Islamic Anthropology Lectures by Hossein Soozanchi (6-10)

A note from Dr. Hossein Soozanchi on the Islamic Anthropology lectures: This year (the 1394–95 academic year) is the third year I have been teaching a course entitled Islamic Anthropology at the master’s level at Baqir al-Olum University (where most students have a seminary background). Western anthropological discussions differ greatly from most of what has been written under the title of Islamic anthropology, and in these classes I try, while avoiding mere imitation and calquing, to establish a relationship between these two domains, drawing on Islamic texts, the book Existence and the Fall (by Mr. Parsania), and the treatises on humanity by Allameh Tabatabai.

The most important issues in anthropology include the origin, the end, and the path. Westerners initially encountered these same three issues; however, their answers to the two issues of origin and end, which were explained in the previous session, gradually altered the very nature of the question of {the path}.

According to the Western view, the path (technological progress), which they initially held to be evolutionist and which later faced serious critiques, led to its own distortion and the rise of pluralism. Western societies believe that the path is simply the one we have traversed, and its end is technology and domination over nature—with backward societies also being part of nature—which they in fact saw as a justification for their own actions. Of course, progress and technology also faced critiques that gave rise to cultural relativism, which claimed that there is no single definite path. It is stated in the book Social and Cultural Anthropology that one of the principles of anthropology is pluralism.

Ultimately, they confine the human being solely to technology, freedom, welfare, and domination, whereas this is not the ultimate end of anthropology. In other words, is the truth of the human being really limited to just these few components?

In truth, Western societies were unable to specify a single path.

We will now examine the issue of the path within the sensory and imaginal–material / rational–quiddative / intuitive–existential horizon.

Diagram 1

When we say this is the horizon of “sensory and imaginal–material” analysis, it is because they consider society as something existing in a single time and place and analyze societies solely through the components of time and space. When we do not posit anything beyond what is sensible (an entity situated in time and space), it is merely spatial and temporal correlations that differentiate societies. In such a horizon, we must either be evolutionists (that is, see the multiplicity of societies within this temporal context and in a linear, progressive manner), or, if we do not recognize Darwinian evolution in the realm of societal differences, we have no choice but to deny any universal judgment about the path of human movement. The result is precisely what has happened today: the acceptance of cultural pluralism (i.e., the denial of a single path for societies) has become one of the principles of anthropology.

The question that arises here is: Is the model for analyzing the human path (and, consequently, the differences among societies) confined to these models proposed by Western schools? Is there no other way?

Note that we do not deny the analysis of difference within the “sensory-imaginal / material” horizon; rather, we consider it incorrect to limit the analysis to this station. Someone looking at this pen in my hand sees only its accidents (its black color, its size, etc.), but is the truth of the pen confined to these accidents? If a person does not know that this marker has an ink that goes beyond these accidents, they will fail in a correct analysis of this pen, and if this pen changes size, they will consider it a new object. Certainly, the statement that the true essence of the pen is constituted by its ink (and not merely the accidents perceived by the sensory faculties) does not mean disregarding or denying these accidents. Similarly, in the analysis of societies, when higher horizons are introduced, it does not mean negating these horizons; rather, it means that this sensory-imaginal horizon must be understood under that higher horizon, not independently of it and based on its denial.

The Rational–Quiddative Horizon:

a) In the West: It seems that Hegel's models of analysis, which do not regard sense perception as the criterion and impose the logic of dialectics, seek the human path within this horizon. Likewise, phenomenologists such as Husserl and Heidegger, whose motto is a movement toward the essence of things and bracketing existence (by which they mean the sensible, sensory existence of things), also propose this same horizon. The fact that they trace different cultures back to various meanings that possess intrinsic meaning appears to enter into this analytical horizon. (For now, we are not concerned with the correctness or incorrectness of the view; rather, the analytical horizon is intended, even if errors are possible within this horizon.)

b) In Islamic philosophical circles: Discussions such as whether humans are social by nature, by necessity, or by choice. Also, discussions like those of Mr. Parsania regarding the unity of humans in imaginary and intellectual meanings; or even the discussion of the primacy of the individual versus society should perhaps be raised within this horizon.

The Intuitive-Existential Horizon

a) Mystical literature: The manifestations of different Names in different communities (Fusus al-Hikam)

b) Quranic literature: The individual (faith and action); the institutionalization of culture based on one's own choice

Society: Structures (type of allegiance, guardianship, Imamate)

The discussion then turned to the most significant plurality of societies worth examining based on religious (Quranic) literature. In the Western context, it was noted that the criterion for the importance of societies is their temporal and spatial scope; thus, for example, the most important societies are civilizations within a specific time and place, and the most important wars in the world are the Crusades or the First and Second World Wars. In contrast, the most important societies that the Quran discusses are those formed around prophets or in opposition to prophets, and similarly, the most important wars in the world are the wars between truth and falsehood, even if their temporal and spatial scope was very small (such as the place of Karbala in history).

In the Quranic view, the truth of the human being (in relation to the heavens and the earth) lies in the trust (We offered the Trust), not in the body or behavior; that trust is faith, and faith is the primary criterion for the truth of the human being. The first step in anthropology is the discussion of doctrinal classification, which also applies to society, not just the individual. From this perspective, every government and every civilization is worth examining based on its religious bond, and civilizations should be categorized by religion, not by geography or time. And in this context, from the moment a religious community (the first religious community: the Children of Israel) appears in the world, no non-religious civilization is worth examining, and this community becomes far more complex than non-religious communities. And from the moment Islam arrives (meaning the religious communities of the People of the Book do not submit to the religion of Islam), both those communities and the Islamic community acquire multiplied complexities, and the analytical horizon becomes focused on these communities, especially the Islamic community and its internal groupings (believer and hypocrite).

Diagram 2

Summary of the Lesson on Islamic Anthropology and the Foundations of Religious Knowledge Session Seven (Commentary on Allamah Tabatabai's Treatise 'The Human Before This World', may God have mercy on him)

Point 1: The discussion of the human before this world stands in contrast to the Darwinian view and pertains to the examination of human capacities before this world. Point 2: The basis of our discussion in the realm of the human before this world is the treatise of the late Allamah (may God have mercy on him) bearing the same title, which consists of two chapters. In the first chapter, he presents a rational discussion regarding the existence of the human before this world, and in the second chapter, he discusses this matter based on transmitted sources. Point 3: The style of this treatise is heavily reliant on transmitted sources, although it possesses a firm and profound rational foundation.

Chapter One: Rational Argument for the Existence of Humans Before This World
Premise 1: Causality demonstrates that the effect is pure dependence on the cause, meaning the entire reality of the effect is also present in the cause.
Premise 2: The three realms (the material world, the imaginal world, and the intellectual world) exist in such a way that the material world is preceded by the imaginal world (a realm in which matter has no place but which possesses the properties of matter), and the imaginal world is preceded by the abstract world, or the intellectual world (a realm in which neither matter nor its properties have any place).
Conclusion: The human being, in the material world, by removing imperfections, also exists in the imaginal and intellectual worlds.

Chapter Two: Scriptural Argument for the Existence of Humans Before This World
In this chapter, considering the noble verses that the late Allamah used for his reasoning, the following points can be expressed:
1. According to verse 54 of Surah Al-A'raf, which states: "Verily, His is the creation and the command," besides the world of creation, there also exists a world of command; that is, in addition to the world of creation within which we reside, we also have a world of command upon which the world of creation is dependent.
The term "command" is not specific to the effects of entities, such that we might say creation pertains to the entities themselves and command to their effects, because:

a) The spirit, which is among the entities, is attributed to the command: "And they ask you about the spirit. Say: The spirit is of the command of my Lord" (Al-Isra: 85).
That is, the spirit is not an effect of entities but is itself an entity.
b) The bringing into being is considered the import of the command, and bringing into being is more general than entity and the effect of an entity. "His command, when He intends a thing, is only that He says to it, 'Be,' and it is" (Ya-Sin: 82).
The primary concept derived from this verse is the bringing into being of entities, not the effects of entities.
2. The world of creation is the realm of gradualness, and the world of command is the non-gradual realm of existence, and this is generally how it is used in Quranic literature.
Note: The entirety of the corporeal world is all of the type of gradual creation due to substantial motion, within which there is also an aspect of command. In other words, this corporeal world is both an instance of creation and an instance of command.

Conclusion: In that which comes into being gradually (corporeal existents and their effects), two aspects emanate from the Creator:

a) A non-gradual aspect of command

b) A gradual aspect of creation

3. Creation is subordinate to and dependent upon the command.

Conclusion: Every temporal existent is dependent upon the existents of the world of command, and that realm encompasses this one, existing with it and sustaining it (the command has descended, constructing the levels of the heavens until it reached the earth).

4. The world of command possesses levels; at least two important levels:

a) The level possessing limit (referring to the imaginal world and the intermediate realm): "The command of God is a decree determined" (Al-Ahzab: 8).

b) The level without limits and prior to determination (referring to the world of abstract entities and the Resurrection): "And there is not a thing but that with Us are its treasuries, and We do not send it down except in a known measure" (Al-Hijr: 21).

(The existents of this level, since they have no limits, exist all together through a single existence despite their multiplicity.)

5. This stage is free from imperfection, and is pure and holy. (By imperfection is meant things like sin and so forth; otherwise, according to the law of causality, every effect is considered inherently imperfect in relation to its cause. Also, this pertains to the arc of descent; otherwise, in the arc of ascent, hell also exists, and Satan apparently finds his way up to the ascending imaginal world.) Proof:

a) The spirit, which is from the world of command, is described with the attribute of holiness: "And We supported him with the Holy Spirit" (Al-Baqarah: 87) / "Say: The Holy Spirit has brought it down from your Lord in truth" (An-Nahl: 102).

b) The speech of the angels, which pertains to the realm above the earth and the world of command: "And we glorify You with praise and proclaim Your holiness" (Al-Baqarah: 30).
That is, we manifest Your holiness and Your purity from imperfections through our essences and our actions.

Quranic proof for the infallibility of the angels and that their action is the very essence of purity:
1) Because our essences and the actions of our essences are by Your command: "Rather, they are honored servants. They do not precede Him in speech, and they act according to His command" (Al-Anbiya: 27). So the action of the angels—who are the intermediaries in events—is by means of the command.

و نیز در مورد ذوات قُلْ كُلٌّ يَعْمَلُ عَلى‏ شاكِلَتِهِ الإسراء : 84 یعنی شاکله وجودی فرشتگان بر طهارت و قدس است كَما بَدَأْنا أَوَّلَ خَلْقٍ نُعيدُهُ الأنبياء : 104 وَ الْبَلَدُ الطَّيِّبُ يَخْرُجُ نَباتُهُ بِإِذْنِ رَبِّه الأعراف : 58 و نسبتش با فعل

2) استدلالشان که أَ تَجْعَلُ فيها مَنْ يُفْسِدُ فيها قرینه‌ای بر فساد نداشتند غیر از إِنِّي جاعِلٌ فِي الْأَرْضِ خَليفَة البقرة : 30 یعنی از زمینی بودن، کشف فساد کردند، پس سمایی بودن، قدس و تسبیح گری می‌آورد.

6. وجه تسمیه این عالم به «امر» این است که لایحتاج فی وجوده الی ازید من کلمۀ «کن» (لذا ماده ندارد): به همین دلیل، از آن به «کلمه» و به «قضاء محتوم» نیز تعبیر شده است. (تبدیل راه ندارد، زیرا تبدیل فرع و لوازم ماده و قوه است.)

7. روح مربوط به عالم امر است.

8. روح غیر از بدن است اما با نفخه الهی با بدن متحد می‌شود و بعدا با جذب ربانی از آن جدا می گردد:

اتحاد با یک نفخه‌ی الهی فَإِذا سَوَّيْتُهُ وَ نَفَخْتُ فيهِ مِنْ رُوحي الحجر : 29/ص : 72 و جدایی با یک جذبه ربانی قُلْ يَتَوَفَّاكُمْ مَلَكُ الْمَوْتِ الَّذي وُكِّلَ بِكُم السجده : 11 توضیح: حقیقت انسان (که با لفظ «من» تعبیر می‌شود) روح اوست: قل یتوفاکم : آنچه توفا شده نفس و روح انسان است که متحد با بدن است (ترکیب اتحادی نه انضمامی) تا حدی که او را به بُعد بدنی هم منسوب می‌کنند: مِنْها خَلَقْناكُمْ وَ فيها نُعيدُكُمْ وَ مِنْها نُخْرِجُكُمْ تارَةً أُخْرى‏ طه : 55 /قالَ فيها تَحْيَوْنَ وَ فيها تَمُوتُونَ وَ مِنْها تُخْرَجُونَ الأعراف : 25 .

9. جسمانیة الحدوث بودن روح. استدلال به روایت شریفه علل الشرایع: عَنْ أَبِی عَبْدِ اللَّهِ(ع) قَالَ قُلْتُ لِأَیِّ عِلَّةٍ إِذَا خَرَجَ الرُّوحُ مِنَ الْجَسَدِ وَجَدَ لَهُ مَسّاً وَ حَیْثُ رُكِّبَتْ لَمْ یَعْلَمْ بِهِ قَالَ لِأَنَّهُ نَمَا عَلَیْهَا الْبَدَنُ . علل‏الشرائع ج : 1 ص : 309 ح 261 یعنی یکی از مراحل رشد افاضه ی روح بود که همانگونه که در بقیه مراحل و تغییرات چیزی را درک نمی کنیم در این مرحله نیز این چنین است.

خلاصه بحث درس انسان شناسی و مبانی معرفت دینی؛ جلسه هشتم

قبل از ورود به ادامه بحث جلسه مباحثی مطرح شد که حاوی چند نکته می باشد:

1. اشکال: علامه (ره) عالم عقل و عالم مثال را که در این بحث مطرح می فرمایند در مورد عالم عقل چنین تعبیری دارند که غیر مقدره و لا محدوده که یعنی عالم عقل نه دارای قدر و اندازه و بعد است (چه مکانی و چه زمانی) و نه محدودیت دارد؛ حال آنکه عالم عقل نیز مانند سایر عوالم معلول است و معلولیت هم عین محدودیت می باشد. اگر بگوییم در اینجا مراد از حد همان ماهیت است، در فضای فلسفه صدرایی، باز هم این مرتبه، مرتبه عالم عقول نخواهد بود بلکه همان وجود منبسط است که وحدت ظلیه دارد و حد ندارد.

2. نکته دوم پیرامون روایت جلسه قبل می باشد که در عبارت امام در مورد روح که فرمودند «نما علیه البدن». شاید یک وجه برای توجیه آن که با جسمانیه الحدوث بودن متناسب شود این است که مراد از بدن را، نه جسم، بلکه همان تعبیر "من" که حقیقت روح است، بدانیم؛ یعنی این بدن (= من) به روی جسم نمو پیدا کرد. در ذهنم این است که گویا اصطلاح جسم در برخی روایات به معنای مطلق «من» آمده باشد نه لزوما ناظر به بعد جسمانی ما باشد.

3. روح قبل از ورود به این عالم دارای علم حضوری است و بعد از ورودش به این عالم و متحد شدنش با جسم ، علم حصولی پیدا می کند. پس علم حصولی مال این مرتبه است البته برای موجود ذی الروح.

4. رتبه علم حضوری قبل از ذهن است فلذا وابسته به ذهن نیست ولی ذهن به آن وابسته است یعنی ما هر آنچه در ذهن داریم باید ما به ازاءش را در علم حضوری پیدا کنیم اما آنچه که در علم حضوری است معلوم نیست که در وادی ذهن هم باشد یا نه.

5. The mind and acquired sciences belong to the presence of the spirit in the world of creation; therefore, the level of the mind is a level in whose formation two components must be taken seriously: a) the spirit, b) the world of creation. Thus, neither the spirit nor the body (the world of creation) alone necessitates acquired perception.

6. After the spirit's union with the body and its reception of bodily organs, it acquires the faculties of hearing, sight, and the thinking, rational faculty. As a result: all bodily dispositions in the world of choice are prepared for it: subjected by His command—"He has subjected to you whatever is in the heavens and the earth," "He has subjected to you the sun and the moon," "He has subjected to you the night and the day." Point: Subjection is by command, not by creation, even though both belong to the command and to creation.

7. The spirit is unconditioned with respect to time, hence it is compatible with any time (the unconditioned gathers with a thousand conditions).

***

Up to this point, some points about the reality of the spirit, and especially its relation to the body, have been stated. 'Allāmah then provides explanations whose important fruit is understanding the differences between the spirit and the angels (both are from the world of command, but they have differences). It seems that, in total, three important differences are indicated: Three Differences Between the Spirit and the Angels

First Difference: Although the spirit is immaterial and free from deficiencies and potentiality, it can descend to this world, become united with a body in all bodily modes, directions, and pure potentiality; but the angels cannot descend below the horizon of the imaginal realm. That is, an angel cannot unite with a body; at most, it assumes a form, and often, even in the station of assuming a form, not everyone sees it.

We said that the descent of the spirit causes the path to branch into two forks: a) Felicity: a good, perpetual life (return to the original exalted station) b) Wretchedness: perdition and ruin, a life in the mold of death: "wherein he will neither die nor live." From this matter, the second difference between the spirit and the angels is understood:

Second Difference: Through its descent to this realm, the spirit is placed at the crossroads of felicity and wretchedness and has the possibility of two outcomes, unlike the angels, who only have the possibility of felicity. For, according to the verses mentioned in the previous session, the angels are the very essence of purity and felicity.

Point: Is the stage before the world only felicity, or is it prior to felicity and wretchedness? It seems that if we are to speak in the terminology of the tradition, we must say that felicity at the beginning of the matter and before the world is general felicity, which encompasses both felicity and wretchedness; not felicity as opposed to wretchedness, which is specific felicity and pertains to the stage of the world and beyond. Yet, there is still a stirring in the mind as to what general felicity, which includes both the meanings of felicity and wretchedness, means. What occurs to this humble one is that in such cases, where we take the meaning of one of the divisions as the basis of division and say that the basis of division is the same as that division in a more general sense (which has many parallels in philosophy: for example, the division of existence into objective and mental existence, where we also take the basis of division as objective existence), such expressions arise from imprecision in the use of words, because the divisions are truly counterparts to one another, and separating the division from the basis of division with the expressions "in a more general sense" and "in a more specific sense" does not solve the problem. Perhaps what is defensible in such cases is to say that the real meaning of the word, in a descriptive sense, is what is found in the division, not in the basis of division; however, sometimes our two divisions have such a broad scope that it seems impossible to step outside them, and in such cases, we are compelled to classify the basis of division under one of the divisions as well. In such cases, the mind employs a trick and removes the concept of the basis of division from its descriptive state and uses it as a pointer. That is, for instance, if we are compelled to consider the stage prior to felicity and wretchedness as being of the genus of felicity or wretchedness, we find the word felicity more proportionate to that stage, just as if we want to refer to the basis of division of mental and objective existence with the word existence, we find the term objective existence more proportionate to it, and so on. Thus, the expression of felicity regarding the stage before the world and the angels (and similar expressions such as purity, sanctity, etc.) is used in these contexts not in its descriptive usage, which is known through its opposites, but in a referential usage.

Note: There were points in the continuation of this discussion and before the concluding discussion (which pertains to the next session) that I do not know whether their explanation was forgotten in class or whether Mr. Rabbani did not bring them up, which I had previously referred to in my discussions; therefore, they are briefly mentioned:

14. There is a spirit specific to believers, other than the spirit of which all partake, which in one place He has called “the word of piety” (elsewhere: light); thus this spirit is inseparable from piety: Those are they in whose hearts He has inscribed faith and whom He has strengthened with a spirit from Him; Then Allah sent down His tranquility upon His Messenger and upon the believers and bound them to the word of piety; so that when a believer sins, the spirit of faith is withdrawn from him.

15. There is a spirit specific to the messengers, other than those two, which is “a light by which others are guided” (the spirit of faith is that by which man is guided in himself): And thus We have revealed to you a spirit of Our command... But We have made it a light by which We guide whom We will...

[“We have revealed to you a spirit” is evidence that revelation is not solely concerned with speech]

16. This spirit is dominant over the spirit of faith (We have revealed to you a spirit of Our command. You knew not what the Book was, nor faith) [The reasoning: by possessing this spirit you understand both the Book and faith; so this spirit not only gives the Book (a light by which We guide whom We will) but also gives faith]

17. Consequently, the difference between these two spirits is one of gradation, not of kind

18. This spirit is united with the human spirit: We guide by it whom We will; and indeed you guide to a straight path

19. The third difference: The rank of the Spirit is higher than the angels and it is dominant over them: He sends down the angels with the spirit of His command, and they act by His command [perhaps the reasoning based on this second verse is that in the previous verse “with the spirit” was understood as “of His command,” meaning if it is “of His command” it is by the spirit; consequently in the second verse too, since it is “by His command,” it is by the spirit: that is, the angels act (descend) by means of 1) the Spirit, which is of the Command, 2) the world of Command; thus for their being of the Command they need the Spirit, the Spirit is the intermediary for the establishment of the Command for them. Another aspect that can be found for this reasoning is: the angels act by His command + the angels descend with the spirit + descending is an act = therefore the angels’ act, including their descent, is by the spirit; thus the Spirit is the ruler (dominant) over the angels.

20. The Spirit is united with the angels and, of course, subsists over them (dominant and sovereign):

Say: Whoever is an enemy to Gabriel—for he it is who brought it down upon your heart, The Faithful Spirit brought it down upon your heart, the Holy Spirit brought it down [This indicates the unity of Gabriel, the Faithful Spirit, and the Holy Spirit.] “The Spirit is a creature greater than Gabriel and Michael; it was with the Messenger of God and it is with the Imams.”

21. The angels, while subsisting through the Spirit, are united with it in essence and act

22. It can be discerned that: the spirit specific to the messengers is also of multiple degrees, because concerning the Spirit there is a narration: “It is a mighty creature, greater than Gabriel and Michael; it was not with anyone who passed before except Muhammad, and it is with the Imams and guides them aright, and not whenever it is sought is it found.”

23. [At the level of the Spirit, unity prevails over multiplicity: “We, by God, are the ones permitted for them on the Day of Resurrection, and the ones who speak rightly.” Note the expression “We,” but in the verse “On the Day when the Spirit and the angels stand... except him whom the All-Merciful permits and who speaks rightly” both “the Spirit” is singular and “speaks rightly” is singular. And in this there is an indication of the unification of the spirits that is not hidden.]

24. The angels are divine lights: We made it a light by which We guide whom We will of Our servants, from darknesses into light, they shall have their reward and their light, the likeness of His light..., light upon light; Allah guides to His light whom He wills.

Conclusion: Man Before the World

(The Bestowal of the Station of Divine Vicegerency, the Teaching of the Names, and the Descent)

(((And when your Lord said to the angels, “I am placing a vicegerent on the earth,” they said, “Will You place therein one who will cause corruption therein and shed blood, while we glorify You with Your praise and call You holy?” He said, “Indeed, I know what you do not know.” And He taught Adam the names, all of them, then presented them to the angels and said, “Tell Me the names of these, if you are truthful.” They said, “Glory be to You! We have no knowledge except what You have taught us. Indeed, You are the All-Knowing, the All-Wise.” He said, “O Adam, tell them their names.” And when he had told them their names, He said, “Did I not say to you that I know the unseen of the heavens and the earth, and I know what you reveal and what you have been concealing?”))) Verses 30 to 33 of Al-Baqarah

Explanation of the Conclusion:

Explaining the difference between humans and angels, and indeed explaining how distinctions arise in the higher realms of existence—how the creation of the human being becomes equivalent to the distinction of the spirit, the angels, and Iblis; and through this, addressing subsidiary issues such as Adam's disobedience, the sojourn in paradise...

1. The angels' question was an inquiry, not an objection. Although it has become established among us that this question was an objection, 'Allamah believes it was an inquiry, because he believes in the infallibility of the angels. One of the proofs for this is the noble verse, "They do not disobey Allah in what He commands them, and they do what they are commanded." Also, a reason that can be deduced from these very verses indicating that the angels' speech was an inquiry is its conclusion with the phrase "the Wise": "Indeed, You are the Knowing, the Wise" (where wisdom is God's knowledge in the realm of action, meaning acting with precision). And their acknowledgment of divine knowledge and wisdom at the end of their question shows that it was not an objection. Furthermore, the statement that has been put forward that "before Adam there were humans on earth who shed blood, and the angels' speech referred to that" is rejected by 'Allamah, because such reasoning is an instance of analogy (or the reprehensible jurisprudential analogy) and a kind of fallacy, and the angels are infallible.

But the explanation of the claim:

God said, "Indeed, I am placing a vicegerent upon the earth." The angels' question: How could this be possible, because: a) The requirement of being earthly is corruption and bloodshed, and this is incompatible with vicegerency = a question of possibility (due to knowledge of the contradiction in the material world and the earth, and that nothing occurs without contradiction and its limitation). b) The requirement of vicegerency is Your glorification and sanctification, which we perform = a question of "why" and "for what reason." Answer: "Indeed, I know what you do not know" — this is the answer, not a "mind your own business." Rather, it means that the angels' knowledge, although some are manifestations of divine knowledge, is not complete and they do not encompass the knowledge of the unseen.

Proof: - Immediately, He explained "what you do not know": "He taught Adam the names, all of them, then He presented them... So when he informed them" (not "taught them") (meaning you do not know, but Adam knew, but when it was presented to you, you still did not know and were only informed). (The difference between 'ilm [knowledge] and naba' [news/information] is that 'ilm is cognition, whereas naba' is news; and in fact, even after Adam's informing, the angels did not realize what those names were, so they become informed through Adam but do not perceive, and divine vicegerency requires a special knowledge that even the angels do not possess.) - Then He explained, "Did I not say to you that I know the unseen of the heavens and the earth?" (The unseen of the heavens = the purport of "what you do not know" which was taught to Adam). And only here did God Almighty say, "I know something you do not know," and that becomes the very knowledge of the unseen of the heavens and the earth; meaning there is a level of My knowledge to which you have no independent access, and that is the knowledge of all the Names (the Name is identical with the Named, so the Names are these very existents: witness: first He said "the knowledge of the names," then He said: "by the names of these"), which is the very unseen of the heavens and the earth (the station of the treasuries). Not that the names are words referring to external referents. One must pay attention to the referent of the pronoun in the word "these," which is the names themselves, meaning the names of the names. In summary, 'Allamah said that the angels have no access to the Names, which are identical with the Named, which is the station of the keys, which are the treasuries.

Note: ʿAllāma infers from the above that it is as though not all the angels were addressed by the foregoing speech. (“These angels who were addressed were only those whose existence does not ascend beyond the world of decree and limits”; and he takes as evidence for this the fact that the phrase “I know what you do not know” was replaced by the phrase “I know the unseen of the heavens and the earth”; thus the heavens and the earth possess an unseen dimension of which these angels are unaware, and the Names that God taught Adam are precisely this mentioned unseen.) Apparently the reasoning is that since everything other than God consists of angels, this unseen is also a group of angels who were not themselves addressed with the prostration. In fact, ʿAllāma’s foundation can be explained as follows: we previously said that the realm of Command is of two kinds:
1) The Treasuries, which are unlimited;
2) The level of the World of Image, which is limited.
Naturally, angels exist in both kinds, and it is clear that the angels who posed the interrogative question had no access to the world of the Treasuries and were among the limited ones; consequently, not all angels were addressed by God Almighty.
ʿAllāma subsequently adduces another piece of evidence, namely that there are narrations stating that there are angels who are unaware of the creation of the world and of Adam because they are immersed in the Divine Sacred Essence, and this lack of awareness indicates that they were not addressed with the command to prostrate.
ʿAllāma’s third proof consists of narrations that say, “When they recognized their error, they sought refuge at the Throne” — the fact that when they realized their mistake they took refuge at the Throne indicates that there was another station for them, and that the Throne itself was not addressed by the Almighty, and the Throne is precisely the Treasuries.

However, a certain disquiet remains in my mind regarding this interpretation and this exception. That is, it seems that in some of ʿAllāma’s statements, the world of the Intellect consists of a number of angels and possesses a kind of multiplicity, but in other expressions it is a single, all-encompassing, limitless existence, upon which the term “angels” cannot then be easily applied; at most, only the Spirit (which is above the angels) could be applied to it, and it appears that the level of all-encompassing existence is above the level of the Intellects. In any case, a disquiet remains in the mind.

***

But in this humble person’s opinion, another possibility can also be proposed: that perhaps what is meant by “Names” is truly “name” and of the category of acquired knowledge, not the named entity itself, and that we should not underestimate expression, name, and word. That is, although in this world — and indeed wherever both acquired knowledge and presential knowledge are possible — acquired knowledge is inferior to presential knowledge and direct witnessing, it is possible that acquired knowledge may have access to domains to which presential knowledge does not. Hence, the value of acquired knowledge would not, in this respect, be less than that of presential knowledge. For example, the knowledge and cognition of the angels themselves is confined to presential knowledge and direct witnessing, and they sometimes have no access to matters such as the unseen identity and the levels close to the Divine Essence (and we too have no path there through presential knowledge), yet through acquired knowledge and these very words that seem insignificant to us, we can make allusions to that realm — something that may not be possible for the angels.

On the whole, it seems to this humble person that, due to the predominance of attention given to direct witnessing and presential knowledge, the importance of acquired knowledge, expression, and the name has been somewhat neglected. A simple example is attention to the difference between Revelation and Sacred Traditions (aḥādīth qudsiyya). If we take the ultimate form of knowledge to be of the type of direct witnessing and presential knowledge, apparently no difference remains between a Sacred Tradition and Revelation, whereas we all acknowledge that Revelation is far superior. What makes Revelation special is that in Revelation, even the wording is from God Himself. The fact that the wording is from God Himself creates a particular characteristic; otherwise, in terms of attribution, we attribute all matters to God. But it seems there is a special capacity in language that places it even above direct witnessing, and perhaps it can be understood that language and wording constitute a very vast category that has received little attention among the ancients. Perhaps by examining this subject and its results, many ambiguities in the history of the Qurʾan and the Sunnah may be resolved.

On this basis, as was mentioned, the meaning of the verse becomes that the existential capacity of Adam is such that he has the possibility of knowledge of the Names (that is, knowledge mediated by name and speech), and through expression he can attain knowledge (our knowledge is not confined to knowledge by presence; rather, through speech we can also attain knowledge and perception of the reality itself). But you do not have this capacity except by following Adam; because the informing was done to them by Adam, and before Adam’s informing, they had no knowledge. So the nature of this following does not place them on the same rank as Adam. Note carefully, for example, perhaps it is because man, by virtue of possessing a mind, can attain knowledge (acquired knowledge) through speech, but the angel, since it has no mind, although due to its union with man it becomes aware of man’s knowledge by following man, it does not have the independent possibility of perceiving this knowledge. Therefore, as long as there is a human being, it becomes aware, but if there is no human being, it is not a perceiver.

***

Let us return to the continuation of ‘Allāmah’s words. And these treasuries or keys of the unseen are not realized except through walāyah: So God placed in the innate constitution of Adam walāyah and the assumption of the character traits of all the Names. (“I breathed into him of My Spirit” is the summary of this detailed exposition of “Adam’s knowledge of the Names …”) And thus the reality of the spirit becomes known: “My Spirit”; this spirit came only in Adam. In other cases relating to the angels: “Our Spirit,” “the Trustworthy Spirit.” In sum, the teaching of the Names = the breathing of My Spirit. So this teaching of the Names is not merely holding a class and a conceptual transfer, and the breathing of the Spirit is not a mere blowing. The breathing of the Spirit = the innate constitution for perceiving the Names.

– In the verse, the expression “I know what you reveal and what you have been concealing” indicates a hidden matter, for which the phrase “he was of the disbelievers” serves as an exposition. (The word “you have been” indicates capacity and points to the fact that the thing by which Adam surpasses you is not a capacity for perceiving it that belongs to you in itself, and the qualifier “you conceal” points to the fact that there were matters hidden and concealed in your existence. Just as in the next verse He says, “So they prostrated, except Iblīs; he refused and was arrogant, and he was of the disbelievers.” This expression “he was” conveys that Iblīs was a disbeliever even before the creation of Adam, and his refusal to prostrate and his opposition stemmed from his inner, concealed opposition. So God says, “I also know that hidden, concealed opposition.”) And in the Tafsīr of Qummī it is mentioned that what is meant by “you conceal” is the angels’ knowledge of what Iblīs was concealing of his refusal to prostrate to Adam, and there are also narrations indicating that Iblīs had promised the other angels that he would not prostrate to Adam if the divine command came. It has also been mentioned.

One of ‘Allāmah’s difficult discussions is where the locus of differentiation and its origin is: Does it begin from the stage of this world, or is it also before this world? ‘Allāmah says on page 29: “Know that we have elaborated the discussion in the Treatise on Actions in the chapter on felicity and wretchedness, and that the origin of these meanings and the source of felicity and wretchedness is before this material genesis.” But here (page 37) he says: “We have explained in the Treatise on Intermediaries that in this genesis prior to the world, felicity and wretchedness are not differentiated, and the locus of differentiation and its origin is this world.” How can these two statements be reconciled? The apparent meaning of ‘Allāmah’s statement is that until the creation of an entity called Adam, who combines the worldly capacity with the spirit, this differentiation did not occur. That is, as was mentioned before, both the spirit is a condition and the world of creation is a condition. In other words, it is the stage of the spirit that possesses the capacity for felicity and wretchedness (and in reality, the capacity for union with the body). Insofar as this capacity belongs primarily and essentially to the spirit, the origin of these meanings is there; and insofar as this capacity is not realized without the body, the locus of differentiation and its origin is this world. Hence, the state of Iblīs before the creation of Adam was that of the other angels, and therefore he was included in the command to prostrate (as indicated by the exceptive particle “illā”), and then he was separated from the angels.

The next point that ‘Allāmah addresses is that in Sūrat al-Baqarah He says: fa-azallahumā al-shayṭānu ‘anhā fa-akhrajahumā mimmā kānā fīhi wa qulnā ihbiṭū... (verse 36) In another place qulnā ihbiṭā (Ṭā Hā/123) In the Qummī narration: lam yadkhulhā Iblīs. Regarding ihbiṭū and ihbiṭā, ‘Allāmah offers two possibilities. ihbiṭā refers to Adam and Eve, but for ihbiṭū, one possibility is that it refers to Iblīs, and another possibility is that qulnā ihbiṭū might be an address on account of Adam’s progeny, and its support is fa-immā ya’tiyannakum minnī hudan, which we know does not include Iblīs because he despaired of mercy and God had said la-amla’anna jahannama minka wa mimman tabi‘aka... There is a difficulty regarding the manner of temptation in Paradise while he was barred from entry; and also the manner of Adam’s temptation while he was infallible—he was tempted. In summary, ‘Allāmah’s answer is that since felicity and wretchedness were not distinct before the descent, these difficulties do not apply, and on this basis he concludes that it becomes clear: Adam’s disobedience was not incompatible with infallibility; rather, it was a natural, essential disobedience, which is the very choice for descent to the world. Mr. Larijani has extracted several opinions in al-Kayzān here regarding temptation in Paradise, which is a good and useful annotation.

‘Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā’ī’s Treatise on Man in the World

Chapter 1 At the beginning of this chapter, ‘Allāmah presents a division as follows: “I‘lam anna al-ma‘ānī allatī ‘indanā wa hiya ‘ulūmunā al-dhihniyya ‘alā qismayn ḥaqīqī wa i‘tibārī”; but after a brief explanation of the first category, he devotes the entire chapter to what i‘tibāriyyāt (contingent constructs) are.

In the Treatise on Wilāyah, he also says that we posit three stages for man: the stage before the world, after the world, and man in the world, and i‘tibāriyyāt belong to the stage of the world. This discussion has good potential for discussions in the social sciences, just as, on this basis, ‘Allāmah says in the Treatise on Wilāyah that civil relations and social constructs are also specific to the stage of the world.

We will examine ‘Allāmah’s discussions in this chapter in the form of several points: ‘Allāmah begins his points from some very clear matters and gradually extracts profound matters from them:

1. Every real external existent, from its beginning to its end, is a single existence, from the moment it appears in existence, then continues its subsistence and its specific life, until it ends in concealment and non-existence.

2. This single existence is analyzed into: a) A thing fixed in itself, like the root: the essence (I) b) Other things that revolve around it and subsist through it, like the branch, and from which the root branches out = accidents and adjuncts Thus, all accidents are adjoined to the essence, and all these accidents and states that become branches upon the essence constitute our being human, and the general system of my existence comes into being. ‘Allāmah sees the “I-ness” of the human being as a continuous reality. Note that even the cells of the body and the parts of the body, from one perspective, are distinct individuals, each having its own life; but all of them together have constituted the system of “me,” and the coming and going of these cells does not destroy our “I-ness” throughout life. So these cells are also, in a way, accidents of my essence that have become adjoined to the essence. Now, does this adjunction to the essence not mean that our essence is a static unit and these adjunctions do not create any change in the essence itself? One of the fruits of this discussion becomes clear in the discussion of the union of the knower and the known, where that existential reality of me (the knower) is intensified by the adjunction of these accidents (knowledge), and this adjunction is achieved in the mode of union. Of course, some accidents are momentary and separate from the essence, like my standing now, which is a description that exists now but is not permanent for my essence.

Note: ‘Allāmah very briefly points out that the sum of these (the essence and its accidents) is a particular system within a particular existent, and the sum of these particular systems is the universal system. This discussion has much room for elaboration on how the primacy of society is constituted by these very particular systems, and the independent existential reality of these particular systems does not conflict with society having an independent real existence; just as all the cells of my body are each considered a living being in themselves, but this in no way conflicts with my person also having an essence and being an independent real existent.

3. The real existent (essence), from the moment of its appearance in the world of existence, has its accidents adjoined to it, and through the adjunction of accidents, it attains perfection.

The perfection of an entity lies in its acquiring a new state, which we then call completion. In fact, its perfection depends on the attachment of accidents to its essence. In other words (considering substantial motion and the fact that a natural existent has no state of rest whatsoever), it can be said that every kind of change is a perfection.

Note: An important question arises here:

When a human being commits a sin, since they have performed an act and an act necessarily involves intensification, do they still attain perfection? There are two ways to answer:

One is to say that existential perfection, which is the same as intensification, is perfection in its most general sense and is different from evaluative perfection (similar to the discussion we had about objective and mental existence, where the point of division was objective existence—we said mental existence is also a kind of objective existence—but this was objective existence in its most general sense).

The second is that existence is fundamentally coextensive with goodness and perfection in the very sense of evaluative perfection, and the sinful act, since it is an act, brings about existential intensification. However, its problem is that through sin, an actuality is attained that lacks the potentiality and capacity for subsequent perfections. In other words, with this new actuality, the human being reaches a dead end. We are commanded not to pursue such short-lived and temporary perfections, which create an actuality that no longer bears potentiality, because sin prevents the actualization of subsequent perfections.

4. The attachment of accidents to the essence is due to the essence's own exigency for them (meaning that if there were no obstacle, all its accidents would accrue to it).

The attachment of accidents to the essence is by the exigency of the essence for them, meaning that if the essence were posited alone without any obstacle, its accidents would follow it due to a connection with them within the essence.

5. In the human being, this exigency of the essence for its accidents is accompanied by knowledge. (Indeed, this exigency of the essence for its accidents is, in the human being, accompanied by knowledge.)

Pay attention: Every voluntary act that a human being performs, even if it is of the type of instinctive acts, is accompanied by knowledge. This is unlike cases that are purely instinctive and not considered voluntary at all (like the circulation of blood). However, in conventional instincts, such as eating, although it is instinctive, it is accompanied by knowledge because it is not purely instinctive. Here, we perceive the agreeable and the disagreeable and deliberate whether to pursue it or not. This very perception takes the human being out of the state of pure instinct. In fact, due to the dominance of will in all conscious and semi-conscious human behaviors, many of the human being's instinctive states have become mixed with numerous constructs.

Conclusion: The human being's perfection in the attachment of their accidents is accompanied by knowledge. This occurs in such a way that they distinguish the agreeable from the disagreeable through knowledge and perception, and then exercise will: they move toward the agreeable and flee from the disagreeable.

[The introduction presented at the beginning of the discussion is used here as point 6:]

6. Meanings for us (the forms of our mental sciences) are of two types:

a. Real — They have a correspondence with and in external reality (a correspondence with them and in them, such that they are so in themselves, whether we abstract those meanings from them, attach ourselves to them, and apply these meanings to them or not). (Like our perception of a tree on the wall, in whose reality I, as a human being, have no role, and whose perception is not subject to my will.)

b) Constructed — Without an external correspondent and dependent on the positing of the positor. That is, the mind imagines externality for them, albeit with the aid of the external world: ["Granting them the limit of external things": We apply them to external things such that if we were to close our eyes and cease intellection and conceptualization, they would have no realization or occurrence in the external world.]

7. When a human perceives something agreeable or disagreeable, he posits upon it a mental form called necessity or prohibition (which he derives from the perception of external necessity—for example, from the relation of his person to another person, or of some parts of his person to his person). (According to ʿAllāmah, from the first-mentioned exigency, obligation is posited, and from its absence and the state of refusal, prohibition is posited.) And this first positing is like prime matter for all subsequent posited things.
For example, there was previously a necessary relation between eating and satiety; so now, when I am hungry, I posit this relation between myself (as hungry) and food, and I say I must eat. Here I posit the obligation of eating for myself in order to reach that previous state, namely satiety.
A necessity is instituted, and ʿAllāmah holds that this positing is the foundation and root of all posited things.

8. Because of the variety of his life’s needs and the obstacles to fulfilling them, man is compelled to social life.

a. The need for mutual understanding and communication — the use of words and language: so much so that the word becomes a verbal existence for the meaning, such that when it is heard, one attends only to the meaning.
b. Cooperation in efforts and the allocation of what one has prepared to oneself — the positing of property, whose root lies in appropriation. And each person’s need for what is in the hands of others brings about the positing of transactions, and then the positing of money. Posited things are laid down one after another, and the science of economics and its structure are established to examine the requisites and conditions of this positing.

Likewise, the positing of marriage can also be initiated, with certain considerations, from this same positing of appropriation—though it differs from the positing of property—and this positing becomes the root of the emergence of the family, and so on.

c. Man’s inclination to appropriate benefits to himself brings about the exigency of injustice and aggression, and this very thing increases the harm individuals suffer in collective life. Hence the positing of law is introduced, along with its requisites, which gradually shape the science of jurisprudence. At the same time, this law requires an enforcer, and the positing of authority is introduced, whose requisites and conditions shape the science of politics.

9. These posited things, given the multiplicity of needs, expand in scope until they permeate all the general and particular affairs of social man. Consequently, his life becomes surrounded by imaginary meanings (which have no reality in the external world), so that in his life man constantly pursues these very posited meanings. Yet what actually occurs in the external world are the real, external matters. Of course, for his perfection, man needs imaginary meanings, but imaginary meanings are an aid for pure perfection and do not possess the reality of, say, bricks and walls. In truth, these imaginary things are a path to reaching God, and they should not become ends in themselves or be taken as goals for us.
ʿAllāmah has an expression to the effect that what occurs in the external world is a real matter; for instance, with money, which is a posited thing, I buy a house and a car, which are real. But it is possible that ʿAllāmah intends something higher, namely that, for example, attachment to a posited thing like money enters my personality and becomes a part of my personality, and I become a money-loving person—that very attachment of accidents to the essence.

10. Thus: In the realm of nature, man has a total attachment to mirage-like, imaginary meanings that are an intermediary between his essence and the perfections that accrue to him. (These imaginary meanings—posited things—become the intermediary between him and his perfections.) They are the intermediary between his essence, which is devoid of perfections, and the contingent perfections that accrue to his essence.

[Chapter Summary: Perfection occurs through the attachment of accidents to the essence. In non-human beings, the essence’s exigency with respect to accidents is sufficient for attracting accidents, but in man it is accompanied by knowledge and requires positing; and this positing encompasses all the affairs of his life.]

[Chapter Objective: To explain why man engages in positing and how, through this positing, he traverses his path of perfection and enters from the stage of “before the world” into the stage of “after the world.”]

Chapter 2

In this chapter, ʿAllāmah links together verses from the Noble Qurʾān as well as narrations in a particular order to reach his desired conclusion. In fact, many of the verses and narrations he cites are premises for the arguments he constructs, without indicating that this was an argument. Therefore, I will present some of the verses that play a pivotal role in his reasoning as headings and explain them below.

1. الذی اعطی کل شی خلقه ثم هدی، الذی خلق فسوی و الذی قدر فهدی:

After creating things (completing their essences), God appoints a measure for them (detailing their existential particularities: کل شی فصلناه تفصیلا) and then guides them toward these decreed particularities. This guidance operates by placing within the thing an intrinsic disposition toward its existential perfections, and this is the true order of reality.

2. خلقنا الانسان فی احسن تقویم ... :

After the completion of his creation (in the finest stature) [the pre-worldly stages and the bestowal of capacity], the human being is returned to the lowest of the low, which is worldly life. (The exception of the believers is also disconnected, because He said لهم اجر غیر ممنون, and this is not realized in this world.) + other verses (الیه یصعد الکلم الطیب، ثم ننجی الذین اتقوا، یرفع الله الذین آمنوا، لو شئنا لرفعناه بها، etc.) The evidence that the "lowest of the low" here refers to this very world lies in indications such as verse 38 of Al-Baqarah: اهبطوا منها جمیعا, or ان منکم واردها, or فیها تحیون و فیها تموتون و منها تخرجون. But to explain how this exception الذین آمنوا is disconnected: if this exception were connected, its meaning would be that God sent non-believing, non-righteous humans to the earth, but kept the believing, righteous individuals with Himself, and they never came to earth at all. Yet this interpretation is contrary to evident reality. The intended meaning of this verse is that after being returned to this world, believing humans are brought back [to a high station], and this is supported by the verses mentioned above, including یرفع الله الذین آمنوا.

3. نما الحیاۀ الدنیا لعب و لهو ... و فی الاخره عذاب شدید و مغفره:

The reality of worldly life is play (an action whose end is imaginary: conventional constructs) and diversion (that which preoccupies one with itself and causes heedlessness of other than it: treating convention as fundamental). Worldly life (= the soul's attachment to the body and the mediation of the body in acquiring perfections) preoccupies the human being with itself, to the exclusion of everything else. The spirit considers itself to be the very body (identifies itself as such), its state and atmosphere are cut off from the higher realm (beyond the world of bodies), it forgets the entire prior world, and in everything it pursues illusory aims that never satisfy it. (God has adorned the earth [adornment: a beautiful thing placed alongside another to make it desirable] so that it becomes the human being's object: لنبلوهم)

Thus, the inner reality of worldly life is either punishment or forgiveness and good pleasure: if it is made the goal, its fruit is destruction, and if the Hereafter is the goal, it is felicity: (من کان یرید حرث الدنیا ... و من اراده الاخره و سعی لها سعیها ...)

And also another verse which states that the world is a provision, meaning We have given the world so that you may transact and reach God.

4. ولو تری اذ الظالمون فی غمرات الموت ... ولقد جئتمونا فرادی کما خلقناکم اول مره و ترکتم ما خولناکم وراء ظهورکم ... ضل عنکم ما کنتم تزعمون

So worldly life is an imaginary mirage (all its members, faculties, and means are conventional and illusory, and its illusory nature becomes apparent at death)—beneath which, of course, lie real matters—and every person returns to God alone and solitary, abandoning the members, faculties, and means upon which they relied, and finds that they were all illusory constructs and deception (غرور): فلاتغرنکم الحیوه الدنیا و لایغرنکم بالله الغرور، ما الحیاه الدنیا الا متاع الغرور، انما هذه الحیوه الدنیا متاع و ان الاخره هی دار القرار، انما مثل الحیاه الدنیا کماء ... فجعلناها حصیدا کان لم تغن بالامس. Allamah says the world is a game. To understand this game, it is helpful to consider the acting of performers in films. Someone takes the role of a boss in a film; now the matter becomes confused for him, as if he truly is the boss of those individuals who are his subordinates in the film. The one who takes the game (worldly life) seriously, and takes what is serious (the life of the Hereafter, which is the true, real life: ان الدار الاخره لهی الحیوان) as a game and jest, becomes wretched; and the one who takes the game as a game and the serious as serious attains felicity. Hence He said: Worldly life is play and diversion whose inner reality is either divine punishment or forgiveness and good pleasure (perhaps the fact that the positive aspect is mentioned as two [forgiveness and good pleasure] is an allusion to the distinction between the Companions of the Right and the Foremost, just as punishment alludes to the Companions of the Left; the people of Hell are not more than one group, but the people of Paradise are two groups).

5. علیکم انفسکم لایضرکم من ضل اذا اهتدیتم

Thus, whoever occupies his soul with other than his own self will go astray, become bewildered, and perish (فمن شغل نفسه بغیر نفسه تحیر فی الظلمات). For man has no life outside the vessel of his own self and the container of his own existence. And this narration that has been transmitted from the Commander of the Faithful has much to say. He said, on the day when apparent causes are set aside and it becomes clear that the true cause of phenomena, and indeed the one in charge of everything, was God (in philosophy we say the Cause of causes, meaning that if these are causes and reasons, He made them causes and reasons, not that they truly possess causality of their own accord), and all the things to which we attributed a role were illusions.

The fact that He says God Almighty has made the world, children, wives, wealth, and so on an adornment contains a profound point. Adornment (زینت) is different from beauty (جمال). Beauty is the loveliness of the thing itself; but adornment is used to attract others to that to which the adornment has been attached. When a woman uses adornment, that is, with gold, or specific clothes, or cosmetics, she tries to suggest to the beholder that she is beautiful to this extent. Adornment is not used so that the beholder falls in love with the adornment itself; rather, it is used so that by seeing the adornment, the person is drawn to the one who has put on the adornment, and it is supposed that she is beautiful. And man has come into this world to realize this and not be deceived by the world. And to understand that we have come to a fork in the road in this world; what matters is whether we see the world as reality or as a bridge to cross toward God and consider it a construct.

[Summary and Conclusion of Chapter 2: So we enter the world and the realm of constructs in order to be tested as to whether we can understand that all these are constructs and that knowledge and power belong only to God or not: based on the last verse of Surah At-Talaq, we have come to this realm (the world) to know that God is in charge of everything, to understand that it is God Almighty who is truly Powerful and Knowing (the other attributes also return to these two). These are also verses that indicate this meaning which Allamah has not cited: اللَّهُ الَّذي خَلَقَ سَبْعَ سَماواتٍ وَ مِنَ الْأَرْضِ مِثْلَهُنَّ يَتَنَزَّلُ الْأَمْرُ بَيْنَهُنَّ لِتَعْلَمُوا أَنَّ اللَّهَ عَلى‏ كُلِّ شَيْ‏ءٍ قَديرٌ وَ أَنَّ اللَّهَ قَدْ أَحاطَ بِكُلِّ شَيْ‏ءٍ عِلْما (الطلاق : 12)

وَ هُوَ الَّذي جَعَلَكُمْ خَلائِفَ الْأَرْضِ وَ رَفَعَ بَعْضَكُمْ فَوْقَ بَعْضٍ دَرَجاتٍ لِيَبْلُوَكُمْ في‏ ما آتاكُم‏ (الأنعام : 165)

الَّذي خَلَقَ الْمَوْتَ وَ الْحَياةَ لِيَبْلُوَكُمْ أَيُّكُمْ أَحْسَنُ عَمَلاً (الملك : 2)

وَ هُوَ الَّذي خَلَقَ السَّماواتِ وَ الْأَرْضَ في‏ سِتَّةِ أَيَّامٍ وَ كانَ عَرْشُهُ عَلَى الْماءِ لِيَبْلُوَكُمْ أَيُّكُمْ أَحْسَنُ عَمَلا (هود/7)

And everything here consists of vanities that pass away:

ترکتم ما خولناکم وراء ظهورکم، لقد تقطع بینکم و ضل عنکم ما کنتم تزعمون، فجعلناها حصیدا کان لم تغن بالامس، انا لجاعلون ما علیها صعیدا جرزا، متاع الغرور،

كَأَنَّ الصَّيْحَةَ قَدْ أَتَتْكُمْ وَ السَّاعَةَ قَدْ غَشِيَتْكُمْ وَ بَرَزْتُمْ لِفَصْلِ الْقَضَاءِ قَدْ زَاحَتْ‏ عَنْكُمُ الْأَبَاطِيلُ‏ وَ اضْمَحَلَّتْ عَنْكُمُ الْعِلَلُ وَ اسْتَحَقَّتْ‏بِكُمُ الْحَقَائِقُ وَ صَدَرَت بِكُمُ الْأُمُورُ مَصَادِرَهَا (نهج البلاغه، خطبه 157)]

Summary of the Two Chapters

The spirit is created with a capacity greater than that of the angels, has traversed realms, and descends to the world of this world. Within this spirit, an aptitude for its perfections is placed; at the same time, man's perfectional movement is coupled with acquired knowledge and takes place through constructs.

Since there is a fork between wretchedness and felicity, and the world has been adorned so that one might consider it the intended goal and deem oneself material, two paths thus arise: one is a mirage and the other is real.

Three Main Components of the Analysis of Man

a) Primordial nature (fitrah), his reality being from the world of command and a descent thereof

b) Composition or the body and entry into the world of this world

c) Free will and the possibility of dilemma and movement through the mechanism of positing (regarding estimative perceptions: a- considers them reality; b- uses them merely as a means of passage)