Reza Naghavi's Article “Is Religious Education of Children Morally Permissible?”

Is Religious Education of Children Morally Permissible?

Reza Naghavi, PhD Student in Philosophy of Religion, Allameh Tabataba'i University

In his article “Raise the Child Only Ethically, and Another Myth,” Dr. Yaser Mirdamadi critiques the claims of opponents of religious upbringing and defends the moral permissibility of religious education. In this article, I will first outline Dr. Mirdamadi’s main claims and then offer my own observations regarding them.

Introduction:

Before delving into the main discussion, I would like to share with you my experience of several years of dialogue on religious matters. In these conversations, I have found that the more thoughtful and philosophical a person becomes, the greater their propensity to fall prey to a form of the motive-and-motivated fallacy. This fallacy could be called “This is something every superficial intellectual says nowadays!” I emphasize in advance that by mentioning this point, I do not intend any disrespect to Dr. Mirdamadi, nor do I wish to claim that he has committed this fallacy, for he has argued in favor of his claim; although I do not consider his argument to be sound. My point is simply that the issue he has addressed is among those where the ground for committing this fallacy exists, and therefore we must intelligently strive to avoid it in similar cases. At any rate, when I spoke with some friends who have advanced philosophical educations and some who are university professors, and who sometimes do not even hold firm religious beliefs, about issues such as women’s rights, social freedom of speech, tolerance towards religious dissenters, and so on, some of their statements astonished me. I certainly did not expect them to accept all the values of secularism and liberalism wholesale and without critique, but the nature of their statements was something beyond a critical engagement with secularism. For example, when we spoke about the freedom of dissenters to express their opinions, one of these friends repeated that well-known claim that a religious society has its own specific exigencies, and if someone does not accept them, they can leave the country! I would say to myself, how can someone who splits hairs in technical philosophical discussions, and even critiques the strongest proofs for the existence of God, speak so dogmatically and unreflectively?! For a long time, such remarks from such individuals preoccupied my mind. Gradually, and through reflection on numerous concrete instances, it occurred to me that perhaps the best explanation for these reactions is the very fallacy I mentioned earlier. These individuals see that the values and principles of secularism are now professed by every learned and lay person, superficial and deep, schooled and unschooled, fair-minded and biased, and so on. Hence, it seems to them that they must distinguish themselves from, in their own words, the fledgling intellectuals who repeat these words as a matter of fashion, and preserve their own thoughtful position. Otherwise, if they show sympathy with the claims of the fledgling intellectuals, they will gradually be considered part of them. It requires no argument that the mere fact that fledgling intellectuals also repeat a statement is no reason for its falsehood; yet, psychologically, and often unconsciously, we practitioners of philosophy are intensely susceptible to committing this fallacy, and we must distance ourselves from it as much as we can. That we should not force-feed our religious/anti-religious dogmas to our children is also among the claims that fledgling intellectuals also hold. We must see what weight this claim carries on the scales of inquiry.

1-The Core Claim of Dr. Mirdamadi:

In my view, the core of their claim is that (a) there is no convincing reason why religious upbringing is morally impermissible, and (b) in the absence of a positive reason against religious upbringing, by appealing to the principle of moral permissibility (every action is morally permissible unless proven otherwise), one can say that religious upbringing is morally permissible. Of course, with the two conditions they mention for it, to which I will refer. They have not offered an argument for claim (b), which is presented at the end of the article, but regarding claim (a), the summary of Dr. Mirdamadi's formulation and critique of the opponents' reasons against religious upbringing is as follows:

1-1- Against the myth of natural atheism: Opponents of religious upbringing claim that the child is naturally devoid of religious and metaphysical beliefs (including belief in the existence of God), and therefore changing this natural state and inculcating the parents' beliefs into the child is morally impermissible. In critiquing this claim, Dr. Mirdamadi believes that, firstly, although a specific form of religiosity results from cultural education and upbringing, regarding the principle of theism, according to recent research, children naturally tend toward theism and the flow of consciousness and purpose in the world, and it is the environment that raises them as atheists or agnostics. Therefore, the

2-1- The Principle of Neutral Upbringing Is Not a Myth: What can be said about neutral upbringing? In presenting the second reason, Dr. Mirdamadi merely stated the scope of the claim and made no effort to present the reason(s) that could be offered in favor of this claim. He simply said that proponents of neutral upbringing claim that we are only permitted to raise a child morally and have no right beyond this to teach the child religious dogmas, and then he criticized this claim, stating that morality is not independent of religion in all aspects, or at least this is not self-evident. But the main question is: why do we not have the right to inculcate our beliefs into a child, and for what reason are we exceptionally permitted, in some cases such as moral principles, to teach things to a child? It seems that the principle of neutral upbringing can be defended with certain qualifications. In this regard, it must first be noted that when we speak of the permissibility or impermissibility of inculcating parents' beliefs into children, in principle and at first glance, there is no difference between religious and non-religious/anti-religious beliefs. It makes no difference whether the parents are theists or atheists, whether they hold religious values or secular and non-religious/anti-religious values. Accordingly, neutral upbringing does not merely mean the prohibition of religious upbringing; rather, it simultaneously means the negation of raising a child based on an atheistic worldview and anti-religious dogmas. Conversely, someone who considers neutral upbringing a myth or a false view and defends the permissibility of religious upbringing must, in principle, also deem atheistic and anti-religious upbringing permissible; unless they provide a morally justified reason for discriminating between religious and anti-religious upbringing—a reason that is absent, at least in this writing by Dr. Mirdamadi. The main point is that parents have beliefs about the world, the human's place in it, the way to regulate relations between humans, etc., which they themselves consider to be correct and beneficial beliefs. It makes no difference whether these beliefs are based on a specific religion or a human school of thought such as Marxism, Liberalism, etc. With this explanation, it seems that, in principle, neutral upbringing is a defensible position. The reason for this is that, firstly, the child, in terms of intellectual and epistemic ability, is in a situation where they absolutely lack the power to discern the truth or falsehood of the metaphysical and religious/anti-religious dogmas being inculcated into them. The child, in terms of age, is in a state where they have the greatest capacity for the inculcated beliefs to become ingrained in their being. Their mind is like virgin soil in which the sapling of metaphysical and religious/anti-religious dogmas can be planted. A sapling that, in youth and middle age, will become a sturdy tree whose uprooting and replacement with other saplings is, psychologically speaking, if not impossible, then extremely difficult and near impossible. Secondly, the inculcators of these dogmas are those to whom the child has the highest emotional attachment, and therefore this very fact drastically reduces the likelihood that the child can later turn their back on these inculcated beliefs and replace them with other beliefs. Historical experience shows that the majority of humans more or less live out their lives with the same dogmas inculcated into them in childhood and adolescence, and they can rarely free themselves from the grip of those dogmas. Considering these points, it seems that any inculcation of religious or anti-religious dogmas is a form of violation of the child's intellectual and rational freedom and is morally impermissible. Intellectual freedom is a necessary condition for any freedom in various political, moral, and customary actions, and violating it amounts to violating all dimensions and instances of an individual's freedom. If we accept that the child is in a passive position relative to our inculcations and beliefs enter their mind without any deliberate selection, then there is apparently not much difference between inculcating these beliefs into children through teaching and upbringing, or, say, creating specific beliefs in them through injections and pills. It might be objected that Dr. Mirdamadi himself has said that this religious education must be coupled with the teaching of critical and evaluative thinking, and this very thing can provide a way for the child to escape these dogmas. But it seems that religious/anti-religious education, by its very nature and definition, is incompatible with raising a child with a critical and evaluative mindset. The conjunction of these two will necessarily lead to us stripping one of these components of its original property and nature and turning it into a mere formality.

والدینی که می‌خواهند باور به تثلیث را در کودک نهادینه کنند، اگر هم‌زمان بخواهند واقعاً تفکر انتقادی را هم به وی یاد بدهند باید به او شیوۀ نقد اندیشه‌ها، از جمله آموزۀ تثلیث را، هم بیاموزند. مثلاً باید به او بیاموزند اینکه والدین تو به چیزی معتقد باشند و آن را به تو القاء کنند به هیچ وجه دلیل بر درستی آن باور نیست. بسیاری از والدین باورهای باطل و خرافی خود را به کودکانشان القاء می‌کنند. یا از طریق نشان دادن اختلاف میان آموزه‌های دینی در ادیان مختلف به فرزندشان گوشزد کنند که قریب به هفتاد درصد انسان‌های روی زمین که انسان‌های کم‌وبیش عاقلی هم هستند، باوری به تثلیث ندارند. یا به آنها توضیح دهند که چگونه بسیاری از باهوش‌ترین متفکران جهان نشان داده‌اند که آموزۀ تثلیث آموزه‌ای تناقض‌آمیز است و ... روشن است که این‌ها با ماهیت آموزش دینی ناسازگار هستند. یعنی نه در آموزش مذهبی رایج چنین روالی برقرار است و نه به فرض که کسی اینگونه آموزه‌های مذهبی را به کودک آموزش دهد جامعۀ مؤمنان عمل او را آموزش مذهبی قلمداد می‌کنند. چنین آموزشی بیشتر شبیه تعلیم به روش سقراطی خواهد بود تا آموزش مذهبی. اما در باب قید دوم ایشان که گفتند ملاحظات عینی حقوق بشری حدّی است بر آموزش مذهبی، باید توجه کرد که مثال‌های ایشان نشان می‌دهد که آموزش دگم‌های دینی اخلاقاً رواست مگر دگم‌هایی که متضمن توصیۀ توحّش و آسیب زدن به دیگران هستند. اولاً مطابق استدلالی که بدان اشاره کردیم (آموزش مذهبی تعرض به آزادی فکری کودک است)، هرگونه تربیت دینی/ضد دینی اخلاقاً نارواست مگر در موارد استثنایی که خواهد آمد و لذا منع تربیت دینی/ضد دینی اختصاصی به موارد منجر به توحش ندارد. اگر ما صرفا معیارِ حداقلّیِ توحش آمیز بودن را مرز تعلیم مذهبی بدانیم؛ آنگاه راه را برای تعلیم بسیاری از آموزه‌هایی که نه تأثیری در رشد اخلاقی کودک دارند، نه به سلامت روانی وی کمک می­کنند و نه شواهد و قرائن بین‌الأذهانی در تأیید آنها وجود دارد را باز خواهیم کرد. نیاز به گفتن ندارد که هرکدام از ادیان و مذاهب جهان علاوه بر آموزه­های کلّی راجع به مبدأ و معاد و وجود ساحت قدسی در عالم، مشتمل بر هزاران و بلکه میلیون‌ها گزارۀ جزئی دیگری هستند که هر چه قدر به سمت  اختلافات جزئی‌تر حرکت می‌کنیم هم نقش ‌آنها در کمال اخلاقی و روانی تضعیف می‌شود و هم وجود شواهد  بین‌الأذهانی به نفع آنها کمتر و کمتر می‌شود. معیار حداقلی دکتر میردامادی به والدین اجازه می‌دهد ذهن کودک را تبدیل به انبانی از باورهای حاصل از اختلافات و تعصبات فرقه‌ای بنمایند. ثانیاً حتی مطابق معیار توحش، منع از تربیت دینی اختصاصی به امور جزئی از قبیل ختنه کردن دختران یا قمه‌زنی و امثال آن‌ها ندارد. در آموزه‌های بنیادین ادیان و مذاهب نیز می‌توان از باورهایی سراغ گرفت که مستلزم تعرض به دیگران هستند. بسیاری از ادیان و مذاهب به نوعی مستلزم تفکیک میان خودی و غیرخودی هستند و غیرخودی را از پاره‌ای حقوق سیاسی، اجتماعی محروم دانسته و تحت شرایطی تعرض فیزیکی به آن‌ها و حتی قتل و غارت در میان غیرخودیان را جایز می‌دانند.

2-2- Relative consensus among human beings as a criterion for exceptions to the principle of neutral upbringing: But the question is, what is our criterion for making exceptions to that general principle? Why do we exempt things like the teaching of moral principles from that principle? It seems this exception is not specific to moral principles. One could say that both desirable and positive matters, as well as the tools and ways of achieving those goals and desires, fall into two categories. Some of them, from the past to the present, have been relatively subject to consensus among all human beings, regardless of religion, nationality, and specific ideologies, while others are, to varying degrees, subjects of dispute among different cultures, religions, and nations. If a matter is such that both its intrinsic desirability and the means of achieving it are subject to the relative consensus of informed and impartial individuals, and if, on the other hand, that matter is considered among urgent and pressing affairs where suspending judgment about it is not possible, here our intuition dictates that we are permitted to teach that goal and that means to the child. For example, there is a relative consensus that physical health is desirable and that certain actions endanger physical health. Here, although we are not dealing with an intrinsically moral matter, according to the aforementioned principle, we are permitted to teach the child how to take care of their physical health. This principle can also be applied to mental health. It might be said that the principle of believing in a sacred entity and considering the world to possess design and consciousness is also among the things that contribute to individuals' mental health and making their lives meaningful, and therefore, theism can also be taught to the child. It seems that here we are faced with an ambiguity that is not easily resolved. On the one hand, we intuitively know that certainly some of the dogmas of our own specific religion or sect regarding God play no role in God's giving meaning to life and are merely a theological and technical belief. For instance, we know that both the God of the pantheists and the God of those who believe in a personal, anthropomorphic God can give meaning to life. Both a God whose attributes are identical to each other and to His essence, and a God whose attributes are additional to His essence, and so on. But on the other hand, we do not know exactly to what extent we can introduce a God to the child, free from these theological disputes, who, while helping the meaningfulness of their life and their mental health, does not fill their mind with a series of unnecessary theological dogmas. Another important case considered an exception to the prohibition of indoctrinating the child is the general moral principles that are subject to relative consensus, such as the prohibition of murder and theft, and so on. In the conflict between whether to exceptionally restrict the child's intellectual freedom or to expose them to matters that, by the acknowledgment of nearly all rational people, are harmful to them, we are morally justified and obligated to choose the first option. Whereas, regarding none of the religious dogmas does such a moral dilemma exist. There is no consensus among the world's rational people that belief in the Trinity is the only path to the child's salvation and happiness, just as there is no consensus that atheism is the only path to salvation. Therefore, in these cases, the principle of intellectual freedom remains unchallenged. But as for the claim that ethics, at least in its historical realization, has been intertwined with religion and that there is no consensus on the complete independence of ethics from religion, it should be pointed out that, in the words of the jurists, "necessities are estimated by their extent." That is, in necessary matters, one must not exceed the bounds of necessity. Our general principle dictated that any form of intellectual imposition on the child is morally impermissible. But we saw that moral education is an unavoidable matter and an exception to that general principle. Nevertheless, in this matter too, we must confine ourselves to the extent of necessity; meaning that we should confine ourselves to consensual moral principles and not indoctrinate the child with the specific moralities of a particular religion. For example, the prohibition of killing an innocent person is a relatively consensual moral principle; but celibacy, bachelorhood, and asceticism are moral principles that exist only in certain religions, and they do not have the right to indoctrinate this moral principle to the child. Secondly, this same consensual principle of the prohibition of murder can be grounded, both theoretically and foundationally, as well as motivationally, in the teachings of a specific religion, such as the existence of the Christian God, etc., or it can be taught to the child without resorting to those teachings. Here, there is no obstacle to observing that general principle (the non-imposition of religious dogmas on children), and therefore we must, as much as possible, raise the child morally without resorting to religious dogmas.

Some religious dogmas have essentially nothing to do with religious ethics, and thus we see that within a single religion, where there are numerous sectarian differences among various denominations, the core of religious ethics is shared among them. Moreover, if we base moral education on those dogmas, there is always the danger that when those dogmas collapse, the validity of these moral principles will also collapse in the person's view and drive them toward moral nihilism.

2-3 The Principle of Moral Permissibility Is Not Defensible: The final point concerns the principle of moral permissibility that Dr. Mirdamadi referred to. “The principle is that an act is morally permissible unless the contrary is proven.” In jurisprudential and legal discussions, we have principles such as the presumption of innocence. For example, it is said that the principle is that everything is permissible unless its prohibition is proven. Or the principle is that individuals are innocent unless the contrary is proven. In philosophical and epistemological discussions, some thinkers have also proposed certain principles, which have, of course, been subject to much controversy, and the principle Dr. Mirdamadi refers to is no exception to this rule. For instance, in his discussions on the testimony of others, Thomas Reid adopted the principle of “credulity” as a criterion, claiming on its basis that the principle is that others are truthful in what they tell us unless the contrary is proven. Or Antony Flew, precisely invoking those same legal principles of England, claimed that in the debate over the existence or non-existence of God, the presumption is with the non-existence of God, and the claimants must provide reasons. Richard Dawkins also repeated Flew’s position in his book The God Delusion. In the words of our jurists, “The burden of proof is on the claimant, and the oath is upon the one who denies.” That is, if someone says, “Zayd stole my book,” he must provide evidence; otherwise, Zayd swears that he did not steal the book, and judgment is issued in his favor. To put it humorously, the argument of Flew and Dawkins is that either theists must provide proof for the existence of God, or we swear by God that no God exists! But the truth is that in the realm of knowledge, especially in areas like proofs for the existence of God or the permissibility and impermissibility of religious education, where reasons for and against both views have been and continue to be presented, regardless of which set of reasons one finds justified, this kind of appeal to a principle is nothing but shirking the responsibility of providing reasons and committing the fallacy of “shifting the burden of proof.” In controversial and grave matters, particularly cases like intellectual upbringing, our action can affect the entire future of another human being, and therefore, in such cases, principles of this sort are less of a guide and more of a pitfall.