Yaser Mirdamadi's “Raise the Child Morally, and Nothing Else” and Another Myth

“Raise the Child Morally, and Nothing Else” and Another Myth

Yaser Mirdamadi

1. Religious Education and Its Critics

The bitter experiences of critics of religious education (of any religion) are undoubtedly instructive. They point to something that, in their view, amounts to the imposition and dogmatism of certain forms of religious education. These experiences, even when they do not lead to catastrophic situations such as abuse, are still painful and usually not only discourage the person with the bitter experience from religious education but can also lead to disbelief in a particular religion itself or in any religious belief or way of life.

Hence, critical attention to these experiences can pave the way for making religious education more open and humane. Of course, critical attention to these experiences may, in a more radical form, also cast serious doubt on the moral permissibility of the very principle of any religious education in the public or private sphere.

With this background in mind, I have two main claims in this piece:

1. Attention to the experience of critics of religious education should not prevent us from paying attention to the diversity of experiences, to the point of ignoring the positive experiences of religious education. Accordingly, a final judgment on the possibility, desirability, and desirable limits of religious education should only be reached after weighing both the positive and negative experiences of religious education.

2. Attention to the experience of critics of religious education should not lead us to believe in two common myths: a) the myth of the “naturalness of atheism,” b) the myth of “neutral upbringing.”

To avoid prolonging the discussion, I will not argue in favor of the first part of the claim in this piece, at least not independently and directly; although I will touch upon it in passing while arguing for the second part. In what follows, I will argue in favor of the second part of the claim.

2. Against the Myth of the “Naturalness of Atheism”

The myth of the “naturalness of atheism” holds that it is self-evident that a child is naturally devoid of religious and metaphysical beliefs unless the parents raise the child religiously. Proponents of the myth of the “naturalness of atheism” then conclude: since atheism is the child’s natural state, religious education for the child is the teaching of something unnatural, and therefore it is self-evident that religious education is at least morally impermissible, even if it has no legal prohibition.

The myth of the “naturalness of atheism,” like many other myths, is not entirely devoid of truth. The claim that belief in a specific religion is not innate in a child is, of course, a true claim; but this claim is true to the same extent that, for example, we say that becoming a Persian speaker is not innate in a Persian speaker either, but is rather inherited and acquired. It goes without saying that if a person were not born and raised in a Persian-speaking environment, their mother tongue would not be Persian.

But from this simple truth, one cannot, in and of itself, conclude that the Persian language is not valuable and should not be taught from childhood. Just as becoming a Persian speaker for someone born and raised in a Persian-speaking environment is not a flaw, because the Persian language has its own linguistic-cultural values, so too the unnaturalness of an inclination toward a specific religion does not, in and of itself, call into question the very desirability of religious education for the child. Just as a Persian speaker can read Hafez and learn lessons from the tales of the heroes of the Shahnameh (though they may also learn many insults in Persian), a believer in a specific religion can also find spiritual delight and, “in a world all passion and all evil,” find the courage for a meaningful life (though they may also learn narrow-mindedness and hostility toward others).

Cultures are not essentially innate; rather, they are transmitted solely through a mode of inheritance (acquisition), and decreeing the prohibition of transmitting a culture (whether religious or secular)—which, like language learning, begins in childhood—is a despotic decree, except in specific cases where objective human rights considerations are at stake. For example, female circumcision is a more or less common culture in some Muslim-majority countries and also among certain Christian communities in parts of Africa. Since female circumcision is an instance of bodily mutilation and a clear violation of basic human rights, combating this culture is not only morally permissible but necessary. In such a case, objective human rights considerations permit critics and even possibly governments to intervene in a corner of a religious-local culture and, if necessary, perhaps even resort to force to stop the culture of female circumcision.

Another example of cultures against which objective human rights considerations exist, and which can therefore be stopped, is the tradition of striking the heads of children and even, in some cases, infants with a blade (qameh-zani) among a small number of Twelver Shiites in recent years. Although this tradition is by no means widespread or ancient, even if it has only occurred rarely and recently, an appropriate response has not been expressed by Shiite sources of emulation (marājiʿ-e taqlīd)—whether they agree with adult blade-striking or oppose it. Rather, the majority of the sources of emulation have passed over it in silence, and, with utter astonishment, in at least one case, one of the Shiite sources of emulation has explicitly deemed it permissible.[1] However, from these exceptional examples, one cannot draw a general conclusion mandating the prohibition of any religious education for children; rather, one must only confront extreme cases.

But leaving aside the issue that the inclination toward a specific religion is not innate, is the primary ground for belief in a purposeful, designed, and conscious universe also merely an acquired ground? The doctrine of the "naturalness of atheism" makes such a claim. However, there is no evidence in favor of the doctrine of the "naturalness of atheism"; rather, research evidence has recently been found against it, such that taking the doctrine of the "naturalness of atheism" as self-evident (without arguing in its favor) is of the nature of mythical beliefs (Note: only the claim of self-evidence for this doctrine is a mythical belief. The doctrine of the "naturalness of atheism" itself, without claiming self-evidence for it, although false or at least unjustified, is not a mythical belief).

Numerous studies, especially in recent decades, have shown that children naturally see the world as purposeful, agent-centered, and designed, and not as devoid of purpose and designing consciousness.[2] Based on these studies, one might even justifiably claim that a child is naturally born with an inclination toward theism (evolutionary causes have been sought for this inclination), and it is the educational environment that makes them an atheist/agnostic. Leaving aside the principle of theism, whether the possibly innate inclination toward theism takes on the color of a specific religion depends, of course, on the individual's cultural upbringing.

But regardless of whether theism is natural or not, this research evidence at least refutes the self-evidence of the doctrine of the "naturalness of atheism" and turns taking this doctrine as self-evident into a mythical belief. In other words, even if recent research evidence does not demonstrate the "naturalness of theism," it at least demonstrates the falsity or unjustifiability of the "naturalness of atheism" and the mythical nature of the claim of self-evidence for this doctrine.

It is worth noting that the possible naturalness of theism does not, in itself, demonstrate the truth (i.e., correspondence with reality) of theism, because a belief may be natural but false (i.e., not corresponding with reality); but this does not harm our discussion, because our discussion here is the philosophy of education, not the philosophy of religion. That is, our discussion is not about the truth or falsity of theism but merely about demonstrating the point that appealing to the doctrine of the "naturalness of atheism" to reject religious education is not justified, because the doctrine of the "naturalness of atheism" is false or at least not justified.

Moreover, my claim is not that “since theism is natural (regardless of whether it is true or false), religious upbringing is therefore permissible.” Rather, the claim is simply that the argument “atheism is natural, therefore religious upbringing is impermissible” is a false or at least unwarranted claim, and the assertion of its self-evidence is a myth. The conclusion is that the naturalness or unnaturalness of theism, in and of itself, neither permits nor forbids religious upbringing, and deeming religious upbringing impermissible requires other reasons (if such reasons exist at all).

3. Against the Myth of “Neutral Upbringing”

But if the doctrine of the “naturalness of atheism” cannot render religious upbringing impermissible, perhaps the doctrine of “neutral upbringing” can. What can be said about this doctrine? There is no doubt that in a multicultural and liberal society, public education must be non-ideological, in the sense that it does not take sides with any particular religion or creed in public education and acquaints the student with various cultures.

Implementing educational neutrality in the public sphere is, of course, a difficult task, and some scholars of education have even spoken of its impossibility. But leaving the public sphere aside, some have attempted to model the ideal state of education in the private sphere on the ideal state of education in the public sphere. However, in the private sphere, speaking of it being “self-evident that only non-partisan beliefs should be taught to the child” is a myth (Note: claiming self-evidence for this doctrine is a mythical belief. The doctrine of “neutral upbringing” itself, without claiming self-evidence for it, though false or at least unwarranted, is not a mythical belief).

The most famous model of the “neutral upbringing” myth says: teach the child, even in the private sphere, only to live morally, and nothing else. But this model, which appears neutral, is itself built upon a non-self-evident and controversial idea which holds that, even in the private sphere, religion is entirely separate from morality. This is while, at least historically, religiosity and morality have been closely intertwined, such that, from a traditional perspective, moral education has generally occurred within the context of religious education.

Even if it were hypothetically established that, theoretically, religion and morality are entirely separate from one another, this historical point still retains its educational significance. Although philosophically, attempts have been made to demonstrate the “complete independence of morality from religion” and this debate continues, our discussion is in the philosophy of education, not in moral philosophy. Even if it were hypothetically established that religion and morality are theoretically completely independent, the practical separation of religion and morality has historically been a rare occurrence and has only gradually taken place in the last one or two centuries.

Furthermore, even if the theory of the “complete independence of morality from religion” were a defensible theory, it is still not a neutral theory; rather, it is a theory that has rivals, the conversation about it is not concluded, and it has not yet managed to consign rival theories to the archives of the history of ideas. In other words, the theory of the “complete independence of morality from religion” has not yet become the sole defensible theory on this subject. Thus, speaking of “neutral upbringing” in the private sphere appears to be a form of doping to push out rival theories, rather than being a well-reasoned and respectable theory in the philosophy of education. To put it another way, the idea that in private education, atheism is the neutral stance while theism is the partisan stance, carries no weight on the scales of inquiry.

4. Conclusion

From the sum of these considerations, it can be concluded that the father, mother, or guardian of the child has the right to teach their religious values to their child, even if these values are controversial and even if they appear as “superstition” from an alternative viewpoint. However, this right is not absolute but must satisfy at least these two conditions:

1. The right to religious upbringing does not include violating objective considerations of human rights — as explained earlier.

2. Religious upbringing must be accompanied by the teaching of critical thinking and familiarity with intellectual/practical diversity.[3]

Teaching critical thinking is meant to prepare the child for independent thought and prevent religious education from turning into brainwashing. For instance, one can teach “Philosophy for Children” (P4C) from the age of four, thereby both cultivating a critical mind and acquainting the child with other ways of living and modes of thinking. These two specific constraints are, of course, in addition to the general constraints that any effective moral education must observe.

A final point: someone might sympathize with my critique of the myth of “the naturalness of atheism” and the myth of “neutral upbringing,” yet still say that these critiques only refute the arguments of critics of religious education, but do not positively demonstrate the moral permissibility of religious education. In response, one can say that the principle is that an act is morally permissible unless proven otherwise. Accordingly, to justify a voluntary and intentional action, it is not necessary to provide an independent positive reason for its moral permissibility (though one can do so, it is not required); rather, it suffices to be assured that there is no convincing argument against its moral permissibility.

In this piece, I have argued that there is no convincing argument against the moral permissibility of religious education, and this alone is sufficient to justifiably believe that, under certain conditions, religious education is morally permissible. [4]

.

---

.

[1] Ayatollah Bashir Najafi, from Pakistan and one of the Shiite sources of emulation in Najaf, has issued an explicit fatwa permitting qameh-zani (blade-cutting) even on the heads of children. Not only that, but in a speech whose video was previously published, he explicitly spoke of the religious permissibility of this act, from his own perspective. The author of this piece had personally viewed this video before, but YouTube removed it from where it was published for violating its content policies. A trace of this video (but not the video itself) can be followed here.

Also, one can see Ayatollah Bashir Najafi’s fatwa in favor of blade-cutting on children’s heads here, a fatwa that is (no longer) visible on this source of emulation’s official website.

Shiite sources of emulation have not reacted much to the issue of blade-cutting on the heads of children (and even infants). Among them, one can only find the explicit criticism of Ayatollah Sayyid Kamal Haydari, the modernist Iraqi source of emulation residing in Qom, who compared blade-cutting on the heads of children or infants to child sacrifice in ancient tribes and deemed it a cause of “weakening Shiism.”

Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah, Secretary-General of Hezbollah in Lebanon, also strongly condemned the tradition of blade-cutting on children’s heads during Ashura in a public speech in 2018, calling it a “Daesh-like” act.

[2] For just one example of this research, see:

Deborah Kelemen, “Are Children ‘Intuitive Theists’?: Reasoning About Purpose and Design in Nature,” Psychological Science 15, no. 5 (May 1, 2004): 295–301 .

[3] Helen De Cruz, “Is Teaching Children Young Earth Creationism Child Abuse?,” The Philosophers’ Magazine, 2013, 21-23 .

[4] In completing this piece, I have benefited from the critical marginal notes of my Facebook and Twitter friends on the first draft; I am grateful to all of them.

.

---

.