The Incompleteness of the Imperfect-Duties Approach to the Overdemandingness Problem in Kantian Ethics, by Iman Abbasnejad

Article: The Incompleteness of the Imperfect-Duties Approach to the Overdemandingness Problem in Kantian Ethics

Author: Iman Abbasnejad

Quarterly Journal of Ethical Studies, No. 2, pp. 49-68

The overdemandingness of ethical theories is an objection that became widespread in recent decades, following Singer's famous 1972 article. This objection states that, intuitively, an ethical theory should not make excessive demands of us. Although most discussions of overdemandingness arise in the context of utilitarianism, in recent years this objection has also been raised concerning Kantian ethics. By invoking the division of perfect and imperfect duties in Kant's moral theory and employing the concept of "latitude" that Kant introduced regarding imperfect duties, some have attempted to show that Kantian ethics will not be overdemanding. In this paper, we will present and examine this solution, and it will become clear that this solution, firstly, renders Kantian ethics undemanding and overly permissive, and secondly, does not solve the problem of overdemandingness in Kantian ethics as a whole, as the most demanding part of Kantian ethics lies in perfect duties.

After Singer's article on the obligatory duty to assist others (Singer, 1972), thinkers' attention was drawn to an issue that, while not new, became a focal point following Singer's article. The issue was whether the moral obligation of the duty of beneficence—which Singer defends—is not overly demanding? And does it not give rise to an overdemanding morality? If we were to act according to the demands of this type of morality, we would likely have to completely set aside all our personal projects, self-interest, and partiality toward our loved ones.

In his famous example in that same article, Singer says: we all agree that if a child is drowning in a pond before us, we are obligated to save them, even if this act incurs some costs for us. For example, it might cause the new suit we bought to be torn and ruined. Now, since we all agree on this example, Singer says: in the current state of the world, we are constantly in this very situation; the state of famine in the world is such that children are always dying because of it, and we can, by forgoing life's luxuries, give that money to charities to save another child from death. The overdemandingness of Singer's theory is well understood from this account.

Given the current situation prevailing in many parts of the world… we are morally obligated to work full-time to alleviate the immense suffering that results from famine or other disasters. (Singer, 1972, p. 238).

Some consider the overdemandingness of morality to be contrary to our intuitions. If we have such an overdemanding morality, perhaps (according to utilitarian theory) the very act of reading this article is immoral; because you could have spent this time earning an income and given the money to Oxfam, thereby saving several children from the risk of death. The problem of overdemandingness was raised primarily in relation to utilitarianism, especially act-utilitarianism, because it was a clear instance of overdemandingness there, and Singer was also considered a classical utilitarian, so attention was mostly directed at overdemandingness in utilitarianism. Nevertheless, this objection has also been leveled against other moral theories, including Kantian ethics, and the objection to the overdemandingness of moral theory has become one of the common debates in moral philosophy, which thinkers have tried to address with various responses.
A very important point that must be noted at the outset, and which some authors have confused here (Braddock, 2013, p. 170), is that the objection of the overdemandingness of moral theory has no connection whatsoever to the famous principle that "ought implies can"; that is, one cannot say, merely by invoking this Kantian principle, that Kant believed morality should not be overdemanding. The said principle states that ability is a condition of duty, and we are not obligated to do impossible things, but the problem of overdemandingness is entirely different. It seems reasonable in a moral theory that "ability" is a condition of duty, and for example, no reasonable theory asks you to move at the speed of light. But the problem of overdemandingness is that we have the ability to do certain things, yet it seems that morality should not make doing these things obligatory for us, and if it does, it would be very overdemanding, and we intuitively consider it a problem for a moral theory. For example, if the boy shining shoes on the street asks me for ice cream, I can refrain from buying him ice cream and give the money to Oxfam, thereby passing over the fact that dozens of children in poor countries could be saved at that moment; but the objection is that if morality made such a demand of me, even though it is doable, it would be overdemanding, and we intuitively consider it a problem for the moral theory. Therefore, it was necessary to emphasize that we should not confuse the discussion of overdemandingness in Kant's moral theory with the aforementioned principle. Thus, Kant's moral theory is indifferent to the problem of overdemandingness.

Now, with this reminder, we must ask what Kant's answer is. Firstly, if we intuitively consider overdemandingness a problem in a moral theory, what is his answer? Secondly, utilitarians, in facing this objection, can offer a straightforward and trouble-free response: this problem exists in all moral theories, and in this respect, we are no weaker than the rest of the theories. In fact, they can say: "If you know better, put your money where your mouth is!" and if you can present a moral theory that has all the strengths of our theory and lacks this weakness, we will follow you. In fact, if the utilitarian cannot deflect the objection from themselves, they can, by introducing an accomplice, say: the situation of all moral theories is the same in this regard, and we do not suffer from an additional problem.

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