The God of Mysticism and the God of Philosophy

This writing is a comparative study of mystical theology and philosophical theology in Islamic culture. The author's main claim is that the disagreements between Muslim mystics and philosophers regarding theology stem from a deeper disagreement about the definition and conception of God. In particular, the rationality of belief in the existence of God and our need or lack of need for proof of His existence, which is one of the central topics of philosophical and mystical theology, is based on the definition and conception that mystics and philosophers have of God. The need or lack of need for God's existence to be demonstrated, the attributes of God, the possibility of knowing God and the manner of knowing Him, His similarity and distinction from creation, the relationship between God and creation, and the rationality of religious beliefs or the relationship between reason and faith are among the fundamental issues and topics of theology, and as we shall see, the resolution of all these issues is somehow based on the presupposition one holds regarding the definition of God.

1. Introduction

Before addressing the main discussion, it is appropriate to review the major perspectives on the relationship between reason and faith in the philosophy of religion. These perspectives, which have an epistemological character, are in fact based on different definitions and understandings of rationality. Three of the most important of these perspectives are Classical Foundationalism, or Evidentialism, Fideism, and Reformed Epistemology, or Experientialism.

1-1. Classical Foundationalism or Evidentialism. Classical Foundationalism is a view about the structure of knowledge according to which: 1) our beliefs are divided into two categories: basic and non-basic, 2) basic or foundational beliefs are self-evident, need no justification, and do not owe their authority and validity to other beliefs, and 3) non-basic or superstructural beliefs are inferred from basic or foundational beliefs and are justifiable only in this way. Beyond these three common principles, foundationalists disagree on 4) the definition or criterion of self-evidence, 5) the instances of basic beliefs, and 6) the manner in which non-basic beliefs are based on basic ones, or how non-basic beliefs are justified on the basis of basic beliefs. Foundationalists claim that 7) foundationalism is a requirement of theoretical rationality and arises from the norms and obligations of theoretical reason.

1-2. Foundationalism regarding religious knowledge can be formulated in the following propositions:

8) No religious belief is acceptable unless it is reasonable; and

9) No religious belief is reasonable unless it can be proven with the help of "argument."

Thus, fundamentalists who believe in the existence of God attempt to prove God's existence with the help of reasoning and justify their belief under its shelter. On the other hand, fundamentalists who deny the existence of God or doubt His existence attempt to show the inadequacy and incompleteness of those reasons, or to argue for the non-existence of God. But both groups agree on the theoretical nature of belief in God's existence and our need for reasoning in justifying this belief. Among the well-known figures of fundamentalism in Christianity is Aquinas, and among the prominent figures of atheist fundamentalists one can name Clifford. Fideism and experientialism (or reformed epistemology) are, in fact, reactions to traditional fundamentalism. Fideists deny the first claim of religious fundamentalism, namely proposition (8), and believe that religious beliefs are unreasonable and yet acceptable. Experientialists or proponents of reformed epistemology deny the second claim of fundamentalism, namely proposition (9), and believe that religious beliefs are reasonable but self-evident and needless of reasoning. Fideists claim that religious beliefs owe their authority and validity to faith, and experientialists claim that religious beliefs derive their authority and validity from religious experience. The difference between the two is that fideists accept traditional fundamentalism as an explanation of the superstructure of rationality, while maintaining that religious beliefs have no rational foundation. Experientialists, however, claim that religious beliefs do have a rational foundation, but that traditional fundamentalism does not provide a correct picture of the structure of rationality or a correct criterion for identifying instances of self-evident beliefs, and therefore considers belief in the existence of God a theoretical belief in need of reasoning. Both theories defend religious beliefs against the challenge of traditional fundamentalism; although they take different paths in this defense.

1-3. Fideism. Fideism is the view that religious beliefs are not susceptible to rational evaluation. One of the reasons typically offered in favor of this claim is that a person's devotion to God must be their ultimate concern, and conditioning faith upon rational argument, in fact, indicates that reason, and not God, is the person's ultimate concern. Therefore, entrusting the fate of faith to reason and accepting the judgment of reason in the realm of religion is incompatible with the essence of religiosity. Fideism has different versions, and Barth, Kierkegaard, and a group of followers of Wittgenstein are among the prominent figures of fideism.

One of the considerable reasons in favor of fideism is based on the difference between faith and belief; it is other than belief-that. Faith goes far beyond mere belief in the truth of a proposition. Faith entails a kind of devotion, commitment, trust, and positive valuation, whereas belief does not; and in this judgment, it makes no difference whether the object of faith and belief is God or something else. Faith in God means faith in the truth and righteousness of God, which entails devotion, humility, and trust; but belief in the proposition "God exists" means belief in the truth of this proposition; that is all.

1-4. Reformed Epistemology or Experientialism. Proponents of reformed epistemology or experientialists, who are inspired by the ideas of John Calvin, the famous Christian reformer, in fact do three things: they show that

1) Traditional fundamentalism is flawed and inadequate;

2) Religious beliefs, including belief in the existence of God, are among self-evident and basic beliefs, grounded in and based on religious experience, and therefore the rational justification of these beliefs is not indebted to reasoning or based on the acceptance of non-religious beliefs; and consequently

3) Doubt about religious beliefs or the denial of their reasonableness, based on the presuppositions of traditional fundamentalism, is baseless.

William P. Alston and Alvin Plantinga are among the prominent figures of this approach in contemporary philosophy of religion. (1)

1-4-1. Alston, emphasizing that sensory beliefs are among our self-evident and rational beliefs whose authority and validity are owed not to reasoning but to sensory experience, attempts to show that belief in the existence of God is likewise self-evident and grounded in religious experience. In Alston's view, religious experience is no different in nature and essence from sensory experience; in both cases, we establish an immediate connection with an objective reality. The only difference lies in the object and referent of these two types of experience, which has no bearing on the authority and validity of the experience and the belief grounded in it. In sensory experience, we encounter natural, material, and conditioned objects, while in religious experience, we encounter a transcendent and absolute being. Alston's critique of traditional foundationalism is primarily based on the point that foundationalists have no reasonable justification for accepting the validity of sensory experience while denying the validity of religious experience. According to Alston, there is no reason that dictates the self-evidence and rationality of sensory beliefs and the non-self-evidence and irrationality of belief in the existence of God; belief in the existence of God is just as justifiable under the shelter of religious experience as sensory beliefs are under the shelter of sensory experience. Thus, Alston seeks to reform the traditional foundationalist view on the nature and validity of religious experience. In terms of epistemological justification, Alston is a reliabilist, meaning he believes that our convictions and beliefs are justified and count as knowledge only if they are obtained through reliable channels. On this basis, he claims that sensory beliefs and belief in the existence of God, both obtained through the channel of experience, are true and justified, because sensory experience and religious experience are reliable channels of knowledge. (2)

1-4-2. Alvin Plantinga offers another version of religious experientialism or reformed epistemology. His critique of traditional foundationalism is based on the claim that basic beliefs are not limited to sensory or indubitable beliefs; there are beliefs based on memory, our beliefs about other minds, and many other beliefs in our minds that are not inferable from our other beliefs, for which we have no evidence, and yet accepting those beliefs is rational, and in accepting them we commit no epistemological error and violate no epistemological principle. Plantinga claims that belief in the existence of God is likewise; that is, it is among the basic beliefs, is not inferable from other beliefs, does not owe its justification to other beliefs, and is nonetheless rational. In terms of epistemological justification, Plantinga is a functionalist and believes that we are in a favorable position from an epistemological standpoint, because our cognitive faculties were created for a specific function, which is the discovery of truth and the acquisition of knowledge, and they perform their task properly. (3)

1-5. The author believes that the dispute between Muslim mystics and philosophers over the rationality of religious beliefs, and especially over the need for or independence of belief in the existence of God from reasoning, can be clearly understood and explained within the framework of the two views of traditional foundationalism and religious experientialism or reformed epistemology. The overwhelming majority of Muslim philosophers are proponents of traditional foundationalism in epistemology and, at the same time, consider none of the religious propositions, including the proposition "God exists," to be self-evident and independent of reasoning; on this basis, they endeavor to argue for the existence of God and to justify belief in the existence of God with the help of non-religious beliefs. As we shall see, this approach is based on the definition that Muslim philosophers provide of God.

On the other hand, Muslim mystics claim that belief in the existence of God is self-evident, clear, and needless of argumentation, and as we shall see, this approach is also based on the definition that mystics provide of the concept of God and His reality. Thus, it can be concluded that Muslim philosophers have accepted both claims of traditional foundationalism regarding religious knowledge, namely propositions (8) and (9), while Muslim mystics largely deny the second claim, proposition (9), and sometimes the first claim of traditional foundationalism, proposition (8). Which of these two views is closer to our religious texts and provides a better interpretation and explanation of these texts is the subject of another article. Here, after stating the definition of God in mysticism and philosophy, we will cite evidence that supports the mystics' view and indicates that belief in the existence of God is among the basic beliefs, and indeed the foundation and presupposition of all other beliefs that may exist in our minds, and without accepting this belief, no belief is reasonable or justifiable. Belief in the existence of God is unarguable and, at the same time, reasonable. Based on the mystical definition of God, religious skepticism is identical to absolute skepticism, and doubt in the existence of God is identical to doubt in the principle of existence. Hence, anyone who negates absolute skepticism has faith in the existence of God. From the mystics' perspective, doubt in the existence of God or denial of His existence arises from an incorrect conception of God, not from the incompleteness of arguments for His existence.

The author's claim, in brief, is that:

1) The existence of God is not susceptible to argumentation, because His existence is the presupposition of every argument; therefore

2) Belief in the existence of God is among the basic beliefs, and indeed, the most fundamental of them;

3) Belief in the existence of God relies upon and is grounded in religious experience; and

4) Religious experience is a graded and variegated reality: some religious experiences are rational experience or intuition, (Thought Experiment Or Intellectual Intuition) and others are experiential knowledge of the heart or knowledge by presence, (Knowledge by Presence). The evidence presented here in favor of the God of mysticism is entirely of the type of rational experience or intuition. This evidence is offered solely for the purpose of placing the audience's mind in suitable conditions for the rational intuition of the proposition "God exists."

Thus, I agree with fideists in the view that argumentation for the existence of God is incorrect; although I have a different reason for this claim. In my view, argumentation for the existence of God is, firstly, incompatible with the Godhood of God; that is, it is based on an incorrect conception of God, and secondly, a God whose existence is proven through argumentation cannot serve as the foundation of religious faith; that is, the knowledge upon which faith relies and is grounded is experiential knowledge that has psychological and practical implications and consequences. My disagreement with fideists is that, in my belief, the slightest degree of knowledge of God precedes faith and is independent of it, and belief in the existence of God is reasonable; in the sense that it is justifiable in light of religious experience; although such justification neither means argumentation for the existence of God nor is it incompatible with God being the ultimate concern of the human being. Belief in the existence of God is reasonable for the same reason that other beliefs based on experience are reasonable. Belief in the existence of God is reasonable because this belief is the foundation and presupposition of all other religious and non-religious beliefs. Since doubt in the existence of God is identical to doubt in absolute existence, the acceptance of absolute existence is identical to the acceptance of the existence of God. Thus, the acceptance of the truth of any proposition depends on the prior acceptance of the existence of God.

On the other hand, I agree with Reformed Epistemology in its claim that belief in the existence of God is among basic and rational beliefs and can be justified by appeal to religious experience. My disagreement with empiricists concerns the nature of religious experience. While empiricists take religious experience to be of the same kind as sensory experience (knowledge by presence), I believe that religious experience has various types and kinds; that is, it forms a spectrum, one end of which is rational intuition or thought experiment, and the other end is the intuition of the heart, or mystical experience, or knowledge by presence. Moreover, empiricists do not claim that the existence of God is indemonstrable. They claim that the existence of God does not require demonstration and that belief in His existence is rational even apart from argument. Whereas my claim is that the existence of God is not demonstrable, that argument for His existence rests on an incorrect conception of Him, and that even if the philosophers' proofs for the existence of God were sound, the being whose existence is established through these arguments is not God.

It can be claimed that the disagreement between philosophy and mysticism concerning theology, ontology, epistemology, and many other areas stems from a difference over one key, fundamental presupposition. This presupposition is that "unconditioned absolute existence exists in the external world, outside the mind." Mystics claim that unconditioned absolute existence exists externally and is not merely a mental concept. On the other hand, philosophers claim that unconditioned absolute existence is a universal and abstract concept that exists solely in the mind, and what exists outside the mind is the instance of absolute existence, not absolute existence itself. Mystics try to show the truth of this presupposition, while philosophers dispute and doubt its truth. In the view of philosophers, objective entities that are instances of the concept of existence are always conditioned by some limitation, and God, who is one of these instances, has an existence conditioned by the qualification of absoluteness; the God of philosophy is existence conditioned by something (bi-shart-i lā), not unconditioned existence. From the philosophical perspective, God is merely one of the determinations of absolute existence, whereas from the mystical perspective, God is absolute existence itself. It is this fundamental presupposition that separates the paths of philosophy and mysticism, not only in theology but in many important issues of ontology and epistemology. The disagreement between philosophers and mystics in defining God also arises from the disagreement over unconditioned absolute existence. It is obvious that if the unconditioned absolute exists, it is God Himself, but if it does not exist, then God must necessarily be one of its determinations.

2. The God of Philosophy

2-1. According to the philosophical definition, God is a being conditioned by the qualification of absoluteness. Islamic philosophy defines the concept of God as existence conditioned by something (bi-shart-i lā), or a specific existence that is distinct and separate from other existents. From the philosophical perspective, the concept of God is composed of existence and the negative condition of "conditioned by something" or absoluteness, by virtue of which God is distinguished and separated from other existents and occupies a specific level of existence, which is the highest level. The possibility of doubting the existence of the God of philosophy and His need for demonstration is due to this very condition. For when an existence is conditioned by a qualification, the existence of that qualification becomes doubtful, and doubt concerning the existence of the condition will also extend to the conditioned existence. Such doubt is rational, because it entails no contradiction or incoherence and can only be removed by proof and demonstration. Thus, based on the philosophical definition of God, His existence is doubtful and in need of demonstration.

2-2. Such a definition of the concept of God has cast its shadow over the philosophers' views on the existence of contingent beings, the relationship between God and creation, the definition of causality, the manner of the emanation of multiplicity from unity, and many other discussions. Some of the most important consequences and implications of this definition are as follows:

2-2-1. Such a definition allows philosophers to accept, in addition to the existence of God, the existence of other beings, albeit in a dependent manner; that is, to commit to the real multiplicity of existence. Philosophers divide the beings of the universe into necessary and contingent, and they hold that contingent beings possess a real existence, albeit conditioned and dependent. In the context of proving the existence of God, philosophers, with the help of philosophical arguments, prove a God whose existence is compatible with the existence of contingent beings. The real multiplicity of existence is the presupposition of the argument for the existence of the God of philosophy.

2-2-2. By accepting this definition, philosophers absolutely purify God of the attributes of contingent beings. For the qualification of absoluteness, in its negative sense, is incompatible and cannot be combined with any other qualification, and an existence conditioned by this qualification is utterly distinct from an existence conditioned by any other qualification.

2-2-3. According to the philosophical conception of God, the coexistence of God and creation in a single rank is impossible. That is, not only are contingent beings not present in the rank of God, but God is also not present in the rank of contingent beings, nor can He be. For the qualification of necessity and the qualification of contingency mutually exclude one another, and a being qualified by one of these qualifications cannot be combined with a being qualified by the other. These qualifications prevent each of them from being present in the rank of the other. The descent of the God of philosophy from His own rank is irrational, because it entails abandoning the qualification of absoluteness and necessity, and the ascent of contingent beings toward Him is impossible, because it entails abandoning the qualification of contingency. Philosophers, of course, claim that God has presential knowledge of contingent beings, but as we shall see, this claim cannot be justified on that basis.

2-3-4. The relationship of the God of philosophy with creation is a relationship of causality in its philosophical sense, and one of the abstruse philosophical discussions is the explanation of how the emanation of multiplicity from unity is possible.

2-3-5. By accepting the philosophers' definition of God, the justification of God's knowledge of creation and creation's knowledge of God becomes problematic. In the first case, the problem arises from the fact that God's knowledge of contingent beings cannot be acquired knowledge; because God does not have a mind so that one could suppose His knowledge of contingent beings is through concepts and propositions present in His mind. On the other hand, the God of philosophy cannot have presential knowledge of contingent beings; for, firstly, as the philosophers themselves explicitly state, presential knowledge is specific to immaterial beings, meaning that in presential knowledge, both the knower and the known are immaterial, and the criterion of presential knowledge is the existential unity or unification of the knower and the known. Therefore, the God of philosophy cannot have presential knowledge of the natural world and the material beings and events of this world. Presential knowledge consists of the presence of an immaterial being before an immaterial being. This knowledge depends on the presence of the knower in the rank of the known or the presence of the known in the rank of the knower, and as we have seen, the qualification of absoluteness prevents the God of philosophy from becoming present in the lower ranks of existence, or beings qualified by other qualifications from becoming present in His rank.

The knowledge of contingent beings of the God of philosophy also faces a problem. For the God of philosophy is wholly other, and due to the qualification of absoluteness, which entails His absolute transcendence from the attributes of contingent beings, He bears no resemblance whatsoever to contingent beings, and hence, the God of philosophy is not knowable through acquired knowledge. Presential knowledge of this God is also impossible for the same reason mentioned above.

3. The God of Mysticism

3-1. According to the definition that mysticism provides of God, "God is absolute, unconditioned existence." Unlike the God of philosophy, the God of mysticism is not qualified by the qualification of absoluteness. Taking this qualification in the definition of God is solely to indicate His freedom from all qualifications, including the qualification of absoluteness.

3-2. If God is absolute, unconditioned existence, the following results will be obtained by definition:

3-2-1. Neither the concept of God nor His existence will have any qualification; therefore, proving the existence of the God of mysticism does not depend on proving the existence of any qualification. Doubt in the existence of the God of mysticism is an impossible and irrational doubt; because the God of mysticism is absolute, unconditioned existence, and absolute, unconditioned existence has no qualification such that doubt in the existence of that qualification would extend to absolute existence. According to the mystical definition, doubt in the existence of God arises from an incorrect conception of God. For if God is absolute, unconditioned existence, as the mystics claim, doubt in His existence is identical to doubt in the very principle of existence, and doubt in existence is an irrational and impossible doubt, the supposition of which entails a contradiction. However, doubt in the existence of God due to an incorrect conception of Him, although possible, can only be resolved through correcting the conception of God, not through reasoning for His existence.

3-2-2. The God of mysticism is with all qualified beings and is present in all ranks of existence; although no qualified being is with Him. Absolute existence is, in one sense, identical with qualified beings, and His descent from the rank of the absolute unseen, and His manifestation, self-disclosure, and determination in the ranks below the Essence is possible. For the unconditioned absolute is truly unconditioned; it combines with every qualified being and does not exclude any qualification or any qualified being. Of course, no qualified being is present in His rank, but He is with all. The Absolute is with all qualified beings, and if He were not, He would not be absolute; yet no qualified being is with the Absolute or with other qualified beings, for if it were, it would no longer be qualified.

3-2-3. The God of mysticism has knowledge of contingent beings; for contingent beings, in the true sense of the word, are not other than Him. God's knowledge of contingent beings is identical with God's knowledge of Himself. The God of mysticism possesses both knowledge by presence and knowledge by acquisition. Knowledge by presence, as we have seen, depends upon the existential union or unity of the knower and the known, and this ontological and metaphysical presupposition can only be assumed under the protection of the mystical definition of God. Knowledge by presence has no meaning other than the presence of the known 'with' the knower and vice versa, and this 'with-ness' is precisely existence at the level of the knower or at the level of the known. But as we have seen, God's existence at the level of contingent beings is only possible and intelligible if we consider Him as absolute, unconditioned existence. Absolute, unconditioned existence, while preserving its absoluteness, can exist and be present at the level of conditioned existents, which are nothing other than His manifestations and theophanies.

As for God's knowledge by acquisition of contingent beings: because knowledge by acquisition traces back to knowledge by presence, in the sense that knowledge by presence of the cause is knowledge by acquisition of the effect. Knowledge by acquisition is a kind of mental consideration and assumption. In knowledge by acquisition, the knowing subject encounters the cause, which is the reality of the effect, and assumes that knowledge of that cause is knowledge of the effect, which is a subtle grade of the cause. In other words, knowledge by acquisition consists of considering the cause, which is known essentially, in place of the effect, which is known accidentally. Therefore, God's knowledge by presence of His own essence and attributes is, from one perspective, His knowledge by acquisition of all else, which are the manifestations and theophanies of His essence and attributes. But this claim is only intelligible and acceptable if causality means manifestation and theophany, and the cause is the reality of the effect, and the effect is a subtle grade of the cause. In other words, the presupposition of this claim is the mystical unity of existence, according to which cause and effect are one thing, not two.

3-2-4. Absolute existence in the mystical sense leaves no room for an 'other,' even in the form of dependent or relational existence. From the mystical perspective, whatever is other than God is merely appearance, shadow, and theophany of God. Causality is not the bringing into being of contingent beings, but the evolution of absolute existence in its modes, its self-manifestation in its aspects, and its appearance in its loci of manifestation. Such an existence is not incompatible with its descents, nor is it distant or separate from them. The result is that, based on the mystical definition of God, true multiplicity in existence becomes impossible, and the multiplicity perceived by the senses can only be explained and accepted as multiplicity in the loci of manifestation.

3-2-5. The God of mysticism cannot be described by any attribute at the level of the Essence. For any attribute is considered a kind of limitation and restriction, and entails departure from absoluteness and limitlessness. In other words, abstracting an attribute from Him depends upon considering a relation and assuming an aspect, which is incompatible with His being the absolute Hidden and the impossibility of intellectual reference to the core of His reality. Hence, all of God's attributes belong to the determinations and descended levels of His existence, which appear as a result of the theophany and descent of that existence from the absolute Hidden.

3-2-6. The existence of the God of mysticism is self-evident, and the proofs established for His existence either stem from an incorrect conception of Him—in which case what is proven to exist will not be God but something else mistakenly thought to be God—or they serve as reminders and notices of His existence, rather than being proofs and demonstrations in the precise, philosophical sense of the word; or they are proofs for the self-evidence of His existence, rather than proofs for the principle of His existence.

3-2-7. The mystics' definition of God necessitates a new interpretation and explanation of all ontological categories. On this basis, 'causality' is interpreted as 'self-manifestation' and 'theophany'; the 'being' of contingent beings as 'appearance and manifestation'; 'gradation in existence' as 'gradation in the loci of manifestation'; the 'gradational unity of existence' as 'true and individual unity'; 'multiplicity in existence' as 'multiplicity in the loci of manifestation'; and the 'first emanation' as the 'all-embracing effusion.'

3-2-8. The mystical definition of God allows mystics to combine similarity and incomparability, and to avoid the absolute incomparability of God.

4. Mysticism, Religious Experience, and Reformed Epistemology

In this section, our aim is to show that absolute existence in its mystical sense—that is, unconditioned absolute existence—exists. It is clear that if the existence of such a being is accepted, it must necessarily be God; for God is a being than which nothing more perfect can be conceived. But we must note that this claim cannot be proven through reasoning; for the acceptance of such an existence is a presupposition of any reasoning, and belief in such an existence lies deep within the mind and conscience of every person. The only thing possible here is to demonstrate the truth of this claim by providing a suitable ground for intellectual intuition. What we need here is “knowledge of knowledge,” and knowledge of knowledge cannot be obtained through reasoning in the conventional sense of the word. Reasoning is for removing ignorance and turning the unknown into the known, not for removing heedlessness and turning the unheeded into the heeded. Removing heedlessness is only possible by removing its causes and factors. Ignorance is the contrary of knowledge, but heedlessness is the contrary of knowledge of knowledge and is compatible with knowledge.

Regarding a truth, a person is either knowledgeable about it or ignorant; and in the first case, they are either heedless of that truth and of their knowledge of that truth, or they are mindful of that truth and their knowledge of it. Reminding of previously known things is different from learning a new truth; and the method of learning is also different from the method of reminding. In the position of reminding, the mind must be placed in conditions where being in those conditions leads to awakening and reminding. What those conditions are depends to a large extent on the subject under discussion. Upon seeing a photo of a friend, the memories we have had with them come alive in our conscience. If “the design of the world,” as the mystics say, “is naught but the image of the Beloved,” why should we not, upon seeing the world, remember the Beloved? For reminding of unconditioned absolute existence, the only thing that can be done is to consider the implications and consequences of belief or disbelief in the existence of such a truth, and by reflecting upon them, realize that belief in the existence of such a truth has already existed in the mind; and this is what this part of the article undertakes. Some of the evidences that lead us to awaken to the truth of the proposition “God exists” are as follows:

4-1. Doubt in the existence and reality of anything is only possible if unconditioned absolute existence is [presupposed]. The meaning of doubt in the existence of x is this: “Does x, in whose reality and existence we doubt, partake of unconditioned absolute reality and have a share of unconditioned absolute existence or not?” Thus, unconditioned absolute existence is the presupposition of doubt in the existence of anything, and without accepting it, not only the acceptance of the existence of conditioned beings, but also doubt and denial of their existence would not be possible. Therefore, doubt in unconditioned absolute existence entails its acceptance at a prior level. And since God, by the mystical definition, is that very unconditioned absolute existence, doubt in His existence is not possible; because such doubt depends on the acceptance of His existence at a prior level. But if God, as the philosophers say, is existence conditioned by the condition of absoluteness—that is, absolute existence with the condition of no-condition (b-shart lā)—doubt in His existence would be possible without any contradiction. For the meaning of this doubt is whether this particular existence partakes of the absolute existence which is other than it or not. In other words, doubt in the existence of the God of philosophy contains no contradiction. For this doubt means: “Has absolute existence with the condition of no-condition partaken of, had a portion of, or a share in unconditioned absolute existence or not?” Posing such a question is reasonable, and this question is an open one whose closure requires reasoning.

But if we consider God, as the mystics say, to be that very unconditioned absolute existence, doubt in His existence or denial of His existence would entail the acknowledgment of His existence, and such a matter is self-evident and not susceptible to proof. For one of the signs of the self-evidence of a proposition is precisely that doubt and denial of that proposition entail its affirmation. Therefore, without accepting unconditioned absolute existence, the acceptance, doubt, or denial of any reality is not possible. We note that based on the mystical vision, conceiving God as a distinct, separate, detached being outside of other beings is a false conception; for it entails the imperfection and limitation of God. In other words, doubt in the existence of God is identical to doubt in the principle of existence, not an instance of it.

According to the definition of philosophy, a person can accept the truth of many propositions and the existence of many beings while at the same time doubting the existence of God, and such a doubt entails no contradiction. In fact, philosophical arguments for the existence of God are all based on the presupposition that, while we doubt the existence of God and need an argument to accept His existence, we do not doubt the existence of contingent things or contingent phenomena, such as motion or order, and therefore we can prove the existence of God through contingent things or contingent phenomena and remove the doubt about His existence. (4) But if God, as mystics claim, is the very unconditioned absolute existence, then doubting His existence is identical to doubting unconditioned absolute existence, and religious skepticism is identical to absolute skepticism; that is, the supposition of doubting God's existence while knowing the existence of contingent things contains an internal contradiction. And since accepting unconditioned absolute existence is the presupposition for accepting anything, negating absolute skepticism and accepting the principle of existence is identical to negating religious skepticism and accepting the existence of God. In this state, the existence of God is needless of proof; in the sense that the supposition of such a need is an unreasonable and meaningless supposition. In other words, when philosophers assume the existence of contingent things as given and self-evident in order to argue for the existence of God, they have, at a prior level, already assumed and taken for granted unconditioned absolute existence. Because the supposition of the existence of anything entails the supposition of unconditioned absolute existence at a prior level. From this perspective, the philosophers' argument for the existence of God contains an internal contradiction; for this argument is for proving the existence of something whose existence has already been assumed within the premises of the argument.

4-2. A proposition's need for a proof depends on the subject and predicate being conceived in a specific way. If the subject and predicate are conceived in such a way that their relation is contingent and they are separable from one another, then proving the truth of that proposition—that is, proving the identity and connection of its subject and predicate—requires a proof; doubting the truth of such a proposition is a possible and reasonable doubt. Because the supposition of the separation of the subject and predicate of that proposition in one of the possible worlds contains no contradiction. But if the relation between the subject and predicate is, by definition, a necessary relation and the supposition of their separation entails a contradiction or other impossibilities, then the affirmation of the predicate for the subject will be needless of a cause, and our knowledge of that proposition will also be needless of proof and demonstration. Such propositions are considered self-evident, and knowledge of their truth depends solely on the precise conception of the subject and predicate; unlike theoretical propositions, which, in addition to the conception of the subject and predicate, also require a proof. The proposition "God exists" is self-evident; because God is identical with existence, and His separation from existence is impossible. God's existence is, by definition, necessary, not contingent; and therefore, the relation between the subject and predicate of the proposition "God exists" is also, logically, a necessary relation.

4-3. The probability of a thing's existence depends on the number of its conditions and stipulations, and the more numerous the conditions for a thing's existence, the weaker the probability of its existence, the more reasonable the doubt in its existence, and the more difficult it will be to prove its existence. Because the existence of that thing depends on the realization of the totality of those conditions, and knowledge of its existence will also depend on knowledge of the realization of all those conditions. But the fewer conditions and presuppositions a being's existence has, the greater the probability of its existence becomes, and where a being's existence, due to its absoluteness, depends on no condition, its existence becomes certain. The existence of God, by definition, depends on no condition; because, by the philosophers' own admission, the concept of existence is abstracted from the very essence of God, and its predication to God does not depend on considering any analytical or restrictive aspect; God's essence is identical with existence.

4-4. To demand a proof for the existence of something depends on conceiving it in a limited, distinct, and separate manner from other things. But conceiving God in a specific, distinct, and separate way from other beings entails deficiency, limitation, and anthropomorphism. Therefore, if, like the philosophers, we conceive God in this way and make such a conception the subject of the proposition "God exists," we have erred; that is, we have not, in reality, conceived and affirmed God, but have substituted something else in God's place and offered a proof for it. And in this judgment, it makes no difference whether the qualification that separates God from other beings is the qualification of absoluteness or not. That is, there is no difference between an essential qualification and a non-essential qualification; for the problem of deficiency and limitation arises from the very principle of qualification, not from its being essential. The qualification of absoluteness strips God of encompassment, comprehensiveness, and all-pervading existence, which is one of the perfections. The only difference between this qualification and other qualifications is that other qualifications, in addition to negating this perfection, also entail the limitation or loss of other perfections. But this difference does not alter the ruling on qualifications. The reason for negating qualification from God is that qualification entails deficiency and limitation and is incompatible with God's divinity. The error of the philosophers lies in not considering the qualification of absoluteness to entail deficiency, whereas existential encompassment and amplitude, which necessitate the true existence and presence of its possessor in all levels of existence, is itself one of the perfections, indeed the most important of them. In other words, dividing the realm of existence into two regions, the Necessary and the possible, or independent and copulative existence, entails limiting God to the domain of necessity and negating His existence and presence in the domain of possible things. We saw earlier that without God's existence and presence in the world, neither His presential knowledge would have any determinate meaning, nor would His agency, influence, and intervention in the world be conceivable.

4-5. God is identical with existence, and existence is identical with His essence; therefore, conceiving the separation of God's essence from existence leads to contradiction, and whenever the negation of a proposition leads to contradiction, its truth becomes self-evident. But the reason that God is identical with existence is that if we suppose God's essence is other than existence, this supposition entails both deficiency and limitation, and dependence on another. For something whose essence is not identical with existence owes its existence to another, and the supposition of its separation from existence is a possible and rationally conceivable supposition. Therefore, to escape this predicament, we must accept that God, by definition, exists and cannot not exist. In other words, the demand for a proof of God's existence is based on conceiving Him as one quiddity among quiddities or one concept among concepts that, in their own essence, are separate from existence; whereas, in the case of God, it must be said that the concept abstracted from the very core of His essence, without considering any causal or restrictive aspect, is the concept of existence, not another concept, and not even the concept of existence qualified by the qualification of absoluteness. Although the philosophers also consider God to be identical with existence and negate quiddity from Him, by incorporating the qualification of absoluteness into the definition of God, they define Him as a mental composite made up of absolute existence and the qualification of absoluteness. This definition entails that the concept of existence cannot be abstracted from the very core of God's essence, and that proving His existence requires a proof. The qualification of absoluteness is itself one of the restrictive aspects that prevents the abstraction and predication of existence from the very core of God's essence. Thus, the philosophers' definition of God is incompatible and contradictory with their claim that His existence is independent of causal and restrictive aspects.

4-6. Logically, one of the conditions for the correctness of a definition is that the definiens be clearer and more evident than the definiendum. But such a condition is not specific to the domain of conceptions; it also applies and is operative in the domain of assents, and its observance is necessary; that is, in assent, the premises must be clearer than the conclusion. But this condition is violated in arguing for the existence of God. For God, by definition, is the most manifest of beings, and not seeing Him or denying His existence is due to the intensity of His manifestation. Whereas arguing for the existence of God is based on the assumption that God is more hidden than other beings and that His existence is more concealed than the existence of the premises of the argument. The great mystic, Shaykh Mahmud Shabestari, says in the poem Golshan-e Raz:

4-7. There is a logical concomitance between the need for a cause and the need for a reason. For something that has no cause, its existence is not doubtful so as to require a reason. Doubt about the realization of a thing stems from doubt about the realization of its cause, and this matter is negated in the case where the thing in question has no cause—indeed, where its having a cause is impossible; therefore, its need for a reason is also negated. God has no reason because God has no cause.

4-8. Fundamentally, as is understood from the sublime contents of the Arafah Supplication, the need for a reason is itself a kind of deficiency from which the Divine Essence of the Exalted Truth is far removed. An existent that is dependent on another for its manifestation, and an existent whose manifestation is indebted to the indication of another, is less perfect than an existent that has no such need. In other words, when philosophers say that God's existence requires a reason, the presupposition of this statement is that God is inherently absent and distant, and dependent on another for His manifestation—an 'other' that, by the philosophers' own assumption, is more manifest and present than God. For the philosophers, God is essentially absent and dependent on another for His manifestation. In other words, 'absence' and 'being distant' are two of the primary conditions for an object's existence requiring a reason, and these two conditions are, by definition, negated concerning God. We resort to smoke to prove the existence of fire when the fire is distant from us and hidden from our view, but when the fire is near to us and we feel its heat, seeking a reason for its existence and proving its existence through the existence of smoke is far from wisdom. As Rumi says:

Of course, the difference between fire and God is that the distance and nearness, presence and absence of fire are possible, whereas the absence and distance of God are incompatible with His Divinity. If someone conceives of God in a way that entails His absence or distance, they have, in truth, not conceived of God correctly, and their conception of God must be corrected, not that God's absence and distance should be taken for granted and a proof established for His existence. God's being manifest and present is essential to Him, and an absent and distant God is not God.

4-9. Some philosophers, inspired by mystical sources, believe that philosophical and existential propositions are 'predicated inversely'; that is, the places of the subject and predicate in them are swapped, and when it is said, 'The human being exists,' the true form of the proposition is, in reality, that 'Absolute existence has become determined in the human determination' and 'has manifested in the human locus of manifestation.' As Jami says:

On this basis, absolute existence is not an empty concept of which conditioned existents are the instances. For the subject of a proposition is unconditioned (lā bi-sharṭ) in relation to its predicate. Absolute existence is that very unconditioned existence upon which, at various levels of existence, determinations, limits, and restrictions occur accidentally and which manifests in diverse loci of manifestation. Hence, without presupposing the existence of an absolute existent in a prior rank, no existential philosophical proposition can be made. The ultimate rational aim of philosophy is to establish the determinations and theophanies of such an existence, not to establish real multiplicity in existence. In other words, unconditioned absolute existence is a presupposition with which philosophy begins by accepting it. It is this presupposition that separates the path of philosophy from sophistry and skepticism, and since absolute existence is identical with God, the existence of God is a presupposition of philosophy, not a problem among its theoretical problems.

4-10. The existence of God can also be grasped through the mind's inability to separate the predicate from the subject in the proposition "God exists," which is itself a kind of intellectual intuition. That is, it can be claimed that given a correct conception of God, our mind, however hard it tries, will not be able to separate God from existence; just as it cannot separate a triangle from having three angles. The supposition of separating God from existence entails that His existence is not from Himself and that in being characterized by existence, He requires a causative or restrictive aspect. The concept of a non-existent God is a paradoxical and self-contradictory concept, and this causes the mind to be unable to conceive of God without existence. On this basis, those who deny the existence of God or doubt it have, in reality, not conceived of God as He is worthy of being conceived; just as those who demand a proof for accepting His existence also have the problem of an incorrect conception of God.

4-11. One of the profound views of Transcendent Wisdom in explaining the relationship between cause and effect is that cause and effect are, in one respect, identical to each other; the cause is the reality of the effect, and the effect is the attenuated form (raqīqah) of the cause. On this basis, cause and effect can be predicated of one another. This predication is known as "predication of reality and attenuated form" (ḥaml-i ḥaqīqah wa raqīqah). Our claim is that accepting such a view is only reasonable if the cause is unconditioned (lā bi-sharṭ) in relation to the effect. For the predication of two disparate and negatively conditioned (bi-sharṭ lā) things upon one another is impossible. Therefore, God, who by the confession of philosophers is the First Cause and the Cause of causes, must be unconditioned absolute existence so that He can be predicated of other existents. And the supposition of the existence of anything entails the supposition of the existence of God in a rank prior to it. For God is the reality of everything, and everything is the attenuated form of God, and the reality of any thing is prior to its attenuated form.

4-12. The proposition "God exists" is an analytic proposition. For God is free from quiddity, and His essence is identical with existence. Analytic propositions are necessarily true, for their predicate is either identical with the subject or a part of it. In other words, the proposition "God exists" is true by definition. For God, by definition, is that very unconditioned absolute existence which is the predicate of all existential propositions.

5. Response to Several Objections

5-1. First Objection: Analytic propositions do not refer to the external world, and their import pertains to the realm of the mind. Hence, an external reality cannot be proven through analytic propositions. In other words, propositions referring to the external world are entirely synthetic and non-self-evident, and require reasoning.

Answer: The claim that analytic propositions pertain entirely to the mental realm is an assertion without proof, and it may well stem from the illusion that the truth of these propositions is established through mental analysis without reference to the external world. But there is no evidence to suggest that objective propositions cannot be proven through mental analysis. If the subject of a proposition concerns external matters, the predicate of that proposition will undoubtedly also be external, and this in itself does not make the proposition synthetic. For external concepts refer to the external world, and through them a judgment about the external world is established, even if the proof of that judgment is carried out through the analysis of the subject. There are many examples of analytic propositions that refer to the external world. For instance, the proposition “every effect has a cause” is an analytic proposition, because having a cause is implicit in the definition of an effect, and at the same time, this proposition refers to the external world, for its import is that if an effect comes into existence externally, it will have a cause externally. Or the propositions “every child has a father” or “every husband has a wife” are analytic propositions that also refer to the external world. Many logical propositions share this same status. For example, when we say that the conjunction of contradictories or contraries is impossible, we mean that the conjunction of contradictories and contraries is impossible in the external world; the conception of the conjunction of contradictories and contraries in the mind is not impossible, because the conception of an impossibility is not itself impossible. Therefore, the proposition “God exists” can be an analytic proposition and, at the same time, refer to the external world.

5-2. Second Objection: The truth of analytic propositions rests on accepting the definition of their subject; but whether that definition is correct or not cannot be proven through these propositions themselves. In other words, the truth of analytic propositions is always based on accepting the claimed definition of the subject, and one can deny the subject of the disputed proposition by rejecting the definition.

Answer: This objection can be interpreted in two different ways. According to one interpretation, this objection is based on the account that logical positivists give of the nature of analytic propositions. They claim that the truth of analytic propositions rests on linguistic conventions, and therefore, if the convention changes, these propositions may also lose their truth. But this foundation is incorrect; for in analytic propositions, the dispute is not over the relation between words and meanings, but over meanings and concepts, and the relation of concepts to one another is not subject to linguistic conventions. The proposition “God exists,” as an analytic proposition, is no exception to this rule. The dispute among philosophers and mystics is not over what meaning the word God has been coined for, or what meaning people intend by this word. The dispute over the meaning of the word God is a linguistic dispute that can be resolved by consulting a dictionary, and if one day people use the word God for a meaning other than unconditioned absolute existence, the proposition “God exists” will not be an analytic proposition; but the debate is over whether such a being is God or not. If all people agree to call it God, and if the existence of this being can be proven through various philosophical arguments, the question “Is such a being God?” would still be meaningful.

The second meaning that can be considered for this objection is that the analyticity of the proposition “God exists” rests on accepting the mystical definition of God. Therefore, by assuming this proposition is analytic, one cannot prove the truth of that definition. In other words, philosophers can justify doubt about the truth of the proposition “God exists” by disputing the definition of the subject of the proposition. It is true that according to the philosophical definition of God, the proposition “God exists” will not be an analytic proposition, but it must be noted that we do not wish to infer the correctness of the mystical definition of God from the analyticity of the proposition “God exists.” Our claim is that the set of philosophers’ assertions in theology contains a contradiction; because, on the one hand, they define God as absolute existence with the condition of no-condition (bishart lā), and on the other hand, they claim that the concept of existence is abstracted from the very essence of God, without considering any restrictive or analytic qualification, and is predicated of Him. These two claims are incompatible with each other, for the first entails that the proposition “God exists” is synthetic, and the second entails that it is analytic. And since the assumption that the abstraction of the concept of existence from God’s essence depends on the addition of some qualification, even the qualification of absoluteness, is incompatible with God’s being God, it must therefore be concluded that God’s being God entails the analyticity of the proposition “God exists,” and the assumption that this proposition is synthetic is incompatible with God’s being God and involves a contradiction.

5-3. Third objection: The existence included in the definition of God is the concept of existence, not its instance; whereas the dispute over God's existence is a dispute over His external and objective existence. Therefore, in this argument, a confusion has occurred between "existence in the primary predication" and "existence in the common predication," or between the concept of existence and its instance. For what is included in the definition of God is existence in the primary predication, i.e., the concept of existence, while the existence in the proposition "God exists" is existence in the common predication, i.e., objective existence.

Reply: First, the existence included in the definition of God is external existence, i.e., existence in the common predication, not the concept of existence; if God were identical with the concept of existence, all the previous difficulties would return. For in that case, God's essence would be other than objective existence, and something whose essence is other than objective existence cannot be God. Hence, the existence taken in the definition of God is external existence; that is, God is an existent whose essence is identical with external existence, which is the same as existence in the common predication. The identity of an existent with the concept of existence or with existence in the primary predication is not considered a perfection for that existent, such that the concept of existence would be included in the definition of God. In other words, if God were identical with existence in the primary predication, His realization outside the mind would become impossible. The concept of existence in the proposition "God is identical with existence" is a referring title, through which external existence is indicated; the import of this proposition is that God is identical with external existence, for it is such an existent that can be God, not an existent that is conceptually equivalent to existence.

Second, accepting the claim that the existence taken in the definition of God is existence in the primary predication would not harm our argument. For the concept of existence can be included in the definition of a thing only and solely when that thing is inseparable from external existence outside the mind; only in such a state is the concept of existence abstractable from its essence without considering any causative or restrictive condition. Including existence in the definition of a thing means nothing other than that this concept is abstractable from the very core of that thing's essence without the addition of any causative or restrictive aspect. Consequently, the proposition "God exists in the primary predication," which is the very definition of God, and the proposition "God exists in the common predication," which is the proposition under discussion, are concomitant in truth and falsehood, and assuming the truth of one with the falsehood of the other, or doubt about the other, leads to contradiction. Thus, philosophers must either not include the concept of existence in the definition of God, or accept His external existence by definition, otherwise they fall into contradiction. The concept of existence can be included in the definition of a thing, and it can be said that the thing is conceptually equivalent to existence, only if that thing is, in its instance, identical with existence outside the mind. Therefore, the conceptual unity of the concept of God and the concept of existence in the mind necessarily and objectively entails the unity of their instances outside the mind, and thus one cannot claim that the concept of existence is included in the definition of God while, at the same time, His external existence is doubtful and in need of proof.

5-4. Fourth objection: Analytic propositions concerning the external world are true on the assumption of the existence of their subject in the external world. For example, when we say "every effect has a cause," the meaning of this proposition is that if an effect comes into existence in the external world, it will have a cause; or when we say "every husband has a wife," we mean that if a husband comes into existence in the external world, he will have a wife. Therefore, the affirmation of the predicate for the subject in these propositions is a hypothetical and suppositional affirmation and does not entail the existence of the subject in the external world. Hence, in the proposition "God exists," the external existence of God cannot be obtained through the analysis of the concept of this proposition.

Reply: This claim is not universal and is true only in cases where the predicate of the proposition is not existence. But in a proposition whose predicate is existence or being, the affirmation of the predicate for the subject is identical with the affirmation of the subject itself, and there is no need to prove the subject at a prior level.

5-5. Fifth objection: Existence can also be included in the definition of a partner to the Creator, and based on the claim of this article, the existence of the partner to the Creator can be analytically extracted from this definition.

Reply: If the existence taken in the definition of God is absolute, unconditioned existence, then the supposition of another existence alongside it, even as a partner to the Creator, entails a contradiction. For a God with this definition leaves no room for anything other than Himself.

5-6. Sixth objection: When we say "x exists," one can always deny the existence of x without harming its being x. In other words, one can say "x is x" even if it does not exist.

Answer: This claim is not universal and holds true only when x is one of the quiddities or a compound of existence and a qualification other than existence. But where x is identical with absolute, unconditioned existence, denying or doubting its existence leads to denying or doubting its being x. That is, once the definition of God is accepted, one cannot deny His existence or doubt it.

5-7. Seventh Objection: One of the objections raised against such an argument against absolute, unconditioned existence is that the opposition and confinement of existents to the Necessary and the possible is a rational confinement, and the supposition of an existent that is neither necessary nor possible, but beyond the Necessary and the possible, is an imaginary supposition whose realization in the external world is impossible.

Answer: The fallacy concealed in this statement is that the qualification of necessity, like the qualification of absoluteness, can be considered in two ways. If we take it as an indicative title, the aforementioned confinement is acceptable; however, in this case, necessity is not truly considered a qualification for the Necessary, so as to separate His existence from absolute, unconditioned existence and also from possible things. In reality, it is the very absolute, unconditioned existence claimed by the mystics. But if necessity is taken as a qualification on the side of the subject, this confinement is not a rational confinement. For, rationally, one can suppose an existent that is above necessity and possibility and is their divider. The whole point is that this divisional existence exists in the external world, and not merely within its divisions; without supposing its existence, such a division is fundamentally meaningless. The core of this division returns to the meaning that absolute, unconditioned existence, which exists in an unconditioned manner, descends from its station, and in this descent, it sometimes acquires a necessitative determination and sometimes a possibilitive determination; and determination is preceded by non-determination. This objection, too, is based on the same fundamental presupposition of philosophy: that absolute, unconditioned existence, free from all qualifications, even from the qualification of absoluteness, is merely a mental concept that exists only within conditioned existents. Whereas this very division of existence into the Necessary and the possible, and the statement that "existence is either Necessary or possible," based on the rule of conversion, necessitates the acceptance of absolute, unconditioned existence at a prior level. For the meaning of this division is that the absolute, unconditioned existence which is, in truth, the subject of the proposition and exists regardless of the predicate, descends from the station of qualitylessness and non-determination and becomes determined with necessitative and possibilitive determination. Contrary to the objector's supposition, the meaning of this proposition is not that the concept of absolute, unconditioned existence outside the mind exists solely either within the Necessary or within the possible. If this confinement is taken in this sense, it is an imaginary confinement, not a rational one.

6. Final Word

The critiques in this article are entirely directed at the definition that philosophy provides of God; and the logical conclusion of these critiques is that the proofs offered to establish such an entity as God are incorrect. However, some philosophers, accepting the mystical definition of God, have set forth indicative testimonies for the existence of God. An example of such proofs in Western culture is the ontological argument, especially its Cartesian version, and in Islamic culture, certain versions of the Proof of the Veracious (Burhān al-Ṣiddīqīn); such as the following version, which states:

The reality of existence, which is identical with the external world, is a reality whose non-existence is impossible, and a reality whose non-existence is impossible is the Necessary Existent.

ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī (ra), in explaining this proof, says:

This is the very reality with which we negate sophistry and find every sentient being compelled to affirm it. This reality is essentially incapable of being removed and invalidated, to the extent that the supposition of its invalidation and removal necessitates its affirmation and positing. If we suppose that all realities at all times or at a specific time are invalid, [this means that] all realities are truly invalid (i.e., reality is affirmed). Similarly, if a sophist sees things as illusory or doubts their reality, in his view too, things are truly illusory and reality is truly doubted (and this means that reality, from the very aspect that it is removed, is affirmed). And since the principle of reality is essentially unaccepting of non-existence and invalidation, it is therefore essentially Necessary. Consequently, there is a reality that is Necessary by Essence, and the things that possess reality, in their possession of reality, are in need of that reality and subsist through it in their existence. And if we reflect on this point, we will clearly find that the principle of the existence of the Essentially Necessary is self-evident for every human being, and the proofs establishing it are, in truth, [mere] reminders. (5)

The clear conclusion to be drawn from this discussion is that the difference between philosophical theology and mystical theology is a fundamental and irreconcilable one, and the God of mysticism and the God of philosophy differ to such an extent that one is inevitably forced to choose between the two. The analyses presented in this article clearly show that the disagreement between mystics and philosophers on the matter of theology is not merely a difference of taste, method, or even perspective. It is not the case that mystics and philosophers offer a single definition and conception of God and merely propose different paths for knowing and reaching this one God. The God of mysticism is other than the God of philosophy, and it is this otherness that is the source of the methodological difference between philosophical theology and mystical theology. Philosophical arguments are not only incapable of proving the God of mysticism, but are fundamentally based on the negation and denial of the existence of such a God. (6)

Arguing for the existence of God entails accepting presuppositions that are incompatible with God's Godhood. Among the most important of these presuppositions are the assumption of the existence of contingent beings, the assumption of God's absence and remoteness, and the assumption of God's being unknown and in need of the proof and indication provided by contingent beings.

Proving God's existence through the existence of contingent beings is based on the assumption of the existence of contingent beings, and the assumption of the existence of contingent beings is incompatible with the correct definition of God; this assumption is not only not self-evident but is also invalid. The correct definition of God is only compatible with the manifestationality of other-than-God, and contingent beings are the manifestations and signs of God, not proofs of His existence. In other words, the real multiplicity of existence, which is a necessary consequence of denying the absolutely unconditioned Existence, is the presupposition of philosophy. Philosophy begins by negating the God of mysticism, and mysticism begins by negating philosophy's presupposition, which also means negating philosophy itself; and we are compelled to choose between these two conceptions of God. The difference between these two conceptions is irreconcilable, and one cannot claim that one is precise and the other more precise. These two pictures are divergent and contradictory, and their commonality is merely in the word. Between my moon and the moon in the sky, the difference is from the earth to the heavens.

It is not amiss to also point out that the reasonableness of belief in God's existence and the possibility of rational inquiry in theology does not depend on the possibility of arguing for God's existence, except based on an incorrect presupposition about rationality and the function of the intellect, according to which the function of the intellect is summarized in argumentation, in the philosophical sense of the word, and the rational justification of beliefs is only possible under the shelter of other beliefs that play the role of proof. Both of these presuppositions are fundamentally invalid and baseless. One might ask: if the rationality of any belief depends on its confirmation and endorsement by the argumentative intellect, how is this very belief itself justified and endorsed? And if the justification of any belief is only possible through providing proof in the conventional sense of the word, what is the proof for this very claim? These assumptions are themselves unproven and unjustified, and therefore the claims based on them are also unjustified. One of the most important functions of the intellect is rational intuition and experience, and many of our beliefs are justifiable only through rational intuition and mental experience. Therefore, the function of the intellect is not summarized in argumentation, nor is rational inquiry merely synonymous with arguing, nor is the epistemological justification of beliefs synonymous with providing proof in their favor. Apart from all this, philosophical argument for the existence of God is incompatible with the nature of religious faith and its expected requisites and consequences, and in a word, distances man from the God of religion, who is other than the God of philosophy.

In another article, we will undertake a comparative examination of the God of philosophy and the God of religion.

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Notes:

1_ See for example:

Wil1iam P. Alston (1991) Perceiving God (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press). Alvin Plantinga (2000) Warranted Christian Belief (New York: Oxford University Press).

2_ For Alston's views on epistemic justification, see:

William P. Alston (1989) Epistemic Justification (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press).

3_ For Plantinga's epistemological views, see:

Plantinga (1993) Warrant: The Current Debate (New YourkL Oxford University Press).

__ (1993) Warrant and Proper Function (New Yourk: Oxford University Press).

4_ Anselm's ontological argument and the Argument of the Righteous (Burhān al-Ṣiddīqīn) as narrated by the late 'Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā'ī are exceptions to this rule. For, as we shall soon see, these two arguments are in fact based on accepting the mystical definition of God as absolute, unconditioned existence. The result of these two arguments is not the proof of the God of philosophy, but rather an awakening to the existence of the absolute, unconditioned God.

5_ Asfār, vol. 6, pp. 14-15. Emphasis is the author's.

6_ Earlier, we made an exception for the ontological argument and the Argument of the Righteous as narrated by 'Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā'ī. These two arguments are not arguments in the true sense of the word; their function is to awaken and remind one of the existence of the God of mysticism, not to prove the God of philosophy. And as we have seen, this point is also accepted by 'Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā'ī.

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PDF file of the article The God of Mysticism and the God of Philosophy

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The God of Mysticism and the God of Philosophy

Author: Abolghasem Fanai

Source: Naqd va Nazar Journal - Winter and Spring 1999-2000 - Issues 21 and 22 (30 pages - from 84 to 113)

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