Eclectic Reformism: A Response by Mousa Ghaninejad to the Note 'Libertarianism as a Cover for Conservatism'

I welcome Mr. Alavi Tabar's new response as a good omen, because the continuation of these discussions can illuminate the ambiguous and, of course, very important points of intellectual currents in the last four decades and show why some of the intellectual knots afflicting our society remain untied and unresolved. This new response, titled "Libertarianism as a Cover for Conservatism," clearly shows that Mr. Alavi Tabar has no desire to enter into the main discussion, namely the responsibility of the former leftists (later reformists) for what has befallen our country, both intellectually and politically. His tactic, or perhaps strategy (both tactic and strategy!), is to raise some peripheral issues so that the main subject is neglected. So that no pretext remains, I will first address all the points raised by him and then, for the umpteenth time, go to the main discussion. His new response has four parts. In the first part, he has written:

In my critique, only five claims, and those in the form of specific propositions, were attributed [sic] to him. I had also summarized each claim in a single sentence. Apparently, he has accepted the correctness of the attribution [sic] of the claims to himself, but he has considered part of my explanation and analysis regarding his first claim as a description of his own views, which is an error that none of the other readers have fallen into!

I am wholeheartedly grateful to Mr. Alavi Tabar for this clarification and regret the misunderstanding I fell into, although I believe his manner of writing contributed to this misunderstanding and I am not sure that no reader fell into it. In any case, I apologize to Mr. Alavi Tabar and to the readers for this. But what is very interesting in this is Mr. Alavi Tabar's evasions from answering the fundamental questions. In that article, I asked him to substantiate any claim he makes on my behalf with a direct quotation so that it becomes clear whether his inferences are correct or not. He had made this claim on my behalf:

"Religious intellectualism" has been the main source and support of the conceptual and theoretical framework of political reformism in Iran. (Alavi Tabar, Liberalism in the Slaughterhouse of Anti-Equality)

I declare explicitly that attributing (not appointing!) this claim to me is, if not incorrect, a narrow and distorted interpretation. Apparently, Mr. Alavitabar's evidence is this sentence: "The reformist project of the former leftists was defined from the very beginning within the framework of religious intellectualism and, subsequently, religious democracy." But before this sentence, I had explained in detail the leftist roots and lineage of the reformists, which Mr. Alavitabar has preferred to ignore. In short, the genealogy of the reformists essentially goes back to the radical Islamist leftist currents of the early revolution that occupied the American embassy, confiscated people's property, shut down the political, cultural, and artistic sphere, carried out widespread "purges" in government offices and universities, divided Iranians into insiders and outsiders, and so on. Of course, this does not mean that the traditionalist current, the right-wingers, or those later known as principlists, were innocent bystanders in this situation and played no role in these events. They too were partners in power, and although the main power was in the hands of the Islamist leftists, this does not negate the responsibility of the right-wing currents in the events mentioned. The religious intellectual current largely had its roots in the early leftist extremists who, with the change in the intellectual and political atmosphere of society, sought to whitewash their "golden" past and find a way into the hearts of the middle and educated classes, and in this endeavor, they were somewhat successful. And regarding word games such as *andaksālārī* (for oligarchy), *yekehsālārī* (for monarchy), and *mardomsālārī* (for democracy), which Mr. Alavitabar is intensely fond of and uses with pride, I must say these translations are misleading. Anyone with even a slight familiarity with European languages knows that these words have Greek roots and in these languages, instead of being translated literally, they are used in their original form, albeit with the specific pronunciation of each language; for example, in English it is "oligarchy" and in French "oligarchie." The Europeans presumably also had the sense to translate these Greek words as Mr. Alavitabar does, but they did not do so because these terms have specific meanings in political philosophy that are lost through translation.

In the second part, Mr. Alavitabar, with the utmost humility and modesty characteristic of the erudite, has sought to give me a philosophical lesson, which is most auspicious. The level of his philosophical lesson is so high that my intellect cannot fully grasp it; therefore, I can only mention a few points. Realizing the contradiction in the concept of religious intellectualism does not require the philosophical knowledge that I lack; only a little common sense is necessary and indeed sufficient for this purpose. Common sense says that argumentative discourse cannot be reconciled with doctrinal and mystical discourse. I have provided an example of this contradiction, in the introduction to the book "Civil Society," regarding the supreme master of religious intellectualism, namely Dr. Hossein Haj Farajollah Dabbagh, known as Dr. Abdolkarim Soroush. This statement by the supreme master that, "We should consider the principle in industry and technology to be *akl-e mayteh* [eating carrion, i.e., a last resort] and not take from it more than necessity and need... Good technology is that which does not exist," is a clear theoretical and practical contradiction. If we make the principle *akl-e mayteh*, no industry would come into being at all for us to talk about. Saying "Good technology is that which does not exist" means returning to the Stone Age and cave-dwelling. Does realizing the contradiction in these statements really require philosophical knowledge?

But the most amusing part of Mr. Alavitabar's philosophical lesson concerns the concept of "family resemblance" and the thought of Wittgenstein. He has claimed that, due to unfamiliarity, I thought the concept of family resemblance was Mr. Alavitabar's invention, whereas this theory was put forward by Wittgenstein. I recommend the philosophy professor read the text carefully once more. What I wrote is this:

Mr. Alavitabar's interpretation of nominalism and essentialism shows his serious disregard for philosophical knowledge, but it seems he has such self-confidence that he can easily make definitive judgments about the most fundamental philosophical concepts and, on his own, propose a new philosophical concept called "family resemblance" as an effective substitute for the two schools of thought in the history of philosophy! (The Irrationality of the Religious Intellectual)

My point here is not to attribute the invention of the concept of "family resemblance" to Mr. Alavitabar, but rather to criticize the fact that Mr. Alavitabar has imagined on his own that this concept is a substitute for two major philosophical traditions. In the book Discourses on the Methodology of Economics, I have referred to Wittgenstein's methodological discussions. Although this Austrian thinker had a significant influence on the positivist movement in the first half of the twentieth century, given the constant changes he made in his philosophical views, he ultimately arrived at no single, coherent conclusion regarding philosophical issues. The concept of family resemblance is by no means an alternative to nominalist and universalist philosophical approaches; at best, it can at most be considered a subset of a kind of nominalist approach. In any case, it is not my intention to enter into philosophical discussions in which I am not a specialist, but I advise someone who once confuses nominalism with philosophical relativism and another time links it to "Wahhabism" to reflect a little, out of respect for the audience, before putting his subjective thoughts into writing. I have written books on epistemology and methodology that are available to those interested, and they can verify Mr. Alavitabar's claim by referring to them, especially since he has stated that I have confused the two concepts of the whole and the universal! And I ask Mr. Alavitabar to inform readers of his scholarly achievements by introducing his philosophical writings and books.

In the third section, he has challenged my remarks about democracy and has expressed astonishment, stating that he knows no one who "believes in combining fascism and Nazism with modern democracy." It is unclear what he means by combining this and that, but the majority of historians have no doubt that the rise of fascism in Italy and Nazism in Germany initially occurred through democratic mechanisms and by popular vote. And of course, there is also no doubt that after seizing power, despite trampling on minority rights, they still considered themselves representatives of the majority. Hence, it can be said with absolute certainty that if democracy is not bound by liberal values, it may turn into the worst kind of dictatorship. In an article entitled "Democracy in Light of the Two Concepts of Freedom and Power" in the same book Civil Society (1998), the new introduction to the new edition of which has sparked these discussions, I have explained the undesirable consequences of conceiving democracy as popular rule, an end in itself and devoid of liberal values. Unfortunately, at the time when the reformists came to power, intoxicated by it, and joyfully conceived of democracy as popular rule, they paid no attention to these remarks. It is even more regrettable and astonishing that after more than twenty years, individuals like Mr. Alavitabar still have not grasped the depth of the catastrophe resulting from mistaken conceptions of modern concepts and values, including the concept of "popular rule." It seems that remnants of leftist thought prevent the understanding of this reality: if democracy is not bound by liberalism and individual rights, it turns into its opposite.

In the fourth section, Mr. Alavitabar has criticized the necessary link between liberalism and private property and, disregarding the argument made in this regard, has once again raised tangential discussions, meaning he has clearly evaded responding to the argument. I am compelled to repeat my previous statement verbatim:

When Mr. Alavitabar writes in defining liberalism, "everyone must be free to decide for themselves," he does not realize that the precondition for any free individual decision is the individual's ownership of their own life and property, and without this precondition, the above proposition is meaningless. What freedom does a slave who owns neither life nor property possess? Every decision of theirs is contingent upon the master's permission, and the "freedom" of their will and decision-making is, in reality, a privilege granted to them by the master; otherwise, they have no independent right of their own.

I do not know in what language it must be said that every definition of freedom is preceded by the assumption of individual or personal ownership. When a person's right of ownership over their life and property is not recognized, how can one speak of their freedom? Instead of answering this question, Mr. Alavi-Tabar has gone to the sideline that I have supposedly equated liberalism with libertarianism. Without entering into the details of this marginal discussion, which has no bearing on the main subject, I will only mention a few points. Since in the United States of America, leftist intellectuals in the twentieth century had appropriated the concept of liberalism to their own ends and were using it in a different sense, American liberals replaced it with the term libertarianism to distinguish themselves from the left. This very term libertarianism has now itself created new ambiguities and encompasses a broad spectrum that includes left and right anarchists as well. For this reason, I try to avoid using this term. The translation of libertarianism as 'ekhtiyargarayi' is wrong and a fabrication. Hayek is not a libertarian and has repeatedly emphasized that he is a classical liberal. Hayek has no problem with John Rawls's theory of justice and, in the second volume of the book Law, Legislation and Liberty, quotes him and sets out the commonalities of his view with him. It seems that this mixing of disparate things by Mr. Alavi-Tabar has no purpose other than evading a serious discussion with a specific subject.

Now I return to the main subject, which was the content of the book Civil Society and its new introduction, an introduction that Mr. Alavi-Tabar addressed some of its contents in his critique. Civil society was one of the main slogans of the reformists, for which they passionately championed, but they did not realize that one of its necessary and inseparable components is an economy based on the free market. Due to the leftist roots of their political ideology, they consciously or unconsciously preferred to ignore this reality and not address it, and for this purpose, they emphasized the primacy of political development over economic development. The main problem of the reformists was that, despite their rightful advocacy of certain political, social, and cultural freedoms, they lacked a coherent theory for realizing their reformist demands. They were rightly critical of government intervention in the censorship of the press, books, and cultural and artistic works, and said that these matters pertain to civil society and the government, in the general sense of the word, i.e., the ruling political power, should not interfere in them. But for some reason, they did not realize that the independence of civil society from political power requires, first and foremost, economic independence, and this is not possible except through the negation of the state economy, the establishment of a free economy, and the growth of a genuine private sector. The press, publishers, and artists whose life and death depend on government subsidies and resources will, willy-nilly, be forced in some way to fulfill the wishes of those in power. In short, it must be said that, theoretically and practically, one cannot find a society in which political and social freedoms exist but whose economy is not based on a free market system.

In closing, I must clarify some of the insinuations and doubts cast in Mr. Alavi-Tabar's piece. The title of his article is "Libertarianism as a Cover for Conservatism," seeking to imply that under the guise of libertarianism, I aim to defend the positions of "right-wing conservatives." If it is not impertinent toward a professor of philosophy, I must state that libertarianism, one end of which is anarchism, stands in direct opposition to conservatism, and one cannot defend the latter under the cover of the former. Moreover, I have never had, nor do I have, any sympathy for right-wing conservatives, as I am neither a conservative nor a right-winger. Mr. Alavi-Tabar's mistake lies in assuming that anyone who speaks about politics is necessarily pursuing party or factional interests. As a researcher, I have never followed any political party or faction. Politically, the standard I accept is the public interest or the national interest. In judging political currents, I look at their proximity to or distance from this standard. The overall conclusion of my research has been that leftist currents in our country, from the beginning of the Constitutional Movement to the present day, despite their good intentions, have in practice played a destructive role in terms of national interests. The reformist current in Iran could have been a source of beneficial effects in our society, provided that its leaders had truly and sincerely subjected their own past to serious criticism and moved beyond it, rather than, through projection, attributing all the faults and failures of the early years of the revolution to their political rivals and primarily seeking to gain or retain power. They lacked a correct and precise conception of modern society and its requirements; otherwise, they would not have spoken of the priority of political development over economic development. The reformist project, due to the eclectic nature of its intellectual foundations, was born incomplete and abortive from the very beginning, and unfortunately, it has remained so, whereas it could have, and even now can, play a positive and effective role in the country's current developments by correcting its mistakes.

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Libertarianism as a Cover for Conservatism

Author: Mousa Ghaninejad

This piece is taken from the Boomrang website.

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