A Critique of Mostafa Malekian's Theological Thought, as Narrated by Hadi Sadeghi

The current of religious intellectualism is one of the somewhat influential intellectual currents of the contemporary era, and despite the existence of various spectra of intellectualism, common aspects can also be found among them. One of the figures of this current is Mr. Mostafa Malekian. This article, with an analytical approach and documentary review, seeks to examine the views of Mostafa Malekian. First, an attempt has been made to reread the various components of his thought by referring empathetically to his works. Then, with some analysis and examination, the author critically expresses his own view on his ideas.

However, since it is not possible in this writing to refer to all dimensions of his thought, some of the more important aspects have necessarily been examined. His most central view is presented in the theory of Rationality and Spirituality. This theory is a kind of pluralism-generating monism that looks at spiritual matters in a minimalistic way and has placed modern rationality as its main foundation. One characteristic of this theory is a kind of spiritualism that shares common aspects with religion, is not religion, nor is it opposed to it, but it does not accept all of its aspects. This theory denies the most important aspect of religion, namely, devotional adherence.

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Introduction

The intellectual current has been one of the influential currents in contemporary thought. Among the various branches of intellectualism, religious intellectualism holds particular importance, and since they have presented numerous claims in the field of interpreting religion and religious beliefs, they require examination and possibly critique. One of the prominent figures in this current is Mr. Mostafa Malekian. This article seeks to analyze the most important principles of his thought. Since the best way to understand any thought is to refer empathetically to the works of its author, in order not to make mistakes in understanding the views of others, we must first seek to grasp what he says without omission or addition. This requires empathy. If we set out from the beginning with the intention of rejection, refutation, and non-acceptance, we will fall into misunderstanding and misinterpretation. Therefore, we will first try to reread the various components of his thought, then engage in some analysis and examination of them, and with a critical eye, express our own view on his ideas.

In this short writing, we cannot refer to all dimensions of his thought. We are compelled to select some of the more important aspects. If we wish to examine his thoughts from the perspective that he is part of Iran's religious intellectual current, we must refer to the articles, lectures, and conversations he has published that have influenced the country's cultural current. With this view, we have selected several fundamental axes from the totality of his writings, which form the core of the discussions in this writing.1

Religious Studies

In the discussions of religious studies, various important topics are raised; but some of them have a key aspect and are considered among the pillars of Mr. Malekian's thought. Among them is the kind of view he holds regarding religious rationality. He believes that there must be an epistemic gap to be filled by faith, and in fact, faith is the filler of the gaps in knowledge. The less the knowledge, the greater the possibility of attaining faith. Accordingly, faith belongs to the world of ignorance.2

Accepting such an interpretation of faith does not sit well with the digestion of common sense. Furthermore, religious texts suggest the opposite of this view. In Islamic texts—both the Quran and hadiths—great emphasis has been placed on knowledge and the pursuit of knowledge, to the extent that it is counted among the characteristics of believers. In some verses of the Quran, it is emphasized that the faith of the knowledgeable and their fear and awe is greater: "But those who believe know that it is the truth from their Lord" (Al-Baqarah, 26); "Only those fear Allah, from among His servants, who have knowledge" (Fatir, 28). From a religious perspective, the filling of epistemic gaps and the increase in the level of human knowledge about the universe does not make faith difficult; rather, it may make it easier.

The most significant intellectual project of Mr. Malekian in the last ten years is the project of Rationality and Spirituality. During this period, he has presented this subject in various formats—lectures, dialogues, articles, and books.3 Given the importance of this project, it merits further discussion. This project has a central core and a set of peripheral discussions. Many of the articles and lectures published by him under this title have addressed the peripheries of the discussion. It can be said that all of his discussions—directly or indirectly—are connected to this project. He believes that in the great world civilizations, either rationality has been sacrificed for spirituality or spirituality has been sacrificed for rationality, and if these two can be combined and reconciled, and a rational-spiritual worldview can be created, many of the problems of both Western and Eastern civilizations will be resolved. He considers several characteristics of contemporary Iran as encouraging him to propose and pursue the theory of Spirituality and Rationality: first, the fundamentalist interpretation of Islam, which also has many adherents; second, a spirit of imitation, indoctrination, and aversion to reasoning, which is the source of dogmatism and rigidity; third, an incorrect interpretation of the self and the other, which has led to narcissism, negative prejudice toward others, and a kind of cultivation of otherness; fourth, politicization and a belief in the primacy of politics; and fifth, the prevalence of ethical materialism (not philosophical materialism), such that in our behaviors—not our beliefs—we act as if there is no spirituality or soulfulness at all, and all that exists is matter and the world.4

The core matter has been addressed in several places. One of the best summaries on this subject is his latest lecture, which was held at the University of Tehran in Ordibehesht 1389 [April-May 2010]. In this lecture, while enumerating the main axes of his theory, he also responded to some criticisms, though he left some unanswered and promised to address all of them in a book he is currently writing. He introduces this project as a plan for an ideal life and says:

1.An ideal life is one that has three characteristics: a. It is pleasant; b. It is good; and c. It is worthwhile.

1-1. The pleasantness of life (happiness) means that I derive the most pleasure from life and endure the least pain and suffering; this is for myself. Five factors influence what each person considers pleasurable: heredity, upbringing environment, psychological type, age, and mental abilities including knowledge, experience, and the power of thought and understanding. Based on the differences in these factors among individuals, I might consider something pleasurable that another does not, and vice versa. In this aspect, we are completely egoistic. This stems from our self-love, which also serves to preserve our self. This is based on psychological egoism.

1-2. The goodness of life (goodness) means living in such a way that we bring the most pleasure to others and cause them the least pain and suffering, and alleviate their suffering. Here, altruism (altruism) prevails. The scope of this altruism is sometimes narrower and sometimes broader.

1-3. The worthwhileness of life means determining the reason for living. Here, we say our life is worth living. A person who lives must consider their life worthwhile; that is, they must know that this life is worth living, and this is realized when we know why we are living. We must ascertain that our life is better than dying, and we should not continue living merely because we lack the courage for suicide; rather, we must know that the benefit of living outweighs its harm.

2. The ideal life is one whose worth makes life meaningful, whose pleasure invites us toward happiness, and whose goodness invites us toward altruism and ethical living. Self-love, love of others, and the meaningfulness of life are all secured. Part of attaining this life lies in my hands (which, in my view, is a large part), and part does not. The part that does not is of two kinds: sometimes it lies in no one's hands and is beyond human capacity (this we call the tragic aspect of life). Sometimes it is not in my hands, but in the hands of social institutions, including the institutions of politics, economics, family, law, and religion. These institutions determine our duties, have an enormous impact on our lives, and influence the quality and quantity of our lives.

3. The claim of the Rationality and Spirituality project is to answer the question of how that part of the ideal life which lies within our control is to be attained. The answer is that this life is achieved through rationality and spirituality. Rationality and spirituality provide the ideal life insofar as it is within the control of the person living it. Since rationality and spirituality are the two components that lead us to the ideal life, neither is an end in itself; both are means. Therefore, these two components must be viewed as two indispensable instruments, and one cannot avoid them and still attain the ideal life. I am not concerned about tradition, nor about modernity, nor about civilization, nor about culture, nor about any abstract matter of this kind. I am concerned about flesh-and-blood human beings who come, suffer, and depart.

Hence, rationality and spirituality must not become idols either; like everything else, they must be employed in the service of humanity and toward reducing human pains and sufferings. In every domain, whether religion, creed, doctrine, ideology, philosophy, empirical sciences, literature, etc., a potion must be extracted, and whatever serves human life and reduces its pain and suffering must be taken. In my view, the raw ingredients of this potion should be drawn mostly from philosophy, literature, and psychology.

4. What is meant by rationality in this project comprises three branches: theoretical rationality, practical rationality, and communicative rationality.

1-4. Theoretical rationality means proportioning the degree of one's attachment and commitment to a belief to the strength or weakness of the evidence and indications.

2-4. Practical rationality means making the means as proportionate as possible to the end or ends; for example, if someone says that women's bad hijab causes floods and earthquakes, this lacks practical rationality, because there is no proportion between the end and the means; what connection is there between these things?.

3-4. Assuming the separation of communicative rationality from practical rationality, one must bear in mind that the aim of speech is to convey what is within to others. To this end, we must adopt means that lead us to this goal. The less ambiguity, allusion, and obscurity our speech contains, the greater its communicative rationality.

5. What I mean by spirituality is not in opposition to religion, nor, on the other hand, do I mean religion itself. Even if spirituality and religion share instances, this co-extensiveness is not permanent. Spirituality means that a person believes in three components:

1-5. In the first branch, from an ontological perspective, one believes that the world is not confined to the laws of physics, chemistry, and biology. Consequently, the physical, chemical, and biological sciences can only acquaint us with a part of the world.

2-5. In the second case, and from an epistemological standpoint, one believes that the world is not limited to whatever human intellects can grasp, and that there are things in the world that lie beyond human reason—these are mysteries. The spiritual person believes that mystery exists in the world. If we acknowledge the existence of mystery, it profoundly affects our lives. Gabriel Marcel placed great emphasis on this point.

3-5. In the third case, from a psychological standpoint, one believes that one's psyche is not the desirable psyche and that one must strive toward the desirable psyche; that is, the person is not satisfied with their current psychological state and seeks inner elevation, striving to improve their desires. Example: Some people, instead of bathing to prevent others from being bothered by their bad odor, use perfume. This is an example of someone who does not want to change their inner self and expects their outer condition to be set right. The spiritual person strives for inner elevation and knows that there are feelings and emotions, beliefs, and desires and inclinations that are better than our own feelings and emotions, beliefs, and desires and inclinations, and we must move toward them. The spiritual person accepts the possibility and necessity of inner transcendence. They always feel, in the three inner areas mentioned, that they can and must become better, and that we have problems within ourselves that we must resolve.

6. The project of Rationality and Spirituality differs from the project of religious intellectualism—whether Iranian, English-speaking, Arabic, Turkish, or otherwise. One of its differences is that religious intellectualism cannot be entirely secular; however, this project is entirely secular; meaning we should not regard religion as a book of law. The conception of religion as a prescription is defensible; but we do not accept the conception of it as a book of law or a blueprint.

7. This project differs greatly from the project of the intellectuals. Iranian intellectualism—both its religious and non-religious varieties—follows French intellectualism, particularly the tradition of Émile Zola, which considers the political regime governing society to be the cause of causes, the exclusive cause, or the main problem of society; but this project considers the culture of society to be the cause of causes, the exclusive cause, or the main problem, and the political regime, like other economic and social systems, is subordinate to culture and one of its consequences. The intellectual should not be the representative of the people; they should be their critic. The second difference is that the intellectuals of the French tradition are collectivist, whereas this theory is individualist. We do not say elitist—as some have attributed to this theory—but rather individualist, meaning everyone must reform themselves. This project has a more ethical-psychological aspect, whereas the intellectuals' project has a more sociological-political aspect.

8. The spirituality that this theory speaks of is the common ground of all religions (apparently, they only share these three points). Although I have not yet proven this claim, it seems to me that this is the case. If we move beyond these three points I mentioned about spirituality, the differences among religions begin.

9. Rationality and Spirituality has five conditions5:

1-9.Adherence to reasoning in accepting a statement. Any demand for acceptance entails a demand for a reason from me.

2-9. Authentic Life: That is, living based on one's own understanding and discernment, in which imitation, blind obedience, and following fashion and the customs of the time are negated. Knowledge, the power of thought, understanding, and experience are four abilities that others also possess. Whatever I undertake, I must use the latest human achievements; but when I want to use the solutions that others offer me, I must bring my own thought, understanding, and other abilities to bear and use them. So do not ask us what we do about consulting specialists. We do consult specialists; but the scale is within me, and that is reason and moral conscience. Historical and institutionalized religiosity is not like this; it contains imitation and blind obedience. I say that to use the inner capital of reason and moral conscience, I must do two things: honesty and seriousness. In contrast to the authentic life stands the unexamined life of Socrates, which we do not experience ourselves.

3-9. Realism: Meaning reference to the realities themselves. We should not measure beliefs against beliefs; rather, we should measure them against realities. Most of us are idealists who measure speech against speech, not against reality. Instead of using 'who said it,' we should use 'what was said.' From this point, we must have a kind of egalitarianism towards personalities and deconstruct authority. In response to the objection that some great figures, like Ali ibn Abi Talib, whose word we trust, hold authority for us, it is said that in this case we are not imitating, but rather we have understood that their word is correct.

4-9. What is it to me? Wisdom: We should not engage at all with what does not concern us. We should not spend our lives on things that are irrelevant to us. Of course, engaging in a profession and acquiring expertise for employment, so as not to be a burden on people, is a necessity of life. We must spend the rest of our lives on something that holds importance and benefit for us; that is, we must pursue beneficial knowledge. Much of what we know is not beneficial knowledge. Beneficial knowledge has three characteristics: a question that, before it is posed and after it is posed, or before finding an answer and after finding an answer, or before this specific answer and after this specific answer, transforms our lives.

A Critique of the Project of Rationality and Spirituality

Due to the large-scale nature of this project, not all its angles can be analyzed and examined in a single article. A project that has been constructed and refined over many years, has multiple dimensions, and about which dozens of articles and lectures have been produced, cannot be properly analyzed in a few-page writing. This requires the writing of an independent book. Out of necessity, we will only point here to the outlines of some ambiguities and questions that exist about it.

The spirituality that has been spoken of is nothing but a self-centeredness and a truthless utilitarianism. If we consider spirituality to be entirely devoid of epistemic status and only grant it a pragmatic status, it becomes empty of truth and merely a tool for worldly comfort.

One cannot deny the benefit of such an approach; but there is much room for reflection in its naming. Why has the sacred name of spirituality been placed upon such a pragmatic approach? What comes to mind from spirituality is something beyond, indeed at the opposite point, of this kind of pragmatic egoism. We want spirituality for existential elevation and nearness to the Truth, not for psychological comfort and the like. The ideal of spirituality is for the human being to become truth-seeking and truth-centered, not to attain comfort. Therefore, it is better to choose another name for this approach; "for example, 'tranquility-seeking'."

The most important merit of this project is that it offers a rational method for understanding, choosing, and spiritual wayfaring to a person who is still on the threshold of choosing a path in life and a school of thought. In other words, it clarifies, to some extent, the predicament of the perplexed individual and tells them on what basis to begin their journey. This project is suitable for beginners and those who know nothing, who have had no spiritual wayfaring so far, have not traversed a path, and have not been attached to any thought. They are told: in evaluating ideas, pay attention to reasoning; in understanding the efficacy of methods, think about the goal and make the proportionality of the path and the goal your criterion; and know that this world is not as it first appears, but beyond it there are things that are mysterious and beyond human understanding, and to attain the ideal life, you must begin with yourself. The most important thing is to reform your inner self and elevate it.

But from this point onward, this project tells us nothing more. The first problem is the same objection leveled against Kant's moral philosophy⁶, namely that this theory tells us nothing in terms of content and its only word is on the form of the ideal life; whereas a comprehensive theory must also provide practical guidance regarding the content of the ideal life. Although he could say that we have entrusted this guidance to the individual's own reason. In that case, another problem arises: as you yourself know, not all human beings possess sufficient rational ability to discern the path of the ideal life, and if such a ready-made model does not exist, they will not be able to construct it themselves. Creating models for the ideal life is the work of the elite; hence, the objection of elitism has been raised against this theory. Of course, Mr. Malekian says: I did not say that the elite should do this. That is true, and his address is to all people, and he emphasizes each and every individual; but only the elite are capable of such a task, because the conditions of the rationalized spirituality he depicts are so difficult that only rare individuals can meet them, and the general public cannot; for instance, they cannot fulfill his conditions of theoretical rationality. In practical rationality, too, the situation is no better.

One must even go further and say that the elite, too, are incapable of presenting a flawless model of the ideal life. If we look at human-made schools of thought, we will realize to what extent they contain flaws, shortcomings, conflicts, and contradictions. How can one expect all people to be able to find the ways and customs of the ideal life by themselves? A comprehensive theory must, just as it offers rational guidance in terms of form, also provide the necessary guidance in terms of content. It might be said that this contradicts the rational method recommended in this project; but this is not true, because, as he himself says, a person can and should use the knowledge, experience, power of understanding, and thoughts of others. The ultimate aim of this project is for the individual to examine things for themselves and reach a conclusion.

Mr. Malekian places great insistence and emphasis on negating any form of taqlid (uncritical adherence). Of course, when faced with the objection that in our daily lives we constantly listen to what others say and imitate them, and that life is essentially impossible without imitation and taqlid, he responds: I do not consider those to be taqlid or imitation, because in those cases, I myself have reached the conclusion that this expert has made the correct diagnosis.

This statement has several problems: one is that someone who is not an expert in a subject cannot understand whether the expert has made the correct diagnosis or not. Another problem with this statement is that the naming is poorly done. In the convention of lexicographers, when they speak of taqlid, they mean acting upon the word of another in a specific matter, regardless of whether we have a rational basis for this action or not; then taqlid and ta'abbud (uncritical adherence) are divided into two types: rational taqlid and ignorant taqlid. But according to his naming, there is only one type of taqlid, and that is the ignorant kind.

In response to the objection of what one does about turning to an expert, he says that this turning is a justified turning, in one of three ways. The first way is this: sometimes what justifies our turning is the convention of the practitioners of that discipline. When all physicists recognize Einstein as a physicist, if we also turn to him, we are in fact turning to the consensus of the physicists who recognize Einstein as a physicist. Here there is a kind of holistic tendency, and the holistic tendency is effective in numerous cases—including this one. I will give an example of this holistic tendency: when you solve a crossword puzzle, sometimes you are not certain of the correctness of any of the boxes you have filled in individually; but when your puzzle is completely filled, you become certain of its correctness. The individual parts are not certain; but when these uncertain parts confirm one another, they also make one another certain.

The second way is that sometimes we turn to a scientific scholar, but not because the convention of the scholars of that science confirms him, but because, in practice, in the past, whatever he has done based on his knowledge has been a successful act; that is, in fact, we want to experience the success of this person in practice, in the past experience of others. In this turning, we ourselves have no experience, but the experiences that others have show that this person is an expert.

The third way is that we turn to someone, but perhaps the initial turning has no rational basis at all, yet immediately after the initial turning we realize that our turning was successful and justifiable. In fact, our personal experience shows that we can trust that expert. In all the cases where we turn to an expert in the realm of our practical and theoretical life, the justification for our turning is one of the three ways above.

In none of these three ways is there taʿabbud (submissive deference), and this is the first difference between taʿabbud and turning to an expert. When we turn to someone, provided we have followed one of these three ways, this turning is not called taʿabbud. But the second difference, which is much more important than the first, is that after turning to an expert, accepting that that person is an expert is a kind of provisional acceptance, or as philosophers say, an ad hoc acceptance; that is, an acceptance until the contrary is proven. In taʿabbud, submission is forever. Once and for all, a person submits himself to someone; you never test the person to whom you practice taʿabbud. Even more than this, sometimes even if clearly invalid things are issued from him, you doubt their clear invalidity. This taʿabbud is something contrary to the innate nature of a healthy human being. A normal human being derives no emotional pleasure or inner peace from this kind of taʿabbud. Why? Because human beings are fundamentally not made this way.

Another point that must be scrutinized regarding taʿabbud is that some have said that we have a reason for the taʿabbud we practice; therefore, our taʿabbud is reasoned. But if taʿabbud is truly accompanied by a reason, it should not be considered taʿabbud. If taʿabbud is accompanied by a reason, it is almost of the same kind as turning to an expert. If we truly have a reason for our taʿabbud, we should not use the word "taʿabbud" in this case at all;⁷ but because of the usage of taʿabbud in these cases, they deviate from the conventional and common usage of the word and are unwittingly drawn to the negation of rational taʿabbud as well; just as this very matter is evident in their own conduct.

Mr. Malekian accepts⁸ that all or the vast majority of the spiritual people of the world throughout history have been religious. In this case, is the view not strengthened that spirituality must be sought in religion, and the way to attain it is the very thing that institutionalized religions introduce? It seems so.

Mr. Malekian has considered the essence of religiosity to be ta‘abbud (blind obedience). It seems that, although there is a kind of ta‘abbud in religiosity, one cannot consider the essence of religiosity to be ta‘abbud. One can be religious without ta‘abbud. Submission is necessary for religiosity. It is possible for someone to know the expediencies and reasons behind the legislation of a religious ruling, yet not be submissive to it. This person is not religious; but if this same person submits to that ruling, they are religious. Therefore, it is more accurate to consider the essence of religiosity to be submission, not ta‘abbud; consequently, one can accept that religiosity is compatible with rationality, and the contradiction he saw between them was formed due to another conception that was incorrect.

Another important question that this theory must answer is what should be done in collective action. This theory can, at most, determine the duty of the individual; but it has nothing to say regarding the administration of society. According to Mr. Malekian himself, his concern is the individual, not society. Society is nothing more than an imaginary entity, and if it is to be reformed, it must be done through its individual members; but is this really the case? Does society truly have no identity independent of its individuals? This statement is highly dubious. In a collective composition, something emerges that is not the sum of its individual parts. There are many examples of this; one can point to the pressure of a gas in a closed container. This pressure is not the sum of the pressure of the individual gas molecules, because they do not possess such pressure. Due to their compression, a state emerges that can move heavy objects or create a massive explosion. The energy resulting from this is far greater than the sum of the energy that the individual components of this molecular collective could produce. Therefore, an independent identity and effects are assumed for the collective and society, and its specific rulings must also be presented. A comprehensive theory for an ideal life cannot be indifferent to providing a model for this aspect of life.

Now, if this project were to be completed, which school, religion, or doctrine would it choose for the administration of society? If they say that here we refer to collective reason, we ask: which collective reason and with which method? What is the recommendation of this project? Ultimately, referring to collective reason itself requires a foundation that clarifies the path and method and determines the duty of society's action. The practical guidance of this project for the administration of society becomes: first, make individuals spiritual and rational, then whatever the result of their collective rationality is, it will be good for society; but will such a utopia emerge? Where and how? This is the very promised utopia that religions have foretold and which he denies.

Rationality, in all three types mentioned, is more complex than what is expressed in this theory. The rationality claimed by this theory is a simple and one-dimensional rationality; meaning that in each of the three types of rationality mentioned, only one aspect has been considered. For example, in theoretical rationality, it is not sufficient to only pay attention to the amount of evidence and determine our adherence and attachment to beliefs based on evidence; of course, this is necessary, but it is not sufficient. In the example Mr. Malekian gave, if someone denies that today is Tuesday—while it truly is Tuesday—there is no necessity to be zealous in dissuading the speaker from their belief. We can leave them be. It is only rational to be fervent when the fact of whether today is Tuesday or not becomes important and, for instance, becomes the basis for an important decision or action; but if it has no practical effect on us, there is no reason, despite sufficient evidence that today is Tuesday, to be fervent and dissuade the speaker from their belief. This shows that other conditions are also necessary for theoretical rationality, among which is practical utility and importance.9

Furthermore, in discursive rationality, which has rightly been considered a form of practical rationality, there can be other goals besides revealing one's inner thoughts. Among other discursive goals is concealing one's inner thoughts. Sometimes we want the audience to remain in ambiguity regarding our inner thoughts. Sometimes we want to speak ambiguously in order to reveal the matter in its own time, sometimes we want to take pleasure in speaking; therefore, we use metaphorical and allusive expressions, sometimes we speak allusively to preserve people's dignity, sometimes we use literary devices so that the speech may better settle in the soul of the audience, sometimes... . If we were to limit discursive rationality to what they have stated, we would have to discard all these styles of speaking and empty literature entirely of simile, metaphor, and figurative language, and create a completely dry, mathematical language.10

There is also much to be said regarding practical rationality. The understanding they have of this rationality is not compatible with the spirituality they have explained; among other things, it seems that in practical rationality we must only take material matters into account; because in the example they have given to refute practical rationality, they have referred to sins that can cause earthquakes. They then criticized this view and said that one cannot correct women's hijab to prevent earthquakes; because "women's hijab, if it has any benefit, lies in another direction; but it has none for the occurrence of miracles; because if it did, you would have committed the greatest betrayal by not informing humanity, after 1400 years of knowing this matter, so that all these earthquakes would not occur"11. Yet they themselves accept that the spiritual person believes in something beyond this material world and believes that we do not know all the factors involved in this world. How can they deny that there is a connection between sins and the occurrence of earthquakes? If such a connection has been declared through divine revelation, should we not accept it?! Moreover, the argument they have presented in rejecting that statement is that if there were a connection between earthquakes and women's hijab, you have committed a betrayal by not saying so. This statement is a fallacy. Assuming we have committed a betrayal, could this matter not be true and we have concealed it? Their manner of dealing with these types of arguments is more compatible with materialism than with spirituality.

In one place12, Mr. Malekian has considered the first characteristic of "rational religiosity" to be its comprehensiveness regarding all dimensions of the religious person's life. This characteristic means that from the perspective of the religious person, not only the individual dimensions of human life, but also its social dimensions have a religious status, and religion must be implemented in all social affairs, from politics and economics to culture and social ethics. This view negates secularism and is a defensible view. Elsewhere13, they explicitly introduce themselves as an advocate of secularism; but the requirement of having a comprehensive and ideal philosophy of life is that we also have a program for politics, economics, culture, and social ethics, and this does not accord with secularism.

He declares the work of the spiritual person to be like swimming, and the work of one who follows traditional religion to be like sailing. The swimmer seeks to discover the truth; but the one in the ship considers himself the owner of the truth; that is, the former seeks the path of salvation, while the latter considers himself already saved. However, this view is incompatible with the historical realities of religions—at least when speaking of the Abrahamic faiths—because in these religions, it is not the case that they give something to the individual, making him an owner, and then tell him he is saved. Religions not only call their followers to search for truth and strive to attain redemption, but each, in its own measure, provides a resource through specific teachings to accelerate the person's movement and correct their course. On this basis, different religions are entirely comparable to one another; for, based on criteria, one can assess the richness of each of these resources and compare it with the resources of other religions. In this view, the state of the religious person is neither that of a mere swimmer, nor that of someone seated in a ship whose navigation is in another's hands and whose arrival at the shore is certain. Rather, if we wish to draw upon the same field of analogy used by the author, the situation of the adherents of different religions is like that of individuals in a turbulent sea seeking the shore of salvation, each given a boat with equipment. Each of these individuals must personally take the helm of the boat and advance by utilizing its facilities, in the shadow of their own resolve and effort. However, these boats are not identical in terms of facilities and equipment, and therefore the highest probability of success belongs to the one who, firstly, chooses the best and most well-equipped boat available, and secondly, by exerting the greatest possible effort, makes the best use of the facilities and equipment of said boat. In this analogy,14 the boats are analogous to different religions, and since their equipment and facilities are not on the same level, they can be compared with one another qualitatively, and consequently, one can reasonably speak of the best boat (or the most complete religion).

Mr. Malekian considers one characteristic of rational religiosity (or "spirituality") to be a gradual movement from "heteronomy" to "autonomy," and since, in his view, obeying God is also a form of "heteronomy," his recommendation is presumably that we exit the state of "being under God's command" and reach a point where we act upon what God has commanded, not as something divinely ordained, but because individual reason (or collective witness) invites us to it. The basis of this analysis and recommendation by the author is nothing other than the self-sufficiency of human reason to discover and traverse the path of felicity, and this, if it does not take the name of idolatry, is self-worship. By Mr. Malekian's own criterion—that whatever you make absolute, you have made into a god—it must be said that this is a great idolatry. However, it should be noted that one can demonstrate, both by recourse to rational principles and by appeal to religious teachings, that obeying God has no conflict with "autonomy"—where what is meant by "self" is the transcendent, higher self—just as it has been rightly said: "Servitude is a jewel whose essence is lordship; servitude to God is a jewel whose innermost core is a kind of lordship and sovereignty."

He then proceeds to make another weighty claim categorically: "All religious propositions are counter-intuitive"; meaning "one can offer no rational argument either for their truth or for their falsehood." Hence, a religious person has no certainty regarding the correctness of their religious beliefs; nevertheless, despite this lack of certainty, they possess tranquility. He then cites certain religious and Quranic expressions, asserting that the Quran has presented all metaphysical matters in the form of conjecture, supposition, perhaps, and so on.

Apparently, in expressing this component, the esteemed author speaks from the position of the fideists, considering not only the rational proof of religious claims unnecessary but also impossible. What can be said briefly is that, firstly, based on the view of many thinkers past and present, at least some religious teachings (for example, the very existence of God) are rationally demonstrable, and secondly, the most that can logically be claimed is that no religious proposition has been proven thus far; however, there is no logical or reasonable basis for the claim that "no religious proposition is provable."15

In another article,¹⁶ Mr. Malekian says: the world is moving toward greater spirituality; but this means it is moving away from the shell and outward form of religion and drawing closer to its essence, which is ethics. There is an unproven presupposition in his statement, namely, that it is impossible to combine the shell and the kernel. It is as if anyone who wishes to reach the kernel of religion and its essence, i.e., ethics and spirituality, must abandon its shell and set it aside. This is a line of thought that is, of course, not unprecedented in history, and the Sufis have always emphasized it; but the question remains: is it not possible to be both completely spiritual and ethical and also attentive to the outward forms of religion? Were the prophets not the most spiritual people of their times? Were these same prophets not themselves the best observers of the outward forms of religion? Leaving them aside, there have been many saints of God throughout history who have combined both aspects.

Imam Khomeini is a contemporary example of this, showing us that one can be a religious scholar, a mystic knower of God, a person meticulous in observing the outward forms of religion, and also a person of politics, war, and statesmanship. Of course, it is obvious that the weight of the outward form and shell of religion is not the same as its inward aspect and kernel. The degree of emphasis these great figures placed on ethical issues and the inner dimension of religion is greater, and the shell should not be made the principle. Some religious preachers, throughout history, have misplaced the emphasis and put the fur coat on inside out; but on the other hand, some have gone to extremes and, thinking to grasp the kernel and inner dimension of religion, have completely cast aside the outward forms and performed the four takbirs¹⁷ over them. This excess and deficiency equally strike a blow against religion and spirituality.

We must also be mindful that, under the pretext of avoiding self-admiration, we should not forget that we Muslims alone possess the Divine Word, and none of the other nations and sects have such a precious pearl, nor do they claim to. Other sacred scriptures are, at most, writings derived from the speech, customs, and traditions of prophets, or their own writings, nothing more. None of them are words revealed by God Almighty. We should also not forget that none of the other sacred scriptures possess the necessary historical authenticity; but the Holy Quran has reached us with firm and widely transmitted historical chains of transmission. If someone also doubts the historical documentation, the challenge (tahaddi) of the Quran is a decisive answer to them. The Holy Quran is an eternal miracle, the like of which no human being has been able, or will be able, to produce. The Quran has issued a challenge in this regard, and if anyone does not accept its truth and divine origin, they can put it to the test.

In Mr. Malekian's discussions on religious studies, there are other mentionable topics that we will not address to avoid prolixity, and we will only present the axes raised in them. Among these discussions is seeing the emergence of a utopia as impossible. Also, the recommendation to the followers of all religions to commit to their own religion with sincerity, and if this happens, they will undoubtedly arrive at the same place.¹⁸ He has spoken of reformism in religion and mentions three meanings for religion, in all three of which, in his view, reformism must be undertaken.¹⁹ The discussion of religious experience is also among other issues of religious studies about which he has written.²⁰ The relationship between reason and faith has also been among his concerns, and he considers it our greatest problem and issue.²¹ Regarding the record of religion, he believes it has been successful in subjective evaluation and unsuccessful in objective evaluation. In his opinion, one cannot provide arguments for religious teachings, and doubt is a constituent element of faith.²² Of the seven dimensions of religion, three—the institutional-social, the narrative-mythical, and the ritual-devotional—are weakened in the process of globalization, while two—the experiential-emotional and the doctrinal-philosophical—are strengthened, and the other dimensions are neutral in this respect. In his belief, the common essence of religions is spirituality, and to attain it, eight negative actions must be performed on historical religion.

In a conversation about spirituality and modernity, Mr. Malekian discusses two topics: first, the incompatibility of religion and modernity, and second, the compatibility of spirituality and modernity. In the first part, he considers the essence of religion to be devotion and the essence of modernity to be rationality, declaring the two incompatible; in the second part, he considers spirituality to be born of rationality and thus declares it compatible with modernity.23 The various meanings and interpretations of the discussion on the "meaning of life," along with issues such as whether the meaning of life is unknown or revealed, the relationship between love and the meaning of life, and the different realms in which the question of the "meaning of life" can be posed, are raised in another conversation.24

In a roundtable on the metrics of religiosity, Mr. Malekian first enumerates the theoretical problems and obstacles of religiosity metrics in four categories. In his view, problems exist in four areas: the definition of religion, the types and varieties of religion, the types and varieties of religiosity, and the criterion of religiosity and the standard for recognizing it; for this reason, one must present their own definition of religion and religiosity. Several phenomena are conflated with the concept of religion in the negative aspect: spirituality, living ethically, mystical outlook, devotion, faith, superstition, idolatry, and sanctimony. In the positive aspect, which is clearly related to religion itself, there are numerous problems. These problems are divided into four categories: first, some definitions offered for religion are not "comprehensive of all instances"; that is, they do not include all religions. Second, sometimes they are not "exclusive to instances"; that is, they include all religions but also encompass other things. The third problem is that definitions of religion are sometimes overly pessimistic; for example, it is said that religion is the opium of the masses. The fourth problem relates to optimistic definitions of religion; for instance, defining religion as elevated morality or the best and most beautiful thing one can do with their solitude.25

Tradition and Modernity

One of the axes that has been notably prominent in Mr. Malekian's perspective is the discussion of tradition, modernity, postmodernity, traditionalism, modernism, and postmodernism. He clarifies that in these discussions, I am not concerned with tradition, modernity, and postmodernity per se; rather, I am concerned with traditionalism, modernism, and postmodernism. Each of these three schools of thought must be compared from four aspects: first, from the aspect of epistemology; second, from the aspect of anthropology; third, from the aspect of ontology; and fourth, from the aspect of deontology, or in other words, ethics.

What is the main difference between these three currents? It could perhaps be said that the main difference between these three currents is the position each takes toward reason. In fact, it is reason that separates these three currents from one another. To put it better, instead of saying that it is reason that separates these three currents, we should say that it is the human position toward reason that has caused these three currents to emerge. In his view, traditionalists believe in incomplete reason, modernists believe in self-sufficient reason, but postmodernists are distrustful of reason.26

The distinction the respected author draws between these three intellectual currents pertains more to ideal types than to real human beings, types that may rarely be found in the actual world. Mr. Malekian himself has said elsewhere that such ideal types are not found in the real world; however, to express the characteristics of different currents, it is better to recognize their ideal limits. Therefore, if it is said, for example, that modernism means the absolute acceptance of reason and the acknowledgment of its self-sufficiency, and that the only way to obtain knowledge of the world is through discursive reason—and nothing else—perhaps most of those called modernists do not hold such a definitive view in practice, and none can live a completely modernist life. Likewise, perhaps no full-fledged postmodernist can be found. What exists in the real world is mostly a mixture of these approaches.

This is why, according to his definition, we would have to exclude most of the fathers of modernity, and it is unclear who would ultimately remain under the name of modernist. If a modernist is someone who believes in self-sufficient reason, recognizes no limits to its capacities, considers it sufficient for human life, and pays no attention to anything else, including tradition—and if, as he himself says, figures such as Hume, Kant, Freud, Marx, and others each exposed a flaw in the capacities of reason—then none of them can be considered modernists; whereas, upon the very first reference to any philosophical or social science dictionary, we see that those named are counted among the foremost modernists. Therefore, a serious revision in the definition of modernism is necessary.

There is another hypothetical form of the human relationship with rationality that exists in none of the three aforementioned currents. That form is to consider reason an important path for gaining knowledge of the world; while at the same time correctly recognizing its limitations and not allowing it to overstep its bounds. Not to limit reason because tradition has said so, but rather to let reason itself determine its own limit, and for reason itself to recognize the need for the assistance of tradition and to refer to it. This is neither traditionalism by the esteemed author's definition, nor modernism. In one respect, it resembles modernism, because it wants the project of rationality to be complete and whole and does not leave it unfinished. In another respect, it resembles traditionalism, in that it accords status and validity to tradition, grants it authority, and through its light also saves reason from becoming secular: this perspective creates a full-fledged project of rationality that is both rational and traditionalist; reason itself has authority, and it also recognizes a supra-human, supra-rational authority and grows in its light. From this viewpoint, the modernists' project is congenitally defective; because their self-founded reason, while being incapable, is incapable of seeing its own incapacity and suffers from an unacceptable grandiosity that ultimately distances human beings from the truth. The blindness of modernist reason lies not only in not seeing the limits of its own capacities, but also in not seeing the path of growth and transcendence.

Various names can be proposed for the fourth approach. Considering that it adheres to rationality, it can be called "moderate rationality." Considering that it refers to tradition, it can be called "rational traditionalism." Considering that it reconciles tradition and rationalism, it can be known as "tradition-seeking rationalism," and so on. However, this humble servant prefers to call it the "Muslim Way," because he sees no reason to remain within the framework of concepts produced in Western culture that do not correspond with our thought and approach.27

To articulate the components of modernism, Mr. Malekian first points to three human realms, then addresses the difference between the two traditional and new perspectives on the issue of "human frustrations" in changing the external world or the internal world, and concludes that the essence of modernism must be found in this very perspective. In his view, the other components of modernism are the logical consequence of this perspective. The basis of the modernist worldview is that we desire change in the external world and want to make the external world conform to us, rather than making ourselves conform to the external world.28

There are many discussions about modernist views in the realm of changing the world, and it is not possible to address all of them; but it is not without benefit to point out that changing the external world requires knowing it. Alongside knowing this world, there is also a need for ideals and direction; because without a goal and direction, change becomes meaningless. The goal of changing the world is to gain greater satisfaction and increase pleasure. Increasing human pleasure and satisfaction requires knowing the human being, and without knowing the inner issues of the human being, a complete knowledge of the human being is not attained. Therefore, the project of modernism will fail without knowing the inner human being. Even to increase satisfaction in this very world, knowledge of the human being—especially knowledge of the inner human being—is necessary.

Regarding traditional man as well, the sweeping judgment that in traditional thought “we were supposed to build ourselves, not the world; we were supposed to change ourselves, not the world” seems open to reflection. Some traditional ideas (such as Stoic thought, which also has followers among Christian and Muslim theologians) have neglected changing the world; but many others have decreed changing the world. The dominant thought in the Islamic world—from the very beginning of Islam to the present day—has been that the foundation of the outer world must also be built; because it is this outer world that provides the ground for building the inner world, and if this world is reformed, the inner world can be better reformed. Alongside self-knowledge, which is of course the most beneficial of knowledges, knowledge of the outer world has also been strongly recommended. In the arguments of Lady Fatima (peace be upon her) after the Prophet (peace be upon him and his progeny) concerning the necessity of the Imamate and the caliphate of Ali (peace be upon him), we find that she counts his Imamate as the cause of the earth’s flourishing, the increase of wealth, the opening of the earth’s treasures, and abundant material blessings.

The recommendation of empirical knowledge in Islam and its promotion by the Imams (peace be upon them) is a sign of attention to knowing the outer world in order to change it. To take all traditional ideas as being of the Stoic type—which sees the world as filthy and base, finds a contradiction between the prosperity of this world and the Hereafter, and recommends world-avoidance and monasticism for the liberation and salvation of the soul—is an incorrect act disproportionate to Islam. One of the methods of the Prophet (peace be upon him and his progeny) was to combat this very thinking. We do not deny that a portion of philosophers or mystics in the Islamic world have inclined toward this idea; but it has not been the dominant thought.

Therefore, one cannot draw a boundary between traditional thought and modernist thought using the criterion of looking inward and looking outward; rather, the criterion is looking at the higher self and the current self. The principal change has occurred within the human being, and the outer change stems from it.

In the discussion of the relationship between religion and modernity, relying on what appears in the book Tradition and Secularism, it can be said that Mr. Malekian, firstly, considers the essence of religiosity to be submission (*ta‘abbud*), and on the other hand, evaluates the essence of modernity as rationality; therefore, he decrees the mutual exclusivity of religion and modernity.29

Paying attention to the problems of religiosity in the new world and examining the obstacles to religiosity in this era is not only a useful endeavor, but a necessary one. Undoubtedly, a precise understanding of the problems of religiosity in the new world is one of the first and most important steps toward strengthening, consolidating, and expanding religiosity. Mr. Malekian has addressed this subject elsewhere. In his view, religiosity in the new world has four problems: 1. the argumentation-orientation of the new world, versus religious submission-orientation; 2. the methodological materialism of the new world; 3. the this-worldly orientation of tests; and 4. globalization.30 However, there are points worth reflecting upon in this regard:

1. Contrasting submission-orientation and argumentation-orientation is correct only “by definition”; that is, to say that submission-orientation is acceptance without requesting a reason, and argumentation-orientation is acceptance with requesting a reason; but what has been and is prevalent among the religious—at least in many cases—is not this type of submission-orientation. The acceptance of the sayings of religious leaders is due to the authoritativeness that has been “demonstrated by reason” for people through various means—including miracles. The history of religions clearly shows that deniers (atheists, polytheists, or adherents of another religion) have always demanded proof and reason from new prophets. Of course, after such authoritativeness was established, rational people would not demand a reason for every single subsequent statement from that prophet or religious leader.

2. Methodological materialism—as the esteemed author has presented it—is not exclusive to the new era. The example provided is clear testimony to this point; for he has written that despite “centuries of failure,” humanity still does not abandon its research to discover the cause of cancer. The study of the two Testaments (the Old Testament and the New Testament), the Holy Quran, and reliable histories also testify that human beings, perhaps due to their familiarity with material things and the natural world, have always sought natural causes; although when they despaired of finding such causes, they would resort to supernatural justifications.

3. A this-worldly test to prove the afterlife is, in fact, an instance of argumentation (the first problem), which again is not exclusive to the modern era. The verses of the Noble Qurʾān have repeatedly drawn attention to this matter: “He says, ‘Who will revive these bones when they have rotted away?’” (Yā Sīn, 78), or “He said, ‘My Lord, show me how You give life to the dead’” (al-Baqarah, 260). It is not without reason that the Noble Qurʾān refers to death as a certainty, and by this expression it has perhaps sought to prepare the human mind to accept this matter.

4. Globalization can greatly help religious people to know other religions more and better, and this greater knowledge—as stated in the article—reveals the strengths of other religions; but first, it also makes their weaknesses better known; second, when people realize that the overwhelming majority of the world’s population is religious, this awareness on the whole increases belief in religion and religiosity; third, it reduces misplaced prejudices and uninformed judgments; and fourth, it provides greater scope for the propagation of the superior religion.

Mr. Malekian says that if the traditional era had been good, humanity would only have abandoned it and stepped into the era of modernity if afflicted by collective madness.31 This statement is problematic in several respects:

a. In this matter, humanity is not a monolithic whole about which a single judgment can be made. If we make a single judgment about all of humanity in relation to the subject of tradition and modernity, we have committed the fallacy of conflating various issues into a single issue. We are faced with different groups of human beings, each group having a separate judgment. The question “Why did humanity enter the era of modernity?” must be turned into several questions so that a correct answer can be given to it; that is, one must ask: “Why did Europeans enter the era of modernity?” “Why did Iranians enter the era of modernity?” “Why did Arabs enter the era of modernity?” “Why did the Chinese and Japanese, etc., enter the era of modernity?” and so on. It is in this case that each question can be given its own corresponding answer. It is possible that some answers may be similar; but this possibility cannot be taken as a presupposition before conducting research.

b. From this, it becomes clear that each of these questions contains a presupposition, namely that the group or nation mentioned in the question has entered the era of modernity. By separating the questions, this presupposition can also be independently verified, and then one can proceed to the answer.

c. By separating the above question, we can also examine the degree of entry into the era of modernity. Different societies are not uniform in this respect. Europeans, Americans, and the Japanese have become modernized more than others. In Asia, there is great diversity in this regard. In Africa, due to the phenomenon of colonialism and depending on the degree of poverty or natural wealth of African societies and the artificial divisions imposed by colonial powers, sharp contrasts are observed in this regard. South Africa is the epitome of modernity on the African continent, and Niger the epitome of non-modernity. In Niger’s neighborhood, there is another country called Nigeria, which has become very modernized; because Niger is a poor region with little benefit from natural resources, and Nigeria is wealthy and coveted by colonialists. Despite the fact that these two nations arose from one race, one culture, and one tradition, one has become modernized and the other has not. Therefore, one should not make a single judgment about humanity.

d. Entry into the era of modernity has various causes. In European societies, the main cause has been considered the inefficiency of tradition in responding to people’s needs and its irrationality. In many countries, the main cause of the entry of modernity is colonialism. India, South Africa, Morocco, Nigeria, Australia, and many other countries turned from their own culture and traditions to modern culture and traditions as a result of colonialism; of course, the degree of their turn is not uniform. In Iran and Turkey, the military introduced modernity through force and with the support of British colonialism. The societies of the former Eastern Bloc have a different story. Some societies have also turned to modernity out of necessity; because the ever-increasing power of industrial societies compels them, in order not to fall behind in the power race, to attain industrial and military power like them so as not to be captured in the clutches of world-devourers.

e. One important reason for committing this error (equating the causes of turning to modernity) is that in the philosophical and cultural literature of the West, which has now achieved a kind of dominance in cultural arenas, an unwarranted generalization takes place, and they extend the rulings pertaining to themselves to all of humanity. It is as if they are the essence of humanity and the rest of the people are quasi-humans. This same error also ensnares the intellectuals of other societies; because many of them, without altering the literature of the discussion, without indigenizing the issues, and without paying attention to the differences between themselves and them, repeat the same words. This leads to the commission of gross errors in the analysis of social conditions.

Regarding the question of what the solution to the problem of modern man is, whether a return to tradition is the remedy or not, whether modernity can overcome its own problems or not, and the like, several points are worth pondering:

1. Whatever meaning we take tradition to have, a complete and total return to the era of tradition is undoubtedly neither possible nor desirable. Likewise, remaining in the current abnormal state is neither desirable nor possible. What is possible and desirable is to take the valuable elements of each, keeping in mind their essential and accidental concomitants, and to seek the solution to humanity's problems not in a realized old or new state, but in an attainable ideal state. This is perhaps the same recourse to a third physician that Mr. Malekian has spoken of; but with the reminder that we may have already had this third physician and been heedless of it.

2. The solution for Muslims and the solution for Europeans are not the same; because their pain is not the same, so the treatment cannot be the same. Furthermore, cultural differences can lead to the presentation of different solutions.

3. The best proof that modernity cannot overcome its problems is the views expressed by the great thinkers of modernity today. One group considers the problems of modernity insoluble. Another group has proposed a return to tradition. A third group considers this current state to be the end of the world; as if humanity has achieved all its hopes and desires and can reach no further. Another group of critics of modernity has offered no solution; but they lament the problems in such a way that their cries indicate despair. Of course, none of these is a conclusive proof of the matter; but their totality shows that modernity itself is incapable of curing itself.

4. It is also worth mentioning that a solution cannot be presented by concocting a hodgepodge of different instructions. The solution to important human problems must arise from a coherent system of solutions.

An ethical society can be built in any material condition and state. What is important is that the goal of living humanely is not forgotten under any circumstances and is taught to society. Otherwise, by strengthening animalistic aspects, one cannot expect a humane life. What matters is attention to the moral education of society, which must be given primacy, be at the forefront of society's goals, and be planned for. It is quite clear that an important moral responsibility of the administrators of societies is to provide for the basic needs of their people. If society's officials properly fulfill this duty, they will have paved the way for society to become more ethical.

Conclusion

In summarizing Mr. Malekian's views, it must be said that his most principal view is presented in the theory of rationality and spirituality, and the rest of his material must be understood in relation to it. This theory is also a kind of pluralism-generating monism that looks at spiritual matters in a minimalistic way and has made modern rationality the main foundation of its work. One characteristic of this theory is a kind of spiritualism that shares common aspects with religion; it is not religion, nor is it opposed to it; but it does not accept all of its aspects; rather, it denies the most important aspect of religion, namely devotion, and we do not know how the name 'religious' can be applied to the followers of such a creed.

The author does not claim to have been able to explore all the angles of this theory; but has tried to offer an honest account of it, to apply what is required by the pursuit of truth to it, and to present the critiques that have occurred to him fairly. Mr. Malekian has always praised this spirit and has himself tried to adhere to it. One condition of this spirit is being critical and open to criticism. I hope this modest effort can kindle a lamp, however dim, on the path of researchers.

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A Critique of Mostafa Malekian's Theological Thought, as Narrated by Hadi Sadeghi

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