Reza Naghavi's essay “A Semantic Reflection on the Soroush–Malekian Dialogue Concerning the Nature of Intellectualism”

A Semantic Reflection on the Soroush–Malekian Dialogue Concerning the Nature of Intellectualism

Reza Naghavi, PhD Candidate in Philosophy of Religion, Allameh Tabataba'i University

In the recent dialogue between Professor Malekian and Dr. Soroush, the discussion turned to the nature of intellectualism and its relation to truth. What drew my attention above all was Dr. Soroush's indirect reference to the "paradox of analysis" and Professor Malekian's response to this objection. The paradox of analysis is one of the important issues raised in the philosophy of language and semantics, which manifests itself regarding any definition, including the definition of the nature of intellectualism, and unless the disputing parties have a refined opinion on this matter, their answer to the nature of the phenomenon in question will not be properly understood. In this essay, I will try to show that, as far as I understand, Professor Malekian's definition of the nature of intellectualism is not based on a refined and defensible view regarding the paradox of analysis and is at least in need of reconstruction and restatement. It seems, as will be shown, that this definition is even inconsistent with some of his own semantic positions. The primary audience of this essay is a reader who, firstly, has a general familiarity with the issues of the philosophy of language and, secondly, seeks philosophical analysis and precision regarding the problem under discussion.

1-The Paradox of Analysis and Dr. Soroush's Critique of Professor Malekian's Definition:

As mentioned, the problem of the "paradox of analysis" is one of the most important issues raised in contemporary philosophy of language. Analytic philosophers trace the history of this problem back to Plato's dialogues (including the Meno). In most books on the history of analytic philosophy and especially the philosophy of language, this problem has been discussed, and there is neither space nor intention here to recount those matters in detail.[1] First, I will briefly state the problem itself and then apply it to Dr. Soroush's critique of the definitions offered of the nature of intellectualism, including the definition defended by Professor Malekian. The core of this paradox is raised regarding the definition of any concept (philosophical-non-philosophical, empirical-theoretical, etc.); but since in the present essay we are dealing with a concept that is a social construct (the concept of intellectualism), I will express the point of contention by resorting to concepts of the same kind. The essence of the paradox of analysis is that any definition is either a tautology or false, and therefore no definition exists that is neither a tautological and arbitrary proposition nor, at the same time, a correct and true definition. For example, consider concepts such as intellectualism, secularism, liberalism, freedom, etc. Suppose in defining an intellectual we said that "an intellectual is someone who possesses components A, B, C, and D." The question is, on what basis did we offer this definition? Do we mean that, by definition and as an analytic proposition, the meaning of the word intellectual is someone who has these four components? If so, we have expressed a necessarily true tautology that is of little use. But if we say that these components are not included in the meaning of the word intellectual and, in this respect, our definition is a synthetic proposition providing new information in which the predicate of the proposition is different from the subject of the proposition, then the objection will be that this definition is therefore necessarily false; because a real definition is one that expresses the constituents and essentials of the phenomenon being defined, and the constituents of any phenomenon are predicated of that phenomenon analytically; whereas you yourself claim that the proposition you have stated is a synthetic proposition; therefore, the said definition is necessarily a false and invalid definition. In other words, in this definition, either the subject and predicate have semantic identity (tautology) or they have semantic non-identity (false definition). Numerous solutions have been proposed for this paradox, and Professor Malekian's response to Dr. Soroush is, in fact, an appeal to one of these solutions, which we will examine later. But regardless of those solutions, the implication of this paradox is that no concept, including the concept of the intellectual, is susceptible to a "correct and useful" definition. Every definition is either false or tautological. It seems that Dr. Soroush's critique of the definitions of intellectualism is precisely by appealing to this paradox. His statement is as follows:

If “articulating truth and alleviating suffering” is part of the definition of “intellectualism,” then this statement is nothing more than a tautology; but if it is not part of the definition of intellectualism, then one must first determine who the intellectual is and what characteristics they possess, and then say: O you who have such characteristics, you must engage in articulating truth and alleviating suffering. I have observed this point regarding most definitions of intellectualism—when they say “the intellectual must lock horns with power,” or “the intellectual must be the grit in society’s shoe,” or “the intellectual must struggle against falsehood, corruption, and oppression,” and so on. My question in all these statements is: who is meant by the intellectual who must perform these tasks? Does “intellectual” refer to the educated? Or the religious? Or a particular group among the educated, such as sociologists? If any one of these definitions is adopted, the problem is resolved to some extent; but when we lack a clear definition of the intellectual, what they should and should not do remains shrouded in ambiguity.[2]

In fact, Dr. Soroush’s objection is this: in your definitions, are you coining a term and presenting your own stipulative definition of the meaning of the word “intellectual,” believing that with this very definition the meaning of the word “intellectual” and its instances are established and recognized? Or have you first determined the meaning of the word “intellectual” and its instances through another means (independent of this definition) and are then stating that the intellectual must be such and such? If the first option is intended, then this is a tautology. And if the second option is intended, the problem is, firstly, what is that independent means by which you initially determined the meaning and instances of the word “intellectual,” and secondly, based on what criterion and logic do you impose these “oughts” upon the intellectual? That is, what is the source of these norms that you consider the intellectual obligated to observe? Furthermore, at the end of the discussion and as a conclusion to their preceding remarks, Dr. Soroush stated that “in my view, intellectualism has no essence and consequently no definition. It is so devoid of essence, or its essence is so broad, that it encompasses many individuals, and everyone in society has a duty of intellectualism and enlightenment, each according to their capacity.” [3]

2-Professor Malekian’s Response to Dr. Soroush:

In this conversation, Professor Malekian did not respond to the latter point (that intellectualism has no essence) and answered the objection of it being tautological. However, elsewhere he has addressed the discussion of whether socially constructed concepts such as religion, modernity, secularism, etc., have an essence or not. In what follows, I will first address Professor Malekian's response to the latter point and then examine his response to the first point. Since he himself, in discussions concerning religion and modernity, has considered matters such as argumentative rationality and dogmatism as constituents of religion and modernity, some critics have accused him of essentialism and have said that it seems Professor Malekian believes in essentialism regarding socially constructed concepts; whereas essentialism is hardly defensible even for natural concepts (such as wood, water, etc.), let alone socially constructed concepts. Among the instances of these concepts, there is such great difference and variation that one cannot speak of a common essence for all these instances. In the critics' view, regarding such concepts, Wittgenstein's theory of family resemblance provides a better answer and has greater explanatory power. Hence, it is preferable to essentialism. Briefly, Professor Malekian's response to these objections is that, firstly, it is obvious that when one speaks of the essence of religion, modernity, intellectualism, etc., the intended meaning of essence is not the specific form (in the Aristotelian sense of the word); for it is clear that the specific form in that sense is exclusive to natural objects, and not only concepts like religion and modernity, but also concepts like chair and table lack essence in this particular sense. Regarding concepts like religion and intellectualism, etc., when one speaks of essence, the intended meaning is that common attribute/attributes which is/are realized among all instances of these concepts, and this very common attribute/attributes is the justification for applying these concepts to multiple instances. With this description, he claims that the theory of family resemblance is acceptable only for certain specific concepts and is not acceptable for a multitude of concepts. All instances of religion, modernity, intellectualism, etc., despite all the differences they have with one another, must share one or more common attributes by virtue of which this term can be applied to all those instances; his statement is as follows:

"When they say we have democracies, we have liberalisms, I say, of course, that is so. You are right. But on the condition that all these democracies share in democracy. Liberalisms must share in liberalism, otherwise, if you say that we have liberalisms, we have democracies, I can consider totalitarianism as an instance of democracy. You say no? I say why not? So it becomes clear that there is at least one thing common to all these democracies that totalitarianism lacks, and for this very reason, you do not allow totalitarianism to consider itself an instance of democracy.[4]

اما در باب انتقاد نخستِ دکتر سروش، در همین گفتگو، استاد ملکیان دو پاسخ در مقابل این انتقاد مطرح کردند. در پاسخ اول گفتند که من اصلا این مؤلفه­ها را در مقام تعریفِ (توصیف) روشنفکر بیان نکردم تا اشکال توتولوژیک بودن مطرح شود. من در مقام توصیه این مؤلفه‌ها را بیان کرده و معتقدم که روشنفکرِ واقعی باید چنین باشد نه اینکه روشنفکر چنین است. بنابراین نهایتا می‌توان گفت که مدعای من توصیه به تحصیل حاصل است؛ بدین معنی که می‌گوید «ای کسانی که دنبال تقریر حقیقت و تقلیل مرارت هستید، بر شما باد تقریر حقیقت و تقلیل مرارت». توصیه به تحصیل حاصل غیر از توتولوژی­گویی است.  در پاسخ دوم گفتند که اصلا من موضوع گزارۀ خودم را با وصف «تقریر حقیقت و تقلیل مرارت» تعریف نمی‌کنم تا توصیه به تحصیل حاصل یا توتولوژی گویی پیش بیابد. بنابراین حتی اگر سخن مرا ناظر به مقام تعریف (توصیف) در نظر بگیریم، تعریف مذکور توتولوژیک نیست؛ چرا که معنای موضوع را با مؤلفه­هایی غیر از معنای محمولْ مشخص و معین می­کنم و از این طریق تعریف ارائه شده قضیه‌ای ترکیبی و مفید اطلاع تازه خواهد بود. پاسخ دوم استاد ملکیان در واقع یکی از راه حل­های پارادوکس تحلیل است که بر اساس آن می‌توان با تفکیک میان ذات اسمی (nominal essence) و ذات واقعی (real essence) به پارادوکس تحلیل پاسخ داد. مراد از ذات اسمی اوصافی از پدیده است که در معرض شناخت و تشخیصِ همگان است و اهل زبان با توسل به آنها معنایِ واژۀ دال بر آن پدیده را تعیین می­کنند و به آن پدیده ارجاع می‌دهند، هر چند این اوصاف جزء عوارض آن پدیده بوده و قوام بخش ماهیت آن پدیده نباشند. در مقابل مراد از ذاتِ واقعی، اوصافی است که قوام بخش آن پدیده هستند و ذات آن پدیده را تشکیل می­دهند. کشف و تشخیص این اوصاف غالبا توسط متخصصین انجام می­شود و همگان قدرت تشخیص آنها را ندارند. برای مثال زرد بودن، چکش خوار بودن، تلألؤ و ... جزء ذات اسمی طلا بوده و داشتنِ عدد اتمیِ 79 (ساختمانِ شیمیاییِ طلا)، ذاتِ واقعی طلا است[5]. بر این اساس، اگر کسی در تعریف طلا بگوید «طلا عبارت است از عنصری که واجد عدد اتمی 79 است» این تعریف، هم توتولوژی نیست و هم صادق است. توتولوژی نیست؛ بدین دلیل که  موضوع این قضیه (معنای واژۀ طلا) را با توسل به ذات اسمیِ آن معین می­کنیم؛ در حالی که محمول، بیانگرِ ذات واقعیِ طلا است؛ در نتیجه این قضیه قضیه‌ای ترکیبی است. همچنین اگر علم شیمی را در کشف ساختمانِ شیمیاییِ طلا صائب بدانیم، این گزاره صادق است. بر همین قیاس، استاد ملکیان مدعی است که روشنفکر یک دسته اوصاف ظاهری و قابل تشخیص برای همگان دارد که ذات اسمی او را مشخص می‌کنند و یک سری اوصاف ذاتی دارد که قوام بخش این پدیده بوده و ذات واقعیِ آن را معین می‌کنند. ذات اسمی روشنفکر  این است: (الف) «روشنفکر کسی است که از آخرین دستاوردهای علوم و معارف بشری در راه‌حل مسائل و مشکلات مردم استفاده می‌کند»[6] در حالیکه ذاتِ واقعی روشنفکر با دو مؤلفۀ تقریر حقیقت و تقلیل مرارت، و لوازم این دو مؤلفه، مشخص می­شود. در واقع این دو مؤلفه قوام بخشِ ماهیت روشنفکر هستند. بنابر این تعریف (ب) «روشنفکر کسی است که به تقریر حقیقت و تقلیل مرارت می‌پردازد» قضیه‌ای ترکیبی و مفید اطلاع تازه است.

3- ملاحظاتی در باب پاسخ‌­های استاد ملکیان:

It seems that both of Mr. Malekian's responses are open to criticism and do not provide a convincing answer to Dr. Soroush's objection, nor, by extension, to the problem of the paradox of analysis. Let us begin with the second response. We saw that according to the second response, since we determine the subject by the nominal essence of the intellectual, definition (B) will be a synthetic definition and convey new information. But the question is: how can the real essence of the intellectual, which is used as the predicate of the proposition, be determined and established? In the case of natural objects like gold, one can say that empirical science has discovered the real essence; but in the case of socially constructed concepts like the intellectual, discovering the real essence through empirical science is not possible, and here there must be another method for discovering the real essence that is, at the same time, acceptable to both parties to the dispute and not arbitrary. It seems the only method we have for discovering the real essence regarding phenomena such as intellectualism is to define them by referring to the intuitive and pre-theoretical instances of these phenomena, which are recognized by the speakers of the language. That is, we first accept certain instances and cases as intuitive examples of the intellectual, and then, by considering their common characteristics, we systematize our intuitions[7]. For example, we might say we intuitively know that individuals such as Sartre, Russell, Abu Zayd, Shariati, Bazargan, Soroush, Shabestari, Fanaei, Malekian, etc., are instances of intellectuals, and then see what common characteristics exist among all of them that distinguish them from other groups (academics, employees, merchants, etc.). Ultimately, we would present the common attributes of these as the real essence of intellectualism, the definition of intellectualism. Mr. Malekian himself, in an interview with Hojjatollah Nikouei, accepted these very pre-theoretical intuitions of language speakers as a criterion for determining the meaning of a word. He is asked: how did you discover that the essence of modernity is rationalism and the essence of religiosity is devotion? Mr. Malekian's response is this:

Regarding the meaning of a word, one must refer to linguistic intuition, as Searle says. One must refer to the linguistic taste of the people who use that word. We cannot just come and assign meanings to words ourselves... We cannot dictate to the speakers of a language; we can only report what the speakers of the language say about the meanings of words. When you use the word 'chair' in Persian, you must see in what sense Persian speakers use 'chair'.[8]

Given that the interviewer's question concerns his view on the essence (constitutive element), religiosity, and modernity, the criterion offered by Professor Malekian (recourse to the linguistic intuition of native speakers) must be regarded as a criterion for determining the real essence of phenomena. Of course, essence in the sense we have discussed is acceptable to him; not essence in the Aristotelian sense. The emphasis on this point is because it might be imagined that when he considers the linguistic intuition of native speakers as a criterion for determining the meaning of words, he has the nominal essence in view, not the real essence, and therefore he cannot be criticized for not himself using the intuition of native speakers as a criterion in defining the category of intellectualism; for he has the real essence in view when offering a definition, not the nominal essence. It seems, considering what has been said so far, that this defense of Professor Malekian's position is not correct, and the pre-theoretical and pre-reflective intuitions of native speakers are a criterion for refining and correcting definitions that are supposed to present us with the real essence of a phenomenon; not that they are merely a criterion for specifying the nominal essence. For example, suppose a moral philosopher wants to define the concept of "good." That is, to state the constitutive elements of a good act as the definition of a good act. Here, to avoid the paradox of analysis, he must first, by resorting to the apparent and universally understood attributes that "good" possesses, specify the nominal essence of "good," and secondly, by taking into account the moral intuitions of human beings, seek to define this concept (determine the real essence of good—state the necessary and sufficient components of good). For instance, in determining the nominal essence of good, he could say: a good act is an act that every healthy and normal human being, firstly, feels a kind of motivation within themselves to perform that act, and secondly, has a motivation to encourage others to perform this act as well. This is exactly like saying that gold is a metal that is yellow, lustrous, malleable, etc. But after this stage, he must still, in order to define good (determine the real essence of good), take into account the moral intuitions of human beings and, considering these intuitions, present his deontological, consequentialist, or virtue-ethical definition. In summary, we have no escape or alternative but to refer to the shared intuitions of human beings, not merely for determining the nominal essence, but also for determining the real essence, and we cannot offer a definition of a phenomenon that is completely in conflict with the shared intuitions of human beings. The moral philosopher cannot define "good" in such a way that, according to the intuitions of native speakers, the definition is non-inclusive and non-exclusive. Meaning that it excludes some intuitive instances of good from the definition and considers some cases that are intuitively not instances of a good act as good acts. Of course, this does not mean that definition is merely the juxtaposition of raw intuitions and that we grant the definer no independent or critical role regarding raw intuitions. The definer can show that some of the initial intuitions of native speakers are outweighed and some are weightier, and in the conflict between them, priority belongs to the weightier intuitions. Or he can, through this same method of intuition and counter-intuition, show that some of our raw intuitions are erroneous. But with all these qualifications, he cannot absolutely disregard the intuitions of native speakers and define the phenomenon solely by his own ideal criteria. And if an intuition is to be deemed erroneous or corrected, it must be done by resorting to clearer, stronger, and more deeply rooted intuitive cases. With this explanation, it seems that Professor Malekian's definition of the category of intellectualism is not a correct definition. That is, it cannot be said that the effort to articulate truth and reduce suffering, with all its logical implications, which Professor Malekian elaborated on in the article "The Flaw and Art of Intellectualism" and also referred to the most important of these implications in the dialogue with Dr. Soroush, are characteristics that he discovered through the aforementioned method, i.e., reflection on the intuitive instances of intellectualism or recourse to the linguistic intuition of native speakers. Evidence for this is that he considers the concept of "religious intellectual" to be a contradictory concept and, consequently, lacking any real instance. In his view, the essence of intellectualism lies in rationality, and the essence of rationality lies in argumentativism, and argumentativism means that a person accepts no statement from anyone without reason and shows no deference to anyone. That is, does not accept the authority of any person or book, etc. Whereas the essence of religiosity lies in deference and acceptance of the authority of the founder of the religion and denomination. Therefore, intellectualism, by definition, is incompatible with religiosity, and "religious intellectual" is a contradictory concept[9].

بدیهی است که وقتی مفهومی تناقض‌آمیز باشد فاقد مصداق خارجی خواهد بود و لذا هیچ دینداری نمی‌تواند مصداقی از روشنفکر باشد. لازمۀ این تعریف این است که متفکرانی از قبیل دکتر شریعتی، مهندس بازرگان، دکتر سروش، دکتر شبستری، دکتر فنایی و غیره، هر عنوانی که بتوانند داشته باشند، اطلاقِ واژۀ روشنفکر بر آنها صحیح نیست. برای مثال ایشان گفتند می‌توان افرادی را که به اصطلاح روشنفکر دینی نامیده می‌شوند «نواندیش دینی» نام نهاد. اما نو‌اندیشی غیر از روشنفکری است. «نواندیش دینی کسی است که سعی دارد دین را (که طبعا مراد از دین، دین خودش و جامعه‌ای است که در آن زندگی می‌کند) برای مردمش قابل فهم و حتی المقدور قابل قبول کند»[10]. می‌بینیم که رویکرد استاد ملکیان به تعریف روشنفکری منتهی به این شده که افراد موسوم به روشنفکر دینی را مصداقی از مقولۀ روشنفکر ندانند و مدعی شوند که این افراد در نهایت نواندیش دینی هستند و نه روشنفکر؛ در حالیکه اگر معیار شهوداتِ پیشانظری و پیشاتأمّلیِ اهل زبان (شمّ زبانیِ اهل زبان) باشد، شکی نیست که بنابر شهودات پیشانظریِ اهل زبان روشنفکران دینی از مصادیقِ بارزِ مفهومِ «روشنفکر» هستند. به هر فارسی‌زبانی بگوییم چند روشنفکر را نام ببر به احتمال زیاد او به نام شریعتی، بازرگان، سروش، شبستری و ... اشاره خواهد کرد. نتیجه اینکه استاد ملکیان در تعریف خود از روشنفکر به هیچ وجه به معیار «شمّ اهل زبان» به تعبیر خودشان، یا «شهودات پیشانظری و پیشا تأمّلیِ اهل زبان»، به تعبیر ما، ملتزم نیستند. همچنانکه که سابقا هم اشاره شد، در اینجا نمی‌توان پاسخ داد که ما تعریف روشن فکر را همان تعریف (الف) می‌دانیم که بر اساس آن «روشنفکر کسی است که از آخرین دستاوردهای علوم و معارف بشری در راه‌حل مسائل و مشکلات مردم استفاده می‌کند». زیرا گفتیم که بنا به پاسخ استاد ملکیان، این بیان تعریفِ حقیقیِ مفهوم روشنفکر نیست، بلکه صرفا بیانگرِ ذات اسمیِ روشنفکر است که با آن موضوعِ قضیه را تثبیت می­کنیم و تعریف چیزی است که قرار است بر این ذاتِ اسمی حمل شود.

4-A Note on Professor Malekian’s First Response

It seems, given what was said regarding the second response, that his first response is also unconvincing. We noted that in his first response he claims that the two components of “articulation of truth and reduction of suffering,” along with all the entailments he enumerated for them, are expressions of oughts and obligations that are ethically incumbent upon the intellectual, and not a description or definition of the intellectual. Here, we set aside the question of how he has discovered the ethical duties of the intellectual and assume that our moral intuitions dictate that the intellectual must adhere to these duties. However, the main problem is that if we regard these components as expressions of ethical oughts and obligations, then we must first be able to define the intellectual independently of these components and then say that the intellectual is ethically obligated to perform these tasks. For example, when we say that the ethical duties of a “human being” consist of A, B, C, and D, we must first define the human being independently of these components and then say that the “human being” is ethically obligated to observe these components. In other words, before assigning specific ethical duties to a human being or an intellectual, we must first discover their real essence (and not merely their nominal essence) and then say that this entity, which possesses such characteristics, is obligated to such-and-such ethical duties. Indeed, it seems that, contrary to Professor Malekian’s conception, one cannot merely rely on knowing the nominal essence of a human being or an intellectual in order to ascribe ethical duties to them. For example, one might say that the nominal essence of a human being is “an animal that walks on two legs, speaks, laughs, etc.” That is, these are attributes of the human being that everyone easily recognizes and by resorting to which they refer to external instances of the human being. But it is clear that if we wish to place specific ethical duties upon the human being, these superficial attributes alone are insufficient for this purpose, and we must first understand the real essence of the human being as far as possible. That is, those attributes of the human being that constitute the very humanity of the human being, by virtue of which the human being is distinguished from other entities and becomes subject to ethical duties. For instance, we might say that attributes such as being free-willed, being created in the image of God, possessing reason and the faculty of distinguishing good from evil, etc., are among the constitutive elements of the human being and factors involved in the real essence of the human being, and by citing these attributes, one can obligate the human being to ethical duties[11]. The very same points recur regarding the category of the intellectual. With this explanation, the problem raised concerning Professor Malekian’s first response is: how can the intellectual be defined independently of the aforementioned components (articulation of truth, reduction of suffering, and the entailments of these two)? In other words, the problem is compounded in this response, because in the previous response the claim was that the aforementioned components sought to define and describe the intellectual, and thus it was possible for the theorist to say that even with the same method of referring to the intuitions of language users (the linguistic sense of language users), one could find at least some of these components among all intuitive instances of the intellectual and therefore define the intellectual by them; but in this response, since we have considered all these components as the ethical duties of the intellectual, we can no longer simultaneously regard them as part of the definition of the intellectual, and we are compelled, disregarding all these components and in addition to definition (A), which was stated merely for the purpose of establishing the subject, to search for the primary and real definition of the intellectual. A search that, it seems, holds little hope of success.

5- Conclusion

It seems, considering the points mentioned, that Professor Malekian has not provided a convincing response to Dr. Soroush's criticism. The main problem is that if a definition is to avoid being tautological and arbitrary, it must necessarily be formulated with regard to the intuitive instances of words and concepts, and be a kind of systematization and formulation of the intuitive understanding that language users have of these concepts and their instances. We noted that Professor Malekian himself has, in one place, considered the linguistic intuition of language users as the criterion for determining the essence of phenomena, including religion, modernity, secularism, and so on. Nevertheless, in defining the intellectual, he himself does not adhere much to the linguistic intuition of language users and defines it according to ideal criteria that he himself accepts. An ideal definition, disconnected from the intuitions of language users, leads him to consider what language users regard as one of the most prominent instances of intellectualism (religious intellectuals) as a contradictory category and, naturally, lacking a real instance. Whereas it seems that categories like intellectualism, even if they possess an essence and nature, and consequently a comprehensive and exclusive definition, this essence can only be known a posteriori, through reflection on their intuitive instances. And precisely because of this a posteriori nature and reliance on intuitive cases, the definitions obtained are all provisional and open, and are always subject to revision and correction through further reflection on intuitive instances. But it appears that Professor Malekian has a dual stance in resorting to intuition and linguistic sense. In some cases, he makes it the criterion, and in other cases, he practically disregards the intuitions of language users. Until Professor Malekian specifies exactly what his criterion for defining phenomena is, the audience will remain in a state of wonder and confusion.

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[1] For example, on this subject, see:

Miller, A. (2007). philosophy of language. Routledge.pp45-47

Also, the author has discussed the historical course of this paradox and the possible and proposed solutions to it in the following article:

Valeh, Hossein, Naghavi, Reza. (1398). Moore's Open-Question Argument in Moore's Moral Philosophy and the Challenge of the Paradox of Analysis within It. Philosophical-Theological Researches. No. 80. 73-95.

[2] Intellectualism and Truth: A Conversation between Mostafa Malekian and Abdolkarim Soroush

[3] Ibid.

[4] Mostafa Malekian's Responses to Some of the Critics' Questions – Part One

[5] On the distinction between nominal essence and real essence, see:

Miller, Alexander, 2003, an introduction to contemporary metaethics,pp162-163

[6] Intellectualism and Truth: A Conversation between Mostafa Malekian and Abdolkarim Soroush

[7] The point that in defining and analyzing philosophical concepts, we have no choice but to refer to pre-theoretical and pre-reflective intuitions and must constantly revise and correct our definitions against these intuitions is emphasized by many analytic philosophers. For example, John Searle makes this point regarding the definition of the "analytic-synthetic proposition," and Plantinga regarding the definition and analysis of "properly basic proposition." On this, see:

Searle, John R. (1387). Speech Acts. Translated by Mohammad Ali Abdollahi. Qom: Islamic Sciences and Culture Academy. pp. 92-97

Plantinga, Alvin.(1992). "Is Belief in God Properly Basic?" in: ContemporaryPerspectives on Religious Epistemology.( pp133-142). Edited by R. Douglas Geivett & Brendan Sweetman. Oxford: Oxford university press. P140

[8] Mostafa Malekian's Responses to Some of His Critics' Questions – Part One

[9] Shushtari, Hesam. Analysis, Critique, and Examination of Religious Intellectualism from Mostafa Malekian's Perspective. pp.12-13

[10] Ibid., p. 14

[11] It should be noted that this statement does not mean that the moral duties of a human being or an intellectual are logically deducible from their definition or, in other words, from their real essence; for this would entail the fallacy of "is-ought" or, in Moore's terms, the "naturalistic fallacy." The point is simply that since moral properties supervene on non-moral properties, one cannot know the moral duties of a human being or an intellectual without knowledge of their non-moral properties.

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