Abbas-Ali Mansouri: Our Inability to Speak the Same Language and Share a Common World Is Why We Iranians Fail at Dialogue

Our problem is the inability or weakness in dialogue. This is true at the macro level—that is, in the structure of politics and decision-making—as well as at the level of non-decision-making elites and the general public. What occurs is mostly dispute and conflict.

Why is the problem of the “inability to dialogue” an important issue?

The inability to dialogue points to a more fundamental problem. The inability to dialogue is not a moral crisis, and reducing it to ethics or politics is to ignore the real issue or to refer to one of its incomplete causes. When two individuals or two groups disagree in their analysis of various issues (political, economic, religious, etc.), it indicates that the root of this disagreement should not be seen in politics or ethics, but rather in their way of looking at issues. Their mental and epistemic world must be examined. This is especially true when we witness that sometimes the parties to a dialogue are moral and good-natured people, or are not even particularly politically minded, yet they still cannot engage in dialogue. The crisis of the “inability to dialogue” indicates a historical and socio-cultural situation. Or, to put it better, it indicates a particular mode of being.

Speaking Different Languages and Inhabiting Different Worlds:

My discussion in this note concerns one of these causes of the inability to dialogue, which I consider to be the fundamental and most important factor, and that factor is: speaking different languages and inhabiting different worlds in understanding and analyzing issues.

In a society where the cultural and epistemic course is natural and gradual, there exists a relative empathy and consensus among the members of society, especially among thinkers and decision-makers, regarding the most important issues of the country and society. For this reason, strategic and long-term plans in such societies are not mere aspirations but are real and operational programs.

But in our society, this relative empathy and understanding does not exist. In our country, regarding the most important issues (cultural problems, the duty of government, the meaning of religiosity, the limits of freedom, the structure of the state and power, etc.), there is a state of speaking different languages and inhabiting different worlds among the elites, the people, and the politicians.

This lack of consensus is serious even at the level of universities, and if it does not manifest itself, it is because we academics fundamentally do not engage in dialogue with one another for this difference in understanding and lack of consensus to reveal itself, and also because we mostly engage in library research that is not particularly the problem of our here and now, and in such research, consensus and empathy are not very relevant. I consider the main cause of this lack of relative empathy and consensus to be a phenomenon called “speaking different languages and inhabiting different worlds.”

Speaking Different Languages and Inhabiting Different Worlds

Speaking different languages and inhabiting different worlds occurs when two individuals, two groups, two generations, or two classes, in confronting an issue, have a different understanding of its key concepts at the level of conception, and hold different presuppositions at the level of assent. Because this is so, they do not grasp each other’s words, and it is more often misunderstandings and motive-reading that direct the discussions rather than arguments.

I will try to explain what I mean by speaking different languages more concretely through an example: Imagine two groups, one of which has an approach to religiosity that sees religion as being for humanity, and the other sees humanity as being for religion. One considers the historical and cultural aspects of religion to be maximal, and the other sees the teachings of religion as largely fixed and trans-temporal and trans-spatial. For one, the moral and spiritual aspects of religion have priority, and for the other, the social and political manifestation of religion. It is clear that dialogue between these two individuals will be very difficult. Not that dialogue is only possible when individuals necessarily have identical presuppositions. Rather, I mean that at the very least, these individuals must be able to look at the issue from the other’s perspective and be aware of their rival’s presuppositions.

The Origin of Speaking Different Languages and Inhabiting Different Worlds: The Challenge of Tradition and Modernity

The main reason for the problem of speaking different languages and inhabiting different worlds is that although we have, to some extent, resolved the challenge of tradition and modernity in our practical and concrete lives (due to the exigencies of practical life), tradition and modernity remain our central and overarching problem in the realm of theory and knowledge. That is, most of our other issues, or the most important problems, originate from this source. In our society, regarding the overarching problem of tradition and modernity, there are two groups: a group that has understood and experienced modernity, the rationality of the modern world, and its exigencies. They possess contemporaneity and historical self-awareness. And a group that has not understood the rationality of the modern world, or has understood it very imperfectly, and has not yet reached the conclusion that the modern world is an entirely different world and universe, and modern man is a different kind of human being. (Whether we deem this good or bad)

An important point I must mention here is that we should not reduce the problem of tradition and modernity to the problem of religion and modernity. The problem of tradition and modernity is the problem of two types of rationality and approaches to humanity and the world. In the words of Mr. Abolqasem Fanaei in his book The Ethics of Religious Studies, our problem is not the conflict between religion and modern rationality, but rather the conflict between ancient rationality and modern rationality. However, the problem arises when a historical understanding and conception of religion is mistakenly considered a trans-historical religion.

How does the challenge of tradition and modernity cause speaking different languages and, consequently, an inability to engage in dialogue?

I note in advance that I am in no way making a value judgment here. That is, I do not wish to say whether the traditionalists or the modernists are right.

To avoid entering into a lengthy discussion about the nature of tradition and modernity and the components of each, I will focus here on what, in my opinion and that of many experts, constitutes the basis of the distinction between tradition and modernity. What forms the essence of modernity is a specific type of rationality, sometimes called critical rationality. Of course, tradition is also based on rationality, but the rationality of these two has an essential difference. In my view, the dual foundation of tradition and modernity goes back to two different conceptions of reason and the degree of its authority and efficacy. (Some consider the foundation to be two different conceptions of the human being, but in my view, this also goes back to two different conceptions of reason.) It seems that the aspect and criterion that separates various religious and political groups and currents is the type of rationality upon which they have built their epistemological system.

These two rationalities truly create two different human beings who possess different epistemological worlds. For each, certain matters are important or have priority, and certain matters are unimportant and anti-values, which are sometimes the opposite for the other. In the words of Dr. Soroush in his article "The Basis and Meaning of Secularism," the traditional human is one who is: submissive, seeking an interpretation of the world, seeking mere reform, passive, seeking certainty, desiring wonder and mystery, in pursuit of sorrow and separation, mindful of death, seeking duties, inwardly oriented, using reason for understanding; and the modern human is one who is: critical and protesting, seeking to change the world, seeking revolution, active, accustomed to doubt and concern, seeking clarity and causality, seeking revolution, seeking joy and delight, mindful of life, seeking rights, outwardly oriented, possessing the world, and using reason for critique.

Tradition and Modernity: Characteristics of Modern Rationality and Pre-modern Rationality

In what has passed, I explained that the fundamental cause of our inability as Iranians to engage in dialogue is a phenomenon called "speaking different languages and inhabiting different worlds," which is rooted in the challenge of tradition and modernity. Here, I will try to explain this challenge in greater detail to clarify how it prevents dialogue, or at least makes it very difficult.

The dual foundation of tradition and modernity goes back to two different conceptions of rationality and the degree of the authority and efficacy of reason. (Some consider the foundation to lie in two different conceptions of the human being, but in my view, this also goes back to two different conceptions of reason.) For what constitutes the essence of modernity is a specific type of rationality, sometimes called critical rationality and sometimes self-founding rationality. Of course, tradition is also based on a rationality, but these two rationalities have fundamental and essential differences. Among them:

Characteristics of the critical rationality of the modern world:

1- Modern rationality is largely self-founded and optimistic about the capacity of reason. It therefore attempts to view issues from the perspective of human reason. Modernity is sometimes equivalent to Enlightenment, and Kant defines enlightenment as the audacity and courage to rely on one's own understanding, considering it the exit from immaturity (i.e., the inability to use one's own understanding without the guidance of others). Traditional rationality, however, is deeply suspicious of reason and, unlike modern rationality, has not moved beyond totemism (sacred matters that are unquestionable) and tabooism (matters so vile and filthy that individuals do not approach them, and naturally no dialogue takes place about them).

2- In modernity, just as the importance and capacity of reason are emphasized, the limitations of reason are also examined, and the domain of possible human knowledge (as opposed to matters beyond the bounds of human understanding) is delineated. In pre-modern rationality, however, although the weakness of reason is stressed, in practice the pursuit of truth (as opposed to expediency or functionalism) and metaphysical thought (as opposed to empirical and historical knowledge) hold a significant role and position in the sphere of pre-modern human thought.

3- Traditional rationality is based on naive realism. That is, firstly, it imagines that truth is simple, clear, and easily accessible, and that anyone who denies it is sick; for this reason, it is dogmatic and incorporates certainty into the definition of knowledge. Secondly, it generally considers the human being a passive and mere spectator in the act of cognition. Hence, it views disagreements among people over truth as arising from their capriciousness. Modern rationality, however, is based on critical realism. That is, firstly, it believes that truth is complex and multifaceted. Secondly, the human being is not entirely passive and a spectator in the act of perception. This distinction causes the product of one to be tolerance and pluralism, and the product of the other to be exclusivism and violence in practice.

4- Modern rationality is intensely critical and is not conservative or desirous of the status quo because, firstly, it is taboo-averse and subjects everything to thought. Secondly, it possesses a functionalist spirit. Thirdly, it believes that no state of affairs is ideal or optimal and that we can change matters and conditions. Traditional rationality, however, is conservative and less frequently engages in fundamental and comprehensive critiques because it lacks the three aforementioned characteristics or benefits little from these three approaches.

5- Critical and modern rationality considers the attainment of certainty to be a very difficult, near-impossible matter; therefore, it is skeptical epistemologically and, psychologically, has less fear of doubt and uncertainty. Traditional rationality, on the other hand, both considers certainty more attainable and, psychologically, fears and is apprehensive of doubt and uncertainty.

6- In understanding social, religious, and human issues, modern rationality adopts a historical and, to some extent, non-essentialist perspective, meaning it tries to understand phenomena within their temporal and spatial context. Traditional rationality, however, often sees the historical perspective as a danger that leads to relativism in knowledge; for this reason, in interpreting phenomena, it predominantly adopts a trans-temporal and trans-spatial perspective.

7- In understanding and analyzing phenomena, modern rationality predominantly employs an a posteriori and non-metaphysical approach, whereas in traditional rationality, an a priori mode of thinking and metaphysical explanation of matters prevails.

8- Modern rationality places great emphasis on research methodology. Because, fundamentally, for it, knowledge is a problem; hence, it is sensitive to the quality of knowledge acquisition. Traditional rationality, however, which is more concerned with cosmology than epistemology, attaches little importance to methodology, is uninformed about the new achievements of science in this field, and analyzes issues using the same ancient methods.

9- In traditional rationality, the essence of the human being is the rational faculty, but in modern rationality, the realm of will, emotions, and feelings is emphasized as one, or even the most important, dimension of human existence. Perhaps it is for this reason that modern humans pay more attention to pain and suffering, strive to alleviate pain and suffering, and consider whatever provides less suffering and more pleasure to be more correct.

10- Modern rationality takes individualism seriously. In the words of Mr. Mostafa Malekian, the meaning of individualism is that, ultimately, securing the rights of the individual is what matters. In fact, the modern person's scale and measure for rejecting or accepting various legal systems (whether political, economic, judicial, criminal, familial, etc.) is the success or failure these legal systems have in securing individual rights, and this means that identities such as ethnic identity, tribal identity, the system, the nation, etc., must all be referred and reduced to the rights of the individual. It is for this reason that the modern world shows less favor toward religions and denominations that believe in collective identities and strive to preserve collective identities, and welcomes more those religions that place the individual at the center of their attention. In traditional rationality, however, individuality and individualism have little place.

11- Modern rationality is rights-oriented and rights-conscious. Traditional rationality, however, is more duty-oriented; that is, its evaluations in relation to oneself and society are duty-oriented and duty-conscious.

12- Modern rationality, unlike traditional rationality, has a here-and-now, non-deferred approach and seeks function in this very world. This statement does not necessarily mean a denial of the afterlife but rather means that it tries not to defer the verification of a belief to the other world. Traditional rationality, however, pays less attention to the here and now.

13- Modern rationality does not trust comprehensive metaphysical systems (which attempt to provide an explanation for every issue within their epistemological system), but traditional rationality considers reasoning and thinking possible only within the framework of comprehensive metaphysical systems.

14- In analyzing natural and social events and phenomena, modern rationality pays little attention to final and efficient causes. In other words, modern science and rationality think about "how" rather than "ultimate whys."

A Considerable Solution for Reconciling Traditional and Modern Rationality:

Reconciling modern and traditional rationality, even if possible, is a very difficult and arduous task. Because, in the words of Gabriel Marcel, while safeguarding modern rationality or extra-religious and critical rationality, we must also safeguard the inner logic of faith (or intra-religious rationality), and maintaining a balance between these two types of rationality is an extremely difficult and delicate task.

Some believe that as long as we have not achieved a balance, if we are compelled to safeguard one more than the other, we should safeguard critical rationality more. Because it both eradicates ignorance and superstition and provides more grounds for peaceful coexistence in the modern world. And, in any case, one who walks this path will certainly, after a period of rational conduct, safeguard the inner logic of faith and will not become heedless of or deprived of the essence and core of religion.

But if we safeguard the side of traditional and intra-religious rationality more, the shell, crust, and appearance of religion are preserved, while the inner meaning and core of religion fall under serious threat. That is, contrary to what we might initially think—that extra-religious rationality may endanger the very foundation of faith—critical rationality actually safeguards faith and spirituality (not necessarily historical religion and denomination) more.