A Conversation Between Mohammad Mohammad-Rezaei and Mohammad-Ali Poudineh: “Are the Epistemological Foundations of Islamic Philosophy Weak?”

The Weakness of the Epistemological Foundations of Islamic Philosophy; Yes or No

A Challenging Conversation Between

Dr. Mohammad Mohammad-Rezaei

(Full Professor of Philosophy at the University of Tehran, Head of the Philosophy of Religion and Modern Theology Working Group of the Council for the Transformation of the Humanities, Head of the Islamic Epistemology and Religious Science Group for University Faculty Development)

and

Dr. Mohammad-Ali Poudineh

(PhD in Philosophy from the University of Tehran, Researcher and Instructor of Jurisprudence, Islamic Philosophy, and Analytic Philosophy)

Introduction

This conversation took place in a WhatsApp group consisting of over two hundred and fifty professors of advanced and graduate-level courses in jurisprudence, legal theory, and philosophy at the Qom Seminary. Following a difference of opinion that arose between Dr. Poudineh and Dr. Mohammad Mohammad-Rezaei regarding the weakness of the epistemological foundations of Islamic philosophy, Dr. Poudineh invited Dr. Mohammad-Rezaei to a discussion. Dr. Mohammad-Rezaei then accepted Dr. Poudineh's invitation and selected the topic of the "self-evidence of the existence of the external world" as one of the foundations of Islamic epistemology, proposing it as the subject of discussion. Accepting the proposed topic, Dr. Poudineh attempts to show that, according to Islamic philosophy, we have no knowledge of the external world, and Dr. Mohammad-Rezaei, in turn, seeks to respond to his objections. After several rounds of objections and responses from both sides, the conversation concludes with Mohammad-Ali Poudineh claiming that Mohammad Mohammad-Rezaei was unable to provide an adequate response to his objections and arguments, while the other party considers his own statements in response to the objections to be sufficient. Ultimately, both professors leave the judgment and assessment of their arguments in defense of their positions to the readers of this conversation. (It should be noted that no alterations have been made to the messages of these two professors, and only content that was entirely unrelated to the scholarly discussions of the two professors has been removed from this conversation; of course, it is preserved with us in trust, and if the professors permit, we are prepared to publish that as well).

The conversation begins when Dr. Mohammad-Rezaei, in response to a message from one of the professors in the group, states:

Dr. Mohammad-Rezaei: If Western philosophy is the philosophy of Nietzsche, Hume, Sartre, Feuerbach, Marx, and so on, which ultimately leads to materialism and atheism, it is the same idolatrous philosophy of the Age of Ignorance in the guise of new terminology, a new idolatry, so to speak, with respect.

Dr. Poudineh: Western philosophy is not only the philosophy of Nietzsche, Hume, etc. Islamic philosophy, too, is not the only philosophy. Fundamentally, it does not matter by whom philosophical content is expressed; it makes no difference whether it is Nietzsche or Mulla Sadra. The value of philosophical content lies in the evidence supporting it. If Hume's arguments are sound, we must accept his argument, and if Mulla Sadra's argument is not sound, we should not accept it. Unfortunately, most of the arguments of Mulla Sadra and Avicenna are epistemologically unsound, and therefore, the epistemological foundations of Islamic philosophy are weak. If you are willing to engage in a discussion, I am ready to demonstrate to you, within this very group, through discussion and argument, that Islamic philosophy is epistemologically weak and baseless.

Of course, I do not consider any of these philosophies to be correct either, and accepting an argument does not mean heartfelt acceptance of its claim.

Dr. Mohammad-Rezaei: Hello, with apologies, someone familiar with Western and Islamic philosophy would not make such a claim.

Dr. Poudineh: Hello. It would be good to demonstrate this claim with argument, not with assertion.

One of the professors present in the group: Explain your claim with reasoned argument.

Dr. Poudineh: In response to you, my dear friend _ who has spoken reasonably _ I would merely point out that, on the one hand, we know that adherents of Islamic philosophy are foundationalists, meaning all theoretical propositions in this philosophy are based on self-evident truths, and on the other hand, self-evident truths in the true sense of the word in Islamic philosophy are, firstly, intuitive cognitions (wijdānīyāt) and, secondly, primary self-evident truths (badīhiyyāt awwalīyya). Primary self-evident truths do not report on the external world, and the mere conception of the subject, predicate, and the relation between them suffices for their affirmation. Only intuitive cognitions, because they are derived from knowledge by presence, report on the external world. Therefore, all theoretical ontological propositions in Islamic philosophy are based on intuitive cognitions.

In an article I wrote about ten years ago (though an uncorrected version was published), I argued that intuitive cognitions are also fallible; hence, one can claim that all theoretical ontological propositions in Islamic philosophy are fallible. Of course, now, with much more serious arguments, I can demonstrate that the foundations of Islamic philosophy are truly weak. If only they had not at least applied the name 'Islam' to Greek and Iranian teachings!

One of the professors present in the group: Well then, you yourself, who, praise God, have escaped the clutches of East and West, what is your solution for proving the external world and its reliable analysis?

Dr. Poudineh: The philosopher, insofar as he is a philosopher, seeks neither to build something nor to destroy something. The philosopher does not seek to reach a specific conclusion. Fundamentally, philosophy is a discipline by means of which one addresses important human questions in an a priori manner, and therefore the philosopher is not concerned about the outcome of his discussions, which he arrives at through rational argument.

Dr. Mohammad-Rezaei: Greetings and wishes for health and success,

Thank you and many thanks

For your declaration of readiness to discuss and debate, I am also thankful and grateful

For this insignificant servant of God, although it is difficult to type matters on WhatsApp, and I am also not familiar with your scholarly standing, nevertheless, by divine grace, we shall put one issue up for discussion

One of the foundations of Islamic epistemology is the self-evidence of the existence of the self and the external world beyond us. Based on the self-evident principle of the impossibility of contradiction, both we and the external world beyond us exist.

Our philosophers are not skeptics or idealists. If we do not eat real food, we perish, and if we do not flee from a real lion, we are destroyed.

This is the primary epistemological principle of Islamic philosophers. If you oppose it, you are either a skeptic or an idealist. Now, if you have a point, I am at your service.

Dr. Poudineh: Greetings. I hope we continue the discussion to the end. You raised two points: firstly, our knowledge of the self, and secondly, our knowledge of the external world. From now on, let us address our knowledge of the external world so that these two matters are not conflated. So, the continuation of our discussion is currently dedicated to proving knowledge of the external world.

The second point: You said, 'Based on the self-evident principle of the impossibility of contradiction, we and the external world beyond us exist.' Thus, to prove the external world, you resorted to the principle of the impossibility of contradiction, whereas the truth of the proposition of the impossibility of contradiction does not prove the external world; that is, the external world could not exist even if the proposition of the impossibility of contradiction is true. In other words, the proposition of the impossibility of contradiction is an analytic proposition, and we affirm this proposition merely by conceiving the subject, predicate, and the relation between them. Therefore, since there is no logical entailment between accepting the proposition of the impossibility of contradiction—even if the truth of this proposition is accepted and there is a justified reason for it—and accepting our knowledge of the external world, we cannot arrive at knowledge of the external world from the proposition of the impossibility of contradiction. P, if P then Q, therefore, Q. But here, the second premise does not hold. If you have another reason for our knowledge of the external world, please state it so we may converse.

The second point: you said, “We are not skeptics or idealists; if we do not eat real food, we will die… This is the primary principle in the epistemology of our philosophers. If you disagree, you are either a skeptic or an idealist.” First, state precisely what you mean by the primary principle of Islamic epistemology. If, according to the apparent meaning of your words, your meaning is that the primary principle in Islamic epistemology is that we are neither skeptics nor idealists… and if you disagree, you are either a skeptic or an idealist, the implication of your statement is that Islamic philosophers’ reason for answering skeptics and idealists is the very claim they make. That is, they beg the question. So they have no reason for negating the skeptics. (Of course, our discussion for now is about proving knowledge of the external world. Let us not enter into discussions of skepticism, as it has various types. Although, after concluding the discussion of knowledge of the external world, we can also enter into the topic of skepticism.)

Secondly, you know that skepticism has various types. Even according to limited skepticism, one can deny knowledge of the external world without falling into the predicament you mentioned; for you know that in Islamic philosophy, what is meant by knowledge is certainty in the specific sense, i.e., the proposition A is B, and it is impossible for A not to be B. This is logical certainty. There is no problem if someone claims they do not have logical certainty about the external world but have psychological certainty about it, and therefore carry out all their daily activities. Hume explicitly acknowledged this point.

Dr. Mohammad-Rezaei: Greetings.

Dear brother, the principle of non-contradiction is a principle that applies everywhere. You declared that the truth of the proposition of non-contradiction does not prove the external world. The external world is proven based on the principle of causality; when we stand next to a fire and our hand becomes warm, the cause of that is not within us. Therefore, it is in the external world. But if you do not accept the truth of the principle of non-contradiction, nothing can be proven; because while the external world exists, it does not exist.

The conclusion of my discussion was that Islamic philosophers base the primary principle of their epistemology on proving themselves and the external world, and they move beyond the boundary of being idealists and skeptics.

You say that according to limited skepticism, one can deny knowledge of the external world.

The question is, if you encounter a lion, a wolf, or a snake, do you deny it? Denying it is one thing, and becoming a morsel is another. Or, if you are hungry, do you deny the delicious food in front of you and instead consume stones and dirt? Do you accept the self-evident principle of Islamic philosophers’ epistemology, which is proving the external world, or do you doubt it?

If you have doubts, state them so that we may prove the external world in another way.

Furthermore, the distinction between analytic and synthetic propositions is problematic; try not to use these borrowed terms whose concept and content are unclear. With respect.

Dr. Mohammad Rezaei, in response to another friend in the group: Greetings. If the external world is an illusion, do not eat food for a few days. A human being should not live based on illusion. Either you are aware of the illusion or you are unaware; if you are unaware, then they are real, and if you are aware that they are illusions, you should not live based on illusion. From now on, whenever you want to eat food, say it is an illusion and practice self-sacrifice; after a few days of living with illusion, your soul will fly to the realm of Barzakh.

Dr. Poudineh: Greetings. Firstly, I also believe that the truth of the proposition of non-contradiction is presupposed in every proposition, but my objection to you in the previous message was that you had said (based on the self-evident principle of non-contradiction, we and the world external to us exist), and I showed that one cannot prove knowledge of the external world by relying solely on the proposition of non-contradiction.

Now you have presented another premise to complete your argument, which is the principle of causality.

In my opinion, the principle of causality also cannot prove knowledge of the external world; because our sensory perceptions do not necessarily come from the external world. That is, we can feel heat, but this sensation may not originate from the external world. In other words, there is no logical entailment between having these sensory perceptions and the external world. For these sensations could, for instance, be caused by an evil demon, or we could be dreaming or hallucinating; like a young person who takes an ecstasy pill and is truly certain they are walking on the ground and has this sensory perception, but this is not the case. Or other reasons: for example, God may have created them directly in us. In the physiology of sensory perception, all empirical scientists agree that humans cannot distinguish between some sensory perceptions that originate from the external world and those that do not; for example, those caused by a medical device. If you wish, I can provide evidence for this claim from major epistemology books in English. At least in today's world and science, no one denies this point.

So your argument is incorrect, because there is no logical entailment between accepting the existence of sensory perceptions and accepting the external world.

To complete this argument, you stated that the cause of this sensory perception is not me. You mean that the cause of this sensory perception is either me or the external world; it is not me, therefore it is the external world. But above, I showed that, firstly, the cause of these perceptions could be physiological problems of our sensory perceptions that reside in our subconscious and of which we are unaware, or like Descartes' dream example, we might be asleep and consider these sensory perceptions real. But I said, even if we accept that they are not generated from within us, there is still the possibility that they did not arise from the external world—for example, they could be caused by an evil demon or by devices attached to my body.

Regarding the second point, I must also say: when you say Islamic philosophers base their position on proving the external world, do they base this on a reason or without a reason? If it is due to a reason, please state your reason (other than the above argument). If they accept such a principle without a reason, then their belief in this proposition is without reason; therefore, knowledge of the external world is not justified.

Regarding the third point, as I also said in my previous post, all philosophers who say we do not have knowledge of the external world all flee from snakes. I myself believe I do not have knowledge of the external world, but if I see a snake, I flee. That is, I do not have logical certainty of this snake's existence, but I have psychological certainty of it. (Of course, unlike some epistemologists in analytic philosophy, I believe that belief in the external world is justified. But I do not have knowledge of the external world; that is, I do not make the claim of Islamic philosophers. Of course, no philosopher in contemporary Western epistemology believes that knowledge of the external world is certain. If the proponents of Islamic philosophy can bring forward an analytic philosopher in contemporary epistemology who says knowledge of the external world is certain, I will give a reward.)

So, although I do not accept the principle of knowledge of the external world, I live just like everyone else.

But regarding the third point about the analytic-synthetic distinction, I think Kant's distinction has problems, but through the work done by analytic philosophers, they have provided us with a clear and distinct criterion for distinguishing these two, which I believe is without flaw. However, since, firstly, there is no need to use these terms in this discussion, secondly, it pertains to Western philosophy, and thirdly, it is not relevant to our current discussion, I will not use these terms in our debate.

Dr. Mohammad-Rezaei: Hello, with apologies, I ask you to at least read Paul Foulquié's book *General Philosophy*, translated by Dr. Yahya Mahdavi, or Descartes' *Meditations* to resolve your own skepticism. But to continue:

Regarding your statement that proving the external world might be impossible due to physiological problems or Cartesian dreaming, I respond: if you truly have a physiological problem and are aware of this problem, treat yourself, and if you do not have a problem, then you accept the external world. Furthermore, if you have a problem and are aware of this problem, then do not consider a predatory lion to be a lion, since you have a physiological problem and are aware of this problem.

The same applies to sleep: if you are aware that you are asleep, then do not fear the lion, and if you are asleep and unaware, then continue your sweet slumber. At least Descartes, after skepticism and the notion that I am dreaming, found a way to overcome skepticism, yet unfortunately, some still have not awoken from the dream.

As for the second point, where you declared that you yourself have no knowledge of the external world but would flee if you saw a snake, possessing psychological certainty rather than logical certainty, I ask in response: whence comes your psychological certainty? Is it based on reality or on illusion? If it is based on reality, then you flee from a real lion, and if it is founded on illusion and not reality, then now that you are aware, do not flee from the lion; in that case, you will have saved both yourself and us (in jest).

Moreover, if you are having an illusory conversation with me and I do not exist in reality, I ask you to please discontinue the discussion.

To escape the skepticism that has afflicted Your Excellency, my suggestion is that they throw you into the cage of a hungry lion for about an hour; let me see if at that moment you still say that you do not accept the external world and have only psychological certainty, not logical certainty.

With respect, Mohammad Mohammad-Rezaei

Dr. Poudineh: Greetings.

You did not respond to my previous argument. In my earlier message, I said that knowledge of the external world cannot be proven through the principle of causality, because there is no logical entailment between having these sensory perceptions and an external world. The content of your argument was as follows: the cause of the perception of heat is not outside of two states; either I myself have created them, or something outside of me has caused this perception. I was not the cause of this perception, so one assumption remains, which is that the cause of my perception is the external world.

Note: the only conclusion of this argument is that there exists a cause for our sensory perceptions other than ourselves. Of course, I stated that even this point itself can be disputed, but I will address that later. However, your claim goes beyond this point, which is proving the existence of the external world. In my previous response, I said that there is no logical entailment between having these perceptions and an external world, because these sensory perceptions can exist without there being an external world. Today, in medical science, they can create precisely these same sensory perceptions for you. That is, they can connect devices to your body that generate sensory data exactly like the sensory data derived from the external world.

Logical certainty means A is B, and it is impossible for A not to be B; if there is one assumption in which A is not B, you will not have logical certainty. So, if it is possible for you to have a sensory perception that does not originate from the external world, the external world is not proven. Today, in medical science, this possibility has been established. To bring this closer to mind, I will give other examples of this point. For instance, God can directly create a sensory perception within us. God has directly affected material beings, such as the effect upon the Virgin Mary. At the very least, it is not impossible for God to directly affect material beings. Or angels sometimes directly cause the existence of sensory perceptions. It is narrated that when the Angel of Revelation descended upon the Prophet, he would sweat from the heat. This sensory perception did not originate from the external world and had an immaterial cause. At the very least, it is not impossible for these sensory perceptions to originate from an immaterial being. Even if you do not accept all these examples, still, as I said, it has been proven in medical science that these sensory perceptions can be created without originating from the external world. Therefore, your argument that because your hand burns from heat, there is a fire in the external world, is incorrect.

In addition to this, there is no logical impossibility in the assumption that these perceptions originate from a malevolent demon; thus, these perceptions can logically exist without an external world. Therefore, you do not have logical certainty.

My example of physiological problems or sleep was to illustrate this very point, but my argument, as I have now explained, does not depend on this matter. Hence, above, without resorting to sleep or physiological problems, I explained the problem with the argument you put forward. But even regarding what you said about physiological problems: “If you really have a physiological problem and are aware of this problem, treat yourself. If you do not, then you accept the external world”; I must say that this statement of yours is incorrect. That is, if we cite a case in which a person unknowingly has a sensory perception caused by physiological problems, and these perceptions arise from within them, your proof is undermined. Because in this scenario, we have a sensory perception that does not arise from the external world, so we cannot obtain logical certainty with this reasoning; for it is not the case that every sensory perception arises from the external world. Thus, your proof is undermined because the assumption that A is not B is not impossible.

Regarding sleep, you also said: “If you are asleep and unaware, then continue your sleep.” Doctor, the issue is not whether a person continues their sleep or not; the issue is the logical entailment between sensory data and the external world. If it is proven that one can have a sensory perception that does not arise from the external world, one cannot burrow from sensory data to the external world. In sleep, we precisely think we have these sensory perceptions; but these sensory perceptions do not arise from the external world.

Of course, I said above that my argument depends neither on sleep nor on physiological problems of the body. Simply by showing that these sensory perceptions are not necessarily from the external world, a logical concomitance between the two is not established. I said that in medicine they create these sensory perceptions, and it is not impossible that they arise directly from an immaterial being.

Regarding the second point you made: “Where has this psychological certainty of mine come from? Is it based on reality or on illusion…” Doctor, my psychological certainty has arisen neither necessarily from the real world nor based on illusion. This psychological certainty of mine arises from the justified belief I have in the external world. So your rational confinement between these two options is wrong. You know that a justified belief is not necessarily infallible. I have a justified belief in the external world, but this belief of mine in the external world is fallible; that is, it is possible that despite all the evidence and proofs I have for the external world, the external world does not exist. But because I have more evidence in favor of the existence of the external world, belief in this world is justified for me; because the probability that these perceptions of mine are from the external world, and not arising from my physiology and subconscious mind, or sleep, or the direct intervention of an immaterial being, is higher.

The next point is that you said I have fallen into skepticism; I must tell you that in contemporary epistemology, someone who has a justified belief in something is not called a skeptic. I have a justified belief in the external world, and therefore, by any definition of skepticism (except for the made-up definitions of some gentlemen!), I am not considered a skeptic. Of course, I do not wish to enter into a discussion of skepticism. If you wish, after the discussion about the external world is finished, we can address this topic. But for now, let us not address what skepticism is called, what its types are, and by what criterion someone is a skeptic or not. Because these are separate from our main discussion about proving knowledge of the external world.

The next point is that you did not answer the second point of my previous post. I am still waiting for your response to this statement of mine. There I wrote: “Regarding the second point, I must also say: when you say Islamic philosophers posit the principle of proving the external world, do they base this matter on a reason or without a reason? If it is due to a reason, state your reason (other than the above reason). If they accept such a principle without a reason, then their belief in this proposition is without reason. Thus, knowledge of the external world is not justified.”

I await your scholarly response.

Dr. Mohammad-Rezaei: Greetings, and wishing you health and success; the proper venue for discussing and conversing about these precise philosophical issues is not this group, and if you have a point, I would recommend holding a session among specialists at the Supreme Council of Wisdom, so that in that gathering you may become aware of the errors in your reasoning, and then the audio of the session can be posted in this group.

My response to the refutation of idealism and skepticism about the external world is that there are a thousand subtleties involved:

If you lack logical belief and certainty in the external world and consider it possible that your sensory impressions have a source other than the external sensory world, then why, when noon arrives and hunger overcomes you, do you seek external food? Or why would you not lie down to sleep with a hungry lion in its cage? Or why would you not marry a stone? If, for any of the reasons you mentioned, you maintain that the source of perceptions is something other than the external world, why do you not disregard them entirely when making decisions? If, when in the company of a predatory lion, you considered it possible that the source of the perception is other than the external world, you should not have fled from it!

This very contradiction and inconsistency between practice and theory is the best proof of the invalidity of your view denying the external world.

All the points you cited from philosophers in denying the external world have been criticized and examined in their proper context. As one philosopher said, the longevity of skeptics is the best proof of the invalidity of their view.

My suggestion to you is to present your views in the form of an article and discuss your reasons for denying the external world in detail.

With respect

Dr. Poudineh: Greetings. I request that you answer the objections I raised in the previous post. Praise be to God, as you know, this group is a gathering of scholars, and numerous professors in this group are either engaged in teaching advanced jurisprudence and legal theory (kharij-e fiqh va usul) or teaching the Asfar, with discussions taking place in their presence and view. I would be most grateful if we could patiently bring the discussion that has begun to a conclusion, rather than referring it elsewhere. Indeed, at the outset of the discussion, I also stated that you should bring the discussion to a conclusion.

But thereafter:

You did not respond to my argument in the previous post. I stated that there is no necessity between having these sensory data and the external world, and I also mentioned reasons. Respond to those reasons. Unfortunately, in this message, you merely offered other examples for your own claim, to which I responded in the previous post. Please avoid repetition. You stated: "If... you consider it possible that your sensory impressions have a source... you should not have fled." In the previous post, I stated that if a logical necessity exists between having these sensory data and the external world, then the possibility that is consistent with having these sensory data and the absence of the external world should not exist. But in the previous post, I showed that such a possibility does exist. Therefore, you do not have logical certainty about the existence of the external world.

Instead of responding to my previous arguments, you again stated here: "This very contradiction and inconsistency between practice and theory is the best proof of the invalidity of your view denying the external world." I am surprised that you did not pay attention to what I said in the previous post. Where did I deny the external world? In the previous post, I said that I have a justified belief in the existence of the external world, and I stated that when a person has a justified belief in a proposition, it is reasonable for them to act upon the content of that proposition in practice. So there is no contradiction between my justified belief in the external world and acting upon its requirements. Pay attention to what I said in my previous post regarding this matter and respond. There, I stated that the dichotomy you presented is incorrect. Raise an objection to that statement of mine.

Another point you make: "All the points you cited from philosophers in denying the external world have been criticized and examined in their proper context." I request that you do not refer the discussion to which philosopher said what or what criticism was made of it. If you have a criticism of my argument in critiquing your argument in the previous post, state it. (Of course, you may draw upon the criticisms you claim exist.)

Another point is that in this post you said: “If you do not believe in the external world and…”. Where have I said that I do not believe in the external world? Precisely in the previous post I said that I believe in the external world. You probably know that a person can believe in the existence of something, yet that belief be false. Moreover, a person can have a true belief in the existence of something, yet their belief in that thing be unjustified. I have a justified belief regarding knowledge of the external world, but I hold that this belief is fallible and that we do not possess knowledge of the external world in the sense intended in Islamic philosophy.

Finally, I ask you, instead of repeating claims and offering new examples for them or raising new issues, to first respond to the arguments of my previous post so that we may then proceed to new discussions and topics.

Dr. Mohammad-Rezaei: Greetings. In your remarks you stated, “I have a justified belief regarding knowledge of the external world, but I hold that this belief is fallible.”

My response is precisely this: you who maintain that your belief in the external world is fallible, why should a rational person base the very principle of their life on a fallible belief?

If you are aware of your error, please go marry a stone or do not refrain from sleeping with a wild lion. If you do not do these things, it is clear that you do not give a fig for that fallible belief of yours. If that is the case, why are you captive to it and why do you utter it!!!!? That fallible belief must manifest itself somewhere. For instance, it must manifest itself in the aforementioned examples. With respect.

Dr. Poudineh: Greetings. I request that you first respond to the objections I raised against your argument in defense of proving knowledge of the external world, as well as some of my other objections that have remained unanswered, and then proceed to raise other objections. You know that posing other questions in response to the objections I raised against your argument for knowledge of the external world is a logical fallacy.

Nevertheless, I will respond to your remarks in this post as well. As I said, my statement that I have a justified, fallible belief in the external world has nothing to do with your claim of proving the external world through causality. But in any case, I will answer it. The very fact that you have, incidentally, retracted your claim that I do not believe in the external world is a positive point. You said: “You maintain that your belief in the external world is fallible; why should a rational person base the very principle of their life on a fallible belief?” Firstly, I ask you to provide a reason that our belief in the external world is not fallible. Secondly, rational people do, in fact, base their lives on fallible beliefs; for example, almost everyone in the world is seeking to get the COVID-19 vaccine, while knowing that this vaccine might not be effective. What matters is that people’s belief that “getting a COVID-19 vaccine approved by the World Health Organization is effective” is justified. This belief is justified because we have considerable evidence that getting the COVID-19 vaccine is effective. Medical science has stated that there is almost more than a 90% probability that the vaccine can prevent this disease. Of course, all doctors also believe it is fallible. Furthermore, you have still not responded to what I said about this in my previous post.

The second point, although it is not a response to the argument and is a continuation of the objection to my justified, fallible belief in the external world, I must say: I said the belief is justified and fallible. From where in this statement did you deduce that “if the justification of a belief is fallible, the person will be aware of their error”? You probably know that if someone is aware of the error of their own sensory belief, their belief is fundamentally not justified! There is a difference between a justified belief being fallible and knowing that it is erroneous.

Another point is that you stated: “If you do not do these things, your belief is not fallible.” God forbid! That is, you claim that if someone holds a belief about something, then their belief in that thing is no longer fallible. No philosopher in the world would utter such a statement! A person may hold a belief about something and act according to its requirements, but the infallibility of that belief does not follow from these matters. That is, under certain conditions, a person may believe that a predatory lion is chasing them and flee from it, but it does not follow from this that a lion is actually chasing them in reality. It is essentially for this reason that all philosophers say: human beliefs may be either true or false. Please pay attention to my previous post under this heading.

Finally, I ask you once again, instead of raising these new objections and issues, to address the objections I raised against your argument for proving the external world through causality and to respond to my other objections, and not to sideline the main discussion.

Dr. Mohammad-Rezaei: Greetings. My dear, why do you complicate matters so much?

You explicitly state that, under certain conditions, a person may believe that a predatory lion is chasing them and flee from it, but it does not follow from this that a lion is actually chasing them in reality.

Response: From this statement of yours, it follows that you may have imagined in a delusion that a lion is chasing you.

If this is a delusion and you are aware it is a delusion, then do not flee. You should not live in delusions. At the very least, this delusion of yours must have an effect somewhere. If you are always fleeing from a predatory lion, then your delusion has no effect whatsoever and is, so to speak, as good as nothing.

A person, under the influence of methamphetamine, imagined his father was an attacking wolf and killed his father. It is not the case that you can imagine a wolf and a father in the external world in such a way, yet in the external world there is neither a wolf nor a father. May God grant your father and mother long life; if you suppose their existence but consider it probable that they do not exist in reality, then in that case, your existence and that of your sisters and brothers would be derived from fictions and thorns, which have not come to fruition. I implore you to think a little about your own words, to where you are being drawn!!!?

Your father and mother and your own existence are the best answer to your skepticism. You have a justified belief in their existence, but their external existence does not necessarily follow from it. If they have no external existence, who brought you into the world?

With respect

Dr. Mohammad-Rezaei, in response to one of the professors present in the group: Greetings. A philosopher deals with realities, not with fancies and delusions. A philosopher never says, “I have a justified belief in the existence of my father and mother, but this does not necessarily mean they exist in the external world.” If you consider even a one-thousandth probability that your father and mother do not exist in the external world, then you must consider the probability of a miracle in every event.

I implore you, do not say such a thing in front of your father and mother—that you consider it probable there may be no father and mother in the external world. This is the very existence of an effect without a cause, which is a rational impossibility. Let us raise our hands in prayer and pray for a good end, lest in old age we deny the existence of our own father and mother.

Dr. Poudineh: Greetings. I implore you, instead of resorting to rhetorical and polemical phrases, address my previous arguments.

In previous posts, I demonstrated that the validity of your argument for knowledge of the external world through causality depends on proving a logical entailment between the existence of sensory perceptions and the external world. I showed through various means that there is no logical necessity between the existence of sensory perceptions and the external world. Therefore, your argument is sterile. Respond to this statement.

In the previous post I stated that, contrary to your claim, a person can have a justified yet fallible belief and it can be reasonable to act upon the content of that belief. You stated that if a person acts according to the dictates of their belief, that means their belief is not fallible. I showed that this claim of yours is incorrect. That is, it is possible to believe something and act according to its dictates, yet that belief be fallible. Reflect on the aforementioned point in the previous post so that the matter becomes clear to you. Regarding illusion, dreams, and the like, I have also answered you in previous posts and will not repeat myself; please do not repeat yourself either.

In this latest response, you write: “If you assume their existence but deem it probable that they do not actually exist, then from what has your existence come about? You have a justified belief in their existence, but their external existence does not follow from that.” In response to you, I must say yes. There is no necessity whatsoever that a person have a justified belief whose content lacks external existence. I suspect no epistemologist in the world denies this point. If this point is not clear to you, I can explain it for you in subsequent posts. These are among the elementary issues of epistemology! Secondly, you stated: “If they have no external existence, who has brought you into existence?” Esteemed professor, are you engaged in reasoning or rhetoric? Our discussion concerns proving knowledge of the external world, and you must prove your knowledge of the external world, whereas you take their existence for granted! This is begging the question.

You stated: “The philosopher deals with realities.” Yes, but our discussion is about providing a reason for the existence of the reality of the external world. Your problem is that, when reasoning about the external world, you assume the existence of the external world. You continued: “If you deem it even one-thousandth probable that your father and mother exist in the external world, you must deem the existence of a miracle probable in every event.” Dear Doctor, the discussion concerns the necessity between our sensory perceptions and the existence of the external world. Everything we perceive of objects is due to the sensory perceptions we have of them. In various ways in previous unanswered posts, I showed that these sensory perceptions can exist without the external world existing. If there were a logical necessity between the existence of sense-data and the external world, it would have to be impossible for sense-data to exist without the existence of the external world. Therefore, esteemed professor, if we deem it even one billionth of a billionth probable that sense-data could form without the existence of a world externally, you can no longer tunnel through to the external world via causality. The discussion is not about the weakness of the probability. The discussion is that if such a probability exists, there will no longer be logical certainty, and thus the claim of Islamic philosophers will be indefensible; because, according to logical certainty, A is B, and it is impossible for A not to be B. Impossible means that from A not being B, a contradiction arises. In previous unanswered posts, I showed in various ways that it is not impossible for sense-data to exist without the external world existing.

Finally, I ask you to respond to my aforementioned unanswered arguments, and I draw your attention to the fact that, instead of providing a reason to prove the logical necessity between having these sense-data and the external world, you should not engage in discussions that have no logical connection to this matter.

Group Administrator: I do not know whether continuing this specialized discussion between you two esteemed gentlemen is advisable or not. I think it would be better to declare the discussions sufficient.

Dr. Poudineh: I believe I have presented my arguments and expressed my critiques of Dr. Rezaei’s reasoning. If he also believes that his aforementioned responses have answered my arguments, I have no issue with the sufficiency of the discussions. The judgment and assessment of our arguments rest with the philosophy professors in the group.

However, if Dr. Rezaei has a new argument or a response to my points that he has not yet presented, I would like the discussion to continue. Although in the last few posts, his points were generally repetitive.

Of course, I, who claimed the weakness of the epistemological foundations of Islamic philosophy, was, as I stated at the beginning of the discussion, prepared to demonstrate the weakness of these foundations in any instance. Professor Rezaei also stated one of these principles, and a challenging discussion ensued on his chosen topic.

Dr. Mohammad-Rezaei: Greetings and thank you. God willing, alongside philosophical lessons and discussions, let us not neglect supplication for a better understanding of truths. Let us not wholly condemn the efforts of past philosophers who sought to combat skeptics and atheists and prove God. Rather, let us seek a better understanding of the interpretations of those dear ones. Suppose, by an impossible assumption, you proved that the external world does not exist and knowledge of it does not correspond to reality—then what?

On the whole, in your statements I found no answer to my own questions other than futile phrase-mongering. I repeat my words once more: denying the external world and knowledge of that world and its contents, including your own father and mother, coincides with your own destruction. If you doubt for a moment the existence of your father and mother and your knowledge of them, God forbid, it entails horrific philosophical and jurisprudential consequences. May God protect and preserve all those thirsting for the path of truth.

In closing, for the joy of the soul of the master Allameh Mesbah Yazdi, let us recite the Fatiha with Salawat.

Dr. Poudineh: Greetings. Once again, you did not respond to my arguments. I will publish the content of these messages in cyberspace for evaluation and judgment regarding our arguments; for the promotion of philosophical dialogues adds to the growth of the culture of thought and reasoning in our country.

In this post as well, as before, I saw no argument from you to prove what logical necessary connection exists between the existence of sense data and the existence of the external world. Here too, instead of responding to my arguments, you merely offered advice to this humble person. As I stated, I believe that regarding whether I presented an argument or not, the judgment and assessment of philosophy professors suffices.

You merely repeated another of your claims here once more, which is: "denying the external world and knowledge of that world and its contents, including your own father and mother, coincides with your own destruction." In my previous messages, I repeatedly pointed out that I have never denied the external world. I said many times in the discussion that I have a justified belief in the external world. How is it possible for someone to believe in something, yet deny it! You probably know that it is impossible for a person to believe in something but deny that thing.

In any case, if I have said anything during this discussion that has caused you distress, I apologize. This humble person also, in the end, invites friends to send a Fatiha for Master Mesbah Yazdi.

Dr. Mohammad-Rezaei: Greetings and wishes for the health and success of the dear and respected brother,

Dr. Poudineh, may his honor endure,

I apologize if, in the dialogue with your excellency, I may have offended your spirit and soul. Such is the nature of the virtual system.

Once again, I apologize for this. I hope you are successful and confirmed in propagating religious teachings.

With renewed respect and devotion; Mohammad Mohammad-Rezaei

Dr. Poudineh: You are most kind. You are the honorable one. This humble person requested that the non-argumentative statements and words that are a disgrace to scholarly discussions among seminary students be removed from our messages, and then this discussion be made available to others so that everyone may know that scholarly discussions are ongoing in the seminary and that the file on no philosophical discussion is ever closed. I hope that such discussions will lead to the growth of our philosophical-intellectual culture.