The Contraction of Jurisprudence and the Expansion of the Inner Path: A Reflection on the Soroush-Alidoust Debate

The Contraction of Jurisprudence and the Expansion of the Inner Path

A Reflection on the Debate between Abdolkarim Soroush and Abolqasem Alidoust

Yaser Mirdamadi

1_ The Matter of Reason I Asked of "Jurisprudence"

Assessing the relationship between reason and jurisprudence was the central point of the three-part Soroush-Alidoust debate, hosted by the online program "Azad" in the second half of 1403 SH. Both sides of the discussion spoke sympathetically of reason. But Soroush defended the "contraction of jurisprudence" to make room for reason, whereas Alidoust defended the "expansion of jurisprudence" to make room for reason. Soroush argued that taking reason seriously, especially modern reason, is an all-or-nothing affair. In his view, firstly, jurisprudence has no choice but to take modern reason seriously in order not to become "irrelevant," and secondly, to secure justice in the new world. However, according to Soroush, once you take modern reason seriously, ultimately nothing remains of jurisprudence; only the jurisprudence of acts of worship and quasi-worship remains, or as Van Ess calls it, the jurisprudence of the "gymnastics of worship," which, of course, if you look closely, is fundamentally a morning, noon, and evening ritual that is external-worldly and not an inner-otherworldly spiritual journey. In a word, what remains of jurisprudence is a passive and desperate effort to adapt itself to the new reason, from the abolition of slavery to (possibly in the future) the abolition of the death penalty, the abolition of inequalities between men and women, and between believers and non-believers, coming to terms with "usury," and so on.

In Soroush's view, rationalizing jurisprudence is stepping onto the downward slope of jurisprudence's erasure, and he has no fear of this. Because jurisprudence is unnecessary and, indeed, harmful. In contrast, however, Alidoust, respectfully and in language incomprehensible to the public, of course, argued that to rationalize jurisprudence, it must be methodically expanded: the element of expediency must be introduced into it, jurisprudence must be made purposive so that a new-style jurisprudence, in novel cases where the "texts" are silent, can make the text speak and extract a ruling compatible with the spirit of the age and in line with the Lawgiver's purposes. Soroush, however, said that when the "texts" are silent, one must refer to modern collective reason — and of course, in Soroush's view, the "texts" are entirely silent, and it is the interpreter who puts words into the text's mouth. Nor do we have pure reason; rather, we have only a fragmentary reason into which fire cannot be cast.

Soroush, insistently and bluntly, pointed to the problems of the expansion of jurisprudence: 1. The lack of a criterion for distinguishing between "pure reason" and "impure reason" (more precisely: the lack of an intersubjective jurisprudential criterion, free from begging the question, for distinguishing between the "purity" and "impurity" of reason), 2. Jurisprudence making its home on others' land, which is the land of collective reason. And of course, Rumi's advice is in our ears: "Do not build a house on others' land." Jurists making their home on the land of modern reason is, in an optimistic scenario, unnecessary and useless, and in a pessimistic scenario, disruptive to modern rationality and usurpatory.

Nevertheless, what was not discussed even in passing, yet is a central issue, are the problems of the "contraction of jurisprudence." Whereas, to develop a comprehensive solution for assessing the relationship between reason and jurisprudence, that is, a solution with the most advantages and the fewest disadvantages, one must weigh the merits and demerits of the "contraction of jurisprudence" and the merits and demerits of the "expansion of jurisprudence" together — a weighing not done once and for all in the manner of rhetoric, but a constant, argumentative, and dialogical weighing. In what follows, I will briefly discuss the problems of the "contraction of jurisprudence."

2_ Abandon Your "Jurisprudence," O "Wise Ones"

If the contraction of jurisprudence occurs completely and leads to the erasure of jurisprudence, that is, if modern reason takes the place of jurisprudence, then what becomes of obedience to God? Let us call this problem the issue of the "conflict between the outer and the inner." This is a theological problem and solely a concern of believers. In modern terms, it is an "intra-religious" discussion. "If, and only if" we consider the specific function of jurisprudence to be securing the minimum ground for obedience to God's commands, then from an intra-religious perspective, the contraction of jurisprudence must never lead to the complete erasure of jurisprudence, otherwise it would defeat its own purpose. Because the erasure of jurisprudence means abandoning obedience to God, and from an intra-religious perspective, obedience to God is the paramount condition for salvation. It goes without saying that defending this "if and only if" is not simple, if it is even possible at all.

This theological question can be considered the mother of all issues in the philosophy of Islamic jurisprudence and one of the fundamental problems of modern Islamic theology, although it is also woven into the very fabric of classical Islamic theology. The esoterics (bāṭinīs) in the Islamic tradition are by no means opposed to obeying God; rather, they not only did not consider jurisprudential thinking the path to obeying God, but on the contrary, they regarded jurisprudence as the “greatest veil” (ḥijāb al-akbar) and the “supreme polytheism” (shirk al-aʿlā). Soroush is an heir to the esoteric tradition. This view is rooted in an interpretation of religion that emphasizes spiritual experience and inner intuition. The esoterics believe that focusing on the outward aspects of the Sharia can become an obstacle to understanding the divine truth. For modernist esoterics, the obstructive nature of jurisprudence in the modern world is a hundredfold, and its updating is neither necessary nor beneficial. Soroush, as a modernist heir to the esoteric tradition, argues that modern rationality can be a better substitute for understanding religion and the human connection with God. In contrast, Alidoust represents the exoteric tradition, which emphasizes the importance of actions and the observance of jurisprudential rulings. The jurisprudential-minded view holds that the minimum of obedience to God is realized through the performance of jurisprudential acts. Proponents of jurisprudential thinking argue that faith devoid of jurisprudential action is indeed incomplete and ineffective.

In a passing comparison with the New Testament, one could say that the esoterics are indeed the Pauls of the Islamic world, and the language of their state is this saying of Paul: “A person is justified not by the works of the law, but through faith in Jesus Christ.” (Galatians 2:16) and also: “For we maintain that a person is justified by faith apart from the works of the law.” (Romans 3:28). The jurisprudential-minded, however, are the heirs to the Jameses of the Islamic world. They are in sympathy with James, the brother of Jesus Christ in the New Testament, who in the epistle attributed to James, addressing Jewish Christians, said: “You see that a person is justified by works and not by faith alone.” (James 2:24) and: “Faith by itself, if it does not have works, is dead.” (James 2:17), and also: “What good is it, my brothers, if someone says he has faith but does not have works? Can that faith save him?” (James 2:14). The Soroush-Alidoust disagreement is, at its very foundation, the Islamic version of the Paul-James disagreement in the New Testament.

3_ “A ‘discussion’ such as this, in the middle of the arena, is my desire”

Although it is well known that the defining characteristic of the Islamic tradition has been the dominance of jurisprudence—that is, the victory of the exoteric over the esoteric—the esoteric tradition has always had a paradoxical presence in Muslim cultures: prominent yet imperceptible, an ever-present absentee. The esoterics have not only been openly present among the Nizari Ismailis and remain so, but at least esoteric veins can also be found, in hidden or semi-hidden form, among Sunni Sufis and Twelver Shiites, both past and present. Even Ghazali, who was himself a jurist critical of the esoterics, has esoteric veins in his critique of jurisprudence, and Soroush has internalized and strengthened these veins in his own thought. In contemporary Islamic philosophy, too, Henry Corbin and his students and promoters have endeavored to unveil the esoteric aspect of Ismaili-Twelver Shiism and its Sufi manifestation among Sunnis, and with it, to apply a balm to the existential pains of the contemporary nihilistic human.

Considering this historical-cultural background, our contemporary problem in the comprehensive assessment of the relationship between reason and jurisprudence is this: the representatives of the exoteric must explain how jurisprudence does not become the “greatest veil” and an “obstacle to the inner path.” The representatives of the esoteric must also explain how the effacement of jurisprudence is compatible with obedience to God. In more detailed terms, on the one hand, proponents of the jurisprudence-centered approach must show how jurisprudential rulings can be compatible with modern rationality and the needs of today’s society, without hindering spiritual growth and a deeper understanding of religion. On the other hand, proponents of the esoteric approach must explain how, in the absence of jurisprudential frameworks, specific ethical and behavioral standards can be proposed for a religious society.

In other words, given the spread of religious individualism and the increasingly selective nature of religiosity in Iran today, the future chapter of the conflict between reason and jurisprudence in contemporary Iran appears to be something of this nature: a return to the ancient problem of “the scandals of the exoterics and the virtues of the esoterics” or “the scandals of the esoterics and the virtues of the exoterics,” or a possible combination of the virtues of both. This is a central issue in modern Islamic theology and the mother of all issues in the philosophy of Islamic jurisprudence, and it requires special scholarly attention from Islamic studies scholars, philosophers of Islamic religion, and contemporary-minded seminary students.

Reviving the discussion of the "conflict between the exoteric and the esoteric" provides an opportunity to rethink key concepts of religion, including the meaning of obedience to God, the role of reason in interpreting religion, and the reconfiguration of the relationship between the exoteric and the esoteric in Islam. Contemporary religious society faces new challenges that require innovative responses, yet ones rooted in the Islamic tradition. Ultimately, such rational, respectful, and fundamental dialogues between representatives of two different and deep-rooted intellectual traditions can contribute to the intellectual and spiritual enrichment of Islamic societies and open a path toward the compatibility of tradition and modernity within the framework of Islamic thought.