Relativism in Moral Values

What is moral relativism? In our time, the idea of moral relativism holds great appeal for many. Moral relativism has been presented in different forms, which can be divided into two main types. One is "comprehensive relativism" and the other is "absolutist relativism." These two types of relativism are the most important forms of relativism.

Definition of Moral Relativism

What is moral relativism? In our time, the idea of moral relativism holds great appeal for many. Moral relativism has been presented in different forms, which can be divided into two main types. One is "comprehensive relativism" and the other is "absolutist relativism." These two types of relativism are the most important forms of relativism.

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Comprehensive relativism can be found in physics. One of the lessons we learned from Galileo is that "there is no absolute motion," or in other words, we cannot say in general whether an object is moving or not. Galileo showed that one must always introduce a "context" or "framework" and assess the motion of objects based on that. Therefore, there is no such thing as "absolute motion." Whenever we are asked whether this object is moving, we must ask, "Relative to what?" The point is that there is no absolute truth about the motion of objects, and the motion of objects is only meaningful relative to a context.

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Furthermore, none of these contexts is superior to another, because if we do not add this principle of non-superiority, we are in fact saying that there are many criteria for motion, but this one is more important than the others or this one is superior, and thus we have rendered relativism meaningless.

Einstein taught us a similar lesson regarding simultaneity. Before "Einstein's special relativity," we would say in an absolute sense that two events may or may not occur at the same time, or ask whether these two events are simultaneous. "Einstein's special relativity" shows that we can only speak of the simultaneity of two events relative to a specific place and time, not in an absolute sense. None of these frames of reference of space and time is superior to the other frames of reference, and therefore they are all equal.

Now we might want to use this same model and say that in moral matters, there is no absolute fact about what "good" and "bad" are; rather, good and bad exist only relative to a context. So when we say "stealing is wrong," the relativist tells us you cannot say this in an absolute sense; you must say "stealing is wrong relative to context A," and this context you mention has no superiority or preference for determining moral rightness over other contexts, or in other words, all these contexts are equal.

Objections to Relativism in Ethics

What is attractive about this kind of relativism, the relativism that tells us we have no absolute facts for determining moral right and wrong, and only relative facts exist, and all of these are equal? One of the reasons for the appeal of this moral relativism is the difficulty of answering the question: where do we get these facts that determine moral right and wrong in an absolute sense, and how can they be accessed? Or how can we know which facts these are? Because across the earth, different individuals, societies, and cultures have reached different conclusions in the moral domain, and disagreement on moral matters is very common.

Suppose you have a disagreement with someone on a moral matter, and they tell you to prove that they are wrong. The difference between this disagreement and a disagreement over matters of fact, such as the shape of the earth, is evident. In different historical times, people, with the different evidence available to them, have described the shape of the earth in various ways, but if we show the available evidence to people of the present era, one cannot imagine they would have any trouble accepting that the earth is not flat.

This kind of relativism must be taken seriously and subjected to critique and examination; if we do not take it seriously, we may foster many misunderstandings in the field of ethics.

Moral Conditions and Standards

Relativists consider moral matters to be dependent on two contexts: "conditions" and "moral standards." These two views and the conclusions they yield are very different. When you consider moral matters relative to "conditions," you are an "absolutist relativist," and when you consider moral matters relative to moral codes, you are a "global relativist." These two approaches are very different, and each leads to actions completely different from the other

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When we determine the morality of something relative to conditions, we are in fact saying that one should not say absolutely that an action is wrong, but rather one must always say that our actions are wrong or right relative to a context. The strength of this approach is that it is coherent and defensible in some cases. In what cases is the wrongness or rightness of an action dependent on conditions? For example, suppose someone's car has broken down on the side of the road; should we stop to help them or not? One could say that rightness or wrongness here depends on the conditions; it depends on whether there is someone else to help them, how dire their situation is, whether they will come to harm if you do not help, and, for instance, whether you yourself might need to go to the hospital for an emergency at that very moment. Therefore, in such a case, one cannot say that whenever a car is stopped on the side of the road you must stop to help; rather, it depends on certain considerations. This is an example of a case where moral rightness or wrongness depends on "conditions"

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Another example is etiquette, which is dependent on "conditions." For instance, whether one should tip after eating at a restaurant, whether one should eat noisily or very quietly and without noise; in some cultures, if you eat without noise, the host will be upset, as it means the food was not tasty. In many cases, right and wrong etiquette is dependent on culture.

However, there are a great many moral matters that are not defensible in any case; for example, if someone says that the wrongness or rightness of harming children for amusement depends on the context, one must tell them: no, it does not depend on any context and is always wrong. Therefore, there are no "conditions" based on which this action could be considered moral

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A very important point that must be noted is that relativizing conditions does not free one from commitment to absolute normative facts. The motivation of the "global relativist" was that we do not know where absolute facts come from. We have a fact that harming children for pleasure is never right; this is an "absolute fact"; the puzzle is where this absolute fact comes from. Likewise, in cases where we consider conditions and relativize moral matters with regard to them (such as helping people whose car has broken down on the side of the road), on what basis do we say that helping them is necessary under these conditions and not under those conditions? Based on what fact do we arrive at this conclusion? Therefore, if, like the "global relativist," the question is "What objective fact shows us where right and wrong come from?" this problem also exists in cases relativized to conditions. What fact shows us that in certain conditions this action is right and in other conditions it is wrong?

It is for this reason that most relativists tie the morality of matters to "moral codes" rather than to "circumstances." In other words, when you relativize moral cases according to circumstances, the rightness or wrongness of a moral act is independent of your moral codes and dependent upon circumstances. Therefore, you will still be committed to objective facts about morality, which in this case are "circumstances," and they are objective in that they tell you what you ought to do in those circumstances regardless of what your own "moral codes" might be. Hence, when you make rightness and wrongness dependent on circumstances, you are an "absolutist relativist."

The Moral Codes of Global Relativism

The "global relativist" seeks for there to be a reality that determines right and wrong based on your moral codes, and what it does is introduce "moral codes or standards" by which right and wrong are determined, and furthermore, based on its relativistic commitment, it must add that none of these moral codes and standards is superior to any other.

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For example, Gilbert Harman, one of the contemporary relativists in ethics, considers a defensible moral relativism to be a type in which you act according to the moral codes you yourself have accepted, which tell you what you ought to do and what you ought not to do. Now, if you say that the rightness and wrongness of our actions are dependent on moral codes and that all codes are of equal value, you have successfully escaped any absolute prescription, because whatever you do, its rightness or wrongness is determined based on your own moral code. This type of relativism is freed from absolutism and has been successful up to this point.

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But the problem is that this approach eliminates ethics as a subject open to inquiry. Suppose we disagree about the education of girls; some think it is morally right for girls to study, and some believe that girls studying is morally wrong. According to what the relativist says, this difference of position should be written in the form of these two statements: "According to the moral codes of the first group, girls studying is morally right," and "According to the moral codes of the second group, girls studying is morally wrong." Everyone considers both of these statements to be correct, because these two statements are descriptive and tell us what each moral code prescribes; no one disagrees that this group prescribes girls studying and that group does not prescribe girls studying. Anyone with any moral outlook can agree with the relativist's statements in this form, because there is no trace of moral oughts and ought-nots in them; they merely describe the different codes of the two groups for us. Moreover, it must be remembered that the relativist is also committed to the idea that no moral code is superior to any other. Thus, with "global relativism," no trace of moral discussion remains, and moral discussion will become meaningless.

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The only type of moral relativism that at least does not destroy moral discussion and preserves it is the relativizing of moral cases to circumstances. As was shown earlier, relativizing according to circumstances still compels you to a commitment to the absolute facts that determine the rightness and wrongness of moral matters. Therefore, if you believe in any kind of moral judgment, you are committed to absolute moral facts or judgments; it is the nature of the subject of ethics that not all commitments can be relativized. The very interesting conclusion of this discussion is that as long as you are concerned with moral discourse—any kind of moral discourse—you are committed to the existence of absolute moral truths.

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Relativism in Moral Values

Paul Boghossian, an American philosopher of Armenian origin, is currently the director of the New York Institute of Philosophy. He received his PhD in philosophy from the University of Pennsylvania in 1987 and is one of the foremost critics of "moral relativism." The following is an account of his critical view on moral relativism, presented in a lecture at the University of Vienna on November 12, 2014.

Translation: Zuhair Bagheri Noaparast

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