Yaser Mirdamadi and Zoheir Bagheri Noaparast Debate the Rationality of Belief in God

We received many calls to the Taboo program asking us to address the subject of God. We have previously dealt with the important and decisive question, “Does God exist?” But you are right—God’s existence or non-existence has such a radical effect on our being and our lives that we can still debate it and answer further questions. In this week’s program, we host two researchers of philosophy, one of whom defends the rational arguments of theists and the other the rational arguments of atheists.

Zoheir Bagheri Noaparast is a doctoral student in philosophy at the University of Vienna and editor-in-chief of the philosophical magazine 42. Emphasizing the necessity of living wisely, he defends atheism. Yaser Mirdamadi, a researcher of religion and philosophy, however, speaks of the limits of reason and believes that one can rationally defend the arguments of theists.

Mr. Mirdamadi, can you explain rationally from what angle theism can be defended, and why?

Yaser Mirdamadi: Before answering your important question, I would like to make two key points. First, I am here defending the “reasonableness” of theism, not the so-called “proof” of theism. The difference between proof and reasonableness, very briefly, is that in proof there is certainty and indubitability, but in reasonableness there is no certainty or indubitability. This means that, in the technical sense of the word, we have no “demonstration” for the existence of God, but we may well have reasons—that is, non-conclusive arguments—for the existence of God. The second point is that when I speak of the reasonableness of theism, I do not even mean that I defend all the well-known non-conclusive arguments that have been advanced in favor of the reasonableness of theism. But some of the well-known reasons advanced in favor of the reasonableness of theism seem to me either to have defensible versions or to be capable of having them. These reasons, I think, are (five reasons): first, the “cosmological argument”; second, the “argument from religious experience”; third, the “argument from consciousness”; fourth, the “moral argument”; and fifth, the “cumulative case argument”—if there is time, we can talk about these later.

Very well. Mr. Noaparast, Mr. Mirdamadi spoke of several categories of rational arguments in defense of theism. Can one then rationally bring arguments in defense of atheism?

Zoheir Bagheri Noaparast: Look, we must see what evidence theists present for the existence of the God they claim and what definition they have of that God; then we, on the atheist side, must examine whether their definition is coherent, defensible, has evidence for it, or is consistent with our best scientific theories. The common definition of God put forward in philosophical discussions usually attributes at least these three properties to God: that He is omniscient, omnipotent, and perfectly good. One of the things atheists do, and the rational arguments they bring, is to raise rational objections to this definition of God and try to show that belief in such a God lacks sufficient evidence. One of the most famous arguments of atheists is the argument from “evil.” By evil is meant all the bad things, sufferings, and pains that humans experience in their lives, which includes natural evils, such as earthquakes, tsunamis, various diseases, etc., and moral evils, which include a range of actions that humans commit against one another, which can be small things like lying and betrayal or very large-scale things like genocide. Well, if God knows everything, is capable of doing anything, and is perfectly good, then by definition, if an evil were to occur, He is aware of it, and since He is capable, He can prevent it, and since He is perfectly good, He naturally should not allow that evil to occur and should prevent it; yet we see all kinds and sorts of evil in our world. Here there appears to be a contradiction in the definition of God. We must either conclude that this God does not exist at all, or if He does exist, He lacks one of those three properties.

Mirdamadi: It can easily be shown that there is no contradiction between a God with these attributes and the existence of evil in the world. Why? For the simple reason that God may have reasons for creating evil, even if we do not know those reasons; merely demonstrating its logical possibility is rationally sufficient to say that there is no contradiction between the existence of evil and a God with—specifically—these three attributes. We see that even parents are compelled, in some cases, to do something for their children that from the children's perspective is evil (or even truly evil, not just from their perspective), but inflicting this evil has a reason from the parents' perspective. However, one might be able to show reasons why, even from our human perspective, a benevolent person should not do this. An example given by one atheist philosopher is that in a forest that catches fire, an innocent, beautiful gazelle burns alive amidst the flames and perishes; what reason does this benevolent God have to let this beautiful gazelle burn? Here, some philosophers have pointed out that certain evils, especially human evils like murder, war, and the like, are inescapable. Particularly regarding moral evils, it can be said that God has given humans free will, and free will necessitates that humans be able to perform wrongful acts. The possession of free will by humans, despite all the evils it can create, may, from a cosmic perspective and from God's viewpoint surveying all of history, have its good outweigh its evil, so to speak. One cannot grant someone free will without granting them the capacity to create evil. On this basis, God can remain omnipotent, wholly benevolent, and omniscient.

Mr. Mirdamadi, I would like to ask you here whether that part of your argument—that "there may be reasons at work to which we have no access"—could not come close to that simplistic wisdom common among people, that it is God's expediency and we do not know and have no access? I mean, could it not, in fact, be an argument that fails to engage reason? Don't you think so? For reasons that we never have access to, while we are speaking of rational argument and need to be able to comprehend it with human reason.

Mirdamadi: Indeed, one of the wonders of reason is that it also recognizes its own limits. We realize the limitations of reason by appealing to reason itself. That is, the religious cannot tell us that reason is limited; only philosophers—that is, those who have entered the arena of rationality—can speak of the limitations of reason. On this basis, philosophically-minded theists can also point to the limitations of reason, without leaving the arena of rationality and without having abandoned respect for rationality. Look, so that it does not seem too strange, when you are dealing with a teacher or a kind father as a child, you may not grasp all the details of what he does, or when you are in class, you may not understand all the strictness and the objections the teacher raises against you, and some of them may even seem groundless to you, but naturally, we trust. This trust is not absolute, but it is present nonetheless. Theists have something similar towards God.

Mr. Noaparast, now perhaps you would like to respond specifically to the arguments Mr. Mirdamadi offered in response to the argument from evil, or this very discussion of "hidden games behind the veil" of which we may be unaware, and then I will have another question for you.

Bagheri Noaparast: Look, first of all, logically there was no problem at all with evil not coming into existence. That is, no logical contradiction occurs. Consequently, if someone says there is a reason for the existence of evil, they must state that reason specifically. Mr. Mirdamadi referred to free will, which is a strong argument against the problem of moral evil. But another issue that exists is that perhaps one could respond by saying that if a God existed, that God could have created human beings in such a way that they would not commit moral evil. For instance, if we want to use the same examples they used, suppose parents can raise their child in such a way that, for example, they do not lie. Another version of this argument could be that it is not even necessary for us to commit the Holocaust in order to exercise our free will; the mere ability to, say, tell a lie or commit a minor misdeed would be sufficient for that threshold.

And since Mr. Noaparast's discussion with Mr. Mirdamadi also moved towards the "divine mystery" of which we might be unaware; I would like to quote the former Cambridge professor, Simon Blackburn (Simon Blackburn), who says he prefers the term "faithless" to "atheist." That is, I want to enter into the discussion of faith as well, and for you to explain to our listeners what the fundamental difference between these is?

Bagheri Noaparast: We have a word called "belief." I now believe that I am speaking. This belief of mine is correct because there is a reality that I am now speaking, but for instance, I do not use the word "faith" for the fact that I am now speaking. Faith refers to a belief to which, for example, a person is committed with great fervor. A person might say, well, the evidence is insufficient, I make a decision of faith. But another encounter can also be had, which is to say that the question "Does God exist or not?" is a meaningless question altogether and will have a kind of therapeutic approach to the issue. It tells us, well, this is a meaningless question, it has occupied your mind and has no answer. So, consequently, it is better to forget this question and set it aside. Faithlessness can have this as one of its meanings.

In my opinion, no one can be faithless in the sense of knowing that God exists or believing in it and at the same time not believing.

Mr. Mirdamadi, now the topic of religions has also come up. You yourself spoke about religious experience at the beginning of the program. Some defend atheism by rejecting religions, and the opposing group, by citing the existence of religions and divine holy books, can reach the conclusion of defending theism. If you want to speak about the rational arguments for defending theism, will the subject of religion and holy books also come into play?

Mirdamadi: Before answering your important question, I would like to briefly respond to one or two points that dear Mr. Zoheir mentioned. Mr. Zoheir said that God could have created human beings in such a way that they would not commit evil. This can be understood in two ways. If the meaning is that God could have created human beings—structurally speaking—in such a way that He gives them will and free choice, but gives them this will and free choice in a way that they only do good, it seems we are faced with a paradox here. Because free choice means the individual can do evil, but if there is a free choice with which one cannot do evil, it appears that it is not free choice. That is the first point. But regarding the point that they should not do extraordinarily terrible things, like the Holocaust or like wars. Look, the answer that can be given is that if God wants to bestow unlimited good upon humanity, it is as if He must, in fact, give them an unimaginably vast will and free choice for evil [as well]. But let us turn to the discussion of Simon Blackburn and non-belief; look, Blackburn's point is that for me, Blackburn, God is not an issue at all for me to then want to reject it in order to become an atheist. Look, this is like someone saying, 'Are you a denier of the three-headed monster?' The person replies, 'I am not even a denier of the three-headed monster; rather, this three-headed monster is not an issue for me at all.' Of course, note that such a person is implicitly denying the three-headed monster, but at the same time, they are adding something more important, which is that this is not an important issue at all, not just that we are deniers. Now, I can add to Blackburn's discussion that this view Blackburn speaks of has recently found a term in English, and they call it Apatheism, for which we must, of course, ask Dariush Ashouri to suggest an equivalent in Persian, but my suggestion for now is 'khodā-bi-eʿtenāʾi' (God-indifference). Let us note that God-indifference, at its very foundation, is still not in contradiction with atheism. God-indifference in fact presupposes atheism but, of course, goes beyond it and considers the issue of God fundamentally unimportant. But let me now turn to your question regarding: Can the rejection of religions lead to the conclusion of the rejection of theism? We have two types of theism; theism independent of religion, which is called Deism, for which Dariush Ashouri has suggested 'dādār-bāvari', and we have a type of religious or revealed theism, which is called Theism. If someone rejects religions, yes, they have rejected revealed theism. On the other hand, if someone rejects theism, they have not necessarily rejected all religions, because not all religions are solely based on theism, and indeed some religions, like Buddhism, are fundamentally not based on theism.

Mr. Noaparast, there is certainly a short opportunity now if you wish to give a response to Mr. Mirdamadi, but at one point he raised a point about God-indifference, which could be an independent and fascinating discussion. I want to ask you: God-indifference is not the certainty of atheism. If one day it becomes clear that theism was the correct belief, in that case, what answer could the defenders of atheism give? Because if we think in terms of consequentialism and utilitarianism, theists do not lose anything.

Bagheri Noaparast: Let me first briefly address the explanation Mr. Mirdamadi gave. Look, for example, where you live now, there are no igloos—the houses they build at the pole. How they build that house, or how they keep it warm in their extremely cold winter, is not a problem for you. Due to the life we lead, the goals and interests we have, and what arises and becomes a concern for us in our lives, certain questions become important to us and others become unimportant. Regarding what you said, that if someone believes in God they lose nothing, and if they do not believe in God and God exists, they lose everything. First of all, some atheists say that this is not the case, because if you believe in God, you lose many things. If God does not exist and you believe in God; there is only one life, and you are forced to live by rules, many of whose reasons you do not understand. Some of them might be completely irrational or anti-rational, and perhaps the lifestyle is not to your liking at all. Consequently, it is not at all clear that someone who believes in God, if God does not exist, has had nothing happen to this one life of theirs and that it has been entirely desirable and good. But this God that is spoken of—see, there is a presupposition here—the presupposition is that there is a God who prefers a human being to be cowardly and worship a god out of fear, rather than a human being who uses their reason and concludes that God does not exist. I think this God, if He exists and His basis is wisdom and rationality, should prefer a human being who rationally examines positions and concludes, based on the available evidence, that God does not exist, over a human being who acts merely out of fear, whose value is unclear. But yes, what if we later find out that God did exist, what should we do? Well, I think this is a very good question. Look, we have a duty to ensure the rationality of our beliefs. Anyone who thoroughly examines the available evidence and adopts a position proportionate to it is not epistemically blameworthy; that is, no one can come and say to them, 'Why did you hold this belief?' Even if it later becomes clear, with new and more evidence, that their position at that time was mistaken. Because we have no other way to ensure the reliability of the rest of our beliefs. If we do not want to adhere to this principle, we must open the way for superstition, fear, and other undesirable characteristics that can be enumerated.

Mr. Mirdamadi, one of the most important, or perhaps I should say the most common, arguments usually brought up regarding theism is the law of cause and effect. Most people, and those who are theists or defend theism, say that nothing comes into existence just like that, without a cause and an agent, and ultimately a First Cause. Would you perhaps like to explain this argument?

Mirdamadi: If you recall, I said at the beginning of my remarks that some theistic arguments seem indefensible to me, and one of the arguments I find indefensible is the conditional or pragmatic argument. Pascal's conditional argument, however, is useful for critiquing apatheism. That is, it shows apatheists a picture and says, Sir or Madam! There are people talking about a being who, if that being exists, could greatly affect your destiny. Consequently, it seems reasonable to listen to their arguments. In other words, Pascal's wager exposes "apatheism." But regarding the cosmological argument you mentioned, this is an ancient argument. A contemporary version is the "Kalam cosmological argument," and a philosopher named William Lane Craig has defended it more than others, and I find it convincing. The first premise is that everything that comes into being (that is, did not exist and then came into existence) has a cause. The second premise states that the universe did not exist and then came into existence, so it came into being. On this basis, it concludes that the universe has a cause. The fourth premise states that the cause of this universe is necessarily outside of this universe and cannot be a part of it. The fifth premise states that, accordingly, the cause of the universe is necessarily and fundamentally not a part of this universe. Something that is fundamentally not a part of this universe is not a natural entity; it is personal, and the final conclusion drawn is that the universe has a cause that is fundamentally non-physical and personal. I am now convinced that this argument can defend the rationality of theism, in a non-deductive way.

Mr. Noaparast, much has been said about what theism is good for, but less has been said about what atheism is good for and what use it is to us. Perhaps it wouldn't be bad to very briefly answer this question: what use is atheism to modern humans, and do you think the debate between these two groups and the presentation of rational arguments in defense of theism or atheism can ultimately be a resolvable discussion?

Bagheri Noaparast: Some atheists have offered a series of responses regarding why, for instance, we should promote atheism or why atheism is desirable. For example, some have said that if we set aside the concept of God, humans realize that they alone determine their own destiny and will not accept oppression. Some have said that if we set aside the concept of God, mental health might improve. There is an anarchist argument that says true freedom depends on setting aside the concept of God because as long as this concept exists, we are, by definition, slaves and servants and cannot be free. We humans have the capacity for reasoning, and it is our moral duty to ensure our beliefs are rational, because living rationally is an absolute good in itself and has nothing to do with what results it will bring us or what benefit we will gain. Living wisely and having wise beliefs is, in my opinion, the greatest achievement a human can bring to themselves. But is this debate resolvable or not? I don't think it is resolvable; at the same time, it is a very ancient debate. That is, from the texts that remain from ancient Greece, there are very many texts concerning whether God exists or not, but this does not mean that because it is one of those ancient philosophical questions, the question is perhaps meaningless or we should set it aside. I think if we look at the course of the debates, it is quite clear that we have made very significant progress. This dialogue must remain open, and the parties must continue to talk to each other because this question is, one might say, if not the most important, certainly one of the most important questions. The existence or non-existence of God, and if He exists, His attributes, each of these can radically affect our lives.

Thank you very much, Zoheir Bagheri Noaparast and Yaser Mirdamadi, for being our guests this week on Taboo.

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Audio file of this debate: "Theism or Atheism: Which is Rational?"

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Yaser Mirdamadi and Zoheir Bagheri Noaparast Debate the Rationality of Belief in God

Theism or Atheism: Which is Rational?

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