Davoud Feirahi's Lecture: Ashura and the Crisis of the Caliphate

Essentially, in our societies, wherever we look—whether ancient or modern states—only a portion of developments can be traced back to rulers, not all of them. In fact, the relationship between society and the state is an enduring question of state studies in all societies. For this reason, when we speak of an event like the Ashura incident, we are actually talking about contexts that occurred within the dialectic or interaction between society and the state, and it was from within this conflict of forces that "Ashura" came into being.

In fact, Ashura is a sign of the anger between society and the state. In societies where the state has separated from society and gained independence, it develops an autoimmune disease and clashes with society, the result of which is, in effect, various prisoners, victims, and massacres. This issue knows no time or place. Whenever a society finds itself in a state of anomie and the state and the nation, or the government and the people, create a rift, it will ultimately end in conflict, manifesting itself in the form of rebellions and repressions.

The second preliminary point concerns the nature of the state in the Islamic world. At certain junctures since early Islam, the state has been a kind of rentier state. A rent based on spoils, meaning a great deal of money is in the hands of the state, and therefore the fate of society rests in the capable or incapable hands of the state. For this reason, in such a society, we witness the state's unbridled dominance, and it must be said that under these conditions, states become totalitarian and seize control of the entire society's destiny.

In such a situation, not only is economic power in the hands of states, but instead of politics adopting the logic of economics, economics adopts the logic of politics, and the state, with the money at its disposal, controls religion, culture, the education system, public opinion, and the media. Under such conditions, two situations arise. First, repression for freedom-seekers, and second, opportunism for opportunists. This situation divides society into two parts: those who protest the status quo and those who benefit from the existing situation.

When we look at pre-Islamic Arab society, we do not see a state in the modern scientific sense of the word. There was a state, but it was technically called a city-state. That is, each city had its own independent state and distinct tradition. From within this historical tradition, two models of governance can be extracted. The first is the Meccan model, which had an aristocratic tradition with a hierarchy led by superior tribes and men; in Greek literature, this mode of governance was technically called "aristocracy" (rule of the best).

In this system, the closer we get to the apex, the smaller and stronger it becomes, and the further down we go, the more the powerless masses increase. While such a system prevailed in Mecca, Medina had a democratic character. Medina relied on the tradition of consultation (shura), and the famous verse "Their affair is by consultation among them" (Quran 42:38) speaks of Medina's situation. The story goes that when the Prophet of Islam (PBUH) entered the city of Medina, he chose the Medinan tradition, steering governance toward a series of contracts and introducing a consultative vein into it.

After the Prophet (PBUH), we gradually witness the merging of the Medinan tradition with the Meccan one, and the predominance of the Meccan tradition over Islamic civilization. That is, the formation of a Quraysh-dominated tribe or an aristocratic government based on the Meccan tradition, which was also a significant tradition inspired by Rome. Under such conditions, Ibn Khaldun has a beautiful sentence in the introduction to his book, saying: if a conflict arises between the Banu Hashim and the Banu Umayya, because the power potential of the Banu Umayya is high, the Banu Umayya will ultimately win power. This happened, resulting in a caliphate that was outwardly based on allegiance (bay'ah) but inwardly contained an aristocracy.

Ibn Khaldun explains that such a caliphate can transition to monarchy in three stages. That is, egalitarian and freedom-seeking elements no longer find meaning within it. At first, it becomes slightly democratic, then outwardly democratic but inwardly more rigid, and finally, after 40 years—that is, from the beginning of Mu'awiya's rule—it moves intensely and rapidly toward Persian monarchy, revealing its elements.

When Muʿāwiya, after the peace treaty with Imam Ḥasan (ʿa), enters Medina under the pretext of the Ḥajj, the notables address him thus: “al-Salāmu ʿalayka ayyuhā al-malik” — that is, they no longer call him Caliph, but address him as king. And when Muʿāwiya protests, asking why they do not call him Caliph, those individuals reply: “The Caliph is the one we choose, but you have imposed yourself upon us by force of the sword.”

There is fundamentally a proposition in history that it takes time for an event or a political decision to move beyond its nucleus and reveal its consequences. That is, the decision of Saqīfa needed sixty years to unfold until it reached ʿAbd al-Malik b. Marwān, and it required fifty years to reach Yazīd b. Muʿāwiya and to manifest its elements. This explanation was necessary to show how the two traditions, the Medinan and the Meccan, were merged in favor of the Meccan tradition, and how important Islamic ideals found no place within it. Such conditions are agonizing for the free-spirited and for those who fixed their hopes on Ḥusayn (ʿa).

Ḥusayn b. ʿAlī (ʿa) should not be viewed in isolation. For the collection of people who had fixed their hopes on Ḥusayn (ʿa) expected a reaction from him. In early Islam, governance was based on the voluntary contributions of citizens; thus, the state was dependent on the people. The last public treasury that the Prophet (ṣ) distributed amounted to about 80,000 dinars, which was not so significant in Medina. Therefore, in reality, the state had no money and relied on the people.

At that juncture, two types of bayʿa (pledge of allegiance) were practiced: one was allegiance to the government, and the other was a moment-by-moment allegiance regarding critical decisions, which today would be called a “referendum.” The year 15 AH is a very important year for the history of Iran and Syria, because in that year the Battle of Qādisiyya took place, and the wealthy empires of Iran and, immediately thereafter, Rome collapsed, and their wealth entered Medina. It is interesting that the management of that wealth fell into the hands of the state, and a system called rentierism appeared, exactly like today’s oil wells. When the state has no need of the citizen, it is impossible for the citizen, a dependent of the state, to exercise proper oversight over its performance.

Thus, all economic policymaking fell into the hands of the Caliph, and an important event occurred: a phenomenon called systematic corruption took shape within the state. Until the year 13 AH, if there was any booty, it was divided equally. For example, when Abū Bakr wanted to distribute the public treasury, he would say that, for him, there was no difference between a mujāhid and a non-mujāhid.

But in the year 15 AH, the second Caliph defined a formula for distributing spoils that remained in place until the end of the Umayyad dynasty and marked the beginning of the Islamic state’s further distancing from the sīra of the Prophet (ṣ). The formula was simple: each Muslim’s share was equal to the degree of his kinship proximity to the Prophet multiplied by his precedence in Islam. That is, whoever had embraced Islam earlier, by the number of days and hours he had done so, gained more privilege over others, and whoever was tribally closer to the Prophet gained more privilege. When we introduce this mathematical formula into the economy, we can calculate how much money Ṭalḥa received and how much a slave or a non-Arab received.

The story of discrimination was the beginning of the systematic corruption that existed in that period. ʿUmar, the second Caliph, had understood part of the problem and said that money should be in the hands of the Companions, but they did not have the right to convert their wealth into capital. This is very important, because wealth is pure assets; but capital means assets that are increasing. It is interesting that very soon the children of those individuals were drawn into corruption, and ʿUmar has a saying: “I stood at the Ḥarra crossing in Medina, watching that the Arab’s waistband did not slip down.” He imagined that he could prevent this process with such statements, but he himself fell victim.

The third Caliph, upon coming to power, immediately began privatization, and all the wealth that was in Medina was converted from coinage into agricultural lands. The Companions, by paying money, bought up the lands of Sābāṭ, Kufa, Rayy, Syria, and other places one after another, turning the previous inhabitants into serfs, and this same money returned to the public treasury and, according to ʿUmar’s formula, went back into their pockets. In reality, this money did not benefit the state and only removed the state’s lands from its possession.

Gradually, Qurayshism and tribalism took shape, imbalance arose, and the seat of the caliphate became a center for the production and reproduction of systematic corruption. In fact, the seat of the caliphate was a heart that pumped this corruption into society. Under such conditions, a phenomenon of protest accompanied by fear takes shape; society develops a suppressed resentment and, because of the political, military, and judicial pressure on its shoulders, cannot express its protest freely.

In such a society, there is no longer any bond between the state and the people; rather, a structural rupture has formed between society and the state, and in this situation, the state becomes a security state and strives intensely to preserve itself, refraining from no violent act to do so. But if its rulers are shrewd, this resentment persists for a time. Mu'awiya is one of the greatest statesman-caliphs in Islamic history, and some have compared him to Machiavelli.

Mu'awiya was asked, "How were you able to govern this populace that Ali ibn Abi Talib (AS) could not control, leading to his martyrdom?" He replied, "People have their angers, but they do not know their way. They stage sporadic rebellions, and at that moment I feel that the bond between Syria and the people has been reduced to a single thread; so, however many people they kill, I loosen this thread. But people soon grow weary and fall asleep, and I pull this thread back as much as it has been stretched, and whoever has been gathered by that thread falls into my hands. And if I pick off these elites one by one, the rest will remain silent for a long time."

Mu'awiya also says in a testament to Yazid: "As soon as I am gone, the people will not leave the leaders residing in Medina in peace, and especially Kufa and Iraq will not remain calm." He advises Yazid to be wary of four people: Husayn ibn Ali (AS), Abdullah ibn Umar, Abdullah al-Zubayr, and Abd al-Rahman ibn Abi Bakr, each of whom is connected to a great figure and each is a prominent figure in society's affairs and a well-known social elite. Interestingly, he advises that if you are harsh, do not be harsh with Husayn (AS), for he is a free man who will resist hardship. So, if you wish to be harsh, be harsh with Abdullah al-Zubayr.

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Audio of Davoud Feirahi's Lecture Titled Ashura and the Crisis of the Caliphate

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Ceremony of the Fourth Night of Mourning for Husayn ibn Ali (AS)

Dar al-Zahra Cultural and Religious Institute

September 17, 2018

Source of the text report: Jamaran

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