Introducing the Book Virtue Epistemology by Zahra Khazaei

The affinity between ethics and epistemology provides an opportunity for philosophers to draw on the fundamental concepts of virtue ethics in explaining the elements of epistemic sciences. Virtue epistemology is an approach distinct from analytic epistemology which, by shifting the axis of evaluation from belief to the believer, introduces the element of “epistemic virtue.” The book “Virtue Epistemology”, motivated by the aim of explaining and introducing this new branch of epistemology, has been compiled in 211 pages and four chapters.

Chapter One can be considered an introduction to the entire book. In this chapter, in order to clarify the nature of virtue epistemology, the author examines the distinction between analytic epistemology and virtue epistemology, the historical and epistemic origins of this theory, and its various approaches. The primacy of intellectual virtues over justified belief and the evaluation of belief passing through the evaluation of the believer in virtue epistemology, versus the primacy of belief over the agent and the focus on evaluating belief in analytic epistemology, is the most important distinction between these two theories. Historically, virtue epistemology (like virtue ethics) is rooted in ancient Greek thought and draws inspiration from philosophers such as Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Descartes, Kierkegaard, and Peirce. However, it was Sosa who, in 1980, in his article “The Raft and the Pyramid,” first introduced the concept of intellectual virtue into the field of epistemology. All virtue epistemologists consider epistemology a normative science and regard cognitive agents and their epistemic faculties and characters as the primary source and main axis of epistemic value, but disagreements such as the multiplicity of accounts of the nature of intellectual virtue, the type of focus on intellectual virtue, the various forms of the relationship between epistemic virtue and knowledge, and also the motivation for the orientation, have led to the formation of multiple approaches. The nature of intellectual virtue is interpreted in the “reliabilist” branch as reliable faculties and in the “responsibilist” branch as an intellectual character trait. Furthermore, the belief in the primacy of truth in reliabilism and the belief in the primacy of virtue in responsibilism is another criterion for the creation of these two branches. Sosa, Greco, and Goldman are counted among the reliabilists, and Code, Zagzebski, Van Woudenberg, and Montmarquet are considered among the responsibilists. The manner of focusing on the agent’s intellectual character has been conceived in at least four approaches and in four ways: semantic focus, ontological focus, focus on virtues as the sole indicator of the evaluative states of beliefs, and finally, focus on virtues merely as the axis of philosophical works. The author introduces another axis for classifying approaches as advocacy for or opposition to theorizing based on virtue (anti-virtue-theorizing approaches are themselves divided into two types: “virtue eliminativism” and “virtue expansionism”). Virtue epistemologists do not hold a uniform view on the relationship between the concept of intellectual virtue and the problems of traditional epistemology. The “conservative” approach believes in a connection between the concept of intellectual virtue and the problems of traditional epistemology, but in the “autonomous” or “independent” approach, appeal to intellectual virtue has a reason other than solving traditional questions. Each of these two approaches is divided into strong and weak branches. Zagzebski and Baehr hold the strong and weak conservative approaches, respectively, and Van Woudenberg and Code hold the strong and weak autonomous approaches, respectively.

Chapter Two is devoted to analyzing the most important elements of virtue epistemology (the nature of epistemic virtue, knowledge, the value of knowledge). “Epistemic virtue” in reliabilism is interpreted as faculties such as sense perception, intuition, and memory, and in responsibilism as character or inner dispositions such as carefulness, open-mindedness, humility, and intellectual courage. The author then goes on to state the characteristics of intellectual virtues in both views. In virtue epistemology, “knowledge” is true belief that is attained through intellectual virtue and not by chance or accident. Of course, reliabilists have also offered the theory of credit or praise in explaining knowledge, in which the object of praise is the competence of the agent who has acquired beliefs through intellectual virtues. In virtue epistemology, the “value” of belief goes back to its attainment through the exercise of virtues. Reliabilists explain this value in terms of the reliability of the cognitive process or faculties, and responsibilists believe that the value must be substantive, essential, and intrinsic; in other words, the agent must have produced it virtuously. An interest in understanding and wisdom, and attention to the distinctness of understanding from knowledge, is another characteristic of virtue epistemologists, especially Zagzebski. In her view, understanding is an important epistemic state related to superior skill that is non-propositional and pertains to patterns and systems, and consequently, unlike propositional knowledge, it is not achieved merely through information. At the end of this chapter, the author briefly introduces two important and influential reliabilists (Sosa and Greco) and two influential responsibilists (Code and Montmarquet), and due to the importance of Zagzebski’s view, dedicates an independent chapter to introducing it. “Sosa,” like other reliabilists and with greater emphasis, considers intellectual virtues to be innate and cognitive faculties or abilities that assist the agent in increasing truth. He, whose main motivation is to resolve the dispute between coherentism and foundationalism, sees the correct explanation of justified belief and knowledge in light of defining intellectual virtue and introducing the normative characteristics of belief based on it. In Sosa’s view, motivation and inclination toward truth play no role in the truth of belief. In his final view on the value of knowledge, he speaks of good and competent belief (belief formed under appropriate conditions) and considers internal and external conditions as two important elements in the process of belief formation. By external conditions, he means the specific environmental conditions of the agent, and by internal conditions or nature, his reliable perceptual faculties. “Greco” is also a reliabilist and offers a faculty-centered definition for intellectual virtues, considering them innate or acquired abilities or faculties. In Greco’s view, praiseworthiness and reliability are two important elements in epistemic justification, and there is a kind of motivational role in knowledge and its value. He considers the definition of knowledge to require three things: the subjective justification of belief (the belief arising from virtues that the individual manifests when motivated by the motivation for believing the truth), the objective justification of belief (acquiring belief through reliable virtues), and finally, that the individual’s belief in the truth of a claim is due to the belief that the claim arises from their intellectual virtues. “Code” is a responsibilist with a social approach and considers “epistemic responsibility” the primary intellectual virtue, placing virtues such as avoidance of prejudice, open-mindedness, honesty, and truthfulness under its umbrella. In the responsibilist view of “Montmarquet,” the desire for truth plays an important and fundamental normative role. He considers the primary epistemic virtue to be “epistemic conscientiousness” (the desire to achieve the worthy ends of intellectual life, especially the desire for truth and the avoidance of error) and introduces impartiality, intellectual seriousness or sobriety, and intellectual courage as three supplementary virtues in regulating this desire.

Chapter Three, despite its general title “Virtue Epistemology, an Epistemological Theory,” is entirely devoted to explaining the theory of Zagzebski (based on her book “Virtues of the Mind”). Zagzebski is a responsibilist and the first person to formulate an epistemological theory based on virtue ethics. By critiquing act-based ethics and the virtue epistemology theories founded upon it, and by enumerating the reasons for preferring virtue ethics theory, she endeavors to develop an epistemological theory based on Aristotle’s (eudaimonistic) account and Slote’s (motive-based or agent-based) account of virtue ethics. The author has attempted, first by presenting Zagzebski’s analysis of virtue and its types, the motivation for knowledge and reliable success, the role and function of phronesis in virtue epistemology, and the evaluation of cognitive activity, to draw the reader’s attention to the distinctiveness of her view from others. The author then examines Zagzebski’s most important epistemological task (defining knowledge and its types, explaining the value of knowledge) as well as her solutions for overcoming Gettier counterexamples. Zagzebski considers intellectual virtue to be a deep, enduring intellectual excellence and believes that knowledge requires an individual to possess a virtuous intellectual motivation and to do what a virtuous person would do in those circumstances, thereby arriving at the truth. She considers “motivation” the most important element of intellectual virtue and knowledge the ultimate end of every intellectual virtue. With great emphasis on the agent’s connection to reality, she offers this definition of knowledge: “Knowledge is a state of cognitive contact with reality (or a true belief) arising from acts of epistemic virtue.” Zagzebski claims that her definition encompasses both types of knowledge: low-level knowledge (non-reflective and limited to knowledge through faculties) and high-level knowledge (reflective and based on character traits), although she does not deem the motivational element necessary in low-level knowledge. In her view, the “value” of a belief is not the product of a cause external to the believer but is internal and a state of the agent. Truth plus an independently valuable source cannot justify value; rather, a belief derives its evaluative properties from the properties of the agent, and the manner of this derivation traces back to motivations that are forms of the fundamental motive of the love of truth. Zagzebski considers motivation an affective state that initiates and directs action. At the end of Chapter Four, after pointing to the reasons for reliabilists’ failure to resolve Gettier problems, the author examines Zagzebski’s solution, which she achieved by distinguishing between the manifestation of virtue and an act arising from virtue. In her view, the definition of knowledge as a state arising from intellectual virtue is such that it entails truth, and according to it, without the agent attaining reality or truth, no knowledge is obtained at all.

Chapter Four serves as a crucible of critique for virtue epistemology. In this chapter, the author points to eleven critical axes, encompassing objections common to both the reliabilist and responsibilist approaches, as well as criticisms specific to each or particular to Zagzebski's view. The insufficiency and non-necessity of the conditions for knowledge, the implausibility of the duality in the analysis of virtue, the lack of independence of virtue epistemology from other epistemic theories, the failure to achieve its goals, and the neglect of social virtues are objections raised jointly against reliabilism and responsibilism. Critics do not consider the conditions of the responsibilists, and especially Zagzebski, necessary for superior knowledge. In their view, the reliabilists' conditions (reliable faculties) are neither necessary nor sufficient for superior, philosophical knowledge; for the existence of faculties is not necessary in the acquisition of superior knowledge—such as moral knowledge itself, scientific knowledge, and religious knowledge—and, on the other hand, such knowledge requires greater faculties, namely, skills and epistemic virtues. Likewise, the conditions for knowledge in neither approach are considered sufficient on their own to avoid Gettier counterexamples and non-accidental knowledge. In response to the objection of the implausibility of the duality in the analysis of virtue, which indicates a need for both types of virtue—faculty-based and character-based—the author states that the existence or absence of such a need is contingent upon accepting or rejecting the

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