʾī for admitting reason, accepting the fourfold classification of hadith, defending the ancient scholars on this matter, and the necessity of this division, and attacks his claim (al-Astarābādī, 1424 AH, 122). Likewise, ʿAbd Allāh ibn Ṣāliḥ al-Baḥrānī's opposition to the Uṣūlīs was so intense that the author of Rawḍāt al-Jannāt, after recounting the differences between the Akhbārīs and Uṣūlīs, introduces him as one of the fanatical Akhbārīs and likens his thought to that of the Ashāʿira (Khwānsārī, 1390 AH, vol. 1, 130). The purpose of these allusions is that the opening statement of this article must be understood and analyzed within a broader context and against the backdrop of the historical Akhbārī-Uṣūlī dispute. Now let us see whether such a belief has any corrupt corollary.

3. The Corrupt Consequence of This Belief

According to the above claim, the necessary implication of Sheikh Baha'i's view is that the actions of individuals like "Abu Hanifa," who are considered by the claimant to be embodiments of misguidance, would be justified and their errors acceptable. But is this truly the necessary implication of Sheikh Baha'i's words? Here, we are not concerned with this challenging instance; however, it seems that fairness has not been observed, and a conclusion has been foisted upon Sheikh Baha'i's view that does not necessarily follow from its premises. Sheikh Baha'i claimed that if someone, out of truth-seeking and in order to reach the truth, strives and examines this opinion and that, and inadvertently goes astray, they have committed no error and are excused. But Sheikh Baha'i's opponents immediately point to a specific instance and say, so you are saying this person is rewarded? Sheikh Baha'i could immediately respond and ask in return, how do you know that this person was led astray while seeking the truth? On what grounds do you think they truly desired the truth? Why do you consider them an instance of truth-seekers who have ended up on the wrong path? Perhaps they knew from the very beginning that they were going astray, and yet consciously chose this path. As it happens, Sheikh Yusuf al-Bahrani, in defending Sheikh Baha'i, employs this very method and argues that it is possible some of them, due to prejudice, did not diligently seek to discover the truth. Or that they strove and indeed found the truth, but due to love of power and desire for leadership, refrained from declaring the truth and adhering to it (al-Bahrani, [n.d.], 19-20). Tunikabuni, in defending Sheikh Baha'i's position, also argues that one must distinguish between the minor premise and the major premise of the proposition, "meaning, if such a person is found, they will not be punished; and as for the minor premise, i.e., whether such a person is found or not, the Sheikh did not say that such a person is found" (Tunikabuni, [n.d.], 242).

Sheikh Baha'i's position here, and the objection raised against him, resembles the position of al-Jahiz and al-Ghazali's objection to him. Al-Jahiz, the rationalist Mu'tazilite thinker, also claimed that the criterion for a person's sinfulness and ill-fated end is "obstinacy" against the truth, not mere opposition to it. Therefore, if someone ends up in falsehood out of helplessness and weakness, their excuse is accepted. But al-Ghazali does not accept this reasoning from him and gives him a response that is surprising from someone as astute as al-Ghazali.

Al-Jahiz, according to al-Ghazali's claim, believed that if the opponents of Islam, whether Jew, Christian, or Dahrī, oppose out of obstinacy, they are sinners. But if someone engages in reflection and contemplation and is helpless to perceive the truth, such a person is excused and sinless. And if someone fundamentally lacks the aptitude for speculation and remains unaware of its obligation, and consequently does not reach the truth, they too are excused, and:

only the obstinate person is sinful and subject to punishment. For God does not burden anyone beyond their capacity, and these people are helpless to perceive the truth and have maintained their beliefs out of fear of God, since the path of knowledge is closed to them (al-Ghazali, [n.d.], vol. 2, 539).

The upshot of al-Jahiz's reasoning is that obligation revolves around capacity and is negated in its absence. One who, due to inability to recognize the truth and failure to realize the incorrectness of their beliefs, does not abandon their misguided convictions is excused in their action, and both reason and religious law testify to this point. Al-Ghazali[10] accepts the principle of the reasoning and its basis, and says that this view is rationally unproblematic. But the reality is that we have definitive transmitted proofs against it, because we know that the Holy Prophet (PBUH), just as he obligated Muslims to perform prayers and fast, also addressed the infidels. Thus, they are obligated to abandon their disbelief and become Muslims (ibid.).

اما به نظر می‌رسد که جواب غزالی قانع کننده نیست. مسئله آن است که آن کافر و دهری از کجا بدانند که این شخص واقعاً پیامبر و فرستادۀ خداوند است. آن «ادله سمعی» ضروری، برای مسلمانانی که پیشاپیش نبوت حضرت رسول را پذیرفته‌اند، ضروری است نه کسی که هنوز اصل نبوت برایش ثابت نشده است. مطلب از این قرار است که آیا مردم باید نبوت رسول خدا برایشان محرز شود تا به او ایمان آورند، یا آن که لازم است کورکورانه از عقاید قبلی خود دست بشویند و به این ایمان جدید تن در دهند. اگر نظر اول را بپذیریم، آنگاه سخن جاحظ درست به نظر می‌رسد و باید شخص با دلائل عقلی به نوعی به حقانیت این پیامبر مرسل ایمان پیدا کند. اگر هم نیازی به احراز حقیقت نبینیم و صرف ایمان را کافی بدانیم، این پرسش کلامی مطرح می‌شود که چه فرقی است بین آن باور پیشین باطل و این ایمان غیر مستدل و بی‌بنیاد؛ زیرا در هر دو مورد عقاید استوار وجود دارد. آن چه یکی را از دیگری متمایز می‌کند و مایۀ برتری آن می‌گردد، درستی و مطابقت با واقع است، نه تحکُّم صرف. اگر هم «ظن» و گمان را کافی بدانیم، در هر دو مورد وجود دارد و دلیلی بر ترجیح یک ظن بر ظن دیگری وجود ندارد. وانگهی قرآن کریم که مروج ایمان جدید است،  با چنین ظنی سر ستیز دارد و آن را جایگزین حق نمی‌داند و بارها تأکید می‌کند که:

وَمَا یتَّبِعُ أَكْثَرُهُمْ إِلاَّ ظَنًّا إنَّ الظَّنَّ لاَ یغْنِی مِنَ الْحَقِّ شَیئًا إِنَّ اللّهَ عَلَیمٌ بِمَا یفْعَلُونَ؛ بیشتر آنان جز از گمان پیروی نمی‌کنند. در واقع، گمان جایگزین حق نیست. خداوند بدان چه می‌کنند، آگاه است (سورۀ یونس، 36).

ادعای غزالی همۀ آن دعوت به تعقل و تفکری را که در قرآن کریم آمده است به پرسش می‌گیرد و تخطئه می‌کند. افزون بر آن، وی به استدلال عقلی-نقلی جاحظ پاسخ نمی‌دهد. جاحظ مدعی شده است که خداوند تکلیف ما لایطاق نمی‌کند، این هم ادعایی است عقلی و هم نقلی. عقلی است، زیرا اگر خداوند علیم، رحیم، و حکیم باشد، که از نظر مسلمانان چنین است، محال است از مردم چیزی بخواهد که از عهده‌شان خارج است. به همین دلیل متکلمان عقلی‌مشرب‌ شیعی و معتزلی تا جایی پیش رفته‌اند که مدعی شده‌اند، تکلیف مالا یطاق قبیح و یا محال است. افزون بر آن که این قاعده‌ای عقلی است، ریشه قرآنی دارد و نقلی نیز به شمار می‌رود. خداوند به صراحت فرموده است: «وَلَا نُكَلِّفُ نَفْسًا إِلَّا وُسْعَهَا وَلَدَینَا كِتَابٌ ینطِقُ بِالْحَقِّ وَهُمْ لَا یظْلَمُونَ؛ هیچ کس را جز به اندازه توانش مکلف نمی‌کنیم و نزدمان کتابی است که به حق سخن می‌گوید و به آنان ستم نمی‌شود» (سورۀ مؤمنون، 62). مضمون این آیه بارها در قرآن کریم آمده است. طبق این آموزه اگر خداوند به کسی بیش از توانش تکلیف کند، به او ستم کرده است و کاری خلاف حکمت و وعده خداوند خواهد بود. چنین کاری از خداوند قبیح است. حال آیا این تکلیف ما لایطاق نیست که به کسی که، طبق فرض، حق را نشناخته و راهی به سوی شناخت آن نیز ندارد، گفته شود که باید حق را بشناسد؟ اگر هم غزالی به حسن و قبح عقلی اعتقادی نداشته باشد، چرا این ادله سمعی قرآنی و ضروری را که همان قاعده عقلی را تأیید می‌کنند، نادیده می‌گیرد و بحث را از مسیر خود خارج می‌سازد؟ حاصل آن که استدلال غزالی در این باره، نه عقلاً قابل دفاع است و نه با آیات صریح قرآن و منش و روش پیامبر اکرم همسازی دارد.

ناکامی استدلال غزالی نیز دامنگیر شیخ عبدالله بن صالح بحرانی می‌شود و همان دشواری راه را بر او  می‌بندد. بنابراین با مثالی که آورده است، نمی‌شود، اصل مدعای شیخ بهایی را ابطال کرد.

4_ آیا مدعای شیخ بهایی قابل دفاع است؟

Thus far I have tried to show that, based on the objections raised against Sheikh Baha'i's claim, it cannot logically be refuted. On the contrary, figures like Tonekaboni defend it by invoking the theological principle of grace (luṭf),[11] ([n.d.], 242). But the question now is whether this position is defensible in itself. In answer, we must reflect a little on our duty as Muslims and see what God expects of us. It can be said that God has two fundamental expectations of us: in the realm of theory, He desires our faith (īmān); and in the realm of practice, righteous deeds (ʿamal ṣāliḥ). Numerous Qur'anic verses express these two principles, and the distinction between a Muslim and a non-Muslim lies precisely in these two principles. Indeed, in various verses, believers are described as those who possess faith and perform righteous deeds. For this reason, many verses reiterate this point in different formulations:

وَالَّذِینَ آمَنُواْ وَعَمِلُواْ الصَّالِحَاتِ أُولَـئِكَ أَصْحَابُ الْجَنَّةِ هُمْ فِیهَا خَالِدُونَ; Those who believe and do righteous deeds—they are the companions of Paradise, abiding therein eternally (Surah Al-Baqarah, 82).^[12]

According to Izutsu, from the Islamic perspective, faith (īmān) is considered the ultimate and final criterion, the central and essential virtue of this religion, and the source of all virtues (Izutsu, 1378 [1999], 373), and the true Muslim bears the name "believer" (muʾmin). From this viewpoint, even righteous deeds are in fact a sign, manifestation, or crystallization of faith (ibid.), and through them one can discern the presence of faith in a person. In other words, the practical result of faith is righteous deeds, and righteous deeds are a sign of the existence of faith. For this reason, the Commander of the Faithful, Imam Ali, says:

فبالایمان یستدل علی الصالحات و بالصالحات یستدل علی الایمان; By faith, one can infer righteous deeds, and by righteous deeds, one can recognize faith (Seyyed Razi, 1370 [1991], Sermon 156, 155).

But the faith desired by the Qur'an is not a blind belief; rather, it stands in opposition to unbelief (kufr) and consists of two main components: piety (taqwā) and gratitude (shukr). Izutsu, by analyzing various verses in which faith, gratitude, piety, and other related concepts are used, shows that gratitude can be another name for faith (Izutsu, 1378 [1999], 407). God-consciousness (taqwā) is also, in numerous verses, accompanied by and synonymous with awe (khashyah). True awe, according to the Qur'an, belongs to the learned, and the Qur'an explicitly states:

إِنَّمَا یخْشَى اللَّهَ مِنْ عِبَادِهِ الْعُلَمَاء; Only those among His servants who have knowledge fear God (Surah Fatir, 28, translation by Ayati, 1374 [1995], 438).

Furthermore, in common definitions, faith is introduced as having three pillars: heartfelt affirmation (taṣdīq qalbī), verbal confession (iqrār lisānī), and behavior based on this affirmation (Raghib Isfahani, [n.d.], 22). Heartfelt affirmation also entails knowing something correctly; that is, a believer is someone who has a firm and unshakeable conviction in something, and this true attribute is knowledge (ʿilm). Therefore, through detailed analysis, it can be shown that God desires our knowledgeable faith, not a blind belief. The command to acquire insight and act knowledgeably, and to avoid incorrect belief and behavior, has been repeatedly emphasized in the Holy Qur'an. For example, in one place, God Almighty warns us against unknowing behavior devoid of the element of knowledge and speaks of the responsibility of the ear, the eye, and the heart (Surah Al-Isra, 38). Elsewhere, He reproaches those who have eyes, ears, and intellects but do not use them, and calls them inhabitants of Hell (Surah Al-A'raf, 179). Moreover, numerous verses in the Holy Qur'an invite people to reflection, contemplation, understanding, careful examination of matters, and recognition of the truth. From the totality of these verses, it can be concluded that what God desires is a conscious faith, accompanied by knowledge and learning, not a dogmatic faith devoid of knowledge and cognition. Therefore, all Muslims must strive to ensure their faith is accompanied by knowledge. But this knowledge is attained through learning and reflection. Thus, the call to seek knowledge and to reflect is seen throughout the Holy Qur'an, and knowledge and reflection are counted among the virtues of faith. Not only does the Holy Qur'an invite us to know, but it also asks us not to be content with any stage and to constantly increase our knowledge. It is with this teaching that God commands His Prophet:

وَقُل رَّبِّ زِدْنِی عِلْمًا; And say: My Lord, increase me in knowledge (Surah Taha, 114).

Again, in the story of Moses and the righteous servant that appears in Sūrat al-Kahf, we read that the Prophet Moses, despite holding the station of prophethood, set out to learn from that righteous servant. It is narrated from ʿAbd Allāh ibn ʿAbbās that he used to say, if anyone were to content himself with what he already knew, it would have been the Prophet Moses; yet he too set out in pursuit of knowledge and went to that righteous servant (al-Māwardī, 1415 AH, 53) and said: Hal attabiʿuka ʿalā an tuʿallimani mimmā ʿullimta rushdā; “May I follow you so that you may teach me some of the right guidance you have been taught?” (Sūrat al-Kahf, 66). The Prophet Abraham, too, though he believed in the Resurrection, wished to become acquainted with the process by which the dead are brought back to life. Thus, from these didactic stories found in the Holy Qurʾān, one can conclude that God desires our knowledge and its increase. As Imam Khomeini writes: “From the Noble Qurʾān itself, the instruction not to stand still and not to be content with a fixed limit” can be derived (1370, 196).

With this outlook, al-ʿAllāma al-Ḥillī has emphasized the obligation of a substantiated faith, considering it obligatory (al-Ḥillī, 1365, 4), and al-ʿAllāma Shaʿrānī, drawing on his views, writes that our belief concerning faith is that certainty is necessary in it and that conjecture does not suffice. For it is not customary among any of the Muslims that if an unbeliever were to say, “I conjecture that there is no god but Allah, and I conjecture that Muḥammad is the Messenger of Allah,” he would thereby have become a Muslim. He then stresses that the expression ashhadu (“I bear witness”) conveys certainty more than other words such as aʿlamu (“I know”). He goes on to add:

And we believe that belief must be based on proof, not on imitation (taqlīd), because imitative belief is not knowledge, and because God Almighty has censured certain peoples for imitating their forefathers. And because if imitation constituted faith, then the unbelievers would also be excused (al-Māzandarānī, 1342, vol. 1, Shaʿrānī’s introduction, yab).

Shīʿī philosophers have viewed faith from this perspective and have considered it to be verified cognition. However, since not all individuals possess the ability to attain this kind of faith, they have divided faith into three levels, taking into account people’s levels of cognition and understanding: imitative faith, which is specific to the common people; demonstrative faith, which belongs to the learned; and intuitive faith, which is particular to the people of spiritual vision. Mullā Hādī Sabzawārī has concisely expressed this view as follows:

Faith has been defined as assent

To what the Prophet brought, in a verified manner,

And it has appeared, whether by tongue or by heart,

As imitation, demonstration, or direct vision (1379, vol. 5, 365).

The upshot is that God desires a faith that is learned and accompanied by our knowledge, and this knowledge has no fixed limit; the more of it there is, the better and more valuable it is. Another virtue is reflection, which in Qurʾānic verses is counted as a sign of the believers. Reflection, too, has its own perils. Peter Singer, the Australian moral philosopher, rightly likens thinking to an escalator. We can choose not to use it, but once we have stepped onto the first stair, we can no longer steer its course in advance toward our desired destination, and we do not know where we will end up (Baron, 1994, 5).

Moreover, a genuine understanding of one’s own religion and its teachings depends on familiarity with other, even rival, perspectives. Knowing the other and others helps us to know ourselves better. Friedrich Max Müller, the great scholar of religion, sums up this point as follows: “He who knows one, knows none”[13] (Martin, 1995, V. 2, 330)—that is, a true knowledge of one’s own path and creed depends on knowledge of other creeds.

Now, if our faith is to be accompanied by knowledge and learning, and this knowledge is to be obtained through the pursuit of learning and the reading of this or that book, or is to result from reflection, then one must accept its perils. Otherwise, God would have placed an impossible obligation upon our shoulders, for He would have asked us to learn and to reflect, and at the same time not to incur their dangers. Hence, one must either say that God desires a simple, dogmatic, and non-cognitive faith from us—what has become known as the religion of old women, or dīn-i ʿajāyiz—or one must say that an informed faith is what God desires, and that unintentional error is pardonable.

The first path leads nowhere, and despite the efforts made to justify dogmatic religion, these efforts have failed. In defense of this path, some have claimed that the Holy Prophet himself said: "Adhere to the religion of old women" (Alaykum bi-dīn al-ʿajāʾiz). Rumi, inspired by this saying, composed the following verse:

In the end, and at the very last, he saw helplessness,

He died, and chose the religion of old women (Balkhi, 1378, vol. 2, 991)

However, this hadith-like statement is fabricated, and its spuriousness has been explicitly stated (al-Albani, 1412 AH, vol. 1, 130). It has also sometimes been considered among the fabrications of Sufyan al-Thawri (Majlisi, 1403 AH, vol. 69, 136). Of course, al-Zabidi, after mentioning those who consider it fabricated, seeks to provide an acceptable justification for it (Murtada al-Zabidi, 1414 AH, vol. 7, 376). Moreover, if we consider this type of faith acceptable to the Lawgiver, then what difference is there between the faith of an old Christian woman and the faith of an old Muslim woman, since the faith in question is supposed to be non-demonstrative, imitative, and without inquiry or investigation? Thus, both possess the same degree of strength.

Considering the ineffectiveness of the first path and its epistemological problems, and bearing in mind the numerous verses on this matter, Sheikh Baha'i chooses the second path, thereby aligning himself with the multitude of rationalist Shia scholars and uttering words that offend Akhbaris such as Sheikh Yusuf al-Bahrani. According to Abdullah Ni'mah, Sheikh Abdullah ibn Salih al-Bahrani's attack on Sheikh Baha'i is, in reality, due to the anti-rationalist thinking of him and his ilk, who do not consider reason as authoritative in such matters; for this very reason, Baha'i's view deserves to be a cause for his praise, not his censure (Ni'mah, 1987, 455).

5_ Two Interpretations of Sheikh Baha'i's Statement

Sheikh Baha'i's statement can bear two interpretations: a minimalist interpretation and a maximalist interpretation. According to the minimalist interpretation, every individual is duty-bound to have a correct faith, corresponding to reality and achieved through investigation. Now, if one proceeds while observing all conditions, including truth-seeking and desiring guidance, and falls into error, they are excused before God and rewarded. If we accept this interpretation, Sheikh Baha'i has, in fact, said nothing more than what Shia scholars and proponents of the theory of "takhti'ah" (fallibility of the mujtahid) have stated. However, according to the maximalist interpretation, the matter goes beyond this. Based on this interpretation, it can be said that Sheikh Baha'i claims that if someone truthfully pursues a path, they fundamentally do not fall into error and are rewarded, without merely being excused. In other words, such a person is, in any case, correct and has attained the truth. Such an interpretation has its own difficulty, for the main issue is that the possibility of error occurring cannot logically be denied, and in that case, one should not categorically state that a truth-seeking person will, in any case, reach the truth. Now, if this understanding cannot be defended with the help of an extra-religious principle, it may well be possible to defend it intra-religiously. For example, one can argue that God Almighty Himself has promised the believers who strive in the path of truth that He will prevent them from going astray, as He has said:

"And those who strive in Our cause, We will surely guide them to Our paths. And indeed, Allah is with the doers of good" (Surah al-Ankabut, 69, translation by Ayati, 405).

This verse indicates that, firstly, striving in the path of God is a righteous deed, and secondly, God will not abandon those who strive in His path to themselves but will guide them. According to Gunabadi, a conjunctive syllogism is performed here, which can be formulated as follows: Whoever strives in Our cause is a doer of good, and whoever is a doer of good, God is with them, because God is with the doers of good (Gunabadi, 1408 AH, vol. 3, 212). Allamah Tabatabai holds that the expression "strive in Our cause" (jāhadū fīnā) is a metaphor to indicate theoretical and scholarly effort directed towards the Almighty Truth (Tabatabai, 1393 AH, vol. 16, 151). Thus, any kind of intellectual effort and striving falls within the scope of this verse and is subject to its ruling.

همچنین اشاره به «سُبُل» یعنی راه‌ها، گویای آن است که این مجاهدت در مسیرهای گوناگونی می‌تواند باشد. به گفته طباطبايي، خداوند در این جا «برای خود راه‌هایی اثبات کرده است که هر چه باشند، به خداوند منتهی می‌گردد» (همان). همچنین به تصریح گنابادی این راه‌ها شامل «کج و مستقیم» هر دو می‌شود (1408ق، همان). فخررازی در کنار تفسیر متعارف از این آیه، تفسیری حِکْمی و فلسفی به دست می‌دهد که طبق آن مقصود از «جاهدوا فینا» کسانی هستند که «در دلایل ما نظر کردند» و بر اساس آن نتیجه می‌گیرد تعبیر «إن الله لمع المحسنین» اشاره «به درجه اعلای استدلال است»، زیرا کسی که با استدلال و تأمل به خداوند نزدیک می‌شود، «چیزها را از او می‌شناسد، نه آن که او را از چیزها بشناسد» (رازی، 1405ق.، ج25، 95).

Therefore, striving to strengthen one's faith, to make it demonstrative, and to hold correct beliefs is itself a manifestation of struggle in the way of God, and according to God's promise, one who steps onto this path will be guided to the paths of truth. Considering this verse and the numerous verses that heavily emphasize that the deeds of the virtuous will not be lost (for example, Surah At-Tawbah, 119), it can be concluded that if someone takes steps on the path of knowing the truth and constantly keeps truth-seeking and submission to the truth as their focus, not only are they rewarded by God, but moreover, it is impossible for them to be led astray. This impossibility is not in its logical sense, but is born of the divine promise. Therefore, the notion of error and misguidance concerning truth-seekers is negated. Is this what Sheikh Baha'i meant, or does the initial interpretation align with his claim? His words can bear both interpretations, and the second interpretation, if it emerges successfully from the crucible of critique, is also compatible with the logic of the Quran.

This interpretation can be objected to on the grounds that, in this case, if two individuals arrive at different and possibly contradictory results, are both in the right, or is one false and the other true? If we say both are in the right, we end up with the theory of taswib (validation of all opinions), which is not only unacceptable to Shia scholars but also has epistemological problems, such as claiming that God has two contradictory rulings on a single issue, which is incompatible with divine wisdom. And if we say that only one of the two is in the right, then that would be the theory of takhti'ah (error). In response to this objection, two paths can be taken. First, to say that from the contradictory results obtained, we can conclude that one of the two, though we do not know which, was not truly a truth-seeker or did not observe the conditions of truth-seeking on this path. Second, to say that in reality, both individuals have reached the truth. However, the truth is not so simple and monolithic that we say one either reaches it or loses it; rather, truth has multiple levels and layers, and perhaps one of the two has reached a layer that appears to conflict with the truth attained by the other, but ultimately, both are the same thing. Or it could be said that each has only attained a part of the truth, a fragment of it. Just as mountaineers each ascend from a path different from the others, but as they climb higher, these paths converge and ultimately become one, seekers of the path of truth may also appear to reach different results that are ultimately manifestations and beginnings of a single, more fundamental truth. Is such an interpretation compatible with the logic of the Quran and the verses that speak of the limited knowledge of humans (Surah Al-Isra, 85)? This is a question that still warrants reflection.

In short, contrary to the claims of figures like Bahrani, Sheikh Baha'i's words on truth-seeking are compatible with Quranic logic and teachings and aligned with the logic of reason, and can be counted among his brilliant statements, which in this regard, at the very least, express the views of rationalist Shia scholars in eloquent language,[14] or indeed, it is the posing of a serious question that opens new horizons for scholars and seekers in inter-religious discussions.

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[1] Published in Ketab-e Mah-e Din, No. 168, Mehr 1390.

[2] For a brief and useful account of his life and works, see: Juya Jahanbakhsh, Pishvā-ye Imāniyān: Nim Negāhi be Zendegāni va Andishe-ye Sheikh Bahāʾi, Tehran, Hamshahri, 1388.

[3] He is a philosopher of theory and sophistry | a deceived infidel philosopher (Introduction to the book Riyāḍ al-Jinān, cited from Khwānsāri, 1390 AH, vol. 4, 252).

[4] As far as the author has researched, this book has not been edited or published.

[5] "He holds some weak beliefs, such as the belief that if a legally responsible person (mukallaf) exhausts his effort in seeking evidence, he bears no blame if he is mistaken in his belief, and he will not abide eternally in the Fire, even if his belief contradicts that of the people of truth."

[6] On this, see: Bahāʾ al-Dīn Muḥammad ʿĀmilī, Iʿtiqādāt-e Sheikh Bahāʾi: The Arabic Text of the Risālat al-Iʿtiqādāt with Three Persian Translations and Commentaries, edited by Juya Jahanbakhsh, Tehran, Asāṭīr, 1387. It should be noted that I benefited from the scholarly and thoroughly researched introduction of this work to access the original sources for completing this article.

[7] Probably Wujūh.

[8] For further familiarity with this discussion and its development, see, for example, the entry "Taṣwīb", by Abolqasem Gorji, in Dāneshnāme-ye Jahān-e Islām, under the supervision of Gholam-Ali Haddad-Adel, Tehran, The Foundation of the Islamic Encyclopedia, 1382, vol. 7, 464, and "Takhtiʾa va Taṣwīb", by Hossein Houshangi, in Dāʾirat al-Maʿārif-e Bozorg-e Islāmi, under the supervision of Kazem Mousavi-Bojnourdi, Tehran, The Center for the Great Islamic Encyclopedia, 1385, vol. 14, p. 680.

[9] Of course, it may be said that the difference between these two views will lie in laying the groundwork for jurisprudence and its changes, and the issue of tolerance and forbearance (on this, see: Takhtiʾa va Taṣwīb, Hossein Houshangi, p. 680).

[10] For familiarity with the various aspects of Ghazali's thought and his influences, see: Majmuʿe Maqālāt-e Ghazali Pazhuhi, edited by Seyyed Hedayat Jalili, Tehran, Khāne-ye Ketāb, 1389.

[11] Of course, some question the validity of this rule; for instance, Dr. Gholam-Hossein Ebrahimi Dinani considers it a non-rational rule, derived from Christian theology and contrary to Islamic theology (Kherad va Kheradvarzi: Arjnāme-ye Doktor Gholam-Hossein Ebrahimi Dinani, edited by Ali Oujabi, Tehran, Khāne-ye Ketāb, 1387, 33-34).

[12] Also, see: Surah Al-Baqarah, verse 277; Surah Āl-e ʿImrān, verse 57; Surah An-Nisāʾ, verses 57, 122, 173; Surah Al-Māʾidah, verse 9; Surah Al-Aʿrāf, verse 42; and Surah Yūnus, verse 4.

[13] He who knows one, knows none.

[14] A similar statement is cited by Mirza Abol-Hasan Jelveh in his Favāʾid as a rational maxim (see: Seyyed Mostafa Mohaghegh Damad, Nokhbegān-e ʿElm va ʿAmal-e Irān, Tehran, Markaz-e Nashr-e ʿOlum-e Eslāmi, 1378).

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