The Illusion of Philosophy's Efficacy

Discussing whether philosophies are dangerous or harmless is a difficult task, especially if the meaning of grave and dangerous is not properly understood. This discussion leads nowhere. Philosophy, in one sense, is certainly a grave matter, and through it the very foundations of people's existence may be overturned, yet not everyone, not even many who have studied philosophy, perceives this danger. If it were said that with Descartes' thought humanity was set on a different path and situated in a different world, this statement might be considered a pretentious claim, because common reason does not accept that a philosophical project, read by a small number—some of whom even oppose it or raise objections and caveats—could have an effect on people's lives. Of course, understanding this matter is not easy, but it is understandable that some might adopt the views of philosophers and that, through philosophical discussions, people's thinking and intellectual habits might change. If the danger of philosophy is mentioned somewhere, what is meant is the direct effect of philosophy. The superficial eye sees the direct effect of philosophy, but this effect is not something very significant. Since we consider science as merely something teachable and learnable, we imagine that philosophy is just those things written in books and taught. Philosophy does not teach us very much; rather, it changes us. If philosophy were limited to philosophical teachings, no one would need to worry that any harm or benefit might come to anyone from philosophy. If philosophy has any benefit or harm, it comes from a place and at a time that the superficial eye and understanding cannot grasp. It has not been the custom of the people of philosophy to think about the benefits and harms of philosophies; rather, philosophers have raised objections and questions within philosophical views. Judging philosophies by the criteria of value, benefit, and harm is one of the effects and signs of the dominance of worldview and ideology over philosophical thought. They say, what harm is there if a philosophy professor combats false opinions and teaches and promotes the correct method of reasoning? This statement is so justified that one can give it greater universality and say that everyone can combat false beliefs... but the moment a philosopher takes a stance of combativeness and contentiousness, he moves from philosophy to the realm of politics and ideology. Philosophy is rational discussion, and in rational discussion, no thinker can impose his opinion on others, and if he is afflicted with such a vain desire, the name philosopher no longer befits him. It should not be inferred from this statement that all philosophies and the views of philosophers are on the same level and that no philosophy has any distinction or preference over another. Plato and Aristotle are masters of philosophy, and everyone acknowledges their mastery. Al-Farabi said that if I had lived in the time of Aristotle, I would have been among his (great) students, but this acknowledgment does not prevent raising questions and objections to their views. Aristotle was Plato's student for twenty years, and as long as the master was alive, he neither organized a class nor published any work. If we are now deprived of studying Aristotle's early works, it is because, perhaps out of consideration for the decorum of being Plato's student, he did not give those works to others, and no copies were made from them; consequently, the likelihood of them reaching later generations became very small. Yet, despite all the respect Aristotle held for his master, he disagreed with some of his views, and if he had not disagreed, he would not have become Aristotle. Every great philosopher has his own specific views and naturally does not accept all the opinions and sayings of his predecessors. Philosophers discuss with one another, and sometimes in discussion the tone of their speech becomes sharp; nevertheless, their discussion is friendly. Through their devotion to thought, they safeguard existence as it has appeared to them (and their danger or harmlessness lies in this safeguarding, not in affirming one statement and denying another). Even if they consider another philosophy entirely false, they either disregard it or refute it based on their own standards. That is to say, there is no vindictive war among philosophers, unless the clash of philosophers replaces the clash of philosophies, and this is possible at a time when the form of worldview and ideology so dominates philosophy that it completely constricts the space for thought. What further compels me to explain this matter is that, after many years, some people still ask me reproachfully why I opposed, or in their words, showed enmity toward, a certain philosopher. I have shown enmity toward no philosopher. When they make a clamor in the name of philosophy, the answer is a clamor. The greatest enmity toward philosophy is to confuse philosophy with ideology and opposition with enmity. In the current conditions, philosophy is in a difficult situation, and how is it possible for philosophy to mingle with ideology and still remain philosophy? What is now said and written in the name of philosophy is mostly an inquiry into the sayings of philosophers or an expression in which philosophy and ideology are clearly intermingled.

For now, we are not concerned with the first form. The second form has various degrees. In some of them, philosophy is used to justify ideology and adorn it, meaning that some people propound ideology and call it philosophy, occasionally inserting a few philosophical sentences into their ideology. In some cases, philosophy is mixed with ideology, and although discerning this mixture and intermingling is not difficult, sometimes minds fail to grasp it. In the early days of the revolution, when various forms of religious ideological interpretation were prevalent and even the high school textbook on religious insight took an ideological form, no one sounded the alarm, and if there were objections, they went unheard, and politicians in particular paid no attention to this objection because in politics, political problems are usually solved by political means. The learned and writers, in a world dominated by ideology, can hardly think free of ideology; for this reason, they supposed that the said objection was made purely from a political stance against a certain form of religious interpretation. Of course, this objection was not entirely free of a political stance, because against a political stance one must inevitably have a political stance, but the main point was not political. The point was that a certain European, unattached to religion and the religious world, whoever he is and whatever he says, let him be and speak, and we may well mention him in the history of philosophy, but what business does he have in our religious instruction textbook? If someone is interested in his views and works, let him go and read them, but religious beliefs cannot be interpreted with non-religious principles and foundations alien to religion, and if someone undertakes such an interpretation, at most he has concocted a bad ideology. This objection did not go unanswered. Of course, no one explained, but the answer they gave was that the objector is a fascist, a communist, irreligious, corrupt, and disgraced. The outcome of this discussion was predictable, meaning the discussion very quickly turned into a private quarrel. The onlookers also did not ask why those who constantly speak of freedom, free discussion, reason, and logic, and insist that speech must be answered with speech, respond to the objection with insults and slander instead. What was said was not so important; rather, something was concealed in these conflicts and remained concealed, something that pertained to the future of our country, and that was the fate of thought and freedom. It is a very bad sign when the defense of philosophy is considered anti-freedom, and they defend freedom with violence, but in any case, defending philosophy is not something one can shirk. They say, and rightly so, that philosophy needs no defense, and if it did, thinkers themselves would attend to this important matter. This is true, but why should we not try to draw a line, however faint and indistinct, between ideology and philosophy? Of course, to do this, we must define philosophy and ideology, but the problem is that philosophy has been transformed into a worldview, and a worldview easily takes on the color and form of ideology. If philosophy could be distinguished from ideology, not all those acquainted with philosophy could easily understand how philosophy has become a worldview, and if it is said that in a worldview, existence is regarded as value, understanding this statement is very difficult and therefore does not help with distinction and discernment, yet this discernment is particularly important for understanding modern philosophy. A worldview is a conception and insight concerning the world and overseeing the course of its affairs. It is evident that neither worldview nor ideology can be dismissed as insignificant, but not recognizing ideology and mistaking it for philosophy prevents us, at the very least, from understanding modern Western history. We currently do not have abundant knowledge or deep understanding of modern and contemporary Western philosophy. Western philosophy in the Persian language consists of scattered, more or less incompatible parts placed side by side, and we do not properly know what relationship exists among these scattered writings. Since the masterly status of Descartes and Kant in the history of philosophy has been established, we inevitably maintain the sanctity of their domain and approach them less with an ideological conception, meaning we content ourselves with the official translation and summary of their views, but if there has been discussion of later and especially contemporary Western philosophies, it has mostly been mixed with ideology. What does an ideological conception mean, and how is it that our conception of the philosophies of Descartes and Kant is non-ideological? We have not yet analyzed the content of Descartes and Kant, and for this reason, the worldview dimension of those philosophies has not become clear to us, but Hegel, Marx, and Nietzsche have a different status because in their words, especially in the material quoted from Marx and Nietzsche, there have also been some blasphemous words.در مورد هگل تا سالهای اخیر حساسیت کمتر بود اما در بحبوحه نزاع وهمی با مارکسیسم هگل را استاد و پیشرو مارکس و صاحب افکاری خلاف اعتقادات دینی معرفی کردند بدون اینکه روشن شود که این خلاف و ناسازگاری از کجا و چگونه است. وقتی تلقی ایدئولوژیک باشد لازم نیست چیزی روشن شود زیرا ایدئولوژی دستور العمل است. در تلقی ایدئولوژیک فلسفه ای را تبلیغ می کنند و فلسفه های دیگر را بدون آنکه درک کرده باشند موهون و بدنام و زشت و فاسد و خطرناک جلوه می دهند.

Is philosophy dangerous? What does philosophy endanger? And who is it that recognizes this danger?

Thinking is broader than philosophy, but the philosophical mode of thinking is an important and grave matter, so much so that when philosophy emerged, it constricted the space for many things and even for other modes of thinking, displaced certain things, and in any case, brought about transformation and change. However, for those who speak here of the danger of philosophy, this is apparently not the danger they have in mind. They are mostly concerned with the conflict between the appearance of certain statements by philosophers and their own beliefs and accepted notions, and they imagine that as soon as a statement contrary to their beliefs is quoted in a technical philosophical book, their accepted and axiomatic truths are endangered. Based on this supposition, they decree that a certain philosophy should be entirely forbidden, that only certain parts of another philosophy should be read, and they deem some philosophies harmless. This perception, when expressed by those who claim to advocate freedom of discussion and inquiry and by practitioners of philosophy, is very significant. But from whichever tongue it comes, it is not free of these several flaws. First, the origin and source of the danger is concealed within it, and they do not know where the danger comes from or what it endangers. Secondly, they imagine that, for instance, people lose their belief and opinion merely upon hearing any statement. Thirdly, they consider philosophy so insignificant that they think with their own reason and understanding, and by writing an article or a book, they can establish any thought or render it ineffective, erased, and annihilated. This supposition that someone can write an article against a philosophy and finish its work once and for all is a strange notion. Anyone afflicted by it, even if they do not engage in a quixotic assault on philosophies, can no longer be a person of philosophy. For someone who thinks that by writing an article one can neutralize and nullify the effects of a thinker's thought has deemed ordinary, everyday opinion and prudence to rule over philosophy, and in contrast, has considered philosophy weak and foundationless, and its practitioners a mindless rabble who, upon reading an article filled with commonplaces, abandon philosophical investigation and become permanent residents of the preacher's and writer's assembly of indoctrination and suggestion. Perhaps it is with this same perception that some people attack books of literature and poetry, purging from the text words whose mention is deemed sinful and forbidden, and their minds are set at ease that they have blocked the path of corruption's entry. Let us move on. I repeat that opposition to any philosophy among people of philosophy is a normal and natural matter. However, prohibiting the teaching of philosophy or certain philosophies, though not unprecedented, if it is presented in the name of philosophy—so that I might not use too harsh or severe a word—is a sign of estrangement from philosophy and of reducing philosophy to the level of propaganda materials. Ordinary people can, through propaganda, increase the consumption rate of a commercial good, a household appliance, or a foodstuff, but they cannot stop the influence of philosophy and thought, nor can they substitute superficial talk for philosophy. A telling example that can be cited in this context is the case of Martin Heidegger. Let me first mention one point: if someone among the practitioners of philosophy considers Heidegger's philosophy a danger to religion and deems other philosophies harmless, it is better for them to abandon philosophy, because they have understood nothing of philosophy, and if they say anything, it is merely a repetition of the words and phrases of philosophers. The philosophers of the modern period are the manifestations of the non-religious order of the modern and modernist era. They are the spokesmen of a world in which religion is an accidental, conscientious, and personal matter. Yet, in this context, Heidegger, who is a critic of the modern, non-religious world, has been identified as an opponent of religion and dangerous. Heidegger called this world the world of human self-foundation and the world of forgetfulness of Being, and by questioning the ground of existence and the constitution of this world, he introduced instability into it. When they easily pass over matters that are in explicit contradiction with their beliefs and deem dangerous the thought of a philosopher who has at least prepared the preliminaries and the ground for the expansion of religious thought, one is astonished, and it seems to them that perhaps the speakers of such words, although they have the words and phrases of philosophy on their tongues, are far removed from philosophy.

In the last twenty years, hundreds of books have been written about Heidegger's life, and even now some are engaged in researching the details of his personal and private life and relationships. These people, too, have apparently seen Heidegger's philosophy as dangerous and have imagined that if they discredit him, the influence and impact of his philosophy will also diminish, lessen, and be destroyed. It is not only we who think that by delivering a lecture or writing an article we can change everything. Westerners have also fallen prey to this illusion, and perhaps this illusion has, in some cases, spread from them to us—and of course, when a contagious disease breaks out, those with a weak constitution are afflicted sooner and more severely.

In recent years, alongside the hundreds of books that scholars have written about Heidegger’s thought, books have also been written with the intent of discrediting the philosopher. As far as I know, no author, philosopher, or even politician has had so many biographies written about him. Apparently, in the eyes of those who write these books or encourage their authors, Heidegger must be of extraordinary importance. The ridiculous point in all this is that non-philosophers want to guide those in philosophy and make them understand that Heidegger not only became rector of the University of Freiburg at the beginning of the Nazi regime but is also a fascist and a Nazi in his thinking. Recently, the Washington Post wrote that someone is researching the relationship between Heidegger, the anti-Jewish fascist, and his renowned Jewish student Hannah Arendt, to see whether, in this teacher-student relationship, something of the customs of chastity might have been abandoned. People who usually have no regard for chastity themselves and never utter the name of chastity except to discredit others are, in truth, the most unchaste of people. What business do researchers have with a philosopher’s life anyway? What importance does a philosopher’s life have? And if a philosophy is not important, what importance does its philosopher have, and why should books be written about him? A philosopher gains credibility through his philosophy. Now that I have mentioned the example of Heidegger, it is fitting to point out another matter. I consider Heidegger among the great philosophers of the modern period, and especially because, at a particular stage of Western history, he thinks about the end of this history and about the future, I deem familiarity with his thought essential. This should not be taken as adherence to Heidegger or being a Heideggerian. The importance I accord to Heidegger I more or less also accord to Descartes, Kant, Hegel, and Nietzsche, and of course to Plato and Aristotle, but just as I am not a Platonist or an Aristotelian, I can also not be a Heideggerian, especially since I consider being a Heideggerian a very difficult task and believe that philosophy should not be used as a means to promote this or that, nor should it be placed in the service of ideological purposes. If philosophy does not become ideological and does not descend into the streets and the marketplace, whatever it may be, it does no harm to customs and beliefs, because philosophy is not something one can believe in without understanding and reflection. Disavowing and rejecting philosophy, which has often been done in the name of religion, has had no effect, and superficial, ignorant opposition has also led nowhere, but serious opposition to philosophy is no easy task. One can insult a philosopher and thereby secure the satisfaction of oneself and a group of others, but insulting a philosopher and philosophy is not the work of philosophers and the wise. Philosophers debate opinions and statements, and the prerequisite for debating opinions and statements is knowledge, information, study, and research. Someone who sees a single sentence in a philosopher’s work, becomes agitated, and makes no effort to understand the context, position, and meaning of that disagreeable sentence is certainly not a person of philosophy and reflection, and if, somewhere, insulting a philosopher finds wide scope, it must certainly be assumed that philosophy is alien and forsaken there. I am never worried about philosophy not existing somewhere, but when I see that, in the name of philosophy, a philosopher about whom they know almost nothing is reproached and accused of deviation, and they imagine that by writing a few pages and declaring that the philosopher falls outside the bounds of their intellectual habits, they have removed his philosophy from the path and cleansed the world of its taint, we must worry that if these words and viewpoints are not accidental, they may represent a stage in the expansion of the desert of irrationality and ignorance, or a sign of the bankruptcy of reason. If a philosopher whose influence is felt in some way upon all the philosophy of the present age and upon contemporary humanities and social sciences can be eliminated by the denial of an ignoramus, then the world, thought, and science must be something more ridiculous than any farce, but thought is not a farce. The existence of these notions is a sign of distance from philosophy. This obsession that such-and-such a thought or philosophy must be stopped, even if it comes from the mouth of a scholar (which rarely happens, and if it does, it is cause for greater concern), is an invitation to mob rule to cut out tongues and break pens, and anyone, even if they resort to mob rule for a good and noble purpose, causes the corruption and defilement of that good purpose and objective.

Which philosophy is dangerous here, and where and to what is its danger directed? They say, for example, that Marxism is harmful to religion and religious beliefs, and of course they are right. There are other philosophies too that are incompatible with religious belief, but if these philosophies do not come out into the street and remain confined and restricted to scholarly philosophical works and books and to circles of discussion and inquiry, without coming into contact with the beliefs of the general public, they do no harm to those beliefs. Marxism was the worldview of the Communist Party and a guide to political action, and Marxists taught dialectical materialism, as they say, to the masses; but if this same Marxism does not come out into the street, supposing it has a few adherents in university settings or within political groups, what importance does it have? They say it is better that not even one or two people be led astray and deviant. This lofty aspiration, which envisions a society in which all people live according to the principles of piety and from whom not the slightest transgression occurs, is the result of comparing human beings to angels, but unfortunately, the realization of this state is not possible on earth. The important point is to know that until the conditions for the acceptance and dissemination of a thought and philosophy are met, that philosophy will find no foothold; yet we still do not know which philosophy is dangerous. I have proceeded on the assumption that some philosophies are dangerous, and I say again that this assertion must be treated with caution and tolerance. Which philosophy is dangerous? Marxism is not a philosophy. Marxism is an ideology, but in universities, the views of Descartes and Spinoza and Hume and Kant and Hegel and Auguste Comte and Stuart Mill and Nietzsche and Bergson and Dewey and Jaspers and Sartre are taught in brief, even though none of these have religious thought, and some are even deniers of religions. Perhaps among all of these, Heidegger's thought is close to religious thought, or in his thought one might find a path to religiosity, just as a great theologian like Bultmann built his theology on the basis of Heidegger's thought. Well, which of these are dangerous and which are harmless? If they are dangerous, what is the criterion for their dangerousness? In the teachings of none of these are our doctrinal principles affirmed. None of them agree with the philosophies of Avicenna and Suhrawardi and Mulla Sadra (do not say they are uninformed. Even if they were informed, the nature of their thought is such that it is incompatible with the nature of the thought of Islamic philosophers). If someone is a follower of Descartes or Kant, they are necessarily not an Avicennian or Mulla Sadrian, but firstly, we have translated some of the books of Descartes and Spinoza and Kant. In books on the history of philosophy, too, summaries of their views have appeared, and we teach these views, and it does not seem that these have constricted the place of Islamic philosophy in the thought and spirit of our learned scholars. Philosophy is not a belief such that if it arrives, it leaves no room for another belief. Philosophy is opinion. One opinion sits easily alongside another. I know a bit of the philosophy of Descartes and Kant and Hegel and Nietzsche, and something of the views of the luminaries of contemporary philosophy, but I am a follower of none of them. I consider Plato and Aristotle great, but I cannot consider myself a Platonist or Aristotelian. It is possible for someone to consider Marx great and not be a Marxist. In that case, what danger is there in knowing philosophies? If someone wants to turn philosophy into ideology, one must defend philosophy and point out that they should not mix it with ideology or turn it into ideology, not subject philosophy to wrath and anger. I have so far asked twice which philosophy is dangerous, and each time I have summarily arrived at this answer: philosophy, in the sense that the general public understands from the word dangerous, is not dangerous, but philosophy has the power to destroy and to found, and in this respect it is dangerous. In truth, philosophy, insofar as it is thought, can be considered innocent but dangerous; so why do I insist on saying philosophy is not dangerous? Was not the edifice of the modern West founded with modern philosophy, and does not the West, not in vain or without reason, once again seek its salvation in philosophy? Philosophy cannot be indicted, but its power cannot be denied; nevertheless, philosophy in our land is the source of no danger, because we are still novices on the path of modern philosophy. We are still in the stage of translation and acquaintance with modern philosophies, and since we have not gone beyond the surface of philosophy, philosophy affects our soul and heart and hand with difficulty, to the extent that if the proponent of a philosophy himself professes irreligiosity or religiosity, we do not perceive the relation of his philosophy to irreligiosity and religiosity. Besides this, anyone who knows a little philosophy knows what the view of Hume and Auguste Comte and Russell is regarding religion, but no one considers these dangerous. Nor are they mistaken. Russell and Auguste Comte are not dangerous at all.

آنها بهمان اندازه که چیزی ساخته اند می توانند ویران کنند یعنی آیا وقتی می گویند هیدگر خطرناک است فهمیده اند که چه می گویند؟ آیا تنها فیلسوفی که از پایان تاریخ تجدد غربی سخن گفته و باطن این تاریخ را اراده بسوی ............. دانسته و در طلب وجود نشانه هایی از ................. و امکان تجدید عهد دینی دیده است، خطرناک است. اما کسانی که شاید منکر خدا و دینند و درس اخلاقشان پیروی از ................ است خطری ندارند و هیچ چیز را تهدید نمی کنند. فرض اول من این بود که گویندگان این قبیل سخنان با فلسفه بیگانه اند و اگر چند کلمه اینجا و آنجا خوانده اند از حدود الفاظ و سطح تجاوز نکرده و با فلسفه انس پیدا نکرده اند ولی بفرض اینکه این حدس خشن و آمیخته به بدبینی و نومیدی درست باشد علمای دین و اولیای دولت فلسفه ها را با سماجت و وسعت نظر تلقی کرده اند و حتی در تاریخ، اگر چند مورد را مستثنی کنیم با فلسفه و فیلسوفان با شدت و خشونت معامله نشده است به این جهت من می پرسم تشخیص خطر با آهنگ و ساز جهانی مخالفت با هیدگر همساز باشد. سی چهل سال پیش که به هیدگر دشنام می دادند درست معلوم نبود که منشاء دشمنیشان با فیلسوف کجاست. می گفتند هیتلر آدمکش بوده و هیدگر هم در زمان هیتلر رئیس دانشگاه شده است پس او را طرد باید کرد. این مخالفت، مخالفت احساساتی و سیاسی است اما اکنون گرچه افشا کنندگان مدعی پژوهش بی غرضانه هستند و می خواهند با نشان دادن انحرافها و فسادهای فیلسوف مردمان را از نیروی او بر حذر دارند، کسان دیگری که از این سطح و مرحله نفاق و غوغاگری گذشته اند می گویند هیدگر آغازگر نقادی تجدد است و دوران تجدد را پایان یافته دانسته و در ذات غرب استیلا و تقلب دیده و عالمی را که ما در آن بسر می بریم پیش روی ما قرار داده و آن را بی آینده یافته است. اگر اینطور است باید از او انتقام گرفت. هیدگر دشمن تمدن غربی نیست اما کسانی که اندیشه پایان یافتن غرب آنها را به وحشت می اندازد طبیعی است که در صدد انتقام جزئی برآیند. اینهمه کتابی که در شرح زندگی هیدگر نوشته اند همه انتقام جزئی است یا شاید بهتر باشد بگوییم نوعی فرو نشاندن قهر و غضب و طلب تسکین و تسلی است اما از فیلسوف نه می توان انتقام گرفت و نه ناسزاگویی در انتشار و قبول و رد یک فلسفه اثر دارد ولی ما نه هیدگر را می شناسیم و نه نیازی به تسکین و تسلی و انتقام جزئی داریم. اروپایی و آمریکایی می گویند فیلسوفی که در زمان هیتلر رئیس دانشگاه شده است فیلسوف خوبی نیست و بخصوص اگر این فیلسوف نوع مرگ اندیش باشد و خبر از پایان تمدن غربی که آن را تمدن جاوید می دانند، بدهد تعجب ندارد که موجب خشم و عصبانیت و برانگیختن عکس العملهای شدید شود. در جاهای دیگر هم اگر یک جوان مارکسیسم زده چیزی بگوید و بنویسد بر او یأسی نیست اما وقتی در جمهوری اسلامی از موضع نیمه رسمی از خطر هیدگر می گویند چه می توان گفت؟ ما که نگران ظهور دوباره فاشیسم و مارکسیسم در اروپا نیستیم از شنیدن خبر پایان تاریخ غربی هم خونمان بجوش نمی آید و حداکثر اینست که به این قبیل سخنان اعتنا نمی کنیم و خلاصه هیدگر اگر خطری دارد این خطر متوجه ما نیست بلکه برای غرب خطر است زیرا او تجدد را که به تعبیر خودش عالم شرط عمل و فکر مردمان و محیط بر زندگی آنان بود، مورد چون و چرا قرار داده است. وقتی عالم مسئله شود دیگر محیط بر زندگی و شرط فکر و عمل نیست بلکه در خودآگاهی مردمان و در برابر آنان قرار می گیرد. هیدگر در عالم غرب خلل پدید آورده است پس اگر پاسداران نظام موجود غرب با او مخالفت و دشمنی کنند وجه آن معلوم است ولی در جاهای دیگر این مخالفت شاید تقلیدی و به حکم تبلیغات جهانی باشد ولی قضیه هرچه باشد به این نکته توجه کنید که فلسفه ها حتی با ردّ جدّی از میان نمی روند. بر خلاف آنچه مشرقیان پنداشته اند غزالی و کتاب نهاقه الفلاسفه او هیچ لطمه ای به فلسفه نزد. در اروپا هم فلسفه قرون وسطی با انتقاد میدان را خالی نکرد. اگر دکارت بجای نوشتن دو سه کتاب کوچک دهها هزار صفحه در ردّ توماس آکوئینی می نوشت هیچ کاری نکرده بود. فلسفه با رد و تردید ................ میدان خالی نمی کند زیرا معمولاً عقل ردّ و جدل در مرتبه پائین تر از عقل تأسیس است. دکارت فلسفه تازه آورد و جا را بر تفکر قرون وسطی تنگ کرد. با چند شعار و لعن و تقبیح و حتی با چون و چرا در مسائل فلسفه یک فیلسوف، آن فلسفه از میان نمی رود و حتی ضعیف نمی شود ولی کار با معلمان فلسفه چون و چرا در فلسفه هاست و چه بسا که در خلال این چون و چراها بارقه های تفکر نیز بدرخشد ولی اگر خیلی به فکر مصلحت فلسفه هستیم بدانیم که مصلحت ما و مصلحت فلسفه اینست که آن را در نزاعهای گروهی وارد کنیم و حتی وقتی رأی و نظری بر ما گران می آید صبر را از دست ندهیم و با حوصله تأمل کنیم و ببینیم که آنچه بر ما گران آمده است چیست و از کجاست و چرا گران آمده است. گیریم که کسی بنام یک فلسفه و فیلسوف فلسفه دیگر را خوار شمرد. اولاً هیچ فیلسوفی فلسفه و فیلسوفان را خوار نمی شمرد. ثانیاً هیچ فلسفه ای با خوار شمردن دیگران خوار نمی شود بلکه یکی از صور خواری ........... خوار شمردن تفکر است. اگر بفرض محال همه مردم دنیا به ابن سینا جسارت کنند از عظمت ابن سینا چیزی نمی کاهد بنابراین هیچکس نگران خوار شمردن فیلسوف و فلسفه نباشد و گمان نکند که با غوغا کار و فلسفه ساخته می شود. اگر اینطور بود اصلاً فلسفه به وجود نمی آمد یا دوام پیدا نمی کرد و یکی از عجیب ترین چیزها اینست که اهل فلسفه به غوغا متوسل شوند یعنی بنام دفاع از فلسفه از آن رو بگردانند ولی همه این بحثها وقتی رفع می شود که بدانیم و دریابیم که فلسفه قائم به فیلسوفان نیست بلکه فیلسوفان سخنگویان فلسفه و تفکرند.

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PDF file of the article The Illusion of Philosophy's Efficacy

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The Illusion of Philosophy's Efficacy

Author: Reza Davari Ardakani

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