The Ethics of Enmity, Abolghasem Fanaei

Having enemies and acting with enmity toward them is one of the bitter and unpleasant realities of human life. Saints aside, expecting people to look upon friend and foe with the same eye, to treat both in the same manner, and to refrain from retaliation is not a realistic expectation; that is, such behavior is beyond the capacity of ordinary people and therefore is not subject to the moral commands, prohibitions, oughts, and ought-nots that govern the conduct of ordinary people. In other words, the morality of ordinary people does not ask us to treat friend and foe identically, nor that the friendship or enmity of others should have no role or influence on the manner of our behavior and reaction toward them.

Nevertheless, the morality of ordinary people does ask us to observe certain specific moral values, oughts, and ought-nots in our conduct toward enemies. That is, although one may treat friends and enemies differently, there is a minimum of moral values whose observance is necessary and essential in any case and under any circumstances, whether in relation to a friend or in relation to an enemy. Put differently, friendship and enmity differ only in maximal morality, but the requirement of minimal morality toward these two stations and situations is the same.

It might be claimed that the first and fundamental principle of the ethics of enmity is the principle of justice and fairness and the obligation to act justly with enemies and to treat them with justice, and that the other principles of this ethics in some way trace back to and are deduced from this very principle. In other words, committing injustice is wrong, even toward an enemy. That is, in determining whether a specific act is just or unjust, friendship and enmity are not morally relevant parameters and should not influence our moral judgment and assessment or alter the moral ruling on the act. This moral principle is also accepted by religion. For instance, it is stated in the Quran: "And let not the hatred of a people cause you to not be just" (Al-Ma'idah: 8), meaning "Let not enmity toward a people cause you to deviate from the path of fairness and justice."

It is true that some moral values are context-dependent, and the etiquette of the station of friendship differs from the etiquette of the station of enmity, but this difference pertains to the values of maximal morality, not to the values of minimal or justice-oriented morality. From the perspective of this morality, there is no difference between these two stations, and we must observe justice in any case. Of course, maximal morality itself has various degrees, and at some of its degrees, forgiving the enemy is preferable to taking revenge upon him. As Imam Ali, peace be upon him, says in Nahj al-Balagha: Forgiving the enemy is the gratitude for the blessing of gaining dominance over him.

It is not amiss to explain this point using the common expressions of our own traditional ethics. In our traditional ethics, anger, lust, and the dominance of these two over reason are considered the source of morally abnormal behaviors, and the goal of minimal morality is that through practice, self-vigilance, and striving against the self, a person can control their anger and lust, that is, bring these two under the control and restraint of their reason and obey them only within the framework of reason's command, which is the command of morality. Establishing justice within oneself is achieved only through controlling emotions and feelings and handing their reins over to reason. Of course, morality does not ask us to suppress our emotions and feelings. What morality asks of us is that (1) in expressing our emotions and feelings (anger and wrath), (2) in decision-making, and (3) in behavior (= following emotions and feelings), we do not "violate" moral values.

In other words, pursuing lust and anger outside this framework is incompatible with one's human identity and originates from the dominance of the animal identity over the human identity. And the moral human being is one who has trained their animal identity, tamed and domesticated the demon within, and bridled their ferocity and savagery. Therefore, satisfying anger and lust outside moral boundaries signifies negligence, spiritual illness, and the dominance of the animal identity over the human identity within us. And if we commit injustice against our enemy, at least at the moment of action, we have descended from the station of humanity to the station of animality and have sold our humanity cheaply. And one who commits injustice against their enemy simultaneously commits injustice against themselves, and because of this act, distances themselves from God, perfection, and spirituality; that is, in this way, they not only harm their enemy but also harm themselves.

The question we must reflect upon here is how one can discern whether a particular speech or action in relation to a particular person (in this case, the enemy) is unjust. Discerning such a thing is difficult because when anger and lust surge within us, the storm and tempest that arise in our soul darken our eyes, disable our intellect, and blind our moral insight. The mechanism of the influence of anger and lust on our decision-making and action takes the form of a kind of "self-deception." That is, emotions and feelings initially cause us to perceive an act that is truly bad and wrong as good and right, and this false perception becomes the basis for our decision and action.

Therefore, we need a method or criterion by which we can reduce the influence of anger and lust in our judgments and decision-making and prevent self-deception as much as possible. That is, we must first free the intellect from the captivity of anger and lust so that we can trust its judgment, arbitration, and discernment. And this task is truly difficult and requires great courage and freedom, for it is a clear instance of fighting against oneself, and it is for this reason that the Holy Prophet (PBUH) said: "The most courageous of people is the one who overcomes their own desires" (Collection of Warram / 2 / 26).

In any case, philosophers and moral teachers have discovered and devised various methods through which one can prevent errors in moral discernment and judgment and the influence of anger and lust on moral ruling and decision-making, or at least reduce these errors. And I will briefly mention some of them here.

One of those methods is to see whether, if our place were swapped with our enemy, this would change our judgment. That is, if we were in that person's place and they were in ours, would we like to be treated in this way? If, under this supposition, our judgment changes, this indicates that the judgment was not moral, or our moral judgment was not correct. In Kant's terms, the formal condition of a correct moral judgment, or fundamentally the condition for a judgment to be moral, is that the judgment be "universalizable."

This criterion is another expression of the words of Imam Ali (AS), which are repeated in several places in Nahj al-Balagha. In a letter that the noble Imam wrote to Imam Hasan (AS), it is stated: "My little son! Consider yourself a scale between yourself and others. So, love for others what you love for yourself, and consider unpleasant for them what is unpleasant for you. And do not commit injustice, just as you do not like injustice to be done to you; and do good, just as you like good to be done to you. And consider ugly for yourself what you consider ugly from others, and approve for yourself from people what you approve of yourself regarding them; and do not say [to others what you dislike hearing], and do not say what you do not know, even if what you know is little, and do not say what you do not like to be said to you" (Nahj al-Balagha, Letter 31; using Dr. Shahidi's translation, (Tehran: Scientific and Cultural Publishing Company, 1380)).

Another method is to try to place ourselves in the "original position" and look at the matter from an impartial perspective, that is, from the viewpoint of a third party and an ideal observer, and then judge between ourselves and our enemy. Although this is difficult, it is nonetheless a condition for the validity and correctness of moral judgment.

In any case, some of the requirements of the principle of justice regarding enemies can be summarized as follows:

(1) In dealing with the enemy, one must not portray them as worse and more villainous than they are. This act, besides being an injustice to them, is also a distortion of the truth and an instance of lying and deceiving others.

(2) Perpetrating violence, promoting violence, sowing the seeds of hatred and enmity, and blocking the paths of peace and reconciliation are morally bad, even in relation to enemies. And violence is not limited to "physical" and "behavioral" violence; "verbal" and "written" violence are also morally bad and impermissible. And those who oppose violence should pay attention to the fact that verbal and written violence is also a form of violence. However, reasoned and fair criticism of the opinions, beliefs, and behavior of others is not an instance of violence, whether those opinions and beliefs are religious or non-religious.

(3) Morally speaking, the end does not justify the means, even in relation to enemies. That is, to overcome and defeat the enemy, one cannot use tools and means that are morally illegitimate. Such an act is especially surprising if it is done by those who oppose Marxism and Communism, because "the end justifies the means" is considered one of the Marxist doctrines. Overcoming the enemy by any means is not permissible, and one who tries to overcome their external enemies using morally impermissible tools has already been defeated by their internal enemy. That is, violating moral values in dealing with external enemies actually means serving the internal enemy and strengthening it. And we must not oppress our external enemies to please our internal enemy.

(4) And finally, promoting a culture of violence and unjust treatment of enemies in our society will distance us from democracy and civil society. Let us remember that the only way to achieve democracy is to practice democracy, and practicing democracy means observing moral standards in dealing with opponents and enemies of democracy. As the late Bazargan said, "Freedom is neither given nor taken; it is learned."

Let us remember that friendship and enmity can act as epistemological vices and prevent the recognition of truth or confession to it, or cause the distortion of truth. Let us be mindful not to destroy great and valuable things in order to crush our enemy. If we defeat and disgrace our enemy using immoral ways and methods, the main loser will be us, not that enemy, as Imam Ali, peace be upon him, says: "Al-ghalib bil-sharr maghlub" (Nahj al-Balagha: Short Saying 372), meaning "One who achieves victory through evil is in reality defeated."

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The Ethics of Enmity, Abolghasem Fanaei, 15 October 2015

Source: Mellat News Network

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