What Use Is the Critique of Relativism?, Yaser Mirdamadi

What Use Is the Critique of Relativism?

Yaser Mirdamadi

“Of course, I welcome [the negation of my own words as well]. If you wish, I can negate all that I have said and tell you the opposite.”

Morad Farhadpour[1]

Us, Tolerance, and Relativism

In a time when our homeland, and indeed our troubled region as a whole, perhaps more than ever, firstly needs tolerance, putting oneself in another’s place, understanding the other, and abandoning prejudice and dogmatism, and secondly, since relativism is a philosophical view that seems to well fulfill the need for tolerance, putting oneself in another’s place, understanding the other, and abandoning prejudice and dogmatism, then what benefit does the translation of the book Fear of Knowledge, which is a relentless critique of relativism, have for us? Are relativists, who deem everyone right despite their fundamental disagreements, not closer to tolerance than anti-relativists, who deem only themselves right and others wrong? Is it not the case that this poor taste in selecting a book for translation once again shows that philosophers, philosophy scholars, and philosophy enthusiasts have settled into their self-made ivory towers and become a breed apart, who, if the world were swept away, would be carried off by the millennia-long sleep of their endless abstract debates, engaged in discussions that “yield no particular benefit, nor ecstasy”?

I confess that when selecting this book for translation, throughout its translation, and now that it has been published, the nagging itch of this doubt, skepticism, and potential objection has been with me. And if even a corner of the critical and brilliant mind of you, the reader of these lines, shares in this itch, then “come, let us, the heart-scorched, gather together.” Nevertheless, in this piece, I will attempt, in a cursory manner, to argue that the concern for tolerance, openness to the other, and the negation of prejudice and dogmatism—a concern that is entirely respectable and indeed essential for our collective well-being and individual inner health—not only, contrary to common perception, does not align with relativism, but that to theorize in favor of tolerance and openness to the other, we entirely need an anti-relativist foundation.

Since our discussion concerns the virtue of tolerance and its connection and relation to relativism, and since tolerance is a moral virtue, I will necessarily focus my discussion on “ethical relativism,” and not other forms of relativism.[2] But before showing that tolerance and ethical relativism do not seem compatible, it is worth speaking a little about what ethical relativism is and its connection and relation to some other meta-ethical views.

What Is Ethical Relativism?

Ethical relativists believe that moral truths exist, and consequently, our moral judgments can be true or false; whereas proponents of “moral nihilism” say that moral truths do not exist and our moral judgments are nothing but projections of our feelings and emotions, and consequently, our moral judgments are not truth-apt. Let me explain the moral nihilist view with an example. When we say, “Killing the innocent is morally wrong,” the moral nihilist says this “proposition” refers to no truth, because fundamentally no moral truth exists; rather, this “proposition” is merely the expression and manifestation of our feelings and emotions. In fact, it is as if we had said: “Ugh to killing the innocent”! It is clear that saying “ugh” to killing the innocent is not truth-apt; rather, it is an expression of disgust and nothing more.

Moral relativists, however, while believing in the existence of moral truths and that moral judgments can be true or false, are nonetheless classified among proponents of “moral skepticism,” just as moral nihilists are also categorized as moral skeptics. That moral nihilists are classified as moral skeptics is not surprising. As mentioned, they do not believe in moral truths or that moral judgments can be true or false—and what could be more skeptical than that in the field of meta-ethics? But why are relativists classified as moral skeptics? After all, unlike moral nihilists, they believe in the existence of moral truths and that moral judgments can be true or false. The answer lies in the relativists’ view of the truth-aptness of moral judgments. Moral relativists believe that the truth or falsity of our moral judgments is not “objective.” In other words, moral relativists oppose “ethical objectivism.”

Moral relativism is, in fact, a view situated between moral nihilism on one side and ethical objectivism on the other. Ethical objectivists say that our moral judgments do not derive their truth or falsity from the belief or disbelief, or the approval or disapproval, of an individual or a group of people; rather, even if no one considered killing the innocent morally wrong, or if all people approved of killing the innocent, killing the innocent would still be morally wrong. Accordingly, “objectivity” here means that a moral judgment is not dependent on the belief or disbelief, or the approval or disapproval, of an individual or a community. Relativists, however, oppose objectivism. In the view of moral relativists, killing the innocent is morally wrong, provided that an individual or a group of people consider it wrong; and killing the innocent is morally permissible, provided that an individual or a group of people consider it permissible. In other words, the rightness or wrongness (truth or falsity) of moral judgments depends on the belief of an individual or a group of individuals and is not independent of it. This means that, according to moral relativists, rightness or wrongness in the moral domain is relative, not objective, and there is no moral standard that applies to all people at all times, universal and independent of the circumstances of the age. Morality, in this view, is entirely and fundamentally a human construct, and human constructs are inevitably diverse; therefore, morality, at its core, differs from one society to another and from one individual to another.

Why Tolerance and Relativism Are Incompatible

So far, I have briefly discussed what moral relativism is and how it differs from some other meta-ethical theories (nihilism and objectivism). Now it is time to address the relationship between tolerance and relativism. Moral relativism has two branches, which, while both being relativist, have differences: the individualist branch and the collectivist branch. The individualist branch of relativism is sometimes called “ethical subjectivism,” and the collectivist branch is sometimes called “cultural relativism.” Ethical subjectivists believe that it is the individual, not the collective, that determines the rightness or wrongness of a moral judgment. In contrast, cultural relativists believe that it is the culture of a society, not the individual, that determines the rightness or wrongness of a moral judgment.

Let us begin by examining the relationship between cultural relativism and the virtue of tolerance. It does not require much reflection to realize that one can find various cultures in which aspects of intolerance and violence are abundant. For example, honor killing

(honor killing) has been an established, accepted, and even pride-inducing aspect in some cultures, both past and present. It is precisely for this reason that perpetrators of honor killings sometimes go unpunished and are even considered a source of pride for at least a segment of that culture's members. On this basis, those who believe in the virtue of tolerance on the one hand, and in cultural relativism on the other, are caught in an inescapable dilemma: on the one hand, they cannot condemn cultures that glorify honor killing, because they believe in cultural relativism, and on the other hand, they cannot easily overlook the intolerance and violence inherent in honor killing, because they believe in the virtue of tolerance. In such a situation, to escape this dilemma, they must either abandon their belief in the virtue of tolerance or set aside cultural relativism, but they cannot consistently hold both beliefs simultaneously. A similar argument can be made regarding cultures that permit slavery, ethnic and religious cleansing and discrimination, and the like. In fact, cultural relativism is a viewpoint to which all intolerant and violence-perpetuating cultures can, and have, resorted in various ways to justify their intolerance and violence.

Individual relativism in the domain of ethics, or ethical subjectivism, faces a similar problem. If cultural relativism renders society, at least in its fundamental principles, morally infallible (because it says whatever a society deems morally right is morally right for that society), ethical subjectivism also renders each individual, at least in their fundamental moral commitments, morally infallible (because it says whatever an individual deems morally right is morally right for that individual). The only type of error that ethical subjectivism recognizes is when an individual fails to act upon their own moral commitments. That is, if an individual, for example, believes in honor killing and finds themselves in a situation that typically necessitates committing such a murder (for instance, seeing their spouse, mother, or sister with a male stranger) but does not commit the murder, then the ethical subjectivist criticizes such an individual! Because only in such a case has the individual committed an error, and this error is nothing but the individual's failure to act upon their own beliefs. But if the individual who believes in honor killing actually commits the honor killing, from the perspective of ethical subjectivism, no error has occurred! With this explanation, an ethical subjectivist can in no way believe in and adhere to the virtue of tolerance, because there is no guarantee that belief in the virtue of tolerance is among an individual's moral principles; and from the perspective of ethical subjectivism, if an individual does not believe in the virtue of tolerance and also adheres to intolerance in practice, then such an individual has committed no moral error, whereas from the perspective of believers in the virtue of tolerance, such a person is fundamentally in error.

If the set of arguments in this piece is sound, I have been able to show that, contrary to common perception, the virtue of tolerance is incompatible with moral relativism, and consequently, theorizing in favor of tolerance requires an anti-relativist foundation.[3]

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1) Morad Farhadpour, Western Winds (A Selection of Conversations and Lectures), Tehran: Hermes, 1382 [2003], p. 158. It is necessary to mention that, by citing the above quote, which seems to clearly possess a relativistic atmosphere, it is by no means intended that Farhadpour, at least in the conscious part of his intellectual project, advocates a relativistic viewpoint; rather, as far as Farhadpour, as a critic of relativism, is concerned, the point is merely that the inclination toward relativism is so deep and pervasive that even its critics are not immune to being unconsciously drawn into this abyss. For an example of Farhadpour's critique of postmodern relativism, see: "The Postmodern Sophists: Considerations on Relativism," in: Depressed Reason, Reflections on Modern Thought, Tehran: Tarh-e No, 1378 [1999], pp. 294-303.

2) In his book Fear of Knowledge, Boghossian focuses his argument on the critique of ontological relativism, epistemological relativism, and the relativism of rational explanation. However, in an appendix added to the Persian translation of the book, Boghossian also critiques moral relativism. See: “Appendix 1: A Critique of Moral Relativism.” In this essay, he shows how “moral relativism” collapses into “moral nihilism.” The difference between moral relativism and moral nihilism will be explained later in the text.

3) For a preliminary, concise, and accessible critique of moral relativism, see:

Russ Shafer-Landau. The Fundamentals of Ethics. Third ed. New York/Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015, Ch. 19.

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"Yaser Mirdamadi's article titled "What Use Is the Critique of Relativism?

Published in the Ordibehesht issue of the "Shahr-e Ketab" magazine

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