اندیشهفلسفهخردگفتگوحکمتمعناپرسشفرهنگ
Revolutionism and reformism are not two logical choices, but responses to different situations; each has shortcomings and needs the other. A contextual understanding of these two horizons challenges the simple model of comparison and opens up a space for dialogue.

Almost all of us know who a revolutionary is and who a reformist is. We know what enormous differences they have. A revolutionary is someone who moves among grand ideals. They seek the greatest goods for humanity in the shortest possible time. They are emotional, impassioned, and ardent. They make sacrifices. They engage in violent actions. Their most important problem is that they do not see realities. Their eyes are fundamentally closed to realities and possibilities. But a reformist is someone who, instead of lofty ideals, seeks the improvement of people's condition in concrete matters. They are patient. They know that every effort requires patience and forbearance to bear fruit. They possess more reason and prudence than emotion. They never engage in violent actions. They are extraordinarily peace-seeking. They pay attention to the feasibility of goals, and to achieve any goal, they carefully scrutinize the objective and practical possibilities and constraints.
With these explanations, is there really any sane person who would prefer a revolutionary over a reformist? It seems revolutionaries are a little mad. They are not well. They must first and foremost be treated. The above perspective is one that has become common in the political literature of the last one or two decades. Every so often, a revolutionary is seated opposite a reformist and they are compared. The one who is supposed to defend revolutionism constantly shouts slogans and provokes the laughter of the audience. The revolutionary cannot properly persuade their audience. The audience does not understand why they are so emotional, why they are vengeful, why they speak of ideals that are not realizable.
The problem with this perspective is that it presents revolutionism and reformism as two logical options before one's eyes. As if we are supposed to choose between two commodities. We ask our audience which choice is reasonable. One is expensive, costly, and useless, and the other is cheap and highly useful. Whereas these are not options to be chosen under equal conditions based on the logic of cost and benefit. Understanding and comparing these two is only possible if we try to comprehend them with attention to their context. Against this conventional narrative, I want to present my point under three axes:
1_ Revolutionism and reformism are not two logical choices; they are two reactions to two different situations and fields of action.
2_ These contexts are related to one another. In the sense that one leads to the other.
3_ Each has shortcomings and needs the other.
By proposing these axes, I intend to question the simple, logical model that is oblivious to the generative contexts of each. My impression is that with a contextual understanding of the emergence of idealist and reformist intellectualism, a better space for dialogue between the two aforementioned horizons will be provided. Then, just as the horizon of revolutionary intellectualism is criticized today, I intend to sit in criticism of our own present-day space.
From the 1340s [1960s] onward, political activists in Iran generally leaned towards revolutionism, and after the revolution, towards reformism. This general inclination in each period reveals the different contexts of political life and action. In pre-revolution Iran, the path to political engagement was completely blocked. By political engagement, I mean entering into collective activities to compete with the whole or a faction of the statesmen. Positions were generally non-competitive. The political structure fundamentally did not allow for overt and organized political activity. Party formation was impossible; something called parliamentary activity had no relevance. One could not openly criticize the political system. There was no rival media against the official media. The people were almost passive. No voice was heard from among the people. Except for domestic whispers.
When the conventional channels of political engagement are blocked, one must turn to the creation of politics. That is, one must generate new capacities within political life. The creation of politics means establishing a new center of pressure at the bottom, at the base of the social pyramid. You must be able to identify the resources that exist in the public sphere and, from them, construct a possibility for producing power, creating collective solidarity, and exerting pressure on political power. Under such conditions, intellectuals, willingly or unwillingly, become subjects who create politics. In an era that demands the production of politics-creating subjects, everything approaches revolutionary politics. The political actor who creates political life must, in the first step, demonstrate that the existing situation is not a natural, inevitable, and predetermined one. It could be otherwise. For the mentality of a passive populace considers the status quo an inevitable situation; it fundamentally cannot conceive of an alternative situation. Therefore, the political imagination of the people must first be challenged. Political ideals usually serve such functions.
Political ideals should not be compared with the country's five-year development plans. One is intended for an audience of policymakers and decision-makers in various executive sectors, and the other is intended for the people in the context of everyday life. One is meant to contemplate execution and action for changing a specific matter, the other is meant to produce the possibility of critiquing existing mechanisms.
Fundamentally, the possibility of creating politics is neither compatible nor aligned with existing, readily available possibilities. Existing possibilities are all foundations of a passive life and a blocked political life. It is exactly like repeatedly showing a prisoner the iron bars and the closed door. On the contrary, you must create an imaginary vista so that the prisoner's entire field of vision is not limited to the closed door and the bars. Ideals serve precisely this function in such a space.
In a situation where political life is mired in stagnation and passivity, the people are humiliated. They feel they have no role in collective mechanisms. They are overlooked. They have withdrawn into their private realms. The subject who creates political life, with the aid of words or symbols or artistic manifestations, draws them out of the domain of their private life and creates a possibility for shared understanding and common discourse. What the established order creates in the public sphere through force and intimidation, the idealistic intellectual produces through words.
The conditions in Iran after the coup of the 28th of Mordad are like this. In an atmosphere of intimidation, intellectuals emerge who succeed in producing and creating a space for political life. With the aid of symbols and resources available in the public sphere, they create new images of political life. Iranian society in the early 1350s benefited from a powerful social base. If the Pahlavi regime had correctly recognized the issue and adapted itself to it, it could have endured and enriched Iran's political arena. But it stood against it and exited the stage.
In contrast to the Pahlavi regime, the Islamic Republic could not, from its very first day, advance its political mechanisms without the vote and the ballot box. This was because the people never entirely retreated to their homes. The Islamic Republic was never a fully structured regime. From the very first day of its establishment, its dominant structure had two or three factions that were in competition and conflict with one another. Even if it had wanted to, the system could never block the path of critique. In public spaces such as the seminary, the university, and the street, diverse voices were always heard. Whether the Islamic Republic is a democratic system or not is another discussion, but without a doubt, it was not a structured and successful system in blocking the public sphere.
Therefore, the issue in post-revolutionary Iran was not the creation of politics, but political engagement within the existing channels of political life. The most important of these is electoral campaigns. The large number of competing press outlets and media provided the possibility of dialogue with the people. To some extent, there were opportunities for party activities, albeit in a limited form. Under such conditions, instead of subjects who create political life, you encounter other subjects. Subjects who try to utilize the actually existing channels of political activity, to mobilize, and to challenge a part of the political system. Reformist subjects emerge in such situations. As we observe, in pre-revolutionary Iran, political subjects are more of the type that create political space, and in post-revolutionary Iran, of the reformist type.
I have said all this to avoid a context-independent comparison of these two types of intellectuals. From the perspective of a space where political engagement is possible, revolutionary subjects appear ridiculous; it is not at all clear what they are doing. Just as from the perspective of a space where there is no path but the creation of space, reformist subjects appear humiliated and absurd.
At first glance, it seems as though these two spaces are entirely alien to one another. But in reality, the two types of space we referred to are related and even intertwined. If we encounter possibilities for political engagement in post-revolutionary Iran, these possibilities are the result of the creation of a space that was built beforehand. The space-creating subjects in pre-revolutionary Iran, alongside other influential factors, of course, so affected the social situation that the alienation from the public sphere does not exist to the extent it did in pre-revolutionary Iran. One must, of course, also pay attention to factors such as the communications and media revolution. But in any case, the difference between Iran and neighboring countries like Saudi Arabia and many other Arab countries lies precisely here: they lack channels for political engagement because they have not yet passed through the era of creating political space.
Moreover, these two conditions are deeply intertwined. Meaning that, certainly, during the Pahlavi era, the politics of space-creation provided platforms for political engagement in that same period, and today, too, the space of political engagement creates necessities for the creation of space. For example, during the Pahlavi era, it was these very politics of space-creation that forced the established regime to open up the political space at a certain point and provide a space for public criticism. A policy that, of course, came late and only generated a channel through which the products of space-creation could mature and overthrow the regime. In today's Iran as well, political engagement requires the creation of new spaces and, as I will explain, requires openings in the space of the collective imagination.
A noteworthy point is the shortcomings of each of these two spaces. Neither is, in itself, a self-sufficient space and each requires the other. The context in which the creation of political space becomes necessary is, in principle, blind to actually existing possibilities. It generates great energy, but is not, by itself, capable of objectifying its demands. It is fundamentally not reconciled with immediate realities. For this reason, the intellectual who is the product of this space has a turbulent heart but is incapable of identifying the techniques that could, in practice, realize the different reality they envision. For this reason, the public sphere cannot, in the long run, participate in the creation of space. It retreats and returns to everyday life, coupled with self-contempt.
The ground opened up for politicking, too, has no horizon of its own. It is so immersed in the field of action for advancing a policy that it cannot raise its head and understand which direction it is heading. Fundamentally, the political operative lacks a general understanding of the conditions, and their capacity for judgment is also limited. For instance, in party politicking, you go from one election to the next and keep the furnace of competitive political life burning. If someone asks you midway, what is the outcome of this tumultuous competitive space after all? Are we ultimately moving towards democracy or regressing? What priority is there, fundamentally, that you be at the helm of power and not another? What different action are you supposed to take compared to your rival? In many cases, there is no answer. So much so that in every election, you must somehow postpone posing these questions so that the work can proceed. The space opened up for politicking faces the complete danger that everything becomes confined to show, spectacle, and propaganda. Politicking, too, can lead to its own negation and, after a while, itself become a factor in depoliticization.
In these years, the generative space of revolutionary intellectualism is being criticized. By raising labels such as armed intellectual, ignorant intellectuals, adventurist, and illiterate, revolutionary and idealist intellectuals are attacked. Such an image of the Pahlavi era is presented as if Mohammad Reza Shah was a benevolent, development-seeking, wise, and prudent king surrounded by a handful of childish adventurers. This is a window that has been opened onto the arena of creating space from the space opened up for politicking. They have sat down, carefree of the exigencies of creating space, and are ridiculing that era. But let us change the game. Let us look at our own era from the perspective of the ground of creating space. I will review today's problems in list form:
Our political operatives have gradually mistaken politicking for bureaucratic life. They think that if people do not make noise and do not stir up the public square, they can fix everything with entreaty, supplication, and bargaining. Their belief in the people is limited to mere participation at the ballot box. But in practice, they have encountered a closed wall. The adversary stands in their way everywhere, and they do not know how, with their bureaucratic wisdom, they can force the adversary to step aside. Therefore, they have taken the government, but the government has, in many instances, remained stalled. It knows the way to transform the economic situation, but its hands are tied in practice. It consoles itself that people will say they are not being allowed. But people gradually come to the conclusion that, for whatever reason, they cannot.
In this space where only politicking is on the agenda, authentic and deep-rooted political figures are gradually marginalized, and second- and third-rate figures come to the scene. Those who are seekers of fame more than politicking, if they are not simultaneously seekers of bread. Compare the well-known and influential reformist figures of today with those of a decade ago. The decline in the rank of reformist political men gradually drives the scene towards degeneration. It gradually disheartens the social base, and existing possibilities will be lost.
There is no guarantee which choice today's political operatives will make in the conflict between their private interests and the public interest. The field of action is fundamentally not that ethical and warm. For this reason, everything sometimes becomes confined to acquiring seats of power. The one who chanted reformist slogans before attaining a post, upon attaining the post they were seeking, proceeds with their work and packs their baggage exactly like the other person who previously sat in their place.
In today's excessively bureaucratized space, political life has been severely stripped of its horizon. No one knows where we are supposed to go. Everything is confined to warding off a danger for now. The lack of horizon in today's space will affect the psychological, social, and cultural realms. Elites are inclined to leave the country, and the public sphere becomes more and more fragmented and tumultuous every day.
Even if the establishment is powerful, it loses more of its authority every day, and therefore is incapable of imposing its will in the public sphere. It is as if people will not soon believe that their good lies in obeying the political will, so they evade as much as they can and refuse to advance the government's will.
The relationship between segments of the people and the state has at times been reduced to a payoff. People offer support and immediately demand payment for it. One instance of this is voting on the condition of demanding a monthly stipend from presidential candidates. In the recent election, this was an effective force in the rival's ability to garner votes against Mr. Rouhani.
These and other cases are examples of the claim that a space opened solely for politics suffers from numerous problems. The issue is not confined to the reformist faction; fundamentally, the Islamic Republic system is in crisis in such a situation. Under these conditions, there is no way out unless we think, to some extent, about creating space. Creating space requires intellectuals who are idealistic. Who are capable of influencing the collective imagination in this tumultuous space. Who can delineate horizons, and stir the moral wills of the people. Who, in addition to practical efficacy, also contemplate moral values.
The truth is that the reformist intellectual and the idealistic intellectual each have a role in organizing a desirable political life. Our society's problem constantly swings from one extreme to the other. We need a situation where both can play their roles alongside one another. Then, neither will the idealistic intellectual think in an overly transcendental and unrealistic manner, nor will the reformist intellectual be reduced to a bureaucrat.
The ground for creating space requires vigilance and openness toward the possibilities of politics, and politics must not neglect the opportunities for creating space. Just as the mere creation of space can lead to catastrophe, mere politics can also negate itself. The political blockage during the Pahlavi era unfortunately provided the ground for creating space, which had limited success in politics, and the absence of a healthy democratic space in today's conditions also generates a political space that operates with little capacity in creating space.
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Political Science
Political Science
Political Science
Political Science
Philosophy
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