On the Decline of Religious Intellectualism in Iranian Society: A Supplement to Mr. Ali Zamanian's Article

Mr. Zamanian, in confronting the question of why intellectualism has declined in Iran and its conceivable future, has rightly exercised patience and reflection, and instead of attempting an answer, has tried to clarify the nature of the problem, articulating four meanings for what is meant by the decline of religious intellectualism. In his view, the first and most profound meaning of religious intellectualism falling into obscurity is a crisis of approach, in the sense that this current has encountered a conflict at its very foundation, as if it has reached the conclusion that the effort to reconcile religion with the contemporary world is a futile endeavor. And he calls this meaning of intellectualism falling into obscurity the {crisis of approach}.

Mr. Zamanian, in the continuation of his writing, does not enter into a discussion of the four aforementioned meanings of the decline of religious intellectualism, and by pointing to the role of the political impasse in the decline of religious intellectualism, considers politics to be the main factor, as if he does not take the second and third meanings of decline seriously.

I am in no way seeking to criticize Mr. Zamanian in this article, and indeed, I consider his writing to be a very good and illuminating piece. What I wish to briefly present in this article is a reflection on the first meaning of the decline and falling into obscurity of religious intellectualism.

In my opinion, even if we cannot say that this meaning of decline is absolutely correct, it is partially correct. In the sense that, initially, the current of religious intellectualism saw the task of reconciling religion with the contemporary world as an easy one. As I have presented in another article, at first the problem was considered so simple that the solution was reduced to the level of resorting to ethical principles. The early new thinkers thought that the most fundamental step for reform was to reform the actions of Muslims.

But the further this intellectual-social project progressed and the problem revealed itself more seriously, they reached the conclusion that they were facing a difficult problem, and that reformism is a much deeper and more time-consuming issue than what the early new thinkers thought, and one cannot expect to achieve desirable results with rapid and superficial changes. Unlike the early new thinkers who thought the most fundamental step for reform was to reform the actions of Muslims, the later new thinkers are of the opinion that the most fundamental step is to reform the thought and the perspective of Muslims and to reduce the historical gap between Muslim societies and modernity and modern sciences.

Therefore, in recent decades, new thinkers have shifted the space of their discussions from a pragmatic approach to an epistemological approach, and epistemic and intellectual issues have become their primary concern. They no longer see the source of the wrong actions of Muslims (or actions conflicting with the spirit and culture of modernity) as merely heresies and neglect of religious principles and teachings; rather, from their perspective, the source of Muslims' actions is the perspective and angle of Muslims' view of religion, which is in serious conflict with modernity and modern sciences; hence, they did not see the path to reform as combating heresy and propagating Islam in new ways and in the language of the times.

New thinkers have, consciously and unconsciously, reached the conclusion in the back of their minds that the path to religious reform and eliminating the friction between tradition and modernity is no longer providing scientific and timely answers to doubts, tolerance and forbearance, justification and esoteric interpretation; rather, one must distance oneself from the traditional method of thought and discourse. And they resorted to solutions such as attention to anomalous fatwas, ijtihad in principles and foundations, distinguishing between the essence and the shell of religion, and attention to the historical aspects of religion.

Gradually, he has moved even beyond the aforementioned steps and reached the conclusion that the most fundamental way to transform traditional discourse is to transform the way Muslims view the issue of revelation and the understanding of religious texts, and that any reform other than this consists of isolated, disconnected reforms without fixed rules or principles, which can never achieve the desired outcome sought by new thinkers; because the basis of the current interpretations, deductions, and understanding of the general Muslim populace is their particular way of looking at the Quran and Sunnah, and as long as this outlook prevails among scholars, researchers, and the general public, we should not expect serious reform in the behavior and thoughts of Muslims. The way to change these interpretations and this type of understanding is to change the way of looking at the nature and function of religious texts. In fact, a deep familiarity with modernity has led new thinkers to the conclusion that one cannot look at religion and religious texts like a non-modern person and, at the same time, live like a modern person without expecting any conflict or discrepancy; therefore, from the perspective of contemporary new thinkers, the main problems of the Islamic world stem from their specific understanding of the nature of religious texts (the Book and Sunnah) and the method of understanding them, and reconciling tradition and modernity is possible based on transforming this type of understanding.

In fact, considering the key role of revelation and texts in Islam, as mentioned, later new thinkers concluded that the key to solving problems in the realm of religion and the conflicts between religion and modernity lies in the issue of revelation and the understanding of sacred texts; hence, current new thinkers consider the study of revelation and Quranic research as the primary tool and the way out of the conflict between tradition and modernity, and for this reason, they have made "the issue of revelation and the understanding of texts" the central axes of their discussions and research.

But it seems to me that now religious intellectuals have realized that the distance between tradition and modernity, and between religion and modernity, is far deeper than they had thought, and they have concluded that modern rationality and the humanism of modern man are vastly distant from traditional rationality and the theocentrism of religions. Consequently, some of them have essentially thrown in the towel, become weary of these discussions, and turned to studies to resolve their personal concerns; others have abandoned the problem in a different way, concluding that religion no longer plays its former role in the mind and conscience of the Iranian person, and the solution to reconciling tradition and modernity lies in turning to political and social reforms. Still others, who have not thrown in the towel and remain within the sphere of thought regarding the problem of religion and the contemporary world, present such an interpretation of religiosity that others consider them close to abandoning religion or deem them the founders of a new sect. And some others have proceeded with caution, becoming more circumspect in their critique of religion and opening their ears more to the global traditionalist movement and the critique of modernity.

What does this dispersion and disagreement indicate? Can it not be said that it signifies a decline, in the sense of a decline in approach?

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On the Decline of Religious Intellectualism in Iranian Society: A Supplement to Mr. Ali Zamanian's Article

Abbasali Mansouri Sarabi (Faculty Member, Department of Islamic Philosophy, Razi University)

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