The Physical Origins and Efficacy of the 'Complementarity' Model

در جستار حاضر پس از اشاره به نظریات و مدل‌های گوناگونی که درباره رابطه علم و دین مطرح شده، به نظریه دنیس الکساندر خواهیم پرداخت. از نظر الکساندر، در میان مدل‌های چهارگانه، تنها مدل مکملیت است که می‌تواند به عنوان جامع‌ترین مدل در رابطه با علم و دین مطرح شود هرچند نقدهایی نیز به آن می‌شود. مهم‌ترین ویژگی این مدل، توجه به چندلایه بودن واقعیت است. در ادامه، ضمن بررسی جایگاه این مدل در اندیشه حکمای نوصدرایی، به بررسی خاستگاه فیزیکی مدل مکملیت خواهیم پرداخت.

مقدمه علوم تجربی غربی مدرن، بدون تردید گسترش ملموس و قابل ملاحظه‌ای را از قرن شانزدهم داشته‌اند. البته گسترش دین بسیار پیش‌تر اتفاق افتاده اما اکنون بیش از پیش شکوفا شده است. درست است که تز سکیولاریزم در این میان وجود دارد و براساس آن علم و تکنولوژی از یک‌سو و دین از سوی دیگر، به صورت معکوسی مربوط شده‌اند چنان‌که اولی در اوج است و دومی در حضیض، با وجود این احیا و بازگشت اخیر دین و باور دینی در بسیاری از نقاط عالم، سایه شک بر تز سکیولاریزم انداخته است. رابطه میان این دو نیروی فرهنگی بسیار عظیم، جنجال‌برانگیز، ذوابعاد و گیج‌کننده بوده است.1 بخش سترگی از ادبیات علم و دین به رابطه این دو پرداخته‌اند و بیان می‌کنند که شمار زیادی از فهم‌های مختلف از این رابطه وجود دارد. پرسش از اینکه چگونه این فهم‌ها می‌توانند دسته‌بندی شوند، به وضوح از اهمیت بسیاری برخوردار است. مک گراث آسان‌ترین راه را برای ورود به این موضوع، پرسش از دو سوال می‌داند که به ترتیب ذیل مطرح می‌شوند. 1. آیا علم و دین به حقیقتی واحد اطلاق می‌شوند؟ 2. آیا بینش‌های علم و دین در تناقض یا در تتمیم یکدیگرند؟ از لحاظ تاریخی مهم‌ترین فهم از رابطه، رابطه تعارض یا همان جنگ2 میان علم و دین است. (مک گراث،1999،ص44)

مدل‌های‌ مواجهه‌ای (تقابلی) مدل تعارض یا جنگ حال‌وهوای کل این مواجهه میان دین (به‌خصوص مسیحیت) و علوم طبیعی می‌تواند مستدل شود که توسط دو کتابی تنظیم شدند که در پایان قرن نوزدهم انتشار یافتند. نخست کتاب «تاریخ تعارض میان علم و دین»3 از جان ویلیام دراپر (1874) و دیگری کتاب «تاریخ جنگ علم با الهیات در مسیحیت»4 از اندرو دیکسون وایت (1896). این دو کتاب، نگرش قوی تحصلی را از تاریخ منعکس می‌کنند و نیز تعیین تکلیفی است که خرده‌حساب‌هایشان را با دین سازمانی تسویه می‌کنند. (همان، ص45)

مدل‌های غیرتقابلی (غیرمواجهه‌ای) علم و دین همگرا و متقارب5اند. در الهیات مسیحی بر این نکته تاکید می‌شود که«همه حقایق، حقایق خداوند هستند.» براساس این پیش‌فرض، تمام پیشرفت‌ها و گسترش‌ها در فهمی علمی از جهان بناست که با ایمان مسیحی تطبیق و آشتی داده می‌شود. منشا این جریان به دئیسم انگلیسی در قرن هفدهم بازمی‌گردد اگرچه توافق کلی بر آن است که در قرن نوزدهم آشکار شده است. پروتستانیزم لیبرال نیروی غالب مسیحیت پروتستانیزم غربی در قرن نوزدهم بوده است. شلایر ماخر6(1768-1834) به عنوان پدر جریان پروتستانیزم لیبرال در نظر گرفته می‌شود. وی استدلال می‌کرد که تفسیر دوباره از ایمان مسیحی باید صورت گیرد که با حکمت مقبول زمان خود سازگار افتد. البرشت ریشل7 بعد از شلایر ماخر این ایده را دنبال کرد. الهیات پویشی نمونه خوبی برای شکلی از اندیشه دینی است که فعالانه سنت مسیحی را برای بینش‌های علوم طبیعی سازگار و متناسب می‌کند. (ص49) در الهیات پویشی خداوند می‌تواند درون پویش طبیعی عمل کند. الفرد نورث وایتهد و چارلز ‌هارتسهورن طرفداران این رای بودند. رویکردی مشابه نزد دیرین‌شناس یسوعی فرانسوی پیر تیها دو شاردان وجود داشت. دو شاردان فرایند کلی فرگشت را به عنوان امری در نظر می‌گرفت که توسط دستان خداوند برای ساختارهای پیچیده و مراتب وجود هدایت شده است. (ص50) چارلز راون8 الهیدان کیمبریجی نیز بر همین رای بود. نزد وی، شیوه‌ای مشابه الهیات پویشی می‌تواند در هر جنبه‌ای از کندوکاو انسانی برای معرفت، خواه دینی خواه علمی به کار رود.

دین و علم متمایزند

The second broad category of the non-confrontational approach emphasizes the distinction between science and religion. This approach is found within the neo-orthodox movement, which stands in opposition to liberal Protestantism. Adherents of this approach believe they sought to conform to the prevailing culture. Karl Barth is a famous representative of this view. For Barth, the natural sciences place no burden upon the Christian person, and since science and theology operate based on conflicting presuppositions, one cannot appeal to the natural sciences to confirm or challenge faith. This distinction is also observed in the writings of North American authors such as Langdon Gilkey9. In the book Maker of Heaven and Earth10, Gilkey argues that religion and the natural sciences offer different and independent ways of approaching reality. Just as the natural sciences deal with "how" questions, religion and theology address "why" questions. Science deals with secondary causes, in other words, interactions within the natural realm, while religion is concerned with primary causes, in other words, the ultimate origin and purpose of nature. (ibid., p.50) When we hear the words science and religion, we quickly conjure up the tumultuous history of their relationship, but the history of religion's encounter with science is by no means solely a history of warfare. It will be explained further that there are at least four ways of this encounter in which science and religion can relate to one another. Briefly, these four confrontations can be recounted as follows: 1) Conflict11 - The convention that science and religion are, in principle, irreconcilable. 2) Contrast12 - The claim that no real conflict can exist between science and religion because each answers completely different questions. 3) Contact13 - An approach that seeks dialogue, interaction, consonance, and agreement between science and religion, and particularly seeks ways in which science shapes theological and experiential understanding. 4) Confirmation14 - An attitude somewhat removed from the fray but very important, which emphasizes the ways in which, at a deep level, religion supports and nurtures all scientific endeavor. (Haught, p.9, 1995) The number of books and articles written in recent years concerning science and religion is truly astonishing, and new works appear on the scene every day. The ideas put forward are very different, and this question, in the words of Stenmark15, arises as to whether it is possible to classify these various perspectives in a meaningful way. Therefore, one of the important challenges in the science-religion discussion is the classification of the major modes of interaction between science and religion. How can this classification be formulated in a helpful and unbiased manner that is neither simplistic nor convoluted and complex? The most famous attempt to articulate such a relationship is Ian Barbour's16 fourfold typology.17 This view articulates four relationships: Conflict18, Complementarity19, Dialogue20, and Independence.21 Other scholars such as Ted Peters,22 John Haught,23 Willem B. Drees24, and Mikael Stenmark have, in fact, proposed alternative typologies in contrast to Ian Barbour.

- Explaining Alexander's Theory Denis Alexander,²⁵ based on his account of four models of the relationship between science and religion, believes that among the four models he presents, only the "complementarity model" can be effective in explaining the relationship between science and religion. We will first briefly outline his accounts of his models and finally state his reasons for choosing the "complementarity model." Alexander first mentions points that are necessary for entering the discussion of science and religion and are considered part of the conceptual and propositional foundations of the discussion. The first point concerns the meaning of the concept of "model." In Alexander's view, a model is ultimately defined as "the core idea that has incorporated a set of data in an acceptable manner." For example, in the early 1950s, there were several competing models to describe the structure of DNA, the molecule that decodes genes. But ultimately, the matter was resolved by Watson and Crick, and the result was this: the double helix model was, in fact, the best way to describe the structure of DNA.²⁶ Alexander's entire claim is that no comprehensive model for explaining the relationship between science and religion has yet been presented. He says: "The question now is whether there is a single model that similarly summarizes the relationship between science and religion? This is highly unlikely. This is for two reasons. First, both science and religion are highly complex enterprises. Moreover, both are constantly changing. Unlike the unchanging structure of DNA, which is described by a single, stable model discovered today, no completely comprehensive model for describing the relationship between science and religion has been discovered. Therefore, it has been argued with good reason that the safest approach in research concerning science and religion is to simply describe the complexity of the relationship between the two."²⁷ As can be seen, Alexander believes that not only has no comprehensive model of the relationship between science and religion been proposed, but the only thing that can be done is to describe the complexity that exists between science and religion. Alexander's Critique of Relationship Theories 1. The Conflict Model and Its Critique Alexander considers the conflict model to indicate a fundamental opposition between science and religion and, quoting Worrall in support of this, writes: "Science and religion are in irreconcilable conflict. There is no way you can have both a scientific mind and be a believing orthodox."²⁸ Although Alexander considers the conflict model sociologically acceptable, he believes that "the prevalence and popularity of a view in public opinion is a weak indicator of its correctness." In his view, what can help the empirical scientist in confirming a scientific view is the evidence and testimonies presented in its favor, not the theory's fame.

2. The NOMA Model Alexander, citing the late Stephen Jay Gould's statement in the book "Rock of Ages," refers to the relationship of pure independence and "two separate magisteria."²⁹ Alexander considers the best reason in support of this model to be Gould's own statement about "different questions implying different domains." In other words, the logic of questioning in science and religion are different from each other, just as science seeks mechanistic explanations and efficient causes, while religion seeks final explanations. This model also has three fundamental critiques. The first critique, as Gould himself has pointed out, is the influence of religious beliefs on the scientific thoughts of scientists in the history of science. Gould weakens his own model in this way.³⁰ The second is that the object of both science and religion is the external world; in other words, the object of both is one and the same. The third problem is that both science and religion are a type of human action and of a single kind, and there is a strong synergy between scientific and religious life.³¹
3. Integration Models Integration models are those that attempt to eliminate the differences in the relationship between science and religion and present one based on the other. Alexander writes: “Integration models represent the opposite pole of the NOMA model. These models tend to completely erase the distinction between religious and scientific types of knowledge or attempt to use science to construct systems of religious thought.” Although, in Alexander’s view, this model takes both science and religion seriously, two general criticisms apply to them. First, “to succeed in God’s world, one must focus on the properties of the world and not the search for its ultimate purpose. The second criticism concerns attempts that seek to construct religious beliefs based on contemporary sciences. The problem with such an approach is that science is changing rapidly, such that today’s prevalent and accepted theories are tomorrow’s rejected views.”
4. The Complementarity Model According to this model, first, science and religion consider a single truth; second, there is no competition whatsoever between science and religion and their explanations; rather, religious explanations function as a complement to scientific explanations. The notion of complementarity was first articulated by Niels Bohr to describe the relationship between particle and wave descriptions of matter. Using the language of complementarity, one can say that religion provides explanations beyond what science is capable of offering—explanations that relate to ultimate goals, namely value and meaning. The classic example given regarding the relationship of complementarity in various scientific disciplines—biology, physiology, psychology, and anthropology—concerns the multiple descriptions of understanding the human individual at various layers of analysis by these sciences. Each description of human understanding offered by these sciences is not a rival to the other descriptions put forth by other sciences. In other words, to explain and understand the complexity of the human being, using all these descriptions is not only necessary but essential. Another example concerns the complementarity relationship between the brain and the mind. Scientific descriptions of neural events during brain activity complement the language of the “I” as a human agent, which expresses the idea of the consciousness of the human mind. (Alexander, p4.2007) In Alexander’s view, although the complementarity model takes both science and religion seriously, it is subject to several criticisms, including that this model can also lean toward the NOMA model because it does not bring seemingly irreconcilable religious and scientific data together under a single theory and model; and the second criticism concerns the strong emphasis this model misleadingly implies, namely that religion pertains to values and the realm of “ought,” while science pertains to the realm of “is” and objective matters. (ibid)

Denis Alexander’s Overall View In Alexander’s view, all four of the aforementioned models suffer from one fundamental criticism, which is that “there is no single model that can formulate all the complexities existing among the different interactions between science and religion within a single framework.” (ibid) However, among the four models, the complementarity model is superior to all for two main reasons: first, because this model is more effective than the rest, and second, because this model, unlike the others, pays attention to the fact that reality is multi-layered.

The Complementarity Model and Neo-Sadrian Philosophers It can be said that Muslim philosophers have also considered the complementarity model in relation to science and religion, but they have presented this model using different interpretations and concepts, and based on other premises and foundations. In the following, we will briefly refer to the views of Professor Javadi Amoli and Professor Hassanzadeh Amoli in this regard. After presenting conceptual and propositional preliminaries concerning reason and tradition and their meanings, Professor Javadi Amoli identifies the origin of the idea that science and religion are in conflict with one another in the point that, on the one hand, religion has been limited to tradition, and reason has also been expelled from the domain of religion. He writes as follows: "The origin of the illusion of the conflict between science and religion is that we limit the domain of religion to tradition and consider reason to be outside the framework of religious knowledge. In this case, only what is understood from transmitted proofs falls within the geometry of religious knowledge, and what is obtained by sensory and empirical reason or abstractive reason is considered scientific and philosophical knowledge, unrelated to the domain of religion. It is here that if a transmitted matter is in some way incompatible with a scientific and empirical or philosophical and abstractive finding, it is considered an instance of the conflict and opposition of science or philosophy and religion. (Javadi Amoli, 1389 SH - page 109) The fundamental point that Ayatollah Javadi points to is that oppositions and conflicts between concepts have been confused. In other words, from his perspective, reason stands in opposition to tradition, not in opposition to religion, and reason has also been introduced as a religious proof from God Almighty. To put it more simply, both reason and tradition are situated within the geometry of religious knowledge, and therefore speaking of a conflict between the two is an incorrect statement. Ayatollah Javadi writes: "But if attention is paid to this fundamental and important point that reason stands in opposition to tradition, not in opposition to religion, and the same God who made transmitted proofs a source of religious knowledge has also made reason a religious proof and a source for knowing religion and its outcome, then in cases of incompatibility between the content of a transmitted proof and a scientific or philosophical knowledge, one must speak of the conflict of science or philosophy and tradition; not consider it as evidence for the conflict of science or philosophy and religion. If reason is placed alongside tradition within the geometry of religious knowledge, speaking of the conflict of science and reason with religion is as unfamiliar and misplaced as speaking of the conflict of tradition and religion. Tradition never conflicts with religion, because tradition itself is a source for knowing religion. In the same way, reason (in its broad sense) does not become incompatible and conflicting with religion, because it is a religious proof and a source for knowing religion." (Javadi Amoli, p. 109, 1389) In response to the question of what the relationship between science and religion is, Allameh Hassanzadeh Amoli has used the concept of 'mu'azadat' (mutual assistance). (Hassanzadeh, p. 346, 1387) In his dictionary, Firuzabadi has defined mu'azadat as meaning cooperation and collaboration. (Firuzabadi, vol. 1, p. 299) In his answer to the eighth question, he considers the separation between science and religion to be incorrect, because, in his view, on the one hand, "the manifest religion of Islam is pure science and the very essence of rectitude," and on the other hand, the religion of Islam is not only not opposed to the new sciences but is "concordant, supportive, and encouraging." (Hassanzadeh, p. 475, 1387) It can be said that Allameh Hassanzadeh, considering these interpretations, also believes in a form of the complementarity model.

The Physical Origins of the Complementarity Model As noted, the notion of complementarity was first advanced by Niels Bohr. Bohr advocated employing wave and particle models and other pairs from the set of opposing concepts. Bohr’s discussion of what he called the complementarity principle encompassed several themes (Barbour, pp. 381–386): first, that speaking of an atomic system is in fact speaking of the “object observed” and the “act of observation” jointly, which complement one another in the process of observation. Hence what must be taken into account is the “interactive process of observation” that necessitates the said process. On the other hand, Bohr believed that if we attempt to impose particular conceptual frameworks on nature, we thereby preclude the full use of other frameworks. Thus we must choose between complete causal or spatio-temporal descriptions, between wave or particle models, between precise knowledge of position or momentum. The more we use one set of concepts, the less we can simultaneously employ the complementary set. This mutual limitation arises because we cannot explain the atomic world on the basis of classical physics concepts and observable phenomena. In complementarity, using one model limits the use of other models. Models are symbolic representations of aspects of interacting reality that cannot be visualized exclusively according to the resemblances they bear to everyday experience.... Bohr himself suggested that the idea of complementarity could be extended to phenomena analyzable by two types of models. It was in this way that some authors went further and spoke of the complementarity of science and religion.

Conclusion Today, drawing a comprehensive and exclusive model for the relationship between science and religion is one of the difficulties facing thinkers in this field. It cannot be said with certainty which model is entirely superior to the others, for each model in some way addresses criticisms that do not apply to the other models. The relative advantage of the models over one another leads Denis Alexander toward the idea that, on the whole, the complementarity model, compared to other models, although subject to criticisms, can nonetheless be more comprehensive and exclusive due to its efficacy and its engagement with reality as a multi-layered affair. It is necessary to note that Alexander’s belief appears to be that the complementarity model is more comprehensive and useful in comparison with other models, not that it is so in and of itself. On the other hand, it seems that some Neo-Sadrian philosophers have also alluded to the complementarity model in other terms and expressions when explaining the relationship between science and religion, although their foundations and principles for the superiority of this model over other models differ from those intended by Denis Alexander.

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Endnotes

1. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/religion-science // 2. warfare // 3. History of the Conflict between Religion and Science // 4. History of the Warfare of Science with Theology in Christendom // 5. Convergent // 6. F. D. E. Schleiermacher (1768 -1834) // 7. Albrecht Ritschl // 8. Charles Raven // 9. Langdon Gilkey // 10. Maker ofHeaven and Earth(1959) // 11. Conflict // 12. Contrast // 13. Contact // 14. Confirmation // 15. .Mikael Stenmark(1962) // 16. .Ian Barbour(1923-2013).

17. Ian Jeremy Barbour (1923–2013), an American scholar born in China, is one of the most important theorists on the relationship between science and religion. He earned his Ph.D. in physics from the University of Chicago in 1950. Some of his works include: Issues in Science and Religion (1966), Science and Religion (1968), When Science Meets Religion (2000), etc. {M}

18 .the conflict view // 19 .the integration view // 20 .the dialogue view // 21 . the independence view // 22 .Ted Peters // 23 .John Haught, // 24 .Willem B. Drees 25. Denis R. Alexander // 26. Watson J.D. and Crick F.H.C. Nature (1953) 171, 737-738. as cited in Alexander 27. John Hedley Brooke: http://161.58.114.60/webexclusives.php‌article_id=590 28. Worrall, J. ‘Science Discredits Religion’, in Peterson, M.L. & Van Arragon R.J. (eds.)Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Religion, Blackwell (2004), p. 60. // 29. Non overlapping Magisteria(NOMA) // 30. Gould, S. J. on the Revd Thomas Burnet, author of the seventeenth century work The SacredTheory of the Earth in Ever Since Darwin, Penguin Books (1980), ch.17. pp. 141-146. // 31. Berry, R.J. (ed.) Real science, real faith: 16 scientists discuss their work and faith, Monarch,.reprint (1995).

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References

- Barbour, Ian, Religion and Science, translated by Pirooz Fatoorehchi, Institute for Islamic Culture and Thought Publications, first edition, 2013 // - Hassanzadeh Amoli, Commentary on the Treatise on the Relationship between Science and Religion, by His Eminence Allamah Abolfazl Hassanzadeh Amoli, commentator Davood Samadi Amoli, first edition, 2008, Qaem Al-e Mohammad Publications, Qom. // - Javadi Amoli, The Geometry of Reason in Religious Knowledge, researcher: Hojjat al-Islam Ahmad Vaezi, Isra Institute, 2010, fourth edition.

-Denis R. Alexander,, Models for Relating Science and Religion, Publication date: April 2007. The Faraday Institute for Science and Religion // -McGrath, Alister E. Science & Religion: An Introduction, 1999, publisher: Blackwell Publishing Ltd. // -Haught john F.science and religion: from conflict to conversation,Paulist press.1995 // -Worrall, J. ‘Science Discredits Religion’, in Peterson, M.L. & Van Arragon R.J. (eds.)Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Religion, Blackwell (2004) // -Gould, S. J. on the Revd Thomas Burnet, author of the seventeenth century work The SacredTheory of the Earth in Ever Since Darwin, Penguin Books (1980) // -Berry, R.J. (ed.) Real science, real faith: 16 scientists discuss their work and faith, Monarch,.reprint (1995).

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The Physical Origins and Efficacy of the 'Complementarity' Model

Mehdi Ghaed Sharaf

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