Punishment, Deterrence, and Moral Education by Seyed Hassan Eslami Ardakani

Punishment, Deterrence, and Moral Education

Dr. Seyed Hassan Eslami Ardakani[1]

Every social system, for its own stability, requires deterrent laws, some of which manifest in the form of criminal laws. Without criminal laws and punishment, social health and security become disordered and may well be destroyed. At the same time, for their survival, human societies need, in addition to punishment, an element of solidarity that punishment does not provide. Hence, we need another moral value that emerges in the form of forgiveness and pardon. The proper interaction of deterrent laws and moral values ensures health, security, and at the same time, solidarity and social growth. From this perspective, one can examine the Islamic educational system, in which those in whom the sense of revenge was strong were first invited toward retribution and penal justice, and then they were nurtured and educated in such a way as to move toward pardon and forgiveness. Thus, despite society's acute need for law, it is ultimately ethics that guarantees its health. In this article, this idea is gradually developed, and after drawing conclusions, five suggestions are offered for strengthening the sense of forgiveness in society.

Social Existence

Ordinarily, no human being, however powerful, can meet their needs alone. Consequently, wherever there is a human being, they need cooperation with others, and this natural need draws them toward forming cities and societies. Thus, the natural need of humans is the source of the emergence of civility and civilization; in Aristotle's words: "The city is a natural phenomenon, and man is by nature a social animal."[2] This is the point of departure for almost all Muslim thinkers, that "man is civil by nature." It is with this view that philosophers such as Ibn Sina attempt to explain part of the philosophy of the sending of prophets and to reveal the necessity of religious law.[3] Khwaja Nasir al-Din Tusi also begins his discussion of the politics of the city by emphasizing the self-insufficiency of humans and their need for one another, and insists on the point that humans seek perfection, and this perfection is only realized in society with the help and support of others.[4] Hence, those who take the path of seclusion and isolation and retreat to mountains and caves, contrary to their own perception, do not attain perfection and, moreover, by doing so, wrong others. Because they use the fruits of their labor without having participated with them in this arena: "For choosing solitude and isolation and turning away from assisting one's fellow human beings while needing their acquisitions is sheer injustice and oppression."[5] Due to their turning away from society and withdrawing themselves, these individuals are like "inanimate objects and the dead," not cultured and virtuous human beings.[6] Ibn Miskawayh, who is considered the intellectual forebear of Khwaja on this matter, deemed such people devoid of virtue and claimed that man is fundamentally not self-sufficient; for this reason, the sages have said: "al-insanu madaniyyun bi'l-tab'" (man is civil by nature), meaning man is in need of a human society through which his virtues can emerge. Consequently, for the growth of his virtues, man needs to associate with others, and choosing seclusion and solitude is incorrect and hinders the growth of virtues.[7] Aristotle has well condensed and presented the essence of this view in his brief saying: "He who is unable to live with others, or is so self-sufficient that he has no need of living with others, is not a member of the city, and must therefore be either a beast or a god."[8]

Thus, the city takes shape, and human beings gather within it, forming a polis or society together. But while most thinkers consider human beings to be "political by nature" and claim that humans have an innate inclination toward coexistence with others, a few thinkers, such as ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī, pursue this issue in a different way. Ṭabāṭabāʾī presents one of his original ideas in the realm of constructual perceptions (idrākāt-i iʿtibārī), in which he puts forward a principle called the principle of utilization (aṣl-i istikhdām). According to this principle, the human being "wants his own benefit from everyone."[9]This statement has been interpreted by Shahīd Muṭahharī as meaning that ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī, according to the principle of utilization, considers human beings to be inherently exploitative. Consequently, human beings are not political by nature but rather political "by consequence" (bi-l-tabaʿ) or by compulsion, and they submit to cooperation with society out of necessity, this cooperation being merely a secondary matter. Hence, "this very principle of utilization is ultimately a respectable form of the struggle for existence; the principle in human beings is struggle, and cooperation has arisen as a result of struggle"[10]and he disputes this interpretation. In the meantime, some have tried to arbitrate between these two thinkers. For example, Dr. Muṣliḥ, referring to the origin of this issue, sides with ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī.[11]We do not intend to judge here, but the essential point is that ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī himself explicitly states that "the human being is political by nature" and yet puts forward the idea of "utilization."[12]Therefore, he sees no incompatibility between the two and claims that the human being wants his own benefit and "for his own benefit, wants the benefit of all," and subsequently "for the benefit of all, wants social justice."[13] Thus, from personal selfishness, he arrives at social justice. And from here, the discussion can be steered in another direction.

Greed or the Pursuit of Justice?

But if human beings want the benefit of others for their own benefit, then what gives rise to all this violation of rights, aggression, oppression, and exploitation? If we look at the anthropological verses of the Quran from this perspective, we notice serious flaws in human nature that practically block the path to justice. Among dozens of flaws and obstacles to perfection, these traits can be named: greed, miserliness, hastiness, ignorance, and oppression. From the perspective of the Holy Quran, the human being was created greedy,[14]is impatient in the face of suffering and adversity,[15]is miserly when possessing wealth,[16]is hasty,[17]and finally is ignorant and oppressive.[18]All these characteristics prevent human beings from achieving justice. Consequently, part of the existential philosophy of the sending of prophets and the revelation of divine books is to educate human beings in such a way that these traits serve them rather than hinder their growth. And this is accomplished through two instruments: law and morality.

A healthy social life depends on the existence of social justice. But as mentioned, the existence of selfish traits such as personal greed prevents its realization. In the words of Khwāja Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī: "The desire for dominance is in human nature, such that a rupture contrary to the wisdom of society appears."[19]It is this reality that justifies the existence of religious law and penal codes, and Ibn Sīnā draws on this very issue to explain religious law and law.[20]However, law is vital for the survival of society, and without it, society would disintegrate. By regulating specific behavioral rules and drawing lines in certain interactions, law both accelerates social communications and, through deterrent rules, prevents individuals from encroaching upon each other's rights. For this reason, in every society, a part of the law plays a deterrent and punitive role. But how are these punishments compatible with justice? Philosophers of law and jurists have tried to provide justifications that explain the relationship between justice and punishment. From this perspective, five main justifications for criminal justice and just punishment have been presented.

The first moral explanation of punishment is retaliation and retribution[21] against the offender. Justice demands that whenever someone harms another, we be permitted to reciprocally, while observing conditions and other matters of course, inflict a harm of the same degree upon them. The second justification for criminal justice is compensation[22] for the harm suffered by the injured party. Here, the law intervenes on behalf of the harmed person and repairs the wrong that has occurred. The third justification is deterrence[23] of the wrongdoer from future misconduct and wrongdoing. Here, the enactment of laws is not for remedying past wrongs, but for preventing future wrongs by potential wrongdoers. The lawgiver or legislator, by establishing laws, deters the wrongdoer and others from continuing in error and makes the cost of this act so heavy that, with a rough calculation, a person prefers not to go near wrongdoing. The fourth justification for criminal laws is the reform[24] of the offender. Finally, the fifth justification is the protection of society[25] against wrongs and violations of rights.[26] Now, considering these justifications and criteria, one can judge the correctness of deterrent and punitive laws.

Justice or Compassion?

The discussion of the efficacy of law is beyond the aim of this writing. Nevertheless, the point is that despite all the efforts the legislator makes and has made, we still witness that the measure of law is not a good glue for binding the members of society together. In other words, even the best laws alone are not sufficient for preserving society. One can imagine a society where anyone who suffers the slightest harm can vigorously pursue the realization of their right and put the aggressor and wrongdoer in their place. Is such a society desirable? Louis Pojman, the moral philosopher, in analyzing the language of rights and emphasizing its importance, points to a noteworthy matter. In his view, although rights are important, the language of rights limits morality and transforms moral norms into a dry, legalistic state. Therefore, one should not overemphasize rights.[27] A society in which the legal element is dominant and everyone is in pursuit of realizing their rights, and in which rights become inflated, is an unstable, unpleasant society, on the verge of extinction, and a "complaint-opolis"[28], not a normative and desirable society.[29]

This reality has led some to take the path of lawlessness and delegitimization, and, considering this aspect of law, to seek in principle to replace it with another element. For example, they advance the element of "love" in place of justice, and by criticizing the position of justice and justice-centeredness in ethics, they call for an alternative in which the element of love is dominant and prevailing. In our own ethical tradition, this discussion has been raised in a different way. Is justice superior, or love? For instance, when speaking of justice, it raises the view that some consider love superior to justice, and it is only in the absence of love that they have reluctantly acquiesced to justice. It then says that Aristotle also reinforced this view[30] Khajeh Nasir al-Din Tusi names philosophers who believed: "The subsistence of existents and the order of the universe is through love, and people's compulsion to acquire justice is due to the loss of the honor of love; for if the people of transactions were characterized by mutual love, they would give each other their due, and discord would be removed and order would be achieved."[31]He himself, after analyzing the concept of justice and stating its relation to tafaddul (grace) or ihsan (beneficence), writes: "Tafaddul is nobler than justice, not because it is outside of justice, but because it is an intensification in justice"[32] It can be said that Tusi "considers justice the foundation of ethics and a general virtue, but regards ihsan as its complement, while 'justice is general and all-encompassing'."[33] The discussion of the relationship between justice and love itself requires independent work. But it at least shows that law alone is seemingly insufficient for the growth and health of society, and the point of emphasis must gradually shift from law to ethics. In fact, society usually cannot be managed without law, but it is also not well managed with law alone. Therefore, both law and ethics must coexist and pave a path that leads to the ultimate development of the human being. Correct law, provided it is also applied correctly, only prevents human greed and provides the ground for achieving justice. Yet, there seems to be a deficiency here. This deficiency is remedied only by ethics, by emphasizing ethics, and by spreading an ethical perspective in society. Now, by reviewing the literature on the relationship between law and ethics and the review we had above, three elements can be identified here: revenge, retribution, and forgiveness. Revenge is rooted in human hatred and vindictiveness; retribution is born from the dominance of justice over the sense of revenge. But forgiveness arises from wisdom and moral maturity. Taking revenge requires no education, but retribution and forgiveness do. Understanding these three and their functions helps us, while making justice the foundation of our work, to gradually move towards love and to reach from the straits of punishment and retribution to the expanse of pardon.

Revenge

The survival of society in its simplest form requires the existence of a sense of revenge. Not all people are content with their rights and possessions. Not everyone is satisfied with the fruits of their own labor. There are those who, like parasites, depend on the efforts and toil of others and, in various ways—whether through violence and directly, or through fraud and indirectly—encroach upon the findings of others and seize the results of their hardship. Thieves, armed robbers, lawbreakers, extortionists, and kidnappers are clear examples of such people.

The simplest and most instinctive deterrent to these people is the sense of revenge. This instinctive sense helps a person not to be indifferent to aggressors and extortionists, but to give them their just deserts. This deterrent sense warns potential aggressors that if they step out of line, they will be subject to revenge.

Thus, the sense of vengeance and the desire for revenge is one of society's protective mechanisms, safeguarding it against deviance and deviants. However, the problem with the sense of revenge is that it has virtually no limits, and this feeling encourages the injured and wronged party to give the transgressor his just deserts. But what are his "just deserts"? This is subject to the instinctive sense of the avenger and the intensity of their anger. For this reason, a whole family may be destroyed for a small mistake, and an entire tribe may be ruined in revenge for the unjust spilling of blood. History clearly shows how this sense of revenge operates blindly, and how much blood is shed and how many innocents are sacrificed before it is appeased. For this reason, it has been said that "Revenge is a kind of wild justice." Aristotle clearly demonstrated the difference between punishment and revenge. According to him, actions stemming from anger and hot temper are revenge, which differs from punishment. Revenge seeks the satisfaction of the agent, whereas punishment is concerned with the person being punished.[34]

Qisas (Retaliation)

To preserve society and prevent blind revenge, the institution of qisas (retaliation) is formed, which primarily has, or should have, two characteristics: first, limiting the scope of the act of revenge, and second, individualizing revenge. According to the first characteristic, revenge must only encompass the same act committed by the wrongdoer. From this perspective, the logic of punishment of an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth is not, in this sense, a promotion of violence, but rather an attempt to reduce the scope of revenge. While the sense of vengeance commands that for one eye, dozens of eyes be gouged out, the law of qisas limits it to one eye. The second characteristic of the institution of qisas is its individualization. The feeling of the avenger is that all those who are somehow related to or close to the wrongdoer are guilty and must suffer the consequences of revenge. However, the institution of qisas emphasizes the personal nature of crime and punishment and commands: wa la taziru waziratun wizra ukhra;[35] no bearer of burdens shall bear the burden of another, and no one is answerable for another's sin. It is this characteristic that transforms revenge from a blind act into a measured response and prevents the spread of violence.

According to the law of qisas, if person "A" knowingly and intentionally kills person "B," the survivors of "B" have the right to kill only person "A" and not his dependents. Qisas, in this sense, is one of the supervisory and deterrent mechanisms in society and warns potential offenders and criminals that if they commit a serious wrong, an equally serious punishment awaits them. In this sense, qisas is necessary for the survival and health of society.[36]

But if the logic of qisas is always applied with full force and is imagined to be the only way to prevent wrongdoing, it will have unpleasant consequences. Imagine a young farmer who, in a family dispute, in a moment of temporary insanity and without any specific plan, has killed his father-in-law. The victim's son, i.e., the killer's brother-in-law, demands qisas. Meanwhile, the victim's daughter, i.e., the killer's wife, seeks forgiveness. The killer has two children, and his execution would leave this woman without a guardian and her children orphaned. The victim's daughter insistently asks her brother not to orphan her children, but he replies: "I will be a father to them myself." This affair lasts for six whole years, and finally, the victim's son gets his way and sends his sister's husband to the gallows. This is a true story that occurred in our country two decades ago. Does this qisas have deterrent power? Did it achieve its goal? Did it ensure the health of society? Is the criminal reformed in its aftermath? And has society fulfilled its duty towards the survivors of that criminal?

It is here that, instead of giving the heirs a free hand in carrying out qisas, we must establish more precise criteria and, for example, distinguish between premeditated murders committed in cold blood by professional criminals and social deviants, and murders born of sudden anger and madness. It is not enough for someone to be angry and pick up a knife for the killing they commit to be considered "intentional." Perhaps public conscience can be a relatively good guide in this regard. In recent years, several game wardens were sentenced to qisas and execution for killing illegal hunters. But the widespread actions of public figures and grassroots groups showed that such killings, although carried out with a lethal weapon, namely a rifle, were not truly intentional murder, and the killers' aim was not to "kill" the hunters; on the contrary, they were seeking deterrence or legitimate self-defense when this incident occurred. Therefore, if we want to preserve society solely based on the logic of qisas and apply the logic of an eye for an eye everywhere, in Gandhi's words, the whole world will soon go blind. This view of qisas is, in reality and in a way, falling into the cycle of revenge, which, in Rumi's words, amounts to "washing blood with blood," and will get us nowhere.

Forgiveness

The institution of qisas does not reflect the entire moral spirit of the Quran and Islam, but mainly expresses its legal spirit, which is lower than the moral spirit of Islam. The legal teachings of Islam, while necessary for preserving society, are not sufficient for its elevation. In contrast to qisas, the Holy Quran has a superior and loftier teaching: responding to evil with good, which is a difficult but necessary task. The Quran's teaching on this matter is clear:

Good and evil are not equal. Repel evil with good, and the one between whom and you there was enmity will become as though a devoted friend. But none is granted it except those who are patient, and none is granted it except one having a great portion.[37]

Mastering the sense of vengeance and even moving beyond qisas leads to the formation of the virtue of forgiveness. Pardon and forgiveness are not acts of helplessness and incapacity; on the contrary, they are acts of power. Fundamentally, forgiveness has conditions, the first of which is having the power of revenge or qisas. In our religious and ethical texts, forgiveness from a position of power is introduced as a tradition of the prophets. Also, in numerous stories, religious figures, such as the Master of Martyrs, have been symbols of pardon and forbearance and heroes of forgiveness.

While revenge is an instinctive act that usually requires no learning, qisas requires a degree of discipline and self-restraint. But forgiveness and forbearance require a great effort to overcome oneself and cultivate this virtue within. Pardon and forgiveness are a virtue between two vices: moral passivity and vindictiveness. Passivity and indifference toward the injustice directed at us is wrong, because this harms the victim, the oppressor, and, in the long run, society. On the other hand, vengefulness and vindictiveness are also wrong and harm the victim, the oppressor, and society. Forgiveness as a virtue stands in the middle and prevents excess and deficiency. For forgiveness to have its real function, the second condition must be met, which is the admission of fault by the wrongdoer. A requirement of forgiveness is that the wrongdoer is remorseful for their behavior and determined to change and reform it. Otherwise, instead of spreading morality in society, forgiveness will cause the continuation of criminals' misconduct. For this reason, applying forgiveness, in addition to possessing the virtue of patience and self-restraint, requires wisdom and a correct understanding of the situation.

While the function and benefit of qisas are few and limited, forgiveness has broader functions and benefits. First, forgiveness benefits the one who pardons and forgives. A person who learns to forbear and forgive from a position of power cultivates a virtue within themselves that cannot be obtained in any other way. They also free themselves from the captivity of malice, hatred, and the past, and rise above the level of their erring enemy. The second benefit of forgiveness is that many wrongdoers, provided they have admitted their fault, will have an opportunity to become better human beings, and the third benefit of forgiveness is that, on the whole, society will benefit more from a culture of forgiveness than from a culture of revenge or qisas.

Of course, forgiveness is not always superior to retribution. Just as it is always a mistake to prioritize retribution, considering forgiveness an absolute virtue is also moral folly. As noted, exercising this virtue requires wisdom and a sound understanding of the dimensions of what we are doing, as well as attention to the context in which we apply it. There are times when justice demands retribution, and times when love and benevolence call for forgiveness. Thus, forgiveness requires a proper understanding of one’s own motives, mastery over one’s instincts—especially anger—and attention to the broader consequences of one’s actions in society.

In the tradition and sayings of Imam Ali (AS) and his personal conduct, we witness a focus on the issues of revenge, retribution, and forgiveness or pardon that is highly instructive. After the Commander of the Faithful (AS) was struck, in his will he first cautioned his survivors against taking revenge, then granted them the right to retribution, and finally invited them to forgiveness.

The striking of the Imam and the criminal act of Ibn Muljam, in the inflamed society of that day, had created a fertile ground for vengeance and bloodshed under the pretext of the murder of the Commander of the Faithful. For this reason, he stated in part of his will:

O sons of Abd al-Muttalib, beware lest you shed the blood of Muslims and say, "The Commander of the Faithful has been killed!" Know that none should be killed except my killer. See, if I die from this blow of his, strike him only one blow and refrain from mutilating him, for I heard the Messenger of God say: "Refrain from mutilation, even of a rabid dog."[38]

Thus, in return for one blow, he permitted them only one blow. But in another will, he called them to pardon and said:

Yesterday I was with you, and today I am a lesson for you, and tomorrow I shall part from you. If I remain, I am the master of my own blood, and if I perish, perishing is my appointed end. And if I forgive, forgiveness is a means of nearness for me and a good deed for you. So forgive; "Do you not love that God should forgive you?"[39]

A question may be raised here. If Imam Ali (AS) called his sons to forgiveness, why did they strike Ibn Muljam with a sword and kill him?

Various answers can be given to this question, but considering the course of this discussion, I find one more convincing. As noted, the second condition for forgiveness is that the wrongdoer be remorseful for his error and determined to change his behavior. However, historical evidence shows that Ibn Muljam was, until the last moment, happy with and proud of his deed, believing he had rendered a great service to religion. For this reason, there was no place for forgiveness, and his return to society would have exposed others to harm.

Five Proposals

By reviewing our own religious tradition, we can reconsider the discussion of law and ethics, or justice and love, and instead of a one-sided emphasis on the letter of the law, pay attention to the spirit of the law—which is deterrence and the preservation of order—while also recognizing the necessity of society’s moral growth and elevation. To this end, the following five proposals may be effective.

One. In cases of conflict between law and morality, or justice and compassion, a group should certainly be formed to examine and consider the long-term dimensions of enforcing the law or suspending it. For example, while public opinion expresses intense revulsion at the execution of environmental rangers and calls for the pardon and forgiveness of those who have unintentionally committed murder in defense of the law, it easily overlooks—and even welcomes—the execution of those who engage in premeditated kidnapping and murder. For instance, in 2014, three individuals abducted a twelve-year-old girl, demanded a large sum of money from her father, and cold-bloodedly killed her before receiving the money. These three were swiftly arrested, tried out of turn, sentenced to death, and the sentence was quickly carried out. Overall, reactions to this action were positive. This issue shows that our society expects greater severity toward criminals who target vulnerable segments of society, such as young children or the elderly, than toward a legal defender facing an armed offender. Paying attention to this element will gradually cause the pendulum of sentence enforcement to swing toward forgiveness and strengthen this Islamic value.

Two. Society and the people must know that forgiveness has been appropriate and in its proper place. The formal expression of remorse or regret by a criminal is not a license for forgiveness. Legislative and law enforcement institutions must define procedures through which a criminal's remorse can be established with relative clarity and its dimensions pursued. For example, if someone causes the death of a passerby due to a serious driving error, forgiveness applies to them only when it can truly be guaranteed with a high degree of confidence that they will drive properly in the future and will not engage in dangerous actions.

Three. The value of forgiveness should be promoted and institutionalized. A segment of our people has been raised in such a way that they consider the realization of rights a sign of correctness and efficacy, and forgiveness a sign of weakness. Until this error is corrected, one cannot expect the culture of forgiveness to spread. For example, in some parts of the country, backing down and showing clemency is fundamentally considered reprehensible and a sign of lacking zeal. Therefore, this culture must certainly be reformed, and it must be emphasized that pardon is a sign of authority, not weakness.

Four. A special socio-ethical service file should be created for those who forgive. In a society that largely emphasizes revenge and retribution, promoting a culture of forgiveness requires extensive measures, including creating a file for everyone who grants forgiveness, recording their names and details, and ensuring that these individuals receive certain services, at least spiritual ones, in the future. By identifying and recording the names of these individuals, more extensive long-term measures can be taken to promote the culture of forgiveness. For example, these individuals can themselves become arbiters and mediators for subsequent acts of forgiveness, speak on this subject on various occasions, give interviews, and, in short, become activists in the field of forgiveness. Forgiveness should not be considered a one-time act, after which the file is closed forever once someone performs it. These individuals can actively serve as symbols of forgiveness and clemency in society in the future and help promote moral norms.

Five. Despite the importance of forgiveness, all psychological pressure should not be directed at individuals to make them grant forgiveness. In a society where taking revenge is the norm and forgiveness is seen as a kind of weakness, if we are to move toward a culture of forgiveness, this must be done in an institutionalized manner, and all those involved and executors must simultaneously seek to promote this moral value. It should not be the case that, for example, during the execution of a sentence, all pressure is directed at the individual to relent and forgive, only for them to later face a host of protests, claims, and subsequent regret over the forgiveness. Moving from the current situation to the desired state and a forgiving society requires subtleties, neglecting which practically invalidates the core issue.

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Bibliography

The Holy Quran.

Nahj al-Balagha.

Ibn Sina, Husayn ibn Abdullah, Al-Isharat wa al-Tanbihat, edited by Mujtaba Zarei, Qom, Bustan-e Ketab, 2002.

Aristotle, Rhetoric, translated by Ismail Sa'adat, Tehran, Hermes, 2013.

Aristotle, Politics, translated by Hamid Enayat, Tehran, Pocket Books, 1985.

Eslami, Seyed Hassan, Gender and the Ethics of Care, Strategic Studies of Women, No. 42, Winter 2009.

Helli, Yusuf ibn al-Mutahhar, Kashf al-Murad fi Sharh Tajrid al-I'tiqad, edited by Hasan Hasanzadeh Amoli, Qom, Islamic Publications Office, 1995.

Tabatabai, Seyyed Mohammad Hossein, The Principles of the Philosophy of Realism, edited by Seyyed Hadi Khosroshahi, Qom, Bustan-e Ketab, 2008.

Tusi, Khajeh Nasir al-Din, Akhlaq-e Naseri, edited by Mojtaba Minovi and Alireza Heydari, Tehran, Kharazmi, 1994.

Miskawayh, Abu Ali Ahmad ibn Muhammad, Tahdhib al-Akhlaq, edited by Constantine Zurayk, Beirut, American University of Beirut, 1966.

Mosleh, Ali Asghar, Philosophy of Culture, Tehran, Elmi, 2014.

Motahhari, Morteza, The Immortality of Moral Principles, in Collected Works, Tehran, Sadra, 1995, vol. 13.

Gensler, Harry J. and Earl W. Spurgin, Historical Dictionary of Ethics, Scarecrow press, Plymouth, UK, 2008 .

Pojman, Louis, How Should We Live? An Introduction to Ethics, USA, Thomson Wadsworth, 2005 .

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[1] Professor at the University of Religions and Denominations.

[2] Aristotle, Politics, translated by Hamid Enayat, Tehran, Pocket Books, 1985, p. 5.

[3] Husayn ibn Abdullah ibn Sina, Al-Isharat wa al-Tanbihat, edited by Mojtaba Zarei, Qom, Bustan-e Ketab, 2002, p. 356.

[4] Khajeh Nasir al-Din Tusi, Akhlaq-e Naseri, edited by Mojtaba Minovi and Alireza Heydari, Tehran, Kharazmi, 1994, pp. 247-250.

[5] Ibid., p. 257.

[6] Ibid., p. 258.

[7] Abu Ali Ahmad ibn Muhammad Miskawayh, Tahdhib al-Akhlaq, edited by Constantine Zurayk, Beirut, American University of Beirut, 1966, p. 29.

[8] Aristotle, Politics, p. 6.

[9] Seyyed Mohammad Hossein Tabatabai, The Principles of the Philosophy of Realism, edited by Seyyed Hadi Khosroshahi, Qom, Bustan-e Ketab, 2008, p. 134.

[10] Morteza Motahhari, The Immortality of Moral Principles, in Collected Works, Tehran, Sadra, 1995, vol. 13, pp. 726-727.

[11] Ali Asghar Mosleh, Philosophy of Culture, Tehran, Elmi, 2014, p. 366.

[12] Seyyed Mohammad Hossein Tabatabai, The Principles of the Philosophy of Realism, p. 133.

[13] Ibid., p. 134.

[14] "Indeed, mankind was created anxious." Surah Al-Ma'arij, verse 19.

[15] "When evil touches him, impatient." Ibid., verse 20.

[16] "And when good touches him, withholding." Ibid., verse 21.

[17] "And mankind is ever hasty." Surah Al-Isra, verse 11; see also Surah Al-Anbiya, verse 37.

[18] "Indeed, he was ever unjust and ignorant." Surah Al-Ahzab, verse 72.

[19] Yusuf ibn al-Mutahhar al-Hilli, Kashf al-Murad fi Sharh Tajrid al-I'tiqad, edited by Hasan Hasanzadeh Amoli, Qom, Islamic Publications Office, 1416 AH, p. 347

[20] Husayn ibn Abdullah ibn Sina, al-Isharat wa al-Tanbihat, p. 357

[21] Retribution.

[22] Restortion.

[23] Deterrence.

[24] Reform.

[25] Protection of the public.

[26]Harry J. Gensler and Earl W. Spurgin, Historical Dictionary of Ethics, Scarecrow press, Plymouth, UK, 2008, p. 181 .

[27]Louis Pojman, How Should We Live? An Introduction to Ethics, USA, Thomson Wadsworth, 2005, p. 203 .

[28] Litigationville.

[29] Ibid., p. 205 .

[30] Abu Ali Ahmad ibn Muhammad Miskawayh, Tahdhib al-Akhlaq, p. 133 .

[31] Khwaja Nasir al-Din al-Tusi, Akhlaq-i Nasiri, p. 149 .

[32] Khwaja Nasir al-Din al-Tusi, Akhlaq-i Nasiri, p. 146 .

[33] Seyed Hassan Eslami, Gender and the Ethics of Care, Strategic Studies of Women, no. 42, Winter 2009, p. 37 .

[34] Aristotle, Rhetoric, translated by Ismail Sa'adat, Tehran, Hermes, 2013, p. 102 .

[35] Surah al-An'am, verse 164 .

[36] "And there is for you in legal retribution [saving of] life" Surah al-Baqarah, verse 179 .

[37] And not equal are the good deed and the bad. Repel [evil] by that [deed] which is better; and thereupon the one whom between you and him is enmity [will become] as though he was a devoted friend. But none is granted it except those who are patient, and none is granted it except one having a great portion [of good]. (Surah Fussilat, verses 34-35)

[38] O sons of Abd al-Muttalib, let me not find you wading through the blood of Muslims, wading [and] saying: 'The Commander of the Faithful has been killed!' Verily, do not kill anyone but my killer. Look, if I die from this blow of his, then strike him a blow for a blow, and do not mutilate the man, for I heard the Messenger of God, may God bless him and his family, say: 'Beware of mutilation, even if it be to a rabid dog.' (Nahj al-Balaghah, Letter 47).

[39] Yesterday I was your companion, today I am a lesson for you, and tomorrow I will part from you. If I remain, I am the master of my own blood; and if I perish, then annihilation is my appointed time. And if I forgive, then forgiveness is a means of nearness for me and a good deed for you. So forgive! 'Do you not love that God should forgive you?' (Nahj al-Balaghah, Letter 23).

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