An Essay by Gholamali Keshani: “Development in Iran: Possible or Impossible?!”

The impossibility or non-impossibility of development—a question that for years has preoccupied the most serious Iranian thinkers who believe in large-scale (macro) social engineering. This has also been the most important question of Iran's economy, politics, society, and history over the last 200 years.

In these inquiries, the model of development has been the dominant European model, with its economic tools of mass production and the free market.

But over the past 100 years, this question has been raised with great neglect and carelessness, disregarding:

– The obsolescence of the meaning of development, and the emergence of strong critiques of the assumed self-evident myths of "progress" and "infinite, inevitable growth," which have so far been equated with European-style industrialization or wholesale Westernization;

– The role and presence of the religion of consumption;

– Its consequences of individual (labor force and individuals), collective, local, and national alienation, alongside the inevitability of moral values being trampled in the relations of the developed industrial free market;

– Disregard for the discussion of meaning and spirituality in this entire roadmap;

– Mass production and its devastating ecological and employment consequences;

– The free market's neglect of the perennial problem of injustice and the severe fault line of distributive inequality within it;

– The inherent globalism of the free market and its crushing of self-founded, self-sufficient indigenous economies and cultures worldwide; and the promotion of bio-cultural homogenization across the entire planet for the consumption of mass goods, through commodity-induced stupefaction or creeping repression; and so on...

Yes! A question devoid of numerous ifs and buts, and other doubts. The question of the "impossibility" and "non-impossibility" of development in Iran has been raised in an incomplete, "truncated," and "sterile" manner among thinkers and macro-intellectual engineers, with attention paid only to the political aspect of this possibility.

The intellectual framework of the majority of these thinkers, as attested by contemporary history, has been: firstly, large-scale social (political, economic, cultural) engineering and implementation; secondly, the primacy of the state's role in design and execution; thirdly, the dominance of the industrialization model as the sole ideal model, instead of a model of well-being, happiness, and meaningful life; and fourthly, the capture of the state machinery [at any cost] as the tool for their developmental approaches. Let alone that large-scale social engineering itself is "under question" (see: Popper, The Open Society, The Lesson of This Century) and large-scale social implementation, especially by the state, is even "more under question" (see: Popper, The Lesson of This Century).

In reality, a question of that magnitude and grandeur, glimpses of which we see above, has been reduced to this brief question and thus simplified, distorted, truncated, and rendered sterile:

"Given the existing political structures, could (can) the condition of the homeland have become (become) better?"

"With figures like Reza Shah or Mohammad Reza Shah and the structures that created them, as well as the structures created by them, was there any hope that Iran could become Switzerland or Denmark?"

"Is development 'feasible' in this land, if we take development to mean this full-fledged Danish-ification? That is, can a government (usually an active, omnipotent, all-powerful government) come to power that can replicate this model in Iran?"

In the question posed in this way, the government has been assumed to be "omnipotent," and everything has usually been expected from the government. It has been assumed that the government is supposed to bring development and welfare. Consequently, if the answer was negative, the questioner could draw the next conclusion: we must change the regime (the Shah) to secure the goals of development. In this prescription, the self-evident definition of development has never been doubted, and has not been.

Oblivious to the fact that the three assumptions above could be entirely invalid:

– "The omnipotent state; and that only the state is capable of creating development";

– "The expectant nation and intellectual, perpetually complaining about that same state," and consequently, the constant targeting of mere distributive justice, while neglecting other forms of justice alongside it;

– “The existence of a state oriented toward and inclined to development and welfare (a welfare still kilometers away from well-being, happiness, and ‘meaningful life’).” [That is, contrary to this assumption, one can imagine states whose primary priority is not at all securing the people’s welfare and this conventional development, but rather solely pursuing oligarchic survival and the consolidation and expansion of their sphere of national/regional/global strategic influence and power.]

[Of course, according to Simone Weil in “On the Abolition of All Political Parties,” all states born of goal-oriented party and quasi-party groups, before and after occupying the seats, have turned into a monster that can only prioritize the survival, perpetuation, and eternal growth of its own power. No ideal remains for them other than this. (End of paraphrased quotation) And if we see them doing anything else, it stems from the side effect of rivals and the media—who are constantly seeking a pretext—or fear of an uprising of public opinion. Therefore, securing welfare can be imposed in some states, and entirely ruled out in most unaccountable states.]

The key neglected points in all these discussions have been that, in the meantime, no one has even asked what post-development is? Why are the current models of development, whatever they may be, the offspring of the free market’s principle of “grow or die,” and consequently forced to obliterate indigenous cultures and knowledges of living? What are the alternatives? Can a good and righteous state even take charge of development? Is development a state matter? Why, in the view of some global thinkers of the late 20th and early 21st centuries, including Murray Bookchin with his libertarian municipalism (and here ), is the attainment of any kind of general quantitative-qualitative welfare (well-being and meaningful life), through the central presence of any state, impossible and unattainable until further notice?

In Iran, however, thinkers have been entirely unfamiliar with these kinds of questions, except for a few such as Majid Rahnema, one of the most prominent global thinkers of post-development who remains unknown to us: ( here and here ), just as they have remained unaware of other critics of Northern-Western development, of the type of Ivan Illich, and of course critics of seizing the apparatus of power for the purpose of changing the world, critics like Simone Weil.

In the realm of economics, politics, and thought regarding solutions for overcoming human afflictions in our land, we have had, in a humorous vein, two straightforward models: – At your service, esteemed authorities; and – Contrary to expediencies. (As recounted by Parviz Sayyad)

The first has been pursued by technocrats, bureaucrats, apparatchiks of the state machine, as well as intellectuals and academics aligned with mainstream global currents—albeit non-left or anti-left currents. But the second has been pursued by the majority of intellectuals outside the sphere of state endorsements and paradigm.

These tendencies, despite mostly criticizing economic-political discrimination and injustices, the existence of stark disparities in entitlements, the lack of balanced and equal opportunities throughout society, and the solutions offered by the mainstream of development missionary bodies—and for this very reason, being labeled, whether documented or not—nevertheless still aligned themselves with one of the major global currents of the Left (or near-Left) or the classic dissent. In practice, they defended a series of solutions whose examples, again, existed within the framework of certain more advanced Western nation-states (be it the Scandinavians, the Eastern Bloc, or even the Western model of Mao and Castro).

We see that both groups share one thing in common: trust and faith in the powerful currents dominating the world in the realm of economics and politics, currents whose current origins lie in the North-West. These regions had, and still have, their missionaries, whether on this front or that, and it is enough to slightly indigenize their recommendations.

This dualistic, black-or-white categorization is still so strong that the moment one points out a flaw in the free market, a socialist solution, state intervention, or the opposite, the speaker is immediately labeled, and in the most vulgar manner possible. The label of being Left or Right is instantly applied, whereas criticizing one factor or another within a solution system can never signify outright opposition to either.

We see that this very flaw indicates the repetition of accustomed national dispositions and temperaments among the white-collar workers and intellectuals, both their proponents and opponents. That is, in a seemingly academic atmosphere, you witness behavior that can only be described through prejudices, biases, backbiting, and domestic, doorstep, and coterie-style ostracism.

Perhaps one of the factors behind the vicious cycles and the sterility of the development debate is precisely these accustomed temperaments and characteristics that have filled our dialogic space. Perhaps!

====================

For seekers not satisfied with three or four lines of question and answer, the following two sources can shed light on just one of the indigenous and regional aspects of this question, and serve as a clue for a possible and conditional answer to this incomplete question.

Some of the global aspects of the question were mentioned above. Here, assuming the correctness and favorability of all global factors, whys, and hows, an indigenous and regional problem is pointed out, as we shall see:

The first: The objective report of a witness;

 Dariush Ashouri and his 15-year experience in the Plan and Budget Organization during the Shah's era.

 He is a thinker versed in philosophy, linguistics, and translation; a prominent intellectual who does not involve himself much in political debates.

But this time, he merely bears witness, while, based on this very recently written report of his (December 2, 2018), he remains faithful to that same incomplete and sterile understanding of the vague concept called "development = industrialization under the shadow of the global free market" and does not question it, without wanting/or being able to allude to the well-known and robust critiques leveled against this understanding.

The second:

An introduction to and a glimpse of a book titled "Planning in Iran, MacLeod" (Ney Publishing), based on the report of the Harvard University advisory group during the Shah's era. Readers are advised to purchase the original book and read the painful tale of "development, Iranian-style" more directly.

Both of these documents merely aim to be a report of what is.

When the shocking reality is placed before us, words must be brief.

“The thief and the goat, both are present!”

.

---

.

PDF file of this article (complete)

.

---

.

Development in Iran: Possible or Impossible?!

Author: Gholamali Keshani

Read this piece on the author's website

.

---

.