Religious Intellectuals: Reconstruction of Religious Thought or Fabrication of Religion?

Those who follow the works of the Iranian school of religious intellectualism have recently witnessed a serious difference of opinion among some of the main figures of this current of thought. On one side of this disagreement are figures such as Mohsen Kadivar, Akbar Ganji, and Arash Naraghi. This group, despite the differences of opinion that exist among themselves, believes that the recent intellectual trajectory of religious intellectualism, especially in the intellectual project of Abdolkarim Soroush and Mohammad Mojtahed Shabestari, has subjected the core and shared beliefs of Muslims (such as the attributes of God, revelation, infallibility, prophethood, and the Quran) to such radical revision that, in this group's view, practically little of the content of the Islamic religion ultimately remains.

If truth had a criterion, we would more or less be omniscient. [But] when we want to discover realities, we must try again and again to err.

Karl Popper (1902-1994), Austrian-British philosopher of science

1. Introduction

Those who follow the works of the Iranian school of religious intellectualism have recently witnessed a serious difference of opinion among some of the main figures of this current of thought. On one side of this disagreement are figures such as Mohsen Kadivar, Akbar Ganji, and Arash Naraghi. This group, despite the differences of opinion that exist among themselves, believes that the recent intellectual trajectory of religious intellectualism, especially in the intellectual project of Abdolkarim Soroush and Mohammad Mojtahed Shabestari, has subjected the core and shared beliefs of Muslims (such as the attributes of God, revelation, infallibility, prophethood, and the Quran) to such radical revision that, in this group's view, practically little of the content of the Islamic religion ultimately remains.

Hence, according to the first group, the intellectual project of Soroush and Shabestari, wittingly or unwittingly, ultimately turns into a new religion (albeit a new religion with tools and materials borrowed from Islam) rather than remaining faithful to religious reform or the reconstruction of Islamic thought. The critics of the first group, of course, do not all necessarily view the phenomenon of religion-making negatively, but they all believe that whatever our judgment about religion-making may be, in the intellectual project of the later Soroush and Shabestari, we are dealing with religion-making and not religious reform or the reconstruction of religious thought.

On the other side, however, are other figures of religious intellectualism (such as Abdolkarim Soroush and Soroush Dabbagh) who believe that the fundamental reconstruction of religious thought is not only not religion-making but is a requisite for the comprehensive reconstruction of religious intellectualism. In the view of the second group, if only jurisprudence or secondary theological beliefs are reconstructed, religious intellectualism has only advanced its work halfway and has not brought it to fruition. In this group's view, the project of religious intellectualism only reaches its perfection if it subjects the common and conventional understanding of God, His attributes, the relationship between God and the world (especially God's relationship with humanity), the prevailing theory of prophethood, revelation, infallibility, Mahdism, and the like to fundamental reconstruction. This reconstruction must take place in light of modern natural-empirical sciences and social-human sciences (especially the philosophy of understanding and new religious studies).

This difference of opinion inevitably brings to mind this more fundamental question: What criterion do we have for distinguishing between religion-making and the reconstruction of religious thought (if, indeed, we have a criterion at all)? Up to what point is the reform of a religion still a reform of that religion, and from what point onward does it turn into religion-making? In this short piece, I do not intend to provide a criterion for distinguishing between the reconstruction of religious thought and religion-making, or even to discuss the more fundamental question of whether such a criterion can be provided at all (however, I believe the quote from Popper at the beginning of this piece contains illuminating points for those who seek criteria). My intention in this piece is merely to show, in a cursory manner, that the first group has so far been unable to propose a defensible criterion for distinguishing between religion-making and the reconstruction of religious thought.

2. Kadivar's Proposed Criterion

Among the first group or their defenders, to date, it is only Kadivar who has proposed a distinction between fabricating religion and reconstructing religious thought. In the second part of a piece titled “Religious Color-Blindness,” Kadivar attempts to set forth criteria for the “authentic” reform of Islamic thought. He believes that deviating from these criteria casts us from the reform of religion into the abyss of fabricating religion. Referring to Soroush’s view on revelation as the Prophet’s dream, he says:

The idea that the Quran is Muhammad ibn Abdullah’s interpretation of the world, or the interpretation of his dreams, or that revelation was subject to his personality and expanded and contracted with the ups and downs of his personality, and that the verses are the offspring of Muhammad’s personality, or that instead of interpreting the Quran, from now on we should seek interpreters to interpret the Prophet’s dreams—these belong to the category of reconstructing religion itself, reforming religion, or tampering with the primary source of Islam. The essence of religion here does not mean essentialism; it means the specific primary source of religion. Changing the primary source of Islam in any of the aforementioned senses leads to changing the religion and results in a new religion.

Soroush does not consider the Quran to be the words of God and does not regard Muhammad as the transmitter of revelation, but rather sees him as the producer of revelation. Muhammad, in his capacity as a prophet, was able to reach a degree of perfection where, in a literary expression, he could peek into God’s private retreat and bring news from there to humankind and change history. Hence, a posteriori, one can consider Muhammad in this peeking to be “under the shadow of divine confirmation and support.” In the conventional and “orthodox” conception of Quranic revelation, however, the Quran is considered the very words of God, Muhammad is merely the transmitter of revelation, and he plays no role in the form and content of the Quran other than conveying them to humankind.

In Kadivar’s view, if we distance ourselves from the conventional and “orthodox” conception of the Quran, then we have in fact prevented the Quran from being the primary source of the religion of Islam. In his opinion, such an act is no longer a reform of Islamic thought, but rather leads to the establishment of a new religion. It seems that for Kadivar, the validity of the primary sources of Islam (the Quran, Sunnah, and reason) depends on not distancing ourselves from the conventional and “orthodox” conception of these sources, and if such a distance emerges, this is no longer a reform of religious thought, but rather the fabrication of religion, or in his words, the “inversion of Islam,” meaning turning Islam into non-Islam.

3. A Critique of Kadivar’s Proposed Criterion

In what follows, I will offer two critiques of this idea. The first critique shows that this view appears to lack external consistency, and the second critique shows that in addition to lacking external consistency, this view also does not seem to possess internal consistency. By external consistency, I mean testing this idea by referring to the history of Islamic thought. By internal consistency, I mean whether the various parts of this view can be consistent with one another, or whether one part of this view contradicts another.

3.1 Lack of External Consistency

If we distance ourselves from the conventional and “orthodox” conception of the Quran, Sunnah, and reason, does this necessarily lead to the establishment of a new religion? One way to find an answer to this question is to refer to the history of Islamic thought and see whether those who have presented an unconventional and heterodox (non-orthodox) conception of the Quran, Sunnah, reason, or Islamic law have necessarily ended up establishing a new religion. The answer seems to be negative. One can compile a long list of Muslim thinkers who did not consider the Quran to be the word of God, yet their views did not lead to the establishment of a new religion, and their views are now an important chapter in the history of Islamic theology, not the opening chapter of another creed. A brief reference to a few names follows.

Ibrāhīm al-Naẓẓām (c. 165–221 AH), a prominent Muʿtazilite theologian from Basra, held that revelation, at the moment of its descent, is created in the air in the form of sounds. These sounds, however, do not belong to any particular language; it is the recipient of the revelation (i.e., the Prophet) who clothes those formless sounds in a specific linguistic garb. Muʿammar ibn ʿAbbād al-Sulamī (d. 215 AH), another Muʿtazilite theologian from Basra, believed that God’s speech is merely “a capacity that God places within an individual so that the individual may utter words indicative of the divine will and creation” (Harry Wolfson, The Philosophy of the Kalam, Harvard University Press, 1976, p. 277). In ʿAbbād’s view, the Qurʾān is not the direct speech of God, but the direct work of nature. According to him, God creates only substances, and it is these substances that create accidents; speech, being among the accidents, is therefore not a direct creation of God. Bishr al-Marīsī (d. 218 or 219 AH), a Murjiʾite theologian and Ḥanafī jurist, held that the Qurʾān is not the speech of God, but rather human speech about God (Josef van Ess, in: The Qurʾān as Text, Brill, 1996, p. 181). Historically, none of the aforementioned theologians founded a new religion, and all are considered Muslims. On this basis, Kadivar’s judgment that a fundamental revision of the prevailing conception of Islam’s primary sources necessarily leads to the founding of a new religion is inconsistent with the history of Islamic thought, and therefore lacks external consistency.

3.2 Lack of Internal Consistency

But regardless of external consistency or inconsistency, does this opinion possess internal consistency? The answer, again, appears to be negative. In another part of the discourse “Religious Color-Blindness,” Kadivar points out that:

What requires reform or structural ijtihād—that is, ijtihād in the principles and foundations—are the Islamic sciences, from jurisprudence [to] legal theory, theology, exegesis, the science of hadith, ethics, philosophy, and mysticism. These sciences have been the understanding of religious scholars, be they jurists, legal theorists, theologians, exegetes, hadith scholars, ethicists, philosophers, or mystics. This is the utmost that a mujtahid in principles and foundations, or a religious intellectual, or a religious reformist (or by any other title with the suffix “religious” and “Islamic”) can and is permitted to do. But the reconstruction or reform of religion itself is an entirely different matter. By the reform of religion is meant “changing the sources of religion.” (The hook and what lies between the hooks are mine)

According to Kadivar, the reform of Islamic thought means the reform of the Islamic sciences, not the reform of Islam itself. In Kadivar’s view, a fundamental revision of the prevailing and conventional conception of the Qurʾān and the Sunnah (the work that Soroush and Shabestari do) means changing the sources of religion, and changing the sources of religion means changing religion itself; and changing religion itself is no longer a reform of religious understanding. But this opinion overlooks the crucial point that what we consider “religion itself” is also, inevitably, a part of our understanding of religion and a part of the Islamic sciences; and if our understanding of religion can be reformed (and this is something Kadivar explicitly accepts and deems a requisite of religious intellectualism or reformism), then our understanding of what counts as “religion itself” can also undergo reconstruction, revision, and reform.

No one’s understanding of religion is equivalent to religion itself; were it so, such a multitude of disagreements among scholars of the Islamic sciences would not have arisen. Yet the understanding of religion also includes our conception of what we consider “religion itself.” In fact, historically, a significant part of the Islamic sciences has been engaged in debating the point: “What is religion itself?” Is “religion itself” the apparent meaning of the Qurʾān’s words, or its inner meaning, or a combination of both? Is “religion itself” the Imams’ interpretation of the Qurʾān, or is the Qurʾān directly authoritative for non-Imams as well? Is “religion itself” that which advanced step by step with Muhammad until it reached a point where, like him, it ascended to the heavens and found a heart as the receptacle of revelation, or not? Nietzsche said that one who always remains a student has wasted their teacher’s efforts. Now, is “religion itself” that which advanced with “Muhammad’s Qurʾān” but did not remain there, until, in the words of Shams Tabrizi, it ultimately found “its own Qurʾān”?

The upshot is that, if the Islamic sciences can be reformed, since a significant part of the Islamic sciences consists of disagreements over what is considered “religion itself,” then the prevailing conception of “religion itself” can also be reformed. But if the prevailing conception of “religion itself” cannot be reformed, it follows that a significant part of the Islamic sciences also cannot be reformed. It is here that Kadivar’s view appears to reveal its internal inconsistency: either the Islamic sciences can be reformed, in which case the prevailing conception of “religion itself,” which is a significant part of the Islamic sciences, can also be reformed; or the prevailing conception of “religion itself” cannot be reformed, in which case a significant part of the Islamic sciences also cannot be reformed.

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Religious Intellectuals: Reconstruction of Religious Thought or Fabrication of Religion?

Yaser Mirdamadi (Researcher in Religion and Philosophy)

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