Do Bread and Security Take Precedence over Freedom?

Do Bread and Security Take Precedence over Freedom?

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My central question in this essay is: Do bread and security take precedence over freedom? As we shall see, this question can ultimately be reduced to another: Is freedom among the instances of “basic human rights”?

To clarify the meaning of this question, I must clarify what I mean by “basic human rights.”

First— “Basic human rights” are a type of “right,” or more precisely, a “moral right.” A moral right provides a rationally acceptable basis for a justified claim, and its corollary is that the enjoyment of the content of that right must be guaranteed at the social level and protected against actual and potential threats. Therefore, for every right we define, a duty is consequently born. So we can say that “right,” in the parlance of logicians, is a two-place predicate, meaning it expresses a relation between two things: one, the referent of the right-holder or the entitled individual, and the other, the party bearing the duty or the obligated individual. Thus, the fulfillment of a right is not a favor done to the right-holder. The right-holder is a “creditor,” and can and should lay claim to their right, and demand its realization with dignity. It is for this very reason that the concept of “right” is deeply intertwined with the concept of “human dignity.” In a society where the concept of “right” does not exist or is not recognized, human beings are degraded. In such a society, people do not see themselves as worthy and deserving of kindness and respect, and if, by chance, someone shows them kindness and courtesy, they attribute it to their great fortune, not to their merit and dignity. A person who lacks rights becomes a parasite on the kindness and generosity of others, and this very parasitism destroys their sense of self-confidence and self-respect, turning them into an abject and base character.¹

Second— “Basic human rights” are instances of “human rights.” By “human rights,” I mean a right that all human beings hold against all human beings. More precisely, whenever both arguments of the two-place predicate “right” are all human beings, we are dealing with an instance of human rights. Therefore, human rights are a claim that every human being, simply by virtue of being human, can rightfully expect every other human being to fulfill. For example, the “right to life” can be considered a clear instance of “human rights,” because all human beings enjoy this right, and all human beings are obligated to respect the right to life of others.

Third— “Basic human rights” are “basic” or “fundamental” in the sense that the realization of all other rights depends on their realization. Therefore, in practice, we must first establish and guarantee the realization of these basic rights, and then proceed to other rights. Basic human rights should be considered the minimum reasonable demands of every human being as such. The truth is that “basic human rights” must be seen as the floor of morality, and a necessary minimum for a dignified life. The mission of morality includes providing a minimal protection for weak and defenseless human beings. Morality does this by defending “basic human rights.” These rights are the last trench that protects defenseless and vulnerable human beings against the excruciating sufferings and calamities of life. These rights place a limit on the unbridled and rebellious steed of politics and economics, lest weak and powerless human beings be utterly trampled and destroyed under the blows of its hooves.

Almost everyone agrees that the “right to security” and the “right to subsistence” are among the most important and clearest instances of “basic human rights.” The right to security protects human beings against “fear,” and the right to subsistence safeguards them from the anxiety of bread or the danger of “hunger” (in the broad sense of the word). By “right to security,” I mean the right to immunity from being killed, tortured, beaten, or subjected to physical assault, violence, or aggression. And by “right to subsistence,” I mean the right to enjoy a minimum of economic security, that is, access to clean air, safe water, adequate food and clothing, suitable shelter, and a minimum of healthcare and medical attention.

But why are the “right to security” and the “right to livelihood” considered among “basic rights”? In general, to show that these rights are instances of “basic rights,” we can argue as follows: If a human being possesses a right, then they necessarily also enjoy the “right to security” and the “right to livelihood.”^۲ Let us formulate this argument more clearly:

(1) Human beings enjoy certain rights. (Let us call these rights, whatever they may be, “A.”) (2) In order to enjoy those rights, certain conditions and contexts must be in place. (Let us call those conditions and contexts “B.”) (3) Therefore, a human being who possesses right “A” also acquires a right to the realization of those necessary conditions and contexts; that is, one who possesses right “A” also possesses right “B.”

It is clear that the enjoyment of security, as well as a minimum of the necessities of livelihood, is a precondition for the realization and enjoyment of any other right. For example, in conditions where an individual’s life is constantly exposed to various threats and physical insecurities, the individual cannot enjoy any of their rights in a proper manner. If individuals are to be able to enjoy their human rights with relative peace of mind, their right to security must be guaranteed. If the right to security of human beings is not recognized in a society, then others, including the government, can intervene in the individual’s life with a free hand and an untroubled mind, or prevent them from truly exercising their other rights. A similar argument can be made regarding the “right to livelihood”: No one can properly enjoy their human rights unless they possess a minimum of the necessities required for a healthy and active life. Therefore, if a human being possesses a right, they necessarily also possess the right to security and livelihood. And this means that these two rights are among the “basic rights” of human beings. And since this argument holds true for every human being, we can therefore consider these rights to be among universal rights.

As I mentioned earlier, as soon as a right is defined, a corresponding duty is consequently generated. Therefore, as soon as we define “basic rights,” we must also identify the duties corresponding to them. Observing and respecting “basic rights” entails observing and adhering to the following duties or obligations:

The first duty or obligation is to refrain from violating the basic rights of human beings. For example, no one has the right to deprive other human beings of their security, or to deprive them of the right of access to the primary and necessary requirements of life.

The second duty or obligation is to protect human beings against the violation of their basic rights. For example, it is incumbent upon everyone to support and protect human beings whose security is threatened by others, or not to allow anyone to deprive another human being of their sole means of livelihood and survival. To protect the basic rights of human beings, at least two important tasks must be carried out: Firstly, everyone must be obliged to refrain from violating the basic rights of others (that is, adherence to the first duty must be made obligatory for everyone.) Secondly, social institutions must be organized in such a way that living under their shadow does not make refraining from violating basic rights a difficult and costly endeavor.

The third duty or obligation is to assist the victims of basic rights violations. For example, it is incumbent upon us to rush to the aid of those who cannot secure their own safety, or who are unable to provide for the basic necessities of life. Among these, there are three groups of human beings whom we are duty-bound to assist:

First, victims for whose rights violations we have been responsible.

Second, victims whose dire situation is a consequence of society’s failure or fault in fulfilling the first and second types of duties.

Third, those who are victims of natural disasters, meaning they have been deprived of the right to enjoy the basic necessities of life due to the occurrence of unfortunate natural events such as floods and earthquakes.^۳

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Let us now return to our main question: how should we understand the relationship between the “right to security” and the “right to livelihood” on the one hand, and the “right to freedom” on the other? Understanding and analyzing this relationship is very important from the standpoint of macro-social policymaking. If it turns out that the “right to freedom,” unlike the “right to security” and the “right to livelihood,” is not a fundamental right, then in the context of planning and macro-policymaking in poor or developing countries, providing for people’s security and livelihood must take precedence over providing for their freedoms. The reason is clear: as stated earlier, fundamental rights are the precondition for the realization of other human rights, and in this respect, their realization is obligatory even at the expense of other human rights. One fundamental right cannot be suspended at the expense of another fundamental right. However, in situations where the realization of a fundamental right conflicts with the realization of a non-fundamental right, the realization of the fundamental right takes precedence.

As it happens, a number of political scientists and development experts, as well as many autocratic rulers around the world, recommend the prescription of “the precedence of security and livelihood over freedom” for developing societies. Perhaps the most prominent representative of this view among political science thinkers is Samuel Huntington. Regarding poor or developing countries, he defends a doctrine sometimes called the “doctrine of the [freedom] dash”^۴. According to this doctrine, in poor countries, the enjoyment of a minimum livelihood can perhaps only be obtained at the cost of forgoing freedom.^۵ Even John Rawls’s theory of justice assumes and is predicated on the notion that, at least in some cases, economic growth requires the sacrifice of freedom.^۶ This doctrine has also been the most important basis for justifying “reformist dictatorships.” For example, Jahangir Amuzegar, the then-representative of Iran at the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, defended the doctrine of the precedence of the right to livelihood over freedom in Third World countries on behalf of the former Shah of Iran. He wrote during that era: “In Third World countries suffering from poverty, widespread illiteracy, and a vast gap in the distribution of wealth and national income, guaranteeing the freedom of [political] opponents and dissidents in the constitution may not be as important as liberation from despair, disease, and deprivation. The masses of people actually prefer to put more morsels in their mouths instead of hollow words; they prefer a healthcare center to a Hyde Park; they prefer a stable, well-paying job to the right to demonstrate in front of government offices. These dashes may seem disappointing and worthy of criticism in the eyes of a Western purist, but they are necessary and inevitable for the majority of nation-states.”^۷ A similar perception persisted among some of the main leaders of the Islamic Republic in the years following the Islamic Revolution.

This claim is not without force. A human being who worries about bread, or whose daily life is exposed to the constant threat of war, violence, or various forms of insecurity, thinks of freedom as the very last thing. Freedom becomes meaningful when people have been relieved, to some extent, from the perils of fear and hunger. In the absence of bread and security, one cannot enjoy the rights related to freedoms. And this means that the right to security and the right to livelihood are more fundamental than the right to freedom. In other words, the “right to security” and the “right to livelihood” are fundamental human rights, but the “right to freedom” does not enjoy such a foundational status. Therefore, in situations where policymakers and administrators of poor or developing countries are compelled to prioritize and choose among the human rights of citizens, the “right to security” and the “right to livelihood” take a higher priority than the “right to freedom.” Under these conditions, the primary and principal duty of these administrators and policymakers is to first strive for the realization and consolidation of the rights related to security and livelihood. If we accept this argument, we must necessarily consider this ranking and policymaking to be morally justified and defensible as well.

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The truth is that the relationship between the right to security and livelihood on the one hand, and the right to freedom on the other, is more complex than it appears at first glance. I believe it is an entirely correct statement that the precondition for enjoying all types of freedoms is the enjoyment of the right to security and livelihood. But on the other hand, the realization and provision of the right to security and livelihood is also, to some extent, contingent upon the realization and provision of at least some types of freedoms. Proponents of the precedence of bread and security over freedom often overlook this latter point. In other words, there is a reciprocal but asymmetrical relationship between the right to security and livelihood on one side, and the right to freedom on the other. This relationship is “reciprocal” because, as we shall see, the provision and realization of the right to security and livelihood also depends to some degree on the provision and realization of the right to freedom. But it is “asymmetrical” because, although the enjoyment of rights related to all types of freedoms depends on the enjoyment of the right to security and livelihood, the enjoyment of the right to security and livelihood depends only on the enjoyment of some freedoms.^۸ The meaning of this statement is that not all types of freedoms can be considered fundamental rights; only some freedoms possess such a status. Of course, I reiterate that here, a right being “fundamental” does not necessarily mean it is “more valuable,” but merely that the realization of that right is a necessary condition for the realization of other human rights. Without a doubt, the enjoyment of certain freedoms plays an undeniable role and necessity in the artistic and cultural flourishing and efflorescence of a society. But this alone is not sufficient to place those freedoms among the “fundamental rights” of human beings. These freedoms, regardless of all their importance, can only be considered among “fundamental rights” if their enjoyment is a requisite for the fulfillment of all other rights. But which type of freedoms can be considered “fundamental” and among the basic rights of human beings?

Among all types of freedoms, at least “freedom or the right to participation” can be counted among the most important instances of the “fundamental rights” of human beings. The concept of the “right to participation” in this context has at least three important facets:

First- As a citizen or a member of society, I must have the right to choose among those social institutions and policies that deal with the categories of livelihood and security—especially when the functioning of those institutions or the implementation of those policies directly affects my life.

Second- The right to participation is only meaningful when my participation has a real impact on the course of affairs. If we place the first and second facets together, the concept of “effective participation” is born.^۹ The meaning of “effective participation” is the possibility of having a real influence on the decisions made by social institutions and policymakers regarding matters that concern my security and livelihood.

Third- The concept of “participation” here is broader than political participation. My security and livelihood, and consequently my entire life (as a citizen or a member of society), is as much influenced by economic organizations as it is by political relations. Therefore, the scope of citizens' right to effective participation extends beyond the political sphere and into the realm of the economy.

Thus, the main claim here is that the “right to participation” in the aforementioned sense is among the fundamental rights of human beings, and the enjoyment of this right is also necessary, among other things, for the provision and realization of the right to security and livelihood.

But this claim faces difficulties. Here, I would like to examine two important objections to this claim.

First objection: Critics of this position can claim that all instances of fundamental human rights are “universal.” And the most important sign of a right’s universality is that all human beings, regardless of nationality, race, geographical region, gender, religion, etc., desire it.^۱۰ Consider, for example, the right to security. All human beings, from whatever group or class they may be, and wherever in the world they may live, are aware of this right and ardently desire to enjoy it. However, according to these critics, on this basis the “right to participation” cannot be considered “universal.” Many people (especially in poor and underdeveloped countries) are fundamentally unaware of such a right, and many of those who have heard something about it have little desire to benefit from it. Is this lack of awareness or unwillingness not a sign that the “right to participation” is not universal and therefore cannot be counted among the instances of fundamental human rights?

The truth is that the answer to this question is negative. In general, judging whether an individual truly possesses right X is absolutely independent of whether that individual ascribes such a right to themselves, or in practice has any desire to benefit from that right. For example, a child very likely has absolutely no idea that enjoying education or proper nutrition is among their rights. Can we conclude on this basis that they therefore do not possess such rights? Or consider an individual suffering from a kind of mental disability, fundamentally incapable of grasping the concept of a right. Does this mean that this individual, for instance, does not enjoy the right to life, and that killing them is morally unproblematic? In many parts of the world, women, due to compounded deprivations, are unaware of many of their basic human rights, such as the right to education or the right to equal rights with men, but does this mean they do not actually have such rights? It is clear that the answer to these questions is negative. If one can, by the force of argument, prove a right for human beings qua human beings, then every human being possesses that right, even if they themselves are unaware of it or have no desire to exercise it. In many cases, particularly in poor or underdeveloped countries, people do not benefit from sufficient education, and consequently lack adequate awareness of many of their fundamental rights and the importance of those rights. Even those who are more or less aware of those rights often find demanding them very costly and sometimes impossible. But none of these things negate these individuals’ rights. Therefore, the condition for a right (e.g., the “right to participation”) to be considered universal is not that all human beings must necessarily consciously consider it among their rights, or want to exercise that right.

The second objection, however, is a more important one. As I mentioned earlier, the defenders of the “doctrine of galloping” and also the proponents of the “benevolent dictator” ultimately believe that under certain conditions, at least some people can enjoy many of their rights, including the right to security and livelihood, without enjoying the “right to participation.” The view of these theorists can be summarized in the following claim:

“The people’s right to security and right to livelihood can be secured without respecting their right to participation.”

If this claim is true, then by definition, we can no longer consider the “right to participation” among the fundamental human rights. But why should this claim be accepted? Probably the most important evidence for this claim is the existence of “benevolent dictators.” Undoubtedly, a benevolent dictator can secure the people’s security and livelihood without involving them in the decision-making and policy-making processes. It seems that this single example is sufficient to demonstrate the truth of that claim.

But is this argument correct? In my opinion, the answer is negative. A subtle but very important distinction has been overlooked in this argument. The truth is that there is a significant difference between securing “security” and “livelihood” on the one hand, and securing the “right to security” and the “right to livelihood” on the other. According to the explanation that will follow, the rulers and policymakers of a society can secure the people’s security and livelihood without necessarily respecting their “right to security” and “right to livelihood.” Therefore, the core of my claim here is this:

“A benevolent dictator can provide for the people’s security and livelihood without respecting their right to participation, but without respecting the right to participation, one cannot provide for and guarantee their ‘right to security’ and ‘right to livelihood.’”

To clarify this claim, it is helpful to recall once more some important aspects of the concept of “right.” As I noted at the outset, the concept of “right” is intertwined with the concept of “claim.” A right provides the rational basis for a kind of “justified claim.” For example, when it is said that Ali has a right to life, it means that Ali can rightfully make a claim upon others and expect them not to harm his life. Or when it is said that Maryam has a right to education, it means that she can rightfully demand her educational facilities from an authority (e.g., the state). It is important to note that when we establish a right for someone, the observance of that right is presupposed on the part of another. When the obligated individual responds positively to the claim of the rights-holder, they are not doing them a favor, but merely fulfilling their duty. Therefore, whenever a right is established for someone, a duty or obligation is immediately presupposed for another or others in relation to that right. This point applies a fortiori to “fundamental rights.” As soon as we establish a right as a “fundamental right,” it is presupposed for everyone (first) to refrain from violating that right, (second) to protect that right, and (third) to come to the aid of the victims of the violation of that right.

But if no one is to pay any heed to the commitment and duty they have towards another’s right, then that right would be more of a wishful thinking, fantasy, or desire. I am the genuine owner of a specific right only when my enjoyment of that right is guaranteed at the societal level. Therefore, mechanisms must be devised to guarantee the enjoyment of rights (especially “fundamental rights”) at the societal level, and to protect those rights against actual or potential threats. For this purpose, we need institutions that can prevent the violation of human rights, and if a person’s right has been violated somewhere, restore the enjoyment of that right. I wish to emphasize that these protective mechanisms are constitutive elements of rights. If the “enjoyment of a right” is not guaranteed in society, and the benefit of that right is subject to the favor and grace or the likes and dislikes of this or that authority of power, the individuals of that society are not truly enjoying that right. Therefore, providing for the people’s security and livelihood is not sufficient; guaranteeing them is equally important.

However, one can perfectly well imagine a benevolent dictator who not only provides for, but more importantly, guarantees the people’s security and livelihood. For example, one can suppose a benevolent dictator who, without respecting the people’s “right to participation,” has established some kind of inspection mechanism or even an efficient and relatively independent judiciary in society, and has given these institutions the scope to protect the people against actual and potential threats that endanger their security and livelihood (even when this threat comes from the government’s own agents). But there are two important problems here:

First, although assuming these ideal conditions is possible, it is not clear to what extent it is realistic. Repeated historical experiences show that in the absence of the people’s “effective participation,” inspection and oversight institutions quickly become corrupt and lose their effectiveness.

Secondly, there is no guarantee that the benevolent dictator will himself remain benevolent over time, and that he will not become tainted by corruption. If such a metamorphosis occurs and the ruler himself begins to violate the people's rights, how can the people be protected against this aggression and how can the violation of their fundamental rights by the absolute ruler be prevented? The main problem with the model of the reformist dictatorship is that the “possibility of violating” the people's rights and the “possibility of protecting” those rights are placed in the same hands. If the avenues for the “effective participation” of citizens in matters that directly concern their security and livelihood are closed, then the people will be defenseless and extremely vulnerable to the violation of their fundamental rights by the government. And this means that in the absence of the people's “right to effective participation,” their fundamental rights, including their right to security and livelihood, are not truly guaranteed. Therefore, the core of my argument in defense of the “right to participation” as a fundamental human right is as follows:

(1) A “right” is not realized unless its enjoyment is “guaranteed.” (2) A real “guarantee” of rights is not possible unless citizens themselves can defend and protect their rights through appropriate and effective social institutions. (3) “Defending one's own rights” requires the possession of the “right to effective participation,” especially in the realm of political decision-making and policymaking. (4) Therefore, the “right to effective participation” is a necessary condition for the realization of other rights, including the “right to security” and the “right to livelihood.”

In the absence of the right to participation, it may well be possible to provide the people with bread and security, but under these conditions their “right to security” and “right to livelihood” are not realized. In other words, the people's “right to security” and “right to livelihood” cannot be secured without respecting their right to participation. If we accept this analysis, then we must acknowledge that the “right to effective participation” is among the fundamental human rights, and morally, no authority can disregard it at any price or under any pretext.

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Notes:

1- For a good discussion on the relationship between “right” and “human dignity,” see.

Joel Feinberg, Social Philosophy, (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1973), pp.58-9.

2- Something akin to this argument can be found in the following classic article:

H. L. A. Hart, “Are there any natural rights?”, Philosophical Review, 64:2(April 1955), pp. 175-191.

3- For an illuminating discussion on this, see.

Henry Shue, Basic Rights, (Princeton University Press, 2nd edition, 1996), Ch.2.

4- “trade-off” thesis

5- To become acquainted with Huntington's views on this, see.

Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), pp.1-92.

6- John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, (Harvard University Press, 1978), Section 82.

7- Jahangir Amuzegar, “Rights, and Wrongs,” New York Times, January 29, 1978.

8- For a very good defense of this view, see.

Henry Shue, Basic Rights, Ch.3

9- On the concept of “effective participation,” see.

Carole Pateman, Participation and Democratic Theory, (New York, Cambridge University Press, 1970), esp. pp. 67-71.

10- For an example of this type of view, see.

Charles Frankel, Human Rights and Foreign Policy, Headline Series No. 241(New York: Foreign Policy Association, 1978), p.45. And also; Thomas Nagel, “Equality”, in his book Mortal Questions (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979), pp.114 and 115.

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Do Bread and Security Take Precedence over Freedom?

Author: Arash Naraghi

California - Santa Barbara

2 November 2006

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