Voluntarism as a Cover for Conservatism: Alireza Alavitabar’s Reply to “The Irrationalism of Religious Intellectualism”

In an article titled “The Irrationalism of the Religious Intellectual,” Mr. Mousa Ghaninejad has attempted to provide a response to my critique, titled “Liberalism in the Abattoir of Anti-Egalitarianism,” of his article “Reformism in the Abattoir of Socialism” (published in the quarterly Siyasatnameh). I will use the opportunity this response has provided to further explain some of the positions raised in my own writing and to note a few points.

First) From among the claims made in his article, I selected and discussed only five. This selection was aimed at limiting the scope of the discussion, something that should be done in any piece of writing that values the reader’s time. If he wishes, I will also write my critiques of his other claims in that article and elsewhere. In my critique, only five claims, formulated as specific propositions, were attributed to him. I also presented each claim in its most concise, single-sentence form. He has apparently accepted the correctness of the attribution of these claims to himself, but has mistaken a part of my explanation and analysis regarding his first claim for a “description” of his own view—an error that none of the other readers fell into! It is possible that his attention and focus on the primary sources and texts of thought caused him to lose track of the article he was reading and intended to critique. I thank God that the Sazandegi newspaper did not print the article on the “Incidents” page, for in that case, he might have inadvertently considered the incident reports as part of my description of his views and become upset that I had also attributed murder and crime to him! Because he mistook my analysis of the subject for a “description” of his own view, he mistook the contradiction between his own claim and my analysis for an internal “contradiction” within my analysis! If he looks at the text again, this problem will be resolved; a philosophical problem that is solved by reading twice!

The use of terms such as andaksalari (a suitable translation for oligarchy) and yekesalari (a suitable translation for monarchy and one-person rule) is customary and conventional among those engaged in explaining and interpreting political developments in Iran. Of course, using terminology requires sufficient familiarity and knowledge in each field, otherwise it creates fear and leads to avoidance. In particular, he should be reminded that one of the reformists’ critiques of the country’s political situation is its “oligarchic” nature and the danger of a tendency toward “monocracy” within it. I am, of course, aware of the fact that from his perspective, if political oligarchy and monocracy serve economic liberalization and the expansion of capitalist relations, they will be defensible, at least in the medium term. That he implicitly defends the positions of “right-wing conservatives” in the first decade after the revolution in his original article, and only questions their ability to theoretically defend their own positions, is understandable within this framework.

To understand the diversity and multiplicity of the intellectual sources of the reform movement in Iran, one does not need to have “intelligence” mastery. It is enough to review the content of a few periodicals: – The journal Hozeh, published by the Islamic Propagation Office of the Qom Seminary. – The quarterly Rahbord, affiliated with the Center for Strategic Research. – The journal Kiyan, the organ of the circle of religious neo-thinkers. – The journal Asr-e Ma, the organ of the Organization of the Mojahedin of the Islamic Revolution of Iran. Alongside these central periodicals, attention to the quarterly Naqd va Nazar, also published by the Islamic Propagation Office of the Qom Seminary, will be useful. Each of these periodicals is the external reflection of the intellectual-political circles that nourished and laid the groundwork for the broad reform movement. One can also speak of the intellectual-political circle associated with the journal Ayeen, which, before the second of Khordad, was mostly engaged in internal dialogue and did not lead to the publication of a licensed journal called Ayeen. Understanding the difference in the political discourse of these sources is not difficult for any informed observer and clearly demonstrates the multi-source nature of the political discourse of reformism in Iran. One only needs to spend a little time and study, nothing more!

Second) In the critique I had written for them, I claimed that their definition of intellectualism is “essentialist.” I will use this opportunity to explain a little about essentialism and its applicability to their definition.

Essence refers to the properties of any thing such that, if they were lost, that object would no longer exist. Given that essence may be attributed to various categories of objects, at least four different interpretations of essence can be considered: a) Attribution of essence to concrete objects (strong essentialism): Essence is the set of features of an object such that, if those features did not hold true for the object, it would no longer exist. b) Attribution of essence to concepts: Essence is that component or element of concepts without which the concept would no longer be meaningful. c) Attribution of essence to the truth of concepts about objects (weak essentialism): Essence is the set of features of an object such that, if they did not hold true for it, that object would not be an instance of a specific concept. d) The Kripkean approach: The essence of an object is merely that from which the object is “made” and “constituted.”

Now it can be said precisely that Mr. Ghaninejad’s definition of “intellectualism” is essentialist in one of the four aforementioned senses. In the most optimistic case, a kind of “weak essentialism” can be seen in his definitions. He takes intellectualism to mean “prioritizing reason and logical argumentation over doctrinal and transmitted argumentations in theoretical discussions” and does not consider it compatible with the religious attribute (unless semantic contradiction means something other than incompatibility!). If a concept has an internal contradiction, it will also lack the possibility of realization outside the mind; this is one of the axioms of logic! “Intellectualism” is a “universal” concept (meaning it can have multiple instances).

Universal concepts can be discussed and examined based on two approaches: ontological and epistemological. From the ontological perspective, the discussion concerns the quiddity of universals, and from the epistemological perspective, the discussion concerns how we become aware of universal concepts and how they are constructed in the mind. Of course, it must be kept in mind that there is a difference between “the whole” and “the universal.” The existence of the “universal” outside the mind has been a point of contention between nominalists and others, which, of course, has no bearing on the existence of “the whole” outside the mind.

I mention this point because Mr. Ghaninejad, in some of his other works, has concluded the non-existence of “wholes” outside the mind from the non-existence of “universal” concepts outside the mind, which is a gross error, but I will not dwell on it. Due to unfamiliarity, he has thought that the concept of “family resemblance” is a concept invented by me! But for his information, I must give a philosophical lesson: the family resemblance theory is the most influential contemporary theory regarding “definition,” or rather, in opposition to definition. The main opposition of this theory is to “essential definitions,” of which Aristotle is recognized as the pioneer. This theory was first proposed in the collection “Philosophical Grammar” by Ludwig Wittgenstein. This book was published with corrections and editing in 1993 (although its writing dates back to 1931), but this theory, which has posed a challenge to essentialism, can also be seen in Wittgenstein’s other works. Regarding “nominalism,” I must also add that, contrary to what he thinks, this concept was not only a precursor to the modern view in modern thought (the thought of figures like William of Ockham). According to Dr. Dinani, individuals like Ibn Taymiyyah, the contemporary manifestation of whose views is “Wahhabism,” were also “nominalists.” In order not to give any more philosophy lessons, especially to someone who has access to primary sources and texts, I will suffice with this amount. Finally, I would add that if he seeks to propose views similar to Popper’s, the appropriate name for it, in Popper’s terms, is “critical rationalism,” and in Barbour’s terms, “critical realism,” and nominalism is not a suitable title for it.

Third) The most peculiar part of his reply is the picture and conception he presents of “democracy.” In his view, democracy is “a means for the peaceful resolution of political disputes and the transfer of political power, but it can serve both anti-human ideologies (fascism and Nazism) and human ones (liberalism).” It seems he has reduced democracy to elections and ignored its theoretical requisites, for we know of no one who believes in combining fascism and Nazism with modern democracy. As far as we know, given the evolution it has undergone in the years since the Second World War, democracy is “a method for decision-making in collective affairs,” but its realization in the political sphere requires the acceptance of three important pillars:

a) Popular Sovereignty: Accepting that the people have the right to appoint, criticize, and dismiss the government and to make decisions in public affairs. b) Political Equality of Citizens: Citizens, regardless of religion, denomination, ideology, ethnicity, or economic and social status, enjoy equal rights to oversee collective decision-making and its exercise. c) Majority Rule with Respect for Minority Rights: The basis of governmental conduct is the opinion of the majority, but the majority does not have the right to violate or disregard the fundamental rights of the minority. Contemporary democracy is a continuous effort to realize these three pillars in the structure of government and public administration. His definition of democracy is incorrect and unacceptable. Combining democracy and fascism!?

Fourth) He has deemed my definition of political liberalism incorrect and emphasized the necessary link between liberalism and private property. He may consider this definition inadequate, but I do not know what contradiction he sees within it? To reject a definition or a viewpoint, it is not necessary to consider it as containing a contradiction. Other criteria, such as not being comprehensive and exclusive, can also be used. Unless one has a particular fondness for the term “contradiction.” I believe his judgment is incorrect, so I will point out some of the roots of this incorrect judgment.

The first point is that he equates “liberalism” with “libertarianism.” Hence, he excludes from the ranks of liberals any theorist who does not agree with the views of libertarians. On this basis, individuals who do not accept the libertarian theory of justice (the views of Nozick and Hayek) (such as John Rawls) or who deem the provision of societal welfare through a minimal government impossible (such as John Maynard Keynes) are no longer considered liberals. The libertarian view of liberalism revolves around a kind of “asocial egoism” that endorses “possessive individualism” and the pursuit of personal goals (especially the acquisition of wealth), sacrificing broader social obligations in return. Asocial individualism, however, is more a characteristic of libertarians or free-market conservatives, who see society as a collection of competitive individuals bound together more by a desire for security than by civic awareness and perceptions. His reference to Locke is not accidental. He has presumably recalled that Locke spoke of the necessity of the express consent of property owners and the tacit consent of others (Locke, 1967:365-80). It is not the liberal distinction between public and private spheres that is being challenged, but rather the separation of the sphere of economic relations from the sphere of political relations, and thus its detachment from the process of democratization, that is being questioned. Contrary to what he claims, the debate is not about the acceptance of personal property either. The concern is that in the real world, within capitalist systems, mechanisms exist that lead to the concentration and monopolization of private property. Such that in America, one percent of the population owns forty percent of the assets.

The second point is that the differences seem to stem from two distinct “value and normative” orientations. The dispute is over whether “we consider social equality desirable and possible, or not?” Theoretical discussions are best understood when attention is paid to their value and normative orientation. I, of course, proudly defend the desirability and possibility of social equality. I will also briefly outline the pillars of this orientation: 1) The majority of human beings flourish better and more fully under conditions of social equality than under conditions of inequality and hierarchy. 2) The very high economic productivity that humanity has achieved has made egalitarianism in the material means of life, and the organization of human society toward this end, more possible and attainable. 3) Actually existing capitalism has created institutions and relations that have blocked the practical path to equality and a radical redistribution of the material means of life. 4) Actually existing capitalism can be transformed from within, through a gradual yet radical movement toward a more equal and balanced social order. Theoretical efforts undertaken to justify the existing state of the world are a conservatism doomed to failure, even if carried out under the guise of voluntarism and libertarianism.

In closing, I will overlook some of his jibes and sarcasm, assuming “...it is not out of malice...”. Throughout his article, he raises questions about political events, the answers to which I will defer to another occasion. But reflecting on them shows to what extent distance from the actual text of political struggles and efforts can lead to oversimplification regarding complex political relations and balances.