The Self-Willed End: A Session at the School of Doubt

The session “The Self-Willed End” at the School of Doubt

In the absence of a meaning-giving narrative for life, individuals see life as largely absurd and futile

Written report: Etemad Newspaper

“The Self-Willed End” was the title of the recent session of the School of Doubt, featuring three professors of sociology, philosophy, and psychology. Suicide, which is in a sense interpreted as a self-willed end, was analyzed from three different perspectives. “Hassan Mohaddesi,” sociologist and assistant professor at Islamic Azad University, “Arash Naraghi,” professor of religion and philosophy at Moravian University in Pennsylvania, USA, and “Mahmoud Moghaddasi,” a senior expert in clinical psychology, were the invited speakers at this online session. At the beginning of the session, the organizer, emphasizing that this program was in no way and is in no way an endorsement of suicide, announced the social emergency number 123 and asked individuals who are thinking about suicide to call this number and receive counseling. The program host also announced the number 1480 for the Voice of the Counselor system and the number 1570, which is the national hotline for supportive, advisory, and social work services. Suicide statistics are among the figures that are released with difficulty, and for several years now, their release by the Forensic Medicine Organization has been canceled due to the prevalence of despair and hopelessness in society. Statistics published by the Law Enforcement Force, which are thought to be lower than those held by the Forensic Medicine Organization, indicate that, based on daily figures, more than 13 people in Iran commit suicide. Most suicides occur among individuals aged 15 to 35. According to the Ministry of Health, in 2018, 100,000 people attempted suicide. On average, out of every 100,000 Iranians, 125 people attempt suicide, of whom 6 lose their lives. Official statistics in Iran show that the suicide rate in Iran has grown by more than 40 percent over the past decade, increasing from about 3,500 cases per year to over 5,000 cases. The latest report on “Social Justice Indicators” in 2021 shows that over a 10-year period, more than 40,000 deaths caused by suicide were recorded by the Law Enforcement Force. This figure is more than double the total number of homicides in the 2010s, which was reported at fewer than 20,000. The increase in suicide in Iran comes at a time when the people were exposed to the most severe economic, political, and social crises during the 2010s. In the Law Enforcement Force statistics, a significant number of deaths are recorded under the title “Other Suspicious Deaths,” and it is not exactly clear what cases this refers to. The number of these suspicious deaths in the 2010s was about 6 times the total number of suicides and 12 times the number of homicides. According to Law Enforcement Force statistics, between 2016 and 2020, an average of 4,183 people in Iran lost their lives each year due to suicide. By this account, the suicide mortality rate is 5.1 cases per 100,000 population. However, this statistic is not evenly distributed. Examination and analysis of regional data show that the suicide rate in the western provinces of the country differs more significantly from the central, northern, southern, and eastern regions of Iran. Specifically, the suicide rate in the provinces of Kermanshah (11.8 per 100,000 people), Ilam (11.5 per 100,000 people), and Kohgiluyeh and Boyer-Ahmad (10.5 per 100,000 people) is more than double the national average. Following these, the provinces of Lorestan, Hamadan, and Chaharmahal and Bakhtiari have the highest suicide rates relative to their population.

Watch the video of Hassan Mohaddesi’s talk on Aparat

Watch the video of Arash Naraghi’s talk on Aparat

Watch the video of Mahmoud Moghaddasi’s talk on Aparat + Q&A

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Dr. Hassan Mohaddesi, a sociologist and the first speaker of this session, considered the concept of suicide to be a highly contentious one. He believes the definition of suicide must be clarified—what exactly we call suicide. We have a phenomenon called a suicide operation, in which an individual blows themselves up to destroy enemy targets. Should this be considered suicide? What is its relationship to forms of suicidal actions where an individual kills themselves due to a dire and critical situation? These are a set of diverse actions that, in the view of various experts, are considered suicide.

Mohaddesi believes: “When the concept of a self-willed end is added to suicide, a new semantic and evaluative weight is also added to the discussion. The concept of ‘self-willed’ implies the voluntary and individual nature of the phenomenon. This is something sociologists strongly oppose. We cannot consider this a purely individual and one-hundred-percent voluntary matter, nor should we assign it an evaluative weight. When we propose the term ‘self-willed,’ it can, in a way, be given a positive connotation. In religious cultures, suicide is considered negative, or in some Western cultures, it signifies a refusal to accept social and individual responsibility, and ignoring it is seen as an immoral act. In the 19th century, there were statistics known as moral statistics; suicide statistics in France were considered statistics of deviant behaviors. Some cultures view it as a deviant behavior or perversion and it carries a negative weight. In different cultural contexts, this type of action carries different weights. In scientific studies, a completely neutral and scholarly stance must be adopted. Therefore, such interpretations are indefensible and carry a normative weight for two reasons. One is that it considers it positive, and the other is that it considers it entirely individual, psychological, and voluntaristic, which is opposed in the sociological view. I regret that no empirical work has been done on suicide in research sources. On a trip to Behbahan, I was invited; this city has a significant suicide rate. Twice a project was supposed to be started on this matter, but it never began, and I was unable to do empirical work.”

Referring to various theories in sociology, Mohaddesi points to Émile Durkheim, considering him the most important figure in sociology who has worked on this subject and regards his book Suicide as one of the most important books in this field. Mohaddesi believes this book was in polemic with psychologists and seeks to show that suicide, which everyone considered a psychological phenomenon, is entirely sociological. This view of Durkheim’s led to the establishment of the sociology discipline in French universities, its entry into its institutional phase, and its introduction to universities worldwide. He says: “Durkheim’s work has been influential; he introduces the human being as an insatiable creature whose desires and needs are never satisfied, he holds a kind of negative anthropology and posits that a morality and a power are needed to exist to control the external part of the human being, for social regulation to occur, so that the individual does not become captive to their own unavoidable needs, harmonizes themselves with society, and is brought under control. A greater reality must exist to restrain the human being, and that is society and morality. That superior power which society possesses, which binds the individual and brings them under control, considers suicide to be contingent upon states and conditions where the individual is in a situation of social rupture and cannot control their aspirations and desires. He establishes a link between social solidarity and suicidal action and discusses a process called the suicidogenic current that exists in society and, under certain conditions, drives individuals toward suicide. In a society, there is a constant rate of suicide, but under specific conditions, when the suicide rate rises, it deviates from its constant state and we encounter an anomic situation. Our main issue is social cohesion; Durkheim speaks of how if society and social bonds weaken, or even if social bonds become too strong, society becomes prone to suicide. It is there that he divides suicides into egoistic and altruistic. Where the individual is excessively dissolved into society and has prepared themselves for self-sacrifice for society, suicide resulting from high integration, or altruistic suicide, has occurred. The Japanese pilots who crashed their planes into enemy ships in World War II are considered altruistic suicide, but in suicide where the individual lacks strong bonds with others and the social world and is detached, egoistic suicide occurs. Also, among Protestants, because social solidarity is weaker, they commit suicide more than Catholics, or single people commit suicide more than married people.”

Mohaddesi then brings up another type of suicide, called anomic, and says: Durkheim, using the official statistics at his disposal, explains that anomic suicide results from the weakening of the social norms that exercise control; the individual is entirely reliant on himself, gets caught in an abnormal situation—imagine a person facing a massive economic failure, in that crisis he commits suicide. Social variables, especially social cohesion, are the main subject of discussion.

After Durkheim, others took up this discussion and tried to see the shortcomings of Durkheim's work, including Douglas, who believes Durkheim's work is mostly abstract. Douglas has a book called The Social Meanings of Suicide, which has not yet been translated. He has serious criticisms of Durkheim, and in his view Durkheim's official statistics are problematic. Douglas says one cannot rely on these statistics. Theoretically, too, he fundamentally criticizes his theory and shows the flaws in his work. Moreover, Durkheim, without respect for the stories of the individuals who committed suicide, defended his own theoretical apparatus and made it appear justified; he does not pay attention to the life stories of individuals, he pays attention to official, macro-level statistics. He did not pay attention to in which populations suicide occurred, how accurate the official statistics are, whether the suicidal individual appears in the official statistics, whether the basis of these has been considered correct or not.

Mohaddesi, agreeing with Douglas, also emphasizes that we cannot rely on official statistics; who is considered a suicidal individual is important. The way they are recorded is important; very often doctors and nurses make gross errors in these classifications and in diagnosing the matter. In many statistics these individuals are not recorded and registered; we cannot conduct an examination by relying on these statistics.

Some other sociological theories, while criticizing Durkheim, address the definition of social cohesion and, in order to cover that weakness, speak of role and status. The conflict that exists in roles can place individuals in strife and difficulty and drive a person toward suicide.

Among other theories is Powell's status theory, which focuses on social status; individuals may not succeed in their jobs or may not be able to perform their role properly and consequently become anomic. They may not be deemed desirable in terms of the conceptual framework and expectations that exist in society. The individual may consider himself incapable of performing the role and be driven toward suicide.

In status change theory, individuals who fail in their economic activity endure pressure because their role performance is not evaluated as successful. This theory links psychological and social factors together in suicide; there are variables involved that drive a person toward suicide. There is another theory that focuses on urban and rural life, the mode of group living, and individuals' lifestyles in terms of the degree of differentiation. In the urban environment, social detachment is high; individuals live in environments where they are more anonymous, the social bond is weaker. In these environments, individuals have expectations, they experience a crisis in terms of their situation and fail. The expectations that exist exert pressure on them and create a tendency toward suicide in them. The next theory concerns the increase of frustration. Whenever individuals become more frustrated, they have a greater tendency toward aggression. The expression of aggression and its manifestation differs in various populations. This violence and aggression can drive individuals toward suicide or family murder. If individuals' economic achievements are high, less frustration is felt, but if they experience economic losses, the increase in frustration leads to an increase in aggression and makes them prone to suicide or murder.

The next theory speaks of social structure and class. When individuals are placed in critical conditions, the urge for aggression increases in them. Aggression differs between the upper and lower classes; lower-class individuals learn to externalize their inner anger and violence; in Iran, these individuals more often turn to family murder. Their outward expression of violence makes them prone to committing family murder. Upper-class individuals direct violence toward themselves and become entangled in it, and suicide occurs.

An existential sociology, such as that articulated by Jack Douglas, speaks of the social meanings of suicide. He believes that the suicidal act carries various meanings; we must examine the meanings of the individual's action, and we must adopt an approach other than the mere examination of statistics.

According to Mohaddesi, the research conducted in Iran has imitated Western scholars and Durkheim. Naturally, the serious criticisms leveled at the works of figures like Durkheim also apply to these studies. He believes that we must take qualitative methods into consideration in suicide studies. "I was inclined to enter this field. Several methods were considered for it, including narrative analysis, which could be effective for penetrating the lifeworld of individuals who have attempted suicide or died by suicide. For this work, we need precise information; imposing a set of theoretical assumptions on reality leads us astray. Today we are in a situation called the state of pervasive despair. In Iran, over the past century, Iranians have repeatedly tried, as a result of the discontents that have formed, to change the country's socio-political conditions through the channel of launching social movements. But each time, conditions have arisen in which these social movements were suppressed. When a social movement takes shape, a prospect of transformation emerges in society. Many individuals get the feeling that transformation is near. They become very hopeful—individuals who have endured many hardships and now see a clear prospect of transformation before them. Hope becomes pervasive in a large segment of society, but the movements encounter immense political force and confrontation. The opposing force breaks the movement, destroys its physical force. Now, after that hope was formed, a pervasive despair takes shape. I call this despair after pervasive hope 'black despair.' This despair is a very dangerous state; it predisposes individuals to withdraw, turn to drugs, or contemplate emigration. A portion of this population is experiencing black despair and turning to suicide. It is for this very reason that I have tried, in my own view, to propose a hope; there is hope for transformation, this transformation is near. Given the black despair we are in, it is necessary that those concerned for the country, those concerned for art and culture, create this hope. Gradually, this atmosphere of black despair, which is linked to the aftermath of a movement's suppression, will dissipate, hope will return to society, and individuals in critical conditions will not resort to suicide. We must preserve individuals in their situation as much as we can, until hope returns to society. That is why I proposed: be patient for two years; these transformations will, God willing, occur within the next two years. We will get through this juncture; these conditions cannot last."

Suicide is a process, not an act

From a sociological perspective, suicide is not an individual, volitional, or psychological matter. Social factors and social position are involved in it. Suicide is not merely an act; suicide is a process. There is a current that pushes the individual toward this path and ultimately toward the act of suicide. We have no right to see it only as the final moment. Mohaddesi emphasizes these points at the end of his talk. "Based on a review of the fact that suicide is a multi-variable phenomenon, one can consider a combination of social and psychological variables as involved in it. It is a very complex phenomenon. I believe that the suicidal act is the product of a form of life and social meanings, and the individual who performs this act is conveying meanings, has an understanding of the social world and their own position. In order to understand their act and provide a scientific explanation, we must understand the meanings of their act and enter their world. We must be able to extract a proper description of the world they were engaged in and the story of their life."

Why should we continue living?

In another corner of this session, Arash Naraghi, a professor of philosophy, speaks about the moral status of suicide or the process of ending one’s life. He refers to past literature and finds the traces of the discussion about suicide faint in these texts. “In our past literature, we see brief and scant discussions about suicide; of course, there have been and are cultures in the world where suicide was considered one of the signs of an individual’s moral perfection. But in our culture, the concept of suicide has long been viewed negatively, and almost no important question about suicide arose for it to be discussed seriously and extensively. On the whole, the dominant view seems to be a kind of primacy of life, meaning that life and survival are the principle, and ending one’s life, if it ever became relevant, required a reason. But it seems that in our present day, this rule has been challenged. This crisis of meaninglessness that has afflicted humanity from a certain point onward in the modern world has been a more or less unsuccessful search for the meaning of life.”

In the absence of a meaning-giving narrative for life, it is natural for individuals to see life as largely absurd and futile, or at least to demand a reason to justify life; thus, in our minds, the question of whether life is the principle and ending it requires another reason gradually transformed into the question: why should we continue living? For what reason should we not end our lives? That is why some philosophers went so far as to claim that the most important philosophical question of our time is “the question of suicide,” because you must provide a reason why you should not end your life—that is, you must offer a justifying reason and narrative for the continuation of life. In the modern era, both due to the loss of grand meaning-giving narratives and because our human lives have become capable of being prolonged, and we can keep individuals alive under extremely agonizing conditions, the discussion about the right to die, the right to end one’s life, has of course gained greater importance.

Suicide: A Voluntary Act, Not Necessarily Intentional

“I consider suicide a voluntary act, which is not necessarily identical with an intentional act. Of course, we make other distinctions regarding suicide that are important for understanding this phenomenon. Sometimes an individual kills themselves by performing a voluntary act, which is active suicide, and sometimes by not performing an act, they bring about their own death. For example, among the Stoics, there was always the discussion that from a certain point when an individual’s quality of life declines, one of the courageous acts is to end one’s life, and to do this, the individual undertakes prolonged fasts and ends their life—that is, passive suicide; meaning, instead of ending their life by doing something, the individual puts an end to their life by not doing something. Sometimes an individual continues their life to secure their personal interests; suppose a person is suffering from severe pain and illness, has no prospect of recovery, their quality of life has become dependent on others, and they derive no pleasure from life. This person, to escape this debilitating suffering, decides to end their life—that is, the individual ends their life because it secures certain interests and concerns of theirs.”

In some cases, an individual ends their life to secure the interests and welfare of another or others—that is, they feel that their life is a heavy burden on the shoulders of their loved ones. The quality of life has become unbearable for them, and at the same time, they see that the continuation of their life diminishes the quality of life for others. Here, the individual commits suicide not necessarily to escape their own personal afflictions, but to free others from this additional heavy burden. This is an example of cases where the end of suicide is not to secure personal interests, but rather considers altruistic interests. At other times, an individual ends their life to escape an actual painful state. They are in severe pain and suffering, enduring it is difficult, and for whatever reason, they decide they no longer wish to continue the situation and end their life. Sometimes an individual ends their life to avoid painful, unbearable, and unavoidable conditions that will befall them in the future. For example, imagine a person gradually loses the ability to move their limbs, to the point where they know that within the next year, they will completely lose all movement in their body and become absolutely paralyzed. The individual might say that while they still have the capacity to decide and act upon their decisions, they prefer to end their life rather than become trapped in the dire consequences they foresee in their future.

Now, the main question under discussion by Naraghi is: do individuals have the right to end their own lives? Can conditions be imagined in which an individual's decision to end their life is morally reasonable and justified? From his perspective, this is a discussion that has received very little attention and has rarely been relevant in our past culture, but there is an exception in the works of "Abu Hayyan al-Tawhidi" that I have not seen elsewhere. Abu Hayyan was a sage of the fourth and fifth centuries AH, and in his book "Al-Muqabasat," he relates: a respected and virtuous elder was afflicted with a condition, and the quality of his life declined to a great extent. People distanced themselves from him, and acquaintances and relatives did not want to have anything to do with him, until one day, in Abu Hayyan's words, the man went to his home, hung a rope from the ceiling, and thus ended his life. Abu Hayyan says that after hearing this news, we were all shocked and saddened, and we sat in a gathering to discuss this event. A dialogue between two people in this gathering is recounted by Abu Hayyan; one of those present speaks in praise of this act, and the other in opposition to it. As far as I know, this is the only place in our past literature where we have a two-sided discussion about the benefits and harms of suicide.

The individual defending and admiring this man presents their argument as follows—I will read some of the phrases aloud: "What an outstanding individual! He acted manfully, by his own choice he did a brilliant deed. His act speaks of his steadfastness and magnanimity. He freed himself from a prolonged calamity, from a situation that was no longer bearable. A situation where no one wanted to associate with him. It brought countless deprivations and hardships into his life. All those who knew him turned their backs on him."

Here the claimant asserts that the person who committed suicide was afflicted by an unbearable, irremediable calamity and that the quality of his life had declined; rather than abjectly submitting to the final death, he commits suicide. In the observer's view, this act is courageous and demonstrates his mental fortitude, will, and spiritual and psychological dignity, in that he refused to submit to abasement in this matter. In response, another person who was in that gathering actually answered this individual and said: “He should have known to abstain absolutely from such an act—an act that reason condemns, tradition deems a sin, and nature recalls with horror, for this is among the well-known religious rulings and the consensus of generations in all regions, and suicide is forbidden, and one must do nothing that leads to it. The reason suicide is forbidden is that the individual carries out this matter under the influence of fancies and delusions that are not endorsed by a clear and sound mind, and which do not occur to those who have control over their faculties. Later, in the world of the Hereafter, the person who committed suicide under such circumstances will become aware of the wrongness of his act and realize what an error he has committed, but he can no longer remedy the error or do anything to rectify this decision. Even if the dictates of reason or the information derived from reason and revelation both obliged the individual to undertake such an act, he still could not destroy himself. He ought not, of his own volition, to do something that people of discernment, intellect, and noble piety condemn. Reason and considered judgment rule without any doubt that the individual must not sunder the interconnected parts that constitute his body, for it is not he who has assembled them, and he is not the true owner; he is merely the inhabitant of a house that God has built for him and in which he has taken up residence, and instead of paying rent, he must strive in its care, cleanliness, repair, and use, in a manner that aids him in the pursuit of happiness in this world and the Hereafter.”

This is the entire discussion we have about suicide in the culture of the ancients. If we pay attention to this opponent of suicide in Abu Hayyan, you will discern at least several important arguments against suicide, against the individual's right to end his own life. These are arguments that have become common in religious literature. Important philosophical aspects lie hidden within them.

Naraghi unpacks the arguments and says: “The first argument claims that suicide is contrary to nature, and if something is contrary to nature, it is immoral. Therefore, suicide is immoral. According to this view, it is assumed that all living beings possess a natural inclination to protect their lives against dangers. In the case of humans, in whom a sense of self-preservation is supposedly embedded, this argument is not very strong. It rests on a dubious claim about the nature of morality—that if something is unnatural, it is also immoral. First, you must define what ‘natural’ means. Even supposing something is unnatural, we have no clear reason why that unnatural thing must be immoral. For instance, brushing one’s teeth is not natural; should we therefore consider it immoral because it is not natural? This argument is based on an assumption about morality that is indefensible. Furthermore, the idea that our inclination to preserve life is an innate tendency does not seem to be a valid claim either. Freud says that there is within us an instinct, a tendency, and a fascination with death; people do dangerous things that put their lives at risk. This is called courting danger and deriving pleasure from it. Therefore, this argument rests on dubious philosophical assumptions.” The second argument you can glean from these statements is based on God’s ownership. The idea is that God is the owner of human beings, and any disposal of another’s property without the owner’s permission is morally wrong. Ending one’s life and destroying the self is also a disposal without permission of another’s property—namely, God’s—and on this account, suicide is wrong. But this argument, too, is neither serious nor defensible. In what sense is God the owner of human beings? In a real sense or a conventional one? In a conventional sense, He cannot be the owner, because applying conventional ownership to God is meaningless. No contract has presumably been signed; it must be real ownership. But even supposing you can properly defend and conceptualize the notion of real ownership, it is difficult to derive moral duties from a factual matter. The philosophical problem is this: let us assume God is the owner of human beings; why is unauthorized disposal of God’s property bad? In the case of humans, we understand why we cannot dispose of someone’s property without permission—because it causes harm and loss to the individual. But in the case of God, why does disposing of our own bodies cause harm to God? God is beyond harm and injury. So you cannot say that disposing of this property of God, assuming it is His, causes harm and loss. You must explain why God’s ownership makes this disposal wrongful. On the other hand, since we are God’s property, we would have to endure every calamity that befalls us so that no harm comes to God. For example, I own a horse. The horse has contracted a disease, is suffering, and is in agony. Should I say that because I am the horse’s owner, no one has the right to deliver this horse from its affliction? Must it suffer? Because if you kill this horse, you have disposed of my property without my permission. This picture does not seem compatible with the religious image of a merciful and compassionate God. Even if we accept that God is the owner of human beings, His ownership imposes a duty of self-preservation upon humans; yet it does not follow that violating another’s ownership is always and everywhere a morally wrongful act. In many instances, even in human affairs, we have good reasons to disregard another’s ownership of something. For example, suppose a car is on fire and a child is trapped inside; you are perfectly entitled to break the window without the car owner’s permission and save the child. No one can tell you that your action was immoral because you did not ask the car owner’s permission.

The Intrinsic Value of the Human Being in Contradiction with Suicide

Naraghi then presents another argument, saying: “There is another argument that is implicitly seen in the words of Abu Hayyan, which is that our life is a gift from God; destroying a gift is an act of disrespect toward the benefactor. When you destroy your own life, you have shown disrespect to the benefactor. It is a wrongful act. Again, this interpretation does not seem defensible. Someone gave me a gift, and this gift is causing harm. For example, they gave me a beautiful flower; it has withered and become putrid, noxious insects have gathered around it—just because you gave it to me, I cannot throw it away. These were some of the important arguments declared within the religious mindset against suicide. But there is a non-religious argument that is important and must be considered. This argument is a non-religious analogue of an important religious concept. In religious literature, we say human life is sacred and inviolable; in non-religious literature, you can offer another interpretation of the issue, which I believe is significant and contains considerable truth. This argument is based on the intrinsic value of life, especially when life is conscious life, and it is founded on this basis. Some philosophers have distinguished among three categories of value that can be given to life: personal, instrumental, and intrinsic values.” “Personal value is the value that is valuable and pleasurable for me: I study, I travel, I eat, I converse with my friends, I listen to music; there are aspects of my life that are pleasurable, and thus these give value to my life.

I have a job, I provide a service somewhere, I translate a book, I give lectures, I help my friends; my life also has an instrumental value, not necessarily for myself but for others. Others also benefit from my existence and appreciate my being.

In addition to all this, my claim is that human life also possesses intrinsic value. Beyond value for oneself, for another, it also has a value in itself. This value in itself means this: imagine I inherited a painting from my grandfather that later turns out to be one of da Vinci’s lost works. This is very valuable to me, a memento of my grandfather; it also has financial value—I can sell it, make a fortune. It is valuable to others as well; I can put it in an exhibition so everyone can see this masterpiece. Suppose, for whatever reason, I fell into enmity with my grandfather, and anything that reminds me of him is repulsive to me. I do not want any trace in the world that reminds me of him to exist. This artwork holds no artistic or financial value for me either; I put it in a chest, locked it, and do not wish to see it. The question is: this artwork, which has no personal value for me, nor for others—do I have the right to throw this property of mine into the fire and turn it to ashes? Many pause and say this is not right, because this artwork, in addition to the value it holds for you and others, has intrinsic value. In the evolutionary process of humankind, countless transformations occurred, numerous artists came and went until reaching a pinnacle like da Vinci. The works he created were the crowning glory of human evolution in artistic aspects; the artwork represents something that transcends you and others and is a sign of something more valuable and independent than you. The same holds true for human beings. Our existence as humans is more wondrous than an artwork; the brain placed within our being, which culminates in the formation of such a phenomenon, is astonishing. Nothing in the universe is more wondrous than the human brain; human existence, in this argument, possesses intrinsic value in addition to personal value for me and others. I, for whatever reason, attach no value to my own life, and others also distance themselves from me, deriving no benefit from my life. Under these conditions, do I have the right to destroy this life? Those who believe in this argument say no. In addition to these, there is also an intrinsic value that the act of suicide disrupts and destroys. This argument is a sound argument. There is something in human existence that has intrinsic value; to conclude from this that under no circumstances and with no other consideration can this intrinsic value be overshadowed, and that under any conditions ending a life is morally impermissible, is a conclusion that does not follow from this premise.” Suppose you accept this basis that human life has value in itself and intrinsic value. I ask: on the battlefield, if you suppose enemies are coming to destroy our city, do we have the right, in defense of our citizens, to attack the invading enemies and, if necessity demands, kill them? It seems that here we deem such logic permissible. It seems other considerations come into play that do not deny intrinsic value but overshadow it. It seems that without needing to deny the intrinsic value of human life, you can perfectly well imagine conditions where other considerations overshadow this value and justify ending a life.

در معنای كلمه مالك و مملوك دو چیز متعارفند. شما مالك ماشین‌تان هستید شما یك چیز هستید، ماشین‌تان یك چیز دیگر است. ما و جان‌مان و وجودمان به نظر می‌آید دو چیز متفاوت نیستیم. كدام مالك كدام است؟ به نظر نمی‌آید خیلی تمایزی بین ما و جان‌مان و بدن‌مان باشد. ما سر و ته یك كرباسیم. كدام مالك دیگری است؟ این منی كه مالكم، چطور از بقیه اجزای وجود من متمایز است. آیا اصولا مفهوم مملوكیت شایسته اطلاق به انسان است یا خیر؟ خواه این مالك خدا باشد، خواه خود فرد باشد. حتی اگر مفهوم مملوكیت بر انسان قابل اطلاق باشد، از این برنمی‌آید كه حق مالكیت من بر خودم بدون قید و شرط است. مثال حق مالكیت من بر خودم اجازه نمی‌دهد من خودم را برده دیگری كنم، این نارواست، نمی‌توان گفت من چون مالك خودم هستم، من برده شما هستم، شما صاحب من شوید. امضای چنین قراردادی را غیراخلاقی می‌نامیم. مثال دیگر فرض كنید حق مالكیت من به من اجازه نمی‌دهد با مملوك خودم كارهایی كنم كه مایه زیان به غیر است. من مالك ماشینم هستم، هركاری بخواهم، می‌توانم با ماشینم بكنم، می‌خواهم ماشینم را آتش بزنم، حق ندارم وسط محله ماشینم را آتش بزنم، چون این آتش ممكن است به خیابان و آدم‌ها آسیب بزند، فضا را آلوده كند. صرف اینكه من صاحب ماشینم، به این معنی نیست كه هر كاری هر جایی دلم خواست با این ماشینم انجام دهم. در این زمینه‌ها بحث زیاد است.

حق خودكشی مشروط است

نراقی حق خودكشی را مشروط می‌داند و می‌گوید: «حق خودكشی اگر وجود داشته باشد، حق مشروط است. یعنی اولا هیچ دلیل قاطعی نداریم كه یكسره حق پایان دادن به زندگی ر ا از افراد سلب كنیم و از طرفی هیچ دلیلی نداریم فرض كنیم این حق نامشروط و نامقید است. فرد تحت هر شرایطی مجاز است به زندگی خود پایان دهد. فرض بر این است تداوم زندگی، اصل است، اما پایان بخشیدن به زندگی در شرایط خاصی می‌تواند اخلاقا موجه باشد. آن شرایط، شرایطی است كه اگر تحقق پیدا كند، ما به فرآیند پایان بخشیدن به زندگی می‌گوییم خودكشی معقول كه منوط به تحقق چند شرط است؛ شرط اول این است دستگاه ادراكی و شناختی فرد كامل باشد، فرد از سلامت عقلی برخوردار باشد تا بتواند تصمیم‌گیری كند، مطالعات مربوطه را گردآوری كند، تحلیل كند، نه كه فقط این اطلاعات را بفهمد. مهم‌تر از آن اهمیت و ارزش این اطلاعات را به درستی هضم كند و بفهمد. شرط دوم این است كه علاوه بر اینكه فرد باید چنین قابلیت‌های عقلی را داشته باشد، پایان‌بخشی به زندگی باید ضامن منافع او باشد. فرد باید بتواند دو وضعیت را باهم مقایسه كند، وضعیتی كه فرد به زندگی خودش ادامه می‌دهد، زندگی‌ای كه شامل درد و رنج توان‌فرسا و تحمل‌ناپذیر است و یك چشم‌انداز واقع‌بینانه‌ای در آینده برای بهبود این وضعیت به چشم نمی‌آید. وضعیت دوم هم این است كه فرد طول زندگی خودش را كوتاه می‌كند. فرد باید این دو وضعیت را كنار هم بگذارد و باهم مقایسه كند. در مقایسه با این شرایط به نحوی واقع‌بینانه به این نتیجه برسد كه زندگی كوتاه شده به مراتب بر آن زندگی طولانی تحت آن شرایط برتری دارد. زندگی در شرایط موجود، ارزش زیستن خود را از كف داده است و كوتاه كردن زندگی با كرامت و ارزش‌های زندگی فرد تناسب بیشتری دارد.

شرط سوم هم این است كه اگر هر دو شرایط اول و دوم تامین شده باشد، عقلا و اخلاقا می‌تواند به زندگی خود پایان ببخشد كه این عمل او ناقض حقوق دیگران و خصوصا تكالیف ویژه‌ای كه نسبت به دیگران دارد، نباشد. مثلا والدینی كه فرزندان خردسال دارند، نمی‌توانند به آسانی بگویند چون زندگی ما بد است، بدون اینكه فكر آینده فرزندان‌شان را بكنند، جان خود را بگیرند. اینجا پایان دادن به زندگی، خود ناقض حقوق آن كودكان است.

اما تا اینجا در مقام تعریف خودكشی معقول بودیم. بحث بر سر این است كه خودكشی معقول در مقام عمل ممكن است یا نه. واقعیت این است که در بسیاری مواقع افرادی كه قصد پایان بخشیدن به زندگی خود را دارند، از افسردگی و دوقطبی رنج می‌برند. این بیماری لزوما بر توان شناختاری فرد تاثیر منفی نمی‌گذارد، اما خلق و خوی فرد را می‌تواند منفی و تیره و تار كند. همیشه ما به‌طور طبیعی نسبت به زندگی كمی زیاده از حد خوش‌بینیم و این خوش‌بینی ما را گرم و امیدوار به زندگی می‌كند. اما وقتی دچار افسردگی می‌شویم، این خوش‌بینی جایش را به واقع‌بینی سرد و یأس‌آور می‌دهد. فرد با مشكلاتی كه مواجه می‌شود، نسبت به زندگی سرد می‌شود. افراد در مواقعی با بحران كه روبرو می‌شوند، شغلی از دست می‌دهند، دچار شكست عشقی می‌شوند، عزیزی را از دست می‌دهند، تصمیم به خودكشی می‌گیرند. بیشتر تصمیم‌هایی كه افراد در این فضا می‌گیرند، هیجانی و عاطفی است. افراد كمتر می‌توانند ارزیابی‌های عقلانی نسبت به وضعیت خود داشته باشند. در بسیاری مواقع، فرد می‌داند وقتی به زندگی خود پایان می‌دهد، زندگی پایان می‌یابد. اما حقیقت این است در بسیاری مواقع فرد به درستی به اهمیت این امر به معنای پایان یافتن این وضعیت توجه و اشراف كافی ندارد. دانستن كافی نیست، اذعان و اشراف به اهمیت این تصمیم هم اهمیت دارد. در شرایطی كه فرد از حیث روحی دچار بحران است، دشوارتر بتواند منافع واقعی خود را و امكانات آینده را ارزیابی كند و كاملا ممكن است ارزش زندگی خود را به خطا كم بشمرد. سوال این است؛ با افرادی كه مایل به خودكشی‌اند، چه كنیم؟ باید حد میانه را انتخاب كنیم. اینكه ناظر و بی‌طرف بمانیم، یا اینكه دخالت‌های مداخله‌جویانه بكنیم. نراقی در پاسخ به این پرسش، می‌گوید: «ما دو نوع اقدام می‌توانیم انجام دهیم؛ یكی اقدامات غیرمداخله‌جویانه كه سطح آگاهی را در مورد اقدامات خودكشی بالا ببرد، حمایت‌های عاطفی در بحران ارایه كند، پزشكان، مربیان را تعلیم دهیم كه بتوانند نشانه‌های ذهنیت خودكشی‌گرا را در افراد تشخیص دهند، دسترسی به خدمات بهداشتی پزشكی خصوصا بهداشت روانی را فراهم كنیم. پژوهش‌هایی كه در این زمینه هستند را حمایت كنیم. اما سطح مداخله‌جویانه هم می‌تواند موثر باشد برای اینكه وقتی فردی اقدام به خودكشی می‌كند، در عین حال كه باید به انتخاب او احترام بگذاریم، باید مطمئن شویم این انتخاب مبتنی بر یك ارزیابی واقع‌بینانه و عقلانی بوده و حافظ منافع اوست. ممكن است در شرایطی فرد را در وضعیت كنترل شده قرار دهید و مطمئن شوید تصمیمی كه گرفته با تحول مود او تغییر نمی‌كند و تحول فكرشده و سنجیده‌ای است. فرض كنید كودكی می‌خواهد خودكشی كند. خودكشی كودك تحت هر شرایطی ناموجه است، چرا؟ چون فرض ما این است كودك قوای عقلانی لازم برای تحلیل موقعیت را ندارد. خودكشی كودكان همیشه باید به لحاظ اخلاقی نامجاز شمرده شود. آنچه این را نامجاز اعلام می‌كند عبارت است از نامعقول بودن فرآیند. بنابراین هرجا خودكشی نامعقول باشد این یكجور هشدار است كه این فرد ممكن است به كمك‌هایی احتیاج داشته باشد كه شاید منصرف شود. كاری كه اینجا انجام می‌دهیم، چون نتیجه عاجل، پرهزینه و برگشت‌ناپذیر است تا حدی دخالت پدرسالاری نرم اخلاقا موجه است.»

در ذهن فرد خودكشی‌گرا چه می‌گذرد؟

The interventions of psychologists in the discussion of suicide is another issue that the psychological community constantly faces, and is in fact considered one of their duties. “Mahmoud Moghaddasi” presents a psychological discussion on suicide that connects to the philosophical and sociological remarks of the two previous experts. He says: “I want to speak both about the reflection of social conditions in the individual’s psychic world and about the conditions that the suicidal person’s mind contemplates at the moment of committing the act; can they think about it freely?” In response to the question of what goes on in the mind of a suicidal person, Moghaddasi says: “In response, I first want to say why, in psychology and psychotherapy, suicide is considered a red line and psychotherapists intervene. When someone is close to suicide and asks us for help, what do we have to say to that person in that situation? A suicidal person is someone who has a tendency toward suicide; it exists on three levels: the person who thinks about suicide occasionally, intermittently, or continuously. Many of us become suicidal at times when we are under pressure. What should be done with the thought of suicide? How should we translate it into psychotherapeutic packages?” Those who are considered suicidal develop suicidal intent. They may or may not act on it; these individuals have taken a step further. A kind of integration has formed within them; mentally, they have been able to advance further. The third group are those who have moved beyond suicidal intent and begin suicidal behaviors, self-harm, or suicide attempts. Those for whom, to a lesser or greater extent, one of their solutions is ending suffering and ennui through suicide. When I say suicide, what do I mean? We have various types of suicide; my discussion does not encompass all types of suicide, including Durkheim’s altruistic suicide or suicides of the euthanasia variety. This suicide has different states. What I am speaking of here as suicide is suicide as emotional escape. In our reaction to events and external stimuli and the tensions we experience, whether internal or external, we use three reactions: fighting, confronting, and fleeing or escaping and coping. Fighting is something we usually do; numbing, coping, and denying occur where it is beyond our capacity, we no longer feel it, we deny it. We do not consider reality; reality is happening, but we have separated a part of our mind from awareness of this event. In the state of flight, we feel the pain, but because we cannot confront it and do something, we flee. Escaping is my subject. We escape and rid ourselves through various models, but we are still alive. People, when facing suicide, do things they have also done throughout their lives. Those who use the mechanism of escaping have a much greater predisposition and possibility for suicide as well. I was reading an example about a military man. I was examining his history; he had cancer, was hospitalized, and his cancer was acute. If he had waited, he would have died 20 days later, but he dragged himself to the windowsill and threw himself down, ultimately dying. We could say this was a rational choice, but when we looked at his background, he had divorced twice, but before being left, he himself had exited the shared life. A military court had summoned him; before going to court, he had left the army. He was about to be detained; beforehand, he had left that area. It was as if the mechanism of escaping was something he used frequently. Let us consider suicide in this sense as a conclusive escape that is more accessible for some. Psychologically, they resort to it more throughout life, and here too, specifically, their problem-solving model can be this very thing.” Considering suicide a red line in psychological discussions, Moghaddasi says: “Psychology considers suicide a red line, but does not take a normative view of it. It is true that psychologists allow themselves to intervene and consider it a serious alarm, and we can even set aside the confidentiality of the therapy room. But this does not mean we consider the person a wrongdoer or weak, or say they have no right to do this. It is important under what conditions we have awareness, our self is functioning; that is where we are exercising our right or facing a diminished self. The psychologist assumes the person’s own self is not functioning, they are ill, have mood swings, or whatever, and allows themselves to intervene. But there is no normative assumption that someone has no right to kill themselves or that this act is wrong.”

The first point about the mind of a suicidal individual is that we must consider suicide as the product of a situation within the person's psychological world. It is necessary to make a distinction between reality and the psychological, objective world. A situation occurs in the individual's psychological world that inclines them toward suicide. This situation may be a perception of a circumstance that is not identical to the circumstance occurring externally. When we want to help a suicidal person, our work can involve introducing reality, a reality separate from the psychological reality they are experiencing. Psychological reality means the reality that each individual experiences, that is, my personal perception of reality, not the external reality itself. My emotional and affective state at any given moment, my psychological history including experiences of defense mechanisms, problem-solving methods, and their psychological tools—all of these constitute my psychological reality. One part is my needs and desires, and another is the interpretation I have of all of them. When I am not greatly afflicted by melancholy or helplessness, it resembles external reality. But under conditions where emotions and feelings gain the upper hand, I become influenced by heated emotions; there, my psychological reality is determined based on internal variables. It is these feelings and emotions that determine my criterion for reality.

External crises activate our internal fault lines

Continuing on the psychological reality of individuals, Moghaddasi points to two other components and says: "Suicide is often the product of an external pressure or an internal experience of the individual. External pressure can easily break me. The loss of external resources, like an economic crisis or anything else, has different effects on different people. Different expectations, psychological history, different memories or recollections, insecurity—all of these cause the reflection of that world within them to take on a different quality. Some individuals fall apart, reach a threshold of unbearability, and commit suicide; external crises activate our internal fault lines. The insecurity happening outside, if my history is full of insecurities, makes me more vulnerable. External conditions can exacerbate the costs of the psychological traumas I have endured. What we are experiencing in today's society—under normal conditions, if there were no crisis, many people could live normal lives. It greatly raises the cost of the micro-traumas we carry. It brings a person who could have lived with relative mental health and not committed suicide at all to the threshold.

I have heard this interpretation many times; individuals say, 'People have much bigger problems than this and are not depressed. I am. They don't think about suicide, I do.' We think that for the intensity of psychological pain, we must have a very intense external factor. Sometimes, we are under the excessive burden of a blaming inner voice that gives us feelings of shame, guilt, and inadequacy. We are enduring more than the burden an external factor could place upon us.

The goal of suicide, it seems, is to end an unbearable psychological pain. The primary emotions present in the individual's mind are anxiety, helplessness, and hopelessness. Anxiety is the terror of our psyche that helplessness is imminent. Disintegration is imminent. Something coming beyond our capacity and endurance. Helplessness is the point where I feel I can do nothing, I cannot do anything to end this psychological pain. This helplessness can be learned. All the objective faculties I possess are of no use. There is one escape, and that is the hope I can place in another. The next stage is hopelessness; hopelessness is the point where I am also hopeless about another. I can do nothing, and neither can another. Helplessness and hopelessness exist side by side.

The balance of the life and death instincts

Moghaddasi poses a question about this pain: "But where does psychological pain come from? It arises from unsatisfied psychological needs. The discussion of helplessness is that I cannot do anything for this psychological need. A need is a desire in the psyche that the psyche experiences as a necessity; if it is not satisfied, its void and its cost remain in the psyche. One or more of their primary needs have gone unanswered for a long time. When they can do nothing, they experience helplessness. When they cannot get help from another person, they experience hopelessness, which traps them in a reality that is excessively dark and without a breach.

But this individual, caught in such a psychological reality, has an ambivalence that is one of the core components of the suicidal mind; they both want to die and want to live. We have this in all of our lives. Love and hate, anger and affection. We sincerely experience contradictory emotions simultaneously. The most famous readings of the death drive in psychoanalysis are that it manifests as destructiveness, or as a desire to eliminate the organism and bring it to a state of tensionlessness and the inorganic; it wants to reduce tension to a minimum. When we do not achieve satisfaction or pleasure from tension, the death drive wants to bring it to its lowest state, and this is the place where the being is dead and finished. The death drive and the life drive are intertwined; the life drive usually has the upper hand—dogs and cats never commit suicide. The organism's purpose is to stay alive, reproduce, and die at its natural time. Once it has done its work, it can then exit this cycle. Due to psychological suffering and consciousness, humans can have an experience where the death drive gains the upper hand, and at times the death drive prevails over life. At the moment when the death drive is dominant, a part of us still wants to live; it is not integrated, we still want life. Consciously or unconsciously, we seek help from others. The individual leaves clues; the individual slits their wrists and, at that very moment, asks for help—both of these behaviors are sincere and without pretense. They want to tip the balance of death and life back in favor of life. One of the things this ambivalence tells us is that we want to end our suffering, not end ourselves. If we find a way to end our suffering, we pursue it. This is where psychologists allow themselves to intervene, because they believe that often this balance is disrupted in favor of death beyond the individual's control. This is where the request for help occurs; when we help, we are disrupting the balance of death and life. We say, entrust a part of this unbearable matter to me. Our presence breaks the individual's loneliness; our presence says that another exists—in this closed-off world, access to the other has been severed.

Very often, our pains are signs; psychological pain that manifests itself in an intense expression like suicidal ideation has delivered a message. When we think about it, we must go after the unanswered psychological need. We must see what they are and seek to respond to the need. They show us that we are trapped in a psychological reality. It helps us emerge from this desperation. Let us consider this as a thermometer for suicidal thoughts; whenever they arise, let us think about what need has remained unanswered, why we feel hopeless, why we feel helpless, and translate it. It should not be that we immediately become frightened and intervene. If my friend or family member is talking about suicide, let us think about what unanswered need they have that they are using this tool to express. We know them; we can help in this way. If they reach the conclusion to kill themselves, we can grant them this right; when we intervene, what we are doing is ensuring that a closed-off or distorted world does not drive them to suicide. We defend the individual's possibility for an ordinary life; we care for the individual's psychological freedom, for the individual's personhood.

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