Pseudo-Virtuous Acts

Pseudo-Virtuous Acts

(Can Vice Be Mistaken for Virtue?)

Published in Issue 128 of The Specialized Scientific Quarterly of Hikmat va Ma'refat Information

Author: Saeed Anvari¹

Introduction

Virtue ethics recommends that we "act in the way that virtuous people act" (Garrett, p. 18). But how do virtuous people act? Can the outward appearance of their actions be taken as the criterion? For example, how can one distinguish self-confidence from arrogance? Consequently, is there a reasonable way to distinguish moral virtues from non-moral ones? (See: Lauden, Virtue Ethics, p. 393).

This article has attempted, by examining pseudo-virtuous acts, to show that an action which outwardly appears to be among the virtues is not always considered a virtue. Accordingly, behaviors have been examined that outwardly resemble moral virtues and are usually mistaken for them, but are not, in truth, virtues. Mulla Mahdi Naraqi writes in Jami' al-Sa'adat: "Opposite each type of virtue, there exists a vice resembling that virtue" (p. 62). For example, abandoning a desire is not a virtue if it is merely due to laziness and despair of attaining it. Or, if a lack of desire for fame (which is counted among the moral virtues and referred to as 'khumul') stems from shyness and social awkwardness, it is not only not considered a virtue, but is a spiritual deficiency that one must strive to overcome. Khwaja Nasir al-Din Tusi has referred to this category of actions, writing: "Actions are issued from people that resemble the actions of the virtuous," then stating that one must distinguish and differentiate "between virtue and that which is not virtue, through knowledge of the true nature of each action and ... between that whose origin is a virtue and that whose origin is a state other than virtue" (Khwaja Nasir, Akhlaq-i Nasiri, p. 122). Dashtaki writes in this regard: "The deficient ignorant person mistakes vices for virtues; for instance, he considers sophistry as wisdom, recklessness as courage, and lethargy (weakness and listlessness) as chastity" (Dashtaki, Akhlaq-i Mansuri, p. 182; also see pp. 185-186). In Mulla Mahdi Naraqi's book Jami' al-Sa'adat, some such actions are also mentioned.1

Pseudo-Virtuous Acts

Most books on ethics examine moral actions and their opposites, and less often examine a category of non-moral actions that resemble virtues. In some ethical works, these matters are referred to as "actions resembling virtues" (for example, see: Jami' al-Sa'adat, vol. 1, p. 83). As Khwaja Nasir, in his book Akhlaq-i Nasiri, has entitled this discussion "On the difference between virtues and states resembling virtues" (p. 122). However, even in such works, pseudo-virtuous acts are only mentioned in a short chapter. In the book Maqalat-i Shams, it is stated (p. 168, no. 197):

"One day, Mustafa, peace be upon him, asked each companion separately about his nature and inclination: whether he inclined towards war or peace? And whether that inclination towards peace stemmed from faint-heartedness, love of life, and seeking safety, or from benevolence, generosity, patience, and forbearance?"

As stated in the above passage, even an inclination towards peace can stem from faint-heartedness and love of life and is not necessarily a virtue. Likewise, Ghazali narrates in Kimiya-yi Sa'adat from the Holy Prophet (PBUH) that:

"When the Muslims stand in battle array against the infidels, the angels begin writing down names, noting that so-and-so fights out of prejudice, so-and-so does so out of zeal, so that it may be said that so-and-so was killed in the path of God" (p. 744).

Therefore, although outwardly a person may have been killed in war, they cannot necessarily be considered a martyr. Similarly, the actions of highwaymen and thieves, although outwardly resembling courage, are not considered a virtue because they stem from greed and avarice (Naraqi, Jami' al-Sa'adat, vol. 1, p. 84). Just as giving to acquire more wealth, or to repel harm, or to attain a specific position, or for worldly pleasure is not considered "generosity" (ibid., p. 86).

It is narrated from Imam Sajjad (Tabarsi, al-Iḥtijāj, vol. 2, pp. 320–321; Majlisi, Biḥār al-Anwār, vol. 71, p. 184):

“If you see someone who has a good and generous appearance and is humble and modest in his movements, beware lest you be deceived by him! How many people are there who have been prevented from attaining worldly gain and committing sins due to physical incapacity or fear and cowardice ... and had they found access to what is forbidden, they would not have refrained from committing it ... Among people there are those who renounce the world for the sake of the world. In their view, worldly leadership is superior to its permissible and lawful blessings, and for this reason they forgo everything for its sake.”

A Classification of Pseudo-Virtuous Acts

Pseudo-virtuous acts (those resembling virtues) can be examined from three perspectives: the outward appearance, the inward intention, and the individual’s awareness of the primary motive:

One) Based on their outward appearance; pseudo-virtuous acts can manifest in two ways, affirmative and privative:

a) In an affirmative manner: performing certain acts resembles the acts of virtuous people. For example, arrogance can be mistaken for self-respect, or laziness can be mistaken for trust in God (tawakkul). Just as renouncing lust may stem from the love of status. Ibn Sina writes in al-Ishārāt that sometimes matters such as the pleasures of food or sex are presented to a person who desires leadership, and he refrains from them for the sake of preserving his standing and status (al-Ishārāt, Pattern Eight, Delusion and Admonition, p. 414). Such a status can even be imaginary and after his death! As Ibn Sina writes, a person might, for the pleasure of praise—even if it comes after his death—attack an army single-handedly and endanger himself (ibid.). Khwaja Nasir al-Din Tusi also writes (Khwaja Nasir, Akhlāq-i Nāṣirī, p. 126):

“It may be that they endure the utmost limits of patience and consent to the cutting off of hands and feet, the gouging out of eyes, and various kinds of torture, exemplary punishment, mutilation, crucifixion, and killing, so that their name and remembrance may remain and spread among a people of their own kind and partners.”

b) In a privative manner: refraining from certain acts resembles the acts of virtuous people. Just as renouncing sexual lust may result from old age, physical weakness, or sexual impotence (being ‘unnīn). Therefore, sometimes the abandonment of a vice is interpreted as a virtue due to the absence of a context for the vice to emerge. Ibn Sina states that it is quite possible that a person who has never tasted a pleasure has no desire for it, or a person who has never endured a pain does not abstain from it (al-Ishārāt, Pattern Eight, Delusion and Admonition, p. 422). Thus, it is possible that a person who has turned to asceticism and abstention from a particular sin has, in reality, never perceived the pleasure of that sin and is disinclined towards it out of ignorance, or the reason a person acts heroically in war is that he is unaware of the dire condition of disabled war veterans.

Two) Based on their inward aspect (intention); from this perspective, pseudo-virtuous acts are divided into two general categories:

a) Acts that are performed deliberately and with the intention of feigning virtue (hypocrisy and dissimulation); for example, Khwaja Nasir writes (Akhlāq-i Nāṣirī, p. 130):

“And likewise, an act resembling justice may be issued by those in whom justice does not exist, and they manifest the deeds of the just, for the sake of ostentation and seeking reputation, so that by means of it they may attract wealth, or status, or some desirable thing, or for some other purpose.”

b) Acts that are performed without the intention of feigning virtue; Mullah Mahdi Naraqi writes that renouncing worldly pleasures due to the weakness and feebleness of the faculties, the weakening of the bodily instruments, or due to an aversion resulting from their excessive commission, or due to fear of diseases, or the failure to perceive their pleasure, are not counted as virtues (Naraqi, Jāmiʿ al-Saʿādāt, vol. 1, p. 83). As can be observed, although these cases are not done out of ostentation, they are still not considered virtues and merely have an appearance resembling moral virtues.

Three) Based on the individual’s awareness of the primary motive; regarding pseudo-virtuous acts, two states are conceivable:

a) The individual is aware of the primary motive behind their pseudo-virtuous act; for example, the individual may themselves know that they are in fact shy and not chaste.

b) The individual is unaware of the primary motive behind their pseudo-virtuous act; meaning the individual is oblivious to the unconscious motives of their actions. This category represents the most concealed type of vices resembling virtues, examples of which can be found among the unconscious processes of humans introduced in psychology.

In psychology, unconscious processes have been introduced that, by distorting reality, protect the individual against anxiety. In these human psychological defense mechanisms, a kind of deception is at work (Hilgard, Introduction to Psychology, Vol. 2, p. 155). In the science of psychology, Freud introduced processes, or better put, defense mechanisms for humans in coping with anxiety, the basis of which is the unconscious distortion of reality. One of these mechanisms is called displacement² (Hilgard, Introduction to Psychology, Vol. 2, p. 162). In this process, the individual's unconscious redirects a desire that is socially unacceptable into a path that is acceptable to society. This process can manifest in two ways:

1_ Reaction formation³; in this manner, the individual exhibits behavior contrary to their primary inclinations. For example, an individual with sexual desires may invert them and turn into a fanatical crusader against prostitution (Schultz, Theories of Personality, p. 67);

2_ Sublimation⁴; in this manner, the individual expresses their reaction in the form of behaviors that are acceptable and admirable to society. For example, their sexual desires manifest in the form of poetry and art (Schultz, Theories of Personality, p. 68); or an obsessive person may manifest their obsessive behavior in the form of editing texts or correcting manuscripts, or through excessive, ascetic worship. Just as some individuals who are political activists or fighters for a worthy cause may, in truth, for psychological reasons, unconsciously need enmity and conflict with others, and even in the event of victory, it is possible that their work may lead to creating enemies within their own organization! (Tilly, Another Kingdom, pp. 185–186); as another example, the censor of magazines may themselves be a lecherous individual who, in this way, satisfies their need in a sublimated manner or through reaction formation.

Of course, by recognizing one's true inner motives, one can manage some moral vices and use them in a positive direction. For example, a nervous and aggressive individual might succeed in one of the martial arts or, say, boxing, and a daydreamer might become a successful novelist. But in any case, from the perspective of others, their dedication to boxing or their engagement in novel-writing is counted among moral virtues, whereas the origin of these matters was not moral values. In this case, although the individual needs to rid themselves of these moral vices, by managing them they can temporarily employ them in a positive direction. For example, a meticulous and capable teacher might be an individual who is fond of talking, enjoys dominating others, or seeks their admiration, and it is the desire to satisfy these needs that has drawn them to this profession, and not a spiritual motive aimed at the education and upbringing of human beings.

Many other examples can be adduced in this context, a few of which will be mentioned here. For instance, being bound to the performance of religious duties can stem from habit. Belief in the resurrection and the afterlife can arise from a desire for immortality and be based on the fallacy of wishful thinking (on this fallacy, see: Khandan, Mughalataat [Fallacies], p. 165) rather than on a rational or faith-based foundation. Persisting in one's religious beliefs in a different or non-religious environment can result from self-aggrandizement and ethnic or familial prejudice, which, due to selfishness, considers one's own attachments, including one's beliefs, to be the best and supreme. Conversely, at the exact opposite pole, an individual's lack of adherence to the religion of their forefathers and their acceptance of a new religion may stem from self-aggrandizement and a spirit of protest rather than from a spirit of truth-seeking. Adherence to religious law may also arise from a tendency toward conformity with the group. Such a person might change their style of dress upon moving from a provincial town to Tehran, or abandon adherence to religious law upon going abroad. The discussion of conformity with the group is one of the topics of social psychology (see: Aronson, Social Psychology, p. 47) and can be the hidden motive in many of our behaviors that others consider a virtue.

Likewise, self-confidence can stem from possessing compound ignorance or a spirit of being a charlatan, rather than from mastery and command of the task at hand. Being a great scholar may be due to obsession, perfectionism, and love of fame. Honoring the scholarly standing of a teacher can arise from love of fame in the individual themselves; for example, consider a person who is a disciple of a great scholar, but solely because association with that great figure confers greatness upon them, they strive in venerating and honoring them in order to make their own name renowned by association. Or, because that great figure loves them and they are in need of receiving affection, they remain among the circle of that person's disciples, rather than out of heartfelt belief in that great figure's words.

Dashtaki has reported that some thinkers considered human ethics to be subordinate to one's temperament (physical condition) (see: Akhlaq-e Mansuri, pp. 165-174). Although Dashtaki does not accept this view, the influence of human temperament and physical states on one's character and disposition is worthy of reflection and can be considered among the instances of actions whose primary motive even the individual themselves is sometimes unaware of. For example, a person may, due to being thin, become hungry later and find fasting easier; or, due to being short in stature, find prolonged standing and praying not difficult; or their obsession may arise from a physical predominance of black bile, or their aggression from a predominance of blood, such that with physical moderation of these matters, these mental states are also amenable to correction.

The Gradational Nature of Pseudo-Virtuous Acts

Since moral vices are gradational and possess degrees, the pseudo-virtues that arise from vices are also gradational. For example, performing certain moral virtues due to fear of disgrace and dishonor is good in the early stages of human development. As Aristotle writes: "It is noble to fear some evils, and it is even our duty, and not fearing them, for instance disgrace, is a vice" (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, p. 101); but at higher stages, performing a moral act out of fear of its consequences is not a virtue. Just as performing virtues due to fear of otherworldly punishment is only commendable in the ordinary state, but at higher stations, the goodness of the moral act alone is the criterion, not fear of its worldly or otherworldly consequences (the Commander of the Faithful (AS) said: "I did not worship You out of fear of Your Fire, nor out of desire for Your Paradise, but I found You worthy of worship, so I worshipped You"; Ahsai, Awali al-La'ali, vol. 2, p. 11). Therefore, virtue is a matter of degrees, and consequently, pseudo-virtuous acts also possess degrees. It is narrated from Jesus (AS) that: "If you love those who love you, what credit is that to you? For even sinners love those who love them. And if you do good to those who do good to you, what credit is that to you? For even sinners do the same. And if you lend to those from whom you hope to receive, what credit is that to you?" (Gospel of Luke, chapter 6, p. 1177).

Conclusion

In this article, pseudo-virtuous acts were examined, and it was shown that there are virtues and vices which share an identical appearance, and it is only the individual's intention that transforms them into a virtue or a vice. It was also demonstrated that the true intention and motive behind an act are sometimes hidden even from the individual themselves. Therefore, due to the existence of pseudo-virtuous acts, one cannot merely look at a person's action and take its appearance as the criterion. As Aristotle writes: "It is possible for someone, through false reasoning, to arrive at a valuable conclusion and to do what ought to be done, but not by the right path" (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, p. 227). Accordingly, in the study of virtue ethics, attention to this category of pseudo-virtuous acts is of great importance.

It should be noted that this article does not seek to undermine or reject the moral actions of history's great figures, but rather points to the hidden veil of negligence over vices that we must recognize through attention and careful self-examination, and not mistake them for virtues.

1) Associate Professor of Islamic Philosophy and Theology, Department of Philosophy, Allameh Tabataba'i University.

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Endnotes

1_ Mulla Mahdi Naraqi adapted much of the content of his book Jami' al-Sa'adat from the Akhlaq-i Nasiri of Khwaja Nasir al-Din Tusi, and Khwaja, in turn, derived large portions of his book from the Tahdhib al-Akhlaq of Ibn Miskawayh. For this reason, there are similarities among the contents of these works.

2_ displacement.

3_ reaction formation.

4_ sublimation

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3_ Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, translated by Mohammad Hasan Lotfi, Tarh-e No, Tehran, 2006.

4_ Aronson, Elliot, Social Psychology, translated by Hossein Shokrkon, Roshd Publications, Tehran, 2003.

5_ The Gospel of Luke, The Holy Bible, Ilam Publications, England, 2002.

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7_ Khandan, Fallacies, Bustan-e Ketab, Qom, 2005.

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