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Political Science
The Fundamentalist Is an Instrumentalist, by Emad Afroogh
Fundamentalism is not inherently reprehensible, but when it reverts to instrumentalism and prioritizes means over ends, it leads to ossification; the United States and Zionism are prime examples. Emad Afroogh identifies disregard for time and place as the cause of political deviation.
Abstract: The concept of the fundamentalist has been politically exploited more than anything else. Fundamentalism, in one sense, is a belief in unchangeable foundations in rights and truths. On the other hand, disregard for the role of time and place and the philosophy of jurisprudence leads to ossification and fundamentalism. But fundamentalism reverts to a kind of instrumentalism that pays more attention and emphasis to instruments than to ends. From this perspective, America and Zionism are clear examples of fundamentalism.
The concept of fundamentalism, its theoretical foundations, and its challenges are mostly exploited politically. Sometimes these political treatments have even infiltrated academic circles. I do not think that, considering the original concept of fundamentalism, fundamentalism is a bad thing. When we speak of human rights, we speak of foundations that are depicted for human beings. If we say, for example, that humans have the right to life, the right to liberty, and the right to property, do we recognize these as changeable principles and foundations, or as fixed principles and foundations that no government at any point in time has the right to violate? Therefore, one cannot condemn every type of fundamentalism. Of course, if we are committed to a set of principles, we must pay attention to the role of time and place in the reproduction of these principles and their interpretation. If we do not pay attention to the role of time and place, even in dealing with these rights [human rights], we may fall into ossification.
One of the meanings of ossification is to ignore the role of time and place and the expansion of rights. Another conception is that we do not attain these rights at all; we lack the ability to arrive at a more pivotal philosophy amidst these particular rulings. For instance, instead of paying attention to the philosophy of jurisprudence, we pay attention to jurisprudence itself; this is a harsher and cruder meaning than its first dimension. These are various theories regarding the concept of fundamentalism. We must see which one we have in mind. Another point that can be made with certainty regarding fundamentalism is instrumentalism. In reality, we cannot reach primary foundations and an ultimate end in the human being by bypassing instruments. If, in our view, ossification is giving importance to instruments over ends, then the American approach will also be considered a form of ossification.
But in the history of Islam, we can attribute the emergence of fundamentalism to the Kharijites; a kind of superficiality in understanding everything. If we look closely, the Akhbari movement in the modern era also, in a way, traces back to Kharijite thought. To make only the Quran a pretext, to ignore human understanding, consensus, tradition, culture, and custom, and to have a superficial understanding of the Quran, far removed from rational thought, and then to use it to evaluate a social movement epistemologically, is itself considered a form of fundamentalism. The Ash'arite-inclined current in the history of Islam can also be considered a type of fundamentalism.
But in the contemporary era, I think it is these roots that connect political currents. In the political currents of the last hundred years, an excessive West-worship occurred in our society, which led to excessive West-phobia or excessive Islamism; a kind of extreme fundamentalist thought.
In reality, fundamentalism in the East was accompanied by a kind of political movement. Because in the East, and specifically in Islamic countries, the separation of religion from politics has not yet been realized, fundamentalist currents have become intertwined with political currents. This does not mean that fundamentalism does not exist in the West; but because, for both intellectual-epistemological reasons and political-social reasons, they have drawn a distinction between religion and politics, we cannot find a clear manifestation of political fundamentalism in the West. Therefore, evidence shows that the same subtle fundamentalism and superstition-orientation is gradually becoming apparent in the West as well, and if it becomes apparent in the West, it will be more intense than in the East and Asian countries. If these movements surge in the West, due to fragmented political identities, they will in fact experience a kind of flight from the center; it will give them a kind of negation of national identity and national interests, and how can the West gather them together?
Zionism, too, is a form of fundamentalism. Here as well, only the instruments have been sanctified. In fact, we have two types of instrumentalism or two types of fundamentalism. One type has defined a set of primary rights for human beings and is in no way willing to define new social rights for them. Liberalism is precisely like this, and opposed to it are the socialists, who have defined a set of social rights for human beings but are unwilling to define individual rights for them. The second type of fundamentalism, which is not at all mild, is essentially instrumentalist in outlook. It lacks primary thought, primary reflection. It does not answer the question of what this text came for and, in fact, what need it seeks to fulfill. It merely focuses on the text; it has no prior understanding of the text, no understanding of the human being before the text, and for this reason the text is considered sacred to it; Zionism is the same.
I think the dispute is over the fact that progressive forces and those seeking advancement, when examining and formulating the discourse of progress and advancement, pursued a path that was alien to culture and tradition, and for this reason their reading was akin to the reading adopted during the Constitutional Revolution. Under such circumstances, we should expect that some, at the opposite pole, will show a reaction of the same kind as that discourse. Wherever in these countries a reading of progress and advancement occurred that looked to the future, paid attention to transformation and change, and was not alien to culture, tradition, and various social strata, it succeeded. Like the discourse of the Islamic Revolution, which did not come to revive everything that existed in our traditional layers. The Islamic Revolution looks to the future; it came to create a widespread change at the level of the social system, not to push aside the layers that foster progress. Hence, we see the people embracing it.
In the long term, the course of the world is moving in a direction where we will, in fact, gravitate toward a true fundamentalism and principlism and attention to human rights, and I do not think that in the long run the division of the world will be in the same manner as it is now. Despite the fact that America achieved a relative success, I see a defeat behind this relative success. This defeat is the defeat of hardware against software. I even believe in a kind of philosophy of history wherein ultimately the divine and monotheistic forces will overcome the satanic forces, and finally a full-scale conflict and struggle will occur between divine civilizations and materialistic, satanic civilizations. I predict that America will not have much of a role in the new international order.
Note
Paying attention to the concept of fundamentalism in order to properly understand this social movement, especially in the current state of the world, is a necessary task that calls upon all Muslim thinkers and politicians for assistance. As Mr. Emad Afroogh has rightly pointed out, what is presented today in political literature as fundamentalism and principlism are, in fact, two different discourses with two different mental paradigms. It seems that these terms were also produced simultaneously within these two discourses and, over time, have each developed a specific semantic field in their respective arenas. In this regard, Mr. Afroogh's effort is worthy of appreciation and reflection.
- True fundamentalism, in his view, means accepting fixed legal foundations while paying attention to the developments of the time in order to achieve the intended legal objectives. In contrast, disregard for the philosophy of jurisprudence and a fragmented view of rulings and rights is considered a form of ossification and negative fundamentalism. The important point is that, firstly, the boundary between these two definitions is not very clear, and it cannot be determined whether true fundamentalism gives primacy to "rights" or to its goals and purposes. Secondly, it must be noted that from the perspective of Shia jurisprudence, one can only attend to the philosophy of rulings and the philosophical aspects of rights to a certain extent, and in many cases, the rights of the Sharia must be accepted as a devotional command.
- It seems that Mr. Afroogh has defined and differentiated the concept of fundamentalism primarily by relying on the domain of rights and duties. Although the main issue of fundamentalism in recent years has usually revolved around political and judicial rights, the primary root of this thought and the opposition of its adversaries must be sought in its theoretical dimensions.
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PDF file of the article The Fundamentalist Is an Instrumentalist
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This article is the result of a short conversation with Emad Afroogh, sociologist and professor at Tarbiat Modares University and the seminary.
Author: Emad Afroogh
Source: Andishe-ye Jame'eh, No. 21
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