اندیشهفلسفهخردگفتگوحکمتمعناپرسشفرهنگ
Critique is the disclosure and decision of reason, upon whose measure thought emerges—a destined relation, not a voluntary one. By courageously accepting and removing obstacles such as the dominant theological climate and the culture of contempt in our land, one can lay the groundwork for hope and thought.

The common conception of critique as thought understands critique on the basis of critical thinking; it is possible to imagine different relations between critique and thought based on the types of thinking. However, if we reflect on the relation between critique and thought with regard to thought itself, the place of the human being in the critique of thought becomes problematic. The following reflection, by considering the critique of thought as an act of appreciation and elucidating the human being's role in this, has alluded to the state of critique in our land and its issues. When critique and thought sit together these days, what first comes to mind, especially for those in philosophy and the humanities, is the critical theory of the Frankfurt School and Adorno. Adorno considered injustice and nihilism to be the offspring of modernity and believed that these two are born from the abstract character of Enlightenment rationality. For this reason, he asserted that the critique of the Enlightenment and its instrumental reason must replace the critique of political economy. Those familiar with the teachings of the Frankfurt School know that by critique, they meant the critique of reason and the illumination of its truth; a reason that in the modern era has become subjective and instrumental and, unlike Greek reason, lacks its authentic characteristics. It is also possible that from the relation of critique and thought, critical thinking (which is mainly occupied with examining types of fallacies and tries to clarify the presuppositions of claims and arguments) might come to mind. The juxtaposition of critique and thought can undoubtedly show other types of relations. But in this short space, we try to consider thought, not its types but thought in its divisive sense, and regard its relation with critique without having a specific school in mind regarding this matter (critique). Critique means to appear, to reveal (2), and to uncover. (The revealing of a thing and its exposure, and from the same root: the critique of a dirham, which is to uncover its state regarding its genuineness or otherwise. / Mu'jam Maqayis al-Lugha; root n q d) For example, when a matter is subjected to the assay of critique, its pure is separated from its impure, and what is worthy is revealed. Therefore, critique does not mean separating the correct from the incorrect or the pure from the impure, but rather it is revealing and becoming revealed. Kant, at the dawn of the German Enlightenment (after Wolff and Leibniz), called his philosophy critical philosophy and noted in the preface to the first Critique that critique is decision (3). Husserl, following Kant, also called critique decision. Kant's words are clear; what is meant by critique is the decision of reason. The decision of reason is its becoming revealed. Reason, which until now has seen and found itself under the guardianship of another, is determined to make its truth manifest. For this reason, the critique of reason is precisely the decision of reason to cast off what has been illegitimately attributed to it and, by determining its own limits, to reveal the limits of the world and humanity. On the other hand, thinking in the space and realm of metaphysics is nothing separate from the emergence of reason. So the beginning of philosophizing and the emergence of metaphysical thinking, beyond which no thinking is conceivable in the territory of metaphysics (4), is decision or critique. To put it more precisely; the middle and the end are also critique. Thinking, therefore, emerges on the scale and measure of the critique of reason or its decision. Thus, thinking is nothing other than the critique of reason, that is, reason's decision to become revealed. In Islamic philosophy, the same story unfolded. Truth belongs to the inner, the malakut, and the knowledge of the Real, and the outer is ultimately a subtle manifestation of truth and a glimpse of the inner. Critique is the clear coming forth and becoming revealed of reason; as sensible truth, it is the becoming-intelligible of nature. Let us summarize: seeing the sensible within the bosom of the intelligible and reason; because reason is the truth and inner dimension of imagination, and imagination is the inner dimension of nature. Nature finds its truth when it emerges in the mold of its truth. Therefore, in the space of metaphysics, critique and thought are intertwined and, more than anything, represent a movement from the inner to the outer. But does thinking remain bound to metaphysics and confined to this realm? It seems that thinking does not shy away from such confinement. Undoubtedly, the realm of conceptual/categorical thinking appropriates thinking for its own benefit and leaves no other sphere for it. Metaphysics is one of the types of thinking. Just as some believe that throughout the history of metaphysics, the outer was neglected and only through critique can one be freed from a content that has always imposed itself upon the outer or form. Critique in this position again means becoming revealed; it is a warning about a predetermined content and an escape from its seizure so that the outer may be allowed to emerge. Liberation from the domination of the inner and content is equivalent to the becoming revealed of something that is manifest from the beginning and upon which only the dust of content has settled. It is observed that in any case, critique has a single meaning. Now, regardless of the types of thinking, what relation does critique have with thinking as such? Whenever the human being wills and their desire attaches to this question, can they pose the question?
Let us be precise: thought does not belong to our question; it is thought that leads the question. Hence, we can only speak of the destiny of thought; for the posing of a particular question in the horizon of a specific time is a destiny guided by thought. This destiny is a descent to a destined measure, and it is solely by this measure that we encounter thought. Let us immediately add that descent is not necessarily a movement from the interior to the exterior. Thought is not concealed so that it may become manifest; rather, it is itself the criterion of all clarity, but by destiny. Critique, in the sense of the unconcealment and clarification of thought, occurs by destiny, and destiny is beyond the grasp of the human being and any of his will. The destiny of thought is like an abyss and a chasm within thought that allows thought to emerge. Therefore, thought cannot be the foundation for that which finds clarity in thought. The critique of thought does not belong to the will and desire of the human being, nor does it even yield to the will of thought. Critique is the destiny of thought upon the order of thought.
What is possible for the human being in this context is a readiness for thought. But is it not the case that this very readiness is also determined by thought and its destiny? We say that what is meant by readiness here is the courage to accept the critique of thought. Courage is the awaiting of (
) the presence of (
) a gift (
) that was previously, and elsewhere (5), mentioned with hope—hope in the sense of readiness for being, the courage to say yes to the destiny of thought, and to life.
Nevertheless, one cannot claim that hope as readiness is not determined by thought. So what is the status of the human being in all this? We speak with probability and conjecture; the human being can only prevent the obstacles to hope and the critique of thought, so that a preparedness for thought may be provided.
Among the obstacles to the realization of thought and its critique is the theological atmosphere. In the theological atmosphere, everyone is a speaker, and there is no ear for listening. The theological atmosphere is the realm of malice and enmity; the confiscation of truth and domination over it; disputation and the guarding of findings and fabrications. If we look closely, the lack of freedom of expression also has its roots in this very atmosphere; for in the domain of theology, no dialogue takes shape. Now, unfortunately, what remains of philosophy (6) in our land seems to have a theological status, and a great multitude of the learned and intellectuals, who are known to be people of philosophy, are deeply immersed in the domain of theology. Let us summarize: in the domain of theology, no room remains for hope (7).
Another obstacle is contempt. Contempt is the fixation of the present state and stands opposed to hope. A human being who is held in contempt expects nothing and has no hope, and thinks of nothing but the fixation of his own state. Let us leave it at that. Other obstacles could also be introduced, but the writer of these lines believes that contempt, and in the next rank the theological atmosphere, are the greatest obstacles to the critique of thought. All of this exists, and we know well that removing the skirt of obstacles, even if it were possible, is not an answer to our question. Hope is merely a preparedness for thought. But mere preparedness is not the critique of thought. The critique of thought is the destiny of thought, and the destiny of thought is its critique.
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1- PhD in Western Philosophy from the Iranian Institute of Wisdom and Philosophy. 2- Critique is used in both intransitive and transitive senses. 3- The sun shone and the shepherd drove the sheep toward the sun. He thought; these creatures never need to make a decision. Perhaps that is why they always stay with me. (Coelho, Paulo, The Alchemist, translated by Arash Hejazi). 4- In the metaphysical space, it is a firm belief that no thought is conceivable outside of metaphysics, and every philosophy believes that it speaks of truth in its totality. 5- Sureh Andisheh Magazine, No. 84-85, p. 141. 6- I deliberately do not say metaphysics so as not to give the impression of thought being confined to metaphysics. 7- It goes without saying that what is meant by kalam here is not the science of theology, which is why we spoke of the theological space and realm. The science of kalam, in its own place, can and has had auspicious and blessed fruits for our culture and literature.
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