Traditionalism Against Tradition

An essay on the epistemological crisis in Iranian society, occasioned by the passing of the contemporary philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre

In this essay, by drawing on the theories of Alasdair MacIntyre (1929–2025), we attempt to recognize the complex and tense relationship between tradition and rationality and to analyze its position in contemporary Iranian society. MacIntyre holds that rationality without the support of a living tradition is empty and meaningless, and that tradition, without the capacity for openness, rethinking, and dialogue, reaches an impasse and stagnation.

Tradition, like a river flowing through the bed of history, is not only the bearer of our collective memory but also the framework within which concepts, values, and rational judgments are formed. However, in the modern world, and especially in societies facing the various pressures of globalization, secularization, and rapid social change, tradition has become a contentious issue: it is both an object of nostalgia and an object of conflict (the lineage of this contention, of course, goes back to the Enlightenment era). Sometimes tradition is defended, but this defense, rather than being situated within the text and world of tradition, becomes an ideological tool for consolidating the status quo or reviving a lost order that no longer has a living connection to people's lives.

In the midst of this, traditionalists appear who, in speech, are defenders of tradition, but in practice, bring about a fundamental rupture from the spirit of tradition. They, sometimes with a selective approach, reduce tradition to a set of rigid decrees, closed propositions, or external symbols, and make of it a political or identitarian version in which there remains no room for dynamism, intra-traditional critique, or rational dialogue. This question arises from the heart of this very experience: Do all those who call themselves "traditionalists" truly live within tradition? Or are some forms of traditionalism, in fact, against tradition itself?

In this essay, with a brief look at the views of Alasdair MacIntyre, the late prominent contemporary moral philosopher and scholar of tradition, I try to find a way to understand the meaning of tradition, tradition-based rationality, and also the pathology of traditionalisms that have led to a severance from tradition. Then, by depicting some of the struggles related to tradition in contemporary Iranian society, I will show how what appears on the surface to be a defense of tradition may lead to the violation of its foundations.

The path of this essay is a journey between theory and reality, between the thought of tradition as the ground of rationality and the experience of de-traditionalization from within, in which traditionalists may, unintentionally or deliberately, render tradition lifeless and empty it of its historical and living role.

MacIntyre and Tradition: Rationality in the Context of History

Alasdair MacIntyre, moral philosopher and theorist of tradition, in his influential book After Virtue (1981), presents a new plan for rethinking ethics and rationality on the horizon of tradition. His point of departure is a critique of the moral and cultural condition of the modern world; a world in which, in his view, moral language has been emptied of meaning and behavioral rules have become rootless and fragmented. In such a situation, MacIntyre believes we live in a world where "fragments of the past" are repeated without a coherent understanding of their tradition, without there being a framework for adjudicating between them.

MacIntyre does not see tradition merely as an inheritance from the past or a set of customs and rituals. Tradition, in his view, is a living, evolving, and historical framework within which rational action and, in other words, rationality finds meaning. The coherence of a tradition depends on the vitality of the debates within it. Within a tradition, human beings learn how to reason, how to think about virtue, and how to discuss the good life. For him, tradition is not an obstacle to rationality, but the condition of its possibility. Contrary to the modern conception that sees reason as an independent and trans-historical entity, MacIntyre holds that rationality is always formed and finds meaning within a specific tradition.

At the heart of MacIntyre's thought lies a fundamental connection between three concepts: tradition, rationality, and virtue. Morality is only possible within the context of a tradition in which virtues have meaning. And a tradition is only alive when it can cultivate rationality within itself and rethink itself in the face of questions and crises. Thus, for MacIntyre, a return to tradition is not a return to a frozen past; rather, it is a return to a living, dialogical framework in which rationality and moral life have flourished.

The Relationship Between Rationality and Tradition in MacIntyre's Thought

One of Alasdair MacIntyre's most fundamental claims is that rationality is essentially tradition-constituted. Contrary to the common modern conception that views reason as an individual, transhistorical capacity for attaining truth or regulating behavior according to universal, general principles, MacIntyre believes that rationality is always formed within specific traditions. By emphasizing the concept of tradition-constituted rationality, he seeks to show that rational judgment, the choice of virtue, and even the formation of fundamental moral concepts are not only impossible without a specific historical and cultural context but are also empty and illusory.

In this view, rationality is not an abstract characteristic of an individual but part of a historical and social process that grows within a tradition. Each tradition is a collection of ways of living, values, definitions of virtue, models of the good life, and modes of moral and practical judgment. Individuals learn within these traditions how to reason, how to distinguish between good and bad, and how to take a stance toward their life, history, and society.

For this reason, MacIntyre is a fierce critic of the idea of "impartial judgment" from outside a tradition. In his view, any attempt at rational judgment without reliance on a specific tradition leads to one of two outcomes: either individual self-foundation, where everyone has their own standard and no dialogue is possible, or complete relativism, where all traditions are dismissed from an external perspective and the possibility of any judgment vanishes. Against relativism, which claims that each tradition has its own standards and no dialogue between traditions is possible, MacIntyre defends "dialogue within and between traditions." Traditions, in his view, are neither closed nor beyond criticism. Rather, they are dialogical and historical spaces within which the standards of rationality are gradually refined in their struggle with reality and experience. Hence, rational judgment is only possible within a living tradition, not from a position outside all traditions.

But this does not mean that traditions are closed and unchangeable. On the contrary, MacIntyre emphasizes the capacity of traditions for internal transformation. A living tradition is one that can rethink itself from within in the face of crises and questions. He speaks of tradition as an extended and open-ended dialogue; a dialogue in which generations engage rationally with one another and with the texts and life-patterns of the past.

On this basis, one can say: rationality without tradition is something like language without grammar—impossible; and tradition without rationality becomes a static, meaningless collection—lifeless and indefensible. And rationality within tradition (or tradition-constituted rationality) is the very possibility that allows a society to redefine virtue, understand crises, and transform itself in the light of experience and critique.

It is from this perspective that traditionalisms which sacrifice rationality for sanctity, and reject any dialogue or questioning, are in fact not the guardians of tradition but its destroyers. In the following sections, we will see how this type of traditionalism operates in our society, and why, from MacIntyre's perspective, it leads not to the revival of tradition but to its denial.

The Struggles of Tradition in Contemporary Iranian Society

Tradition in contemporary Iranian society has always been an arena of intellectual, cultural, political, and identity-based struggles. From the late Qajar period and throughout the fourteenth century of the solar calendar, tradition has been subjected to two types of pressure: the external pressure of hasty, imitative modernization and the internal pressure of ideologization and appropriation by power.

In the dominant narrative of Iranian intellectualism, tradition has often been presented as an obstacle to progress, rationality, and freedom. Modernist intellectuals, from the Constitutional era through the Pahlavi period and after the revolution, have consistently viewed tradition as a static, anti-rational force with which a reckoning must be made. In response, the traditionalist reaction to this process emerged in the form of projects for a "return to the self" or the "revival of traditional values," without always being able to offer a deep, historical understanding of tradition itself.

But the main issue is that both camps—modernists and traditionalists alike—have, in many cases, held an essentialist and ahistorical understanding of tradition. Iranian intellectualism sometimes conceived of tradition as a closed, monolithic, and irreformable whole and rejected it outright. On the other hand, certain traditionalist currents reduced tradition to rigid, unrepeatable, and sacred propositions that must be reproduced in their ancient form, without regard for their social and historical context.

In practice, tradition in contemporary Iran is neither living nor dynamic, for it has either become a subject of nostalgia or a tool of power. Instead of providing a space for cultivating endogenous rationality and creative critique, tradition has turned into a hollow slogan or a control mechanism for consolidating the status quo. As a result, a kind of deep distrust toward tradition itself has emerged; as if people, through the experience of impositions and fundamental contradictions, no longer know what tradition is, what function it has, and how one can live within it and think toward the future with it—and of course, to speak of deriving any spiritual benefit from this approach to tradition is, at best, impossible, if not outright destructive. Dariush Shayegan calls this situation the ideologization of tradition and believes that ideological tradition has lost its connection to Eastern spirituality and, by reproducing tradition in a modern mold, has unconsciously adopted the internal logic of modernity. Ideological tradition cannot provide a possibility for producing spirituality and will merely have a political function for competing with modern ideologies. He considers ideology to be false consciousness and believes that the transformation of religion into ideology is a negative reaction to the process of the collapse of Eastern traditions in the face of the onslaught of secular rationality and the myth-destroying nature of modernity, which ultimately turns tradition into a political tool for historical self-alienation and sacrifices its spiritual capacities to the secularized political myths of the modern world. The transformation of religion into ideology, according to Shayegan, stems from the collapse of the deep spiritual concepts of religions in the new age.

Traditionalism Against Tradition

In the late modern world, the reaction to identity crises and the collapse of meaning sometimes manifests as a return to tradition. But this return does not always mean a return to a traditional way of life or the revival of a dialogue with tradition. What occurs in many cases is a traditionalism that turns tradition into a stereotype, a closed and rigid system, and sometimes a tool for power; a phenomenon that can be called traditionalism against tradition.

Such traditionalism, contrary to MacIntyre's understanding of tradition, is characterized by several distinct features:

1. Sanctification of the past and the rendering static of tradition

In this model, tradition is regarded not as a historical and dialogical process, but as a pre-established and sacred truth. No intra-traditional rethinking or reinterpretation is permitted. Tradition, instead of being a ground for rationality, becomes an obstacle to rationality.

2. Selectivity and the ideological reproduction of tradition

Traditionalists often view tradition with a selective gaze. They highlight elements of tradition that align with their identity-based or political goals and eliminate or ignore the rest. In this way, tradition is emptied of its historical and moral coherence and acquires an instrumental function.

3. Negation of intra-traditional dialogue

In a living tradition, there is room for dialogue, revision, and internal critique. But ideological traditionalism, by absolutizing traditional propositions, regards any internal questioning or reflection as a sign of heresy or deviation. As a result, the internal rationality of tradition ceases to function, and with the decline of dialogue, tradition is reduced to a set of commands.

4. Overlap with Power and the Instrumentalization of Tradition

Traditionalism that seeks to legitimize the existing political order uses tradition as a cover for social control. In this situation, tradition is not a source of continuity and meaning, but a tool for repression and consolidation. This very fact undermines social trust in tradition.

From MacIntyre's perspective, such an approach is in complete contradiction with the nature of tradition. For him, tradition is an arena for historical rationality, for the cultivation of virtue, and for rethinking within continuity. But in dominant traditionalism, tradition, instead of remaining alive, is suffocated in the name of defending itself. And this is how traditionalists, in practice, do not revive tradition, but deny it.

Epistemological Crisis in MacIntyre's View and the Situation of Contemporary Society

Alasdair MacIntyre, in his book Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (1988), in his analysis of the process of tradition in the face of challenges, posits three stages: In the first stage, tradition has not yet encountered a fundamental question or challenge and is in a state of calm. In the second stage, tradition encounters challenges that reveal its flaws and weaknesses, and the third stage, which is a crucial stage, is when tradition seeks to remedy and repair itself. At this stage, if the questions can create a dialogue within the context of tradition, tradition stirs and moves and can renew itself in a dialogical creation and continue its survival, but if at this stage traditions cannot take on a new configuration, in MacIntyre's terms, they are in a state of "epistemological crisis." Perhaps the concept of epistemological crisis can be used to describe the collapse of tradition, which is due to the deadlock of dialogue within tradition. In such a situation, individuals and groups become "islands of meaning" that cannot find a common language for interaction and mutual understanding. MacIntyre sees this crisis as stemming from the fact that modern rationality has tried to free itself from every tradition, but as a result, instead of finding an independent and neutral foundation, it has encountered emptiness and a loss of meaning.

In contemporary Iranian society, this epistemological crisis has manifested in a particular way. Traditionalist and authoritarian approaches, in the name of reviving tradition, along with economic, political, and cultural pressures, and identity-based and historical conflicts, have caused traditional unity and cohesion to disintegrate, yet alternative traditions have also failed to provide a living and robust framework for understanding and action. As a result, society has entered a state in which rifts and divisions, mutual distrust, and epistemic confusion shape everyday life.

In such a situation, what is felt to be lacking more than anything else is the possibility of rational dialogue within tradition; a dialogue that is neither based on an absolute reconstruction of the past, nor on its denial and complete severance. It is this context that makes MacIntyre important for us: he sees tradition not as a museum of dead values and rulings, but as a living ground for rational and ethical living. But the prevalent traditionalisms in Iran—discussed in the previous section—instead of helping to revive tradition, turn it into something lifeless, closed, and ideological.

From MacIntyre's perspective, the way out of this crisis is perhaps, instead of ideological readings, a dialogical reading of tradition as something living; a tradition that is not static and absolute, but revisable and open. Such a tradition can provide a ground for shared understanding, rational dialogue, and the formation of new virtues that are in harmony with contemporary realities.

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References:

MacIntyre, Alasdair. Epistemological Crises, Dramatic Narrative, and the Philosophy of Science. Translated by Seyed Alireza Hosseini Beheshti. Tehran: Nahid Publications, 1395 [2016].

MacIntyre, Alasdair. After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory. Translated by Hamid Shahriari and Mohammad Ali Shomali. Tehran: SAMT Publications, 1393 [2014].

Weinstein, Jack Russell. MacIntyre's Philosophy. Translated by Kaveh Behbahani. Tehran: Ney Publishing, 1393 [2014].

Shayegan, Dariush and Mehrban, Mehrdad. “The Ideologization of Tradition”. Kiyan, Year 4, No. 19, Khordad 1373 [June 1994], pp. 25–31.

MacIntyre, Alasdair. Whose Justice? Which Rationality? University of Notre Dame Press, 1988.
Knight, Kelvin. The MacIntyre Reader, University of Notre Dame Press, 1998.