The Seventeen Types of Conceptual Definition

We said that sometimes we define a word, sometimes we define an external concrete object, and sometimes we define a concept. Our discussion was about conceptual definition. Therefore, when we speak of the seventeen types of definition, we mean the seventeen types of conceptual definition, and we have nothing to do with the definition of words or the definition of external concrete objects.

The Seventeen Types of Conceptual Definition

Mostafa Malekian – Sessions 21 and 22 of Philosophical Analysis – Year 1389

1. Definition by Genus and Differentia

The first of these definitions, which we discussed in the previous session, is what we call definition by genus and differentia, a method dating back to Aristotle, also referred to as definition by genus and definition by differentia. According to this definition, we had ḥadd (complete definition) and rasm (description), and then ḥadd itself was divided into complete ḥadd and incomplete ḥadd, and rasm into complete rasm and incomplete rasm. This logical system is entirely based on essentialism. Among these four, the highest virtue belonged to complete ḥadd, then incomplete ḥadd, then complete rasm, and finally incomplete rasm. Since this is now obsolete, I will not go into it further, and our logical texts have discussed it ad nauseam. Of course, sometimes the term ḥadd was used to mean any definition. In this sense, Ibn Sina named his treatise on definitions the Treatise on Ḥudūd (Risālat al-Ḥudūd), meaning the treatise on ḥadds, on definitions. But ḥadd was one type of definition, and the other type of definition was rasm.

2. Stipulative Definition

The second type of definition is stipulative definition. In a stipulative definition, you yourself coin a concept and define it by juxtaposing several other concepts. This is called a stipulative definition, or a determinative definition, where you yourself determine that you will use this concept in this way. For example, I say there is a concept in my mind that I name with the word korok. You ask, what does korok mean? I say korok is the product of a person's height multiplied by their weight and by the amount of food they consume in a day. Then we ask, what is Mr. So-and-so's korok? Now a new concept has been created. Like how they calculate RH. Pay attention: I coined a concept that seemed useful to me in some way and defined it by juxtaposing n other concepts. If we want to define korok, we say we have provided a stipulative definition of korok.

Many of the definitions found in physics, chemistry, and biology are stipulative definitions; that is, it is useful for a physicist to coin a concept and then, by juxtaposing other concepts, introduce that concept to their audience. Stipulative definitions are usually used in the sciences, meaning in disciplines; that is, in various branches of mathematics, logic, philosophy, and the empirical sciences, both natural and human. Stipulative definitions are used a great deal in these fields. For example, a philosopher says: if something, by the requirement of its essence, is no more inclined toward existence than toward non-existence, and no more inclined toward non-existence than toward existence, we call this a contingent being. Now, contingent being has acquired a stipulative definition. These stipulative definitions are very useful. For instance, the conventional definition that exists under the title "standard of life" is a definition that was coined. They put several things together and then created a definition called the standard of life, which also has practical application.

Points on Stipulative Definition

اگر در این تعریف دقت كنید از آن چند نكته به دست می‌آید كه من به همه نکات اشاره كردم. نكته‌ی اول این‌كه مفهومی در ذهن من تعریف‌كننده متولد شده که قبلاً این مفهوم نبوده، و این مفهوم قبلاً در ذهن كس دیگری وجود نداشته است. نكته‌ی دوم این‌كه من قصد شناساندن این مفهوم را به مخاطبانم دارم. و سوم این‌كه نمی‌توانم مخاطبان خودم را از راه معرفت، از راه آشنایی، با این مفهوم آشنا كنم و باید از راه معرفت و از راه توصیف یعنیknowledge by   description استفاده كنم. اگر می‌توانستم مخاطبانم را از راه knowledge by acquaintance یا معرفت از راه آشنایی آشنا كنم، به معرفت از راه توصیف روی نمی‌آوردم. معرفت از راه توصیف، با از كنار گذاردن nتا مفهوم به دست می‌آید. این تعریف تصریحی یا تعریف قسم دوم است. گاهی وقت‌ها شخص آن لفظی كه انتخاب می‌كند برای آن مفهوم مثل كُرُكِ من نیست. كُرُك تا حالا در فارسی اصلاً به كار نمی‌رفت. من اولین بار از كرک استفاده كردم. اما گاهی شخص آن مفهومی كه در ذهن ابداع كرده لفظی كه برایش وضع می‌كند، قبلاً هم در آن زبان به كار می‌رفته، ولی به معنای دیگری هم كار می‌رفته، مثل خدا و نیرو. مثلاً قبل از این‌كه فیزیك از لفظ نیرو استفاده كند، مردم از لفظ نیرو استفاده می‌كردند. مثلاً می‌گفتند نیروی فلان مرد زیاد است. بعد فیزیك‌دان‌ها مفهومی را جعل كردند و برای اشاره به آن مفهوم باز از لفظ نیرو استفاده كردند. غالباً هم همین‌طور است. وقتی مفهوم جدیدی در ذهن یك فیزیك‌دان یا شیمی‌دان یا عالم یا فیلسوفی می‌آید، به ندرت یك لفظ نامستعمل یا مهمل را استخدام می‌كنند و این لفظ مهمل را از این به بعد مستعمل می‌كنند، یعنی به آن معنا القا می‌كنند. ممكن است من از لغت فرهنگ استفاده كنم، اما آن را به هیچ كدام از مفاهیمی كه تاكنون در فارسی به كار رفته به كار نبرم و خودم برای مفهومی كه در ذهنم است از لفظ فرهنگ استفاده كنم و باز این‌جا هم فرهنگ، تعریف تصریحی می‌شود. چون لفظش به كار می‌رفته، اما با معنای دیگری. مثل این می‌ماند كه من تمام محتوای یك تخم‌مرغ را با یك آمپول بكشم و بعد آن را با مواد دیگری پركنم. الان ظاهرش همان تخم‌مرغ است، اما در باطنش دیگر زرده و سفیده نیست و یك مایع دیگری در آن است. در این جا هم من لفظ فرهنگ را از معنایی كه داشته، خالی كرده و یك معنای جدیدی را القا كردم به داخل آن. اشكالی هم ندارد، به شرط این‌كه تصریح بكنم به این معنا و بگویم از این به بعد اگر در گفته‌ها و نوشته‌های من فرهنگ به كار رفت، به معانی كه تاكنون به كار می‌رفته نیست، من این مفهوم در ذهنم هست و برای این مفهوم از واژه‌ی فرهنگ استفاده كرده‌ام.

تعریف تصریحی رایج‌ترین تعریف در علوم

 تعاریف تصریحی خیلی بیشتر از آنی هستند كه ما فی بادی‌النظر تصور می‌كنیم. ما خیلی از تعاریف تصریحی استفاده می‌كنیم، ولی چون از واژه‌ آشنا در زبان استفاده می‌كنیم كه قبلاً هم مستعمل نبودند و مهمل نبودند و به كار می‌رفتند، كسی متوجه نمی‌شود كه من مفهوم جدیدی را ابداع كردم و با این لفظ، به آن مفهوم جدید اشاره می‌كنم. این تعریف، رایج‌ترین نوع تعریف در علوم و معارف، یعنی discipline، نه زندگی روزمره‌ است. چه علم طبیعی باشد یا فلسفی یا ریاضی یا منطقی كه رایج‌ترین نوع تعریف است. در تعریف‌های تصریحی باید به قراردادی كه با مخاطب بسته می‌شود تا آخر پای‌بند ماند. بنابراین مثلاً فرهنگ را به آن معنا به كار ببرد كه تصریح كرده بود و برنگردد به آن معانی كه قبلاً استفاده می‌شد. در مورد كُرُك این پیش نمی‌آید، چون كُرُك قبلاً هیچ معنایی نداشت.

3. تعریف سیاقی یا متنی

The third definition is contextual or textual definitions, known as contextual definitions. To clarify these definitions, I must return to a point in grammar. In different languages, the words that are used are classified in various ways. For example, in Arabic they say that every word is either a noun, a verb, or a particle, and it does not fall outside these three categories. In Arabic, we do not have adjectives, adverbs, or pronouns. A pronoun or an adjective is considered a type of noun. In Persian, words are divided into between six and nine categories. They say we have nouns, pronouns, verbs, adverbs, adjectives, prepositions, conjunctions, markers, and so on. But in all languages, despite the fact that words are classified in different ways, one thing is common to all of them, and this is part of universal grammar, meaning it holds true in all languages.

The words used in any language are divided, in one broad classification, into two types: words that have an independent meaning and words that do not have an independent meaning. If a word is such that when used alone it conveys a meaning to your mind, we say this word has an independent meaning. For example, we say water, or forest, or nightingale, or cat, or to go, he took... But there is a series of words in language whose meaning is not understandable on its own, unless they are used within a phrase or a sentence. Otherwise, their meaning cannot be identified. That is, they must be used in a clause or phrase, or in a sentence. We say these have dependent meanings. For instance, I say "from"; what does "from" mean? "From" cannot be understood. But if I say, Hassan went from Tehran to Qom, "from" acquires a specific meaning. Here, "from" takes on the meaning of a starting point. But if I say, the cake is made from eggs and flour, "from" here does not mean a starting point, and if I say, so-and-so asked of me that..., here "from" has neither the first meaning nor the second. If I say, from the fact that you are my friend..., here "from" has a fourth meaning. Water is not like this. Water, in whatever sentence it is used, still has the same meaning of water. These are called words that have dependent meanings. Usually, in the language of our scholars, they call this second type having harfiyyah meanings or a harfī meaning. Because our scholars dealt with the Arabic language, and in Arabic, words are nouns, verbs, and particles. A noun has an independent meaning. A verb also does. Only a particle does not have an independent meaning. Like az, min; from this perspective, they call these harfiyyah meanings, because they saw the instances of dependent meanings in particles. But we are not like this in language. The method of semantics is also used for the second type, not for the first.

Harfiyyah Meanings

Now, the discussion is that you can never define words that have dependent meanings unless you bring the phrases and sentences in which those words are used. We understand that dependent meaning through those phrases and sentences. From this perspective, this definition is called a textual definition. You must bring a text, a context, so that from that text and context we gradually understand what "from" means. Otherwise, we do not understand what meaning "from" has. If you pay attention, in very reputable dictionaries, they do not put a meaning next to particles; instead, they say it is used for such-and-such, because they cannot say "from" means a starting point. For example, they write "from" is used to indicate a starting point. Because if that were the case, one could replace the starting point with "from," and instead of saying, Hassan went from Tehran to Qom, we would say, Hassan went starting point Tehran to Qom. So it becomes clear that "from" does not mean "starting point." "From" is used to mean "starting point." This is why in English dictionaries like Oxford and Cambridge, when they bring a particle, they write "used when." That is, it is used when... Otherwise, if they wrote "from" equals "starting point," "starting point" has an independent meaning, but "from" does not have an independent meaning, so the meaning of "from" cannot be "starting point."

Question: That is, one can find synonyms for nouns and verbs in a thesaurus, but for particles, we must refer to a usage dictionary to understand the meaning of, for example, "from" and find its application. Of course, this is regarding particles, but sometimes such a situation also exists for words and concepts.

Answer: Yes, exactly.

What do certain particles, like “and,” mean? For example, “Ali and I came.” You say “and” means accompaniment. Yet “and” is a particle, but it has no meaning. This is why “and” or the particle “or” itself cannot be written in a dictionary opposite “or,” or equated with “or.” In a contextual definition, they write “drink either water or soda,” and opposite it they write “if you drink water, do not drink soda, and if you drink soda, do not drink water.” So “or” means that two things cannot be combined. If you have noticed, they did not come here to define “or.” Here they have merely equated a sentence in which the particle “or” is used with another sentence through which you understand the meaning of “or.” We said, if you drink water, do not drink soda, and if you drink soda, do not drink water. Here the discussion also concerns “if” itself. “If” itself has a particle-like meaning. “If” itself must also be defined through another context; for instance, we might say “if you come to our house, I will show you such-and-such a book,” meaning we define this and say “I will show you the book only on the condition that you come to our house.” Through this, we understand that the meaning of “if” is conditionality, that is, “if” is used to mean a condition; the condition for seeing the book is that you come to our house. In this respect, simple logical operators must all receive contextual definitions, such as conjunction, disjunction, and so on, which you have studied in logic, and we have no other way to define them, and often this definition is a difficult one. For example, you want to define “and” for me; you say to yourself, I will bring a sentence and explain the particle “and” to him within the framework of that word. For instance, I say “Hassan and Hossein came.” Now you want to translate “and,” so you put a word in place of “and” in this sentence so that I understand the meaning of “and.” You might say “both Hossein came and Hassan came.” Here “both” appeared. Now you want to explain “both.” “Both” has a non-independent or particle-like meaning. Then, in explaining “both,” they say “it was not the case that Hossein came and Hassan did not come, and it was not the case that Hassan came and Hossein had not yet come.” Then, as soon as you say this, you see that “and” was used. Here, in defining “both,” we have again used “and.” This is very complex. One of the interesting and entertaining topics for philosophers is being able to define particles. Some of these particles are conditional operators, some are conjunctive operators, some are disjunctive operators, and so on. Some have said there is also a verb which, despite being a verb, has a particle-like meaning, and that is the verb “to be.” For example, we say “Hassan is sick.” Although “is” is a verb grammatically, it still seems to have a particle-like and non-independent meaning and must be explained through context, text, and circumstance. In any case, particles must be defined in this way. Sometimes nouns also find themselves in the same situation, like “before” and “after.” These are nouns but have particle-like meanings, and one cannot understand what “before” means and what “after” means except within the framework of a sentence. All suffixes, prefixes, and infixes are the same. For example, consider the prefix “co-”: classmate, co-student, fellow townsman. How can this “co-” be explained? Suffixes are the same. The suffix “-mand” like “daneshmand” (scientist), “honarmand” (artist), “ayalmand” (having a family), “fazilatmand” (virtuous), or infixes like the infix “a” in “beynāmatniyat” (intertextuality), “beynāzhāndriyat” (intergenderness)—this “a” that is between “beyn” and “zhāndr” is an infix—or the “a” in the word “keshākesh” (struggle), which is also an infix. How can one really define this “a” in “keshākesh”? This is also the third type of definition.

4. Operational Definition

The fourth type of definition is operational definitions. In these definitions, you cannot define your concept. You construct a device and say that this device indicates that concept. For example, physicists created a concept called "temperature." Then they could not define it. So they invented the thermometer and said temperature is what the thermometer indicates. Or the definition of "field" in physics. They invented a device and said "field" is what is shown by means of this device; this is also called an operational definition. That is, an operation must be carried out so that a device emerges, and this device indicates something that we ourselves cannot define. That is, currently, temperature cannot be defined in physics, and they say temperature is what is shown by a thermometer. Therefore, if they ask, what is the temperature of this room? It means, if we place this device here, on what number will it settle? Then, whatever number it settles on, we say the temperature of this room is that much. Temperature does not mean heat; rather, in physics, it means the degree of heat, and a degree exists when you create a scale. What is the degree of heat here now? If you have a thermometer that shows degrees in Celsius, it is 28 degrees. But if you have a Fahrenheit thermometer, it is 130 degrees. Now, which of these two is actually correct? Both of them are correct. Because temperature depends on the device used to measure it. Someone might say, if we also showed 3 other types of scales, which one is correct? Temperature depends on the device. It depends on what kind of device you make. Now, between two hours, we have constructed the device in such a way that how many seconds are there between 8 and 9 o'clock? 3600 seconds. Now, if someone makes a clock where there are 5000 seconds between 8 and 9 o'clock, both show real time. Because a second means one thirteen-hundred-and-sixtieth of this interval; now, if you made a device that divided this second into 5000 pieces, one second becomes one five-thousandth of this interval. You can neither say it does not show this time, nor can you say it does not show that time. Why? Because time is something shown by a clock. Philosophers have provided a definition of time, but physicists have not; however, we did not understand the philosophers' definition. Physicists say time is by means of the clock, minute, and second. Therefore, in operational definitions, we need a device that we build and then claim that the device indicates that thing which is our definiendum and signifies that thing which is our definiendum, our defined thing. These operational definitions are numerous in physics, chemistry, and biology, but when we come to definitions, these become fewer, and when we enter the humanities, they become even fewer.

5. Instrumental Definition

The fifth type of definitions is instrumental definitions. In instrumental definitions, we define a thing through its effects and results. In the humanities, this type of definition is used a great deal. For example, we say "IQ," which is one of the inventions of psychologists. Then they say IQ means that a person can solve m out of n problems. IQ is a force within us whose effect and result is problem-solving. That is, if someone can solve 170 out of 200 problems, we say their IQ is 170. Problem-solving is the result of having an IQ. A person who has a specific IQ can solve 70 out of 100 problems. If you defined water as something that quenches human thirst, you have provided an instrumental definition of it. Because you defined the effect and result of water instead of water itself. In this definition, you showed what the effect and result consequent upon water is. Similarly, if you defined the state in this way: the state is a force that prevents citizens from transgressing against one another. This is the effect and result of the state, not the state itself. The effect and result of the state is that it prevents citizens from transgressing against one another.

6. Extensional Definition

One kind of definition is ostensive definitions. Well, what are ostensive definitions? Three types of definition have been mentioned for ostensive definitions. It has been said that in ostensive definitions, we sometimes show the instances of the concept. Another is that it has been said that in ostensive definitions, we mention the instances of the concept. Yet another is that they said ostensive definitions are definitions in which we either mention or show its instances. Firstly, if the matter is showing, this only holds true for concepts whose number of instances is limited or narrow. For example, if there were three living dinosaurs on Earth and someone asked us to define a dinosaur, we could show them these three dinosaurs. But this cannot be done for a butterfly, because one cannot show someone all butterflies. So, if the intention is to show the ostensive instances, this is only applicable to concepts that have limited and narrow instances.

Questions and Answers:

Question: Must we show all the instances?

Answer: Yes. We must show all the instances.

But if it is mentioning, no, this limitation does not exist, because one can mention without showing. However, the more interesting definition is the third one, in which the instances are either mentioned or shown. The word ostensive itself literally means indicative; that is, a person points more, and this aligns more with showing instances. A mistake that many writers, including Western writers, have made is that Westerners, for example, said if someone asked what the Middle East means and we said the Middle East means Egypt + Lebanon + Turkey + Iraq + Iran + ..., this is an ostensive definition. But in an ostensive definition, one must show the instances. Is Egypt an instance of the Middle East? No. Can we point to Egypt and say "the Middle East"? We can point to a butterfly in the world and say "this is a butterfly." We can also point to any dinosaur and say "this is a dinosaur." But can we point to Egypt and say "this is the Middle East"? They have confused part and whole with particular and universal. The Middle East is a whole whose parts are Iran, Lebanon, Egypt, etc., and if you define the whole by defining its parts, this is no longer an ostensive definition. Because in an ostensive definition, we wanted either to show the instances or to mention the instances. Here, you did not mention the instances; here, you mentioned the parts, and the parts of a thing are not its instances. For example, can one say that the instances of a biscuit are sugar, flour, etc.? These are not instances; these are parts that come together. Similarly, one cannot say Latin America means Argentina, Peru, Ecuador, etc. These are parts of Latin America. I have seen in some Western books that this was also considered an ostensive definition. But this is a definition of parts, not instances. All instances of water are water, but the parts of water are not all water.

Question: Can we show a country on a map and say all these countries are instances of the Middle East?

Answer: There are two problems. As we said, we must show the instances. A map is not an instance.

Question: What if we mention the countries as a set and say Afghanistan, Iran, Lebanon, etc., make up the Middle East?

Answer: Well, that becomes an explicit definition. Here, we have nothing called an instance. Unless, in one scenario, someone gets on a plane and goes to an altitude where the entire Middle East is visible as a whole—not with borders clearly marked. Then someone explains to them and says, "What you see, with the Oxus River on one side and the Caspian Sea on the other, is called the Middle East." Then this definition is an ostensive definition. And this ostensive definition is not of the type that mentions an instance, but rather an ostensive definition of the type that shows an instance.

Question: What about Iran? Can one also go by plane and see it?

Answer: Again, an ostensive definition is of the type that points to an instance. I have said before that we have a problem. For example, when we say we have Iranian culture, what does Iran itself mean? Is Iran a geographical unit, or a historical, racial, linguistic, or cultural one? And whichever we take, a problem arises.

Question: But what I meant by going by airplane is that, for example, such a thing is not possible for fourth-century Iran, and we are only able to show present-day Iran.

Answer: Yes. Ostensive definitions either mention the instance or show the instance, and as I said, in my opinion the best definition is the third type, which incorporates both mention and presentation. Ostensive definitions are truly rarely used, but sometimes nothing can really be done, and we have no choice but to give an ostensive, instance-based definition.

Question: Regarding the previous case, you said that mentioning all instances is necessary. Is it the same in this case?

Answer: Yes. Again, it involves "all." Presenting all instances, mentioning all instances, or presenting and mentioning all instances. One type of definition is subjective or mental definitions. In these definitions, how do we define x? In these definitions, we say x means that which you consider to be x. This is a very strange definition, but it commonly occurs, especially in art. For example, what is the definition of beauty? If you ask Dr. Hossein Elahi Ghomshei, he will speak of harmony and contrast, and so on. That is, as if beauty means having contrast and having harmony. But they pay no attention to the fact that opposition and harmony themselves have very ambiguous meanings. Secondly, if your definition were correct, only composite things would be beautiful, as they have parts whose parts either have harmony with each other or contrast with each other. Simple things, then, should not be beautiful; whereas this is not the case at all, and simple things can also be beautiful. So, you who say that all beauty is God, God should not be beautiful at all, because God is the simplest of the simple and has no parts, so God should not be beautiful. After that, there are many things that we see as beautiful, but we see no contrast between their parts or see no harmony between their parts. How can you say that these have harmony between their parts? Of course, all three of these objections are very expandable, and I do not wish to go into their details. But in any case, beauty and the beautiful cannot be defined. The beautiful is something that someone sees as beautiful. The beautiful can sometimes be considered by a specific person, or we can define it for a specific group of humans. Humans who live in specific times or specific places or specific conditions, or who have membership in a specific group, or else all humans on the planet throughout history. Ultimately, its subjectivity has not disappeared. Ultimately, the beautiful is something that someone considers beautiful, whether that someone is me or we Iranians of the early twentieth century AD. Here, the matter ultimately became a mental matter. Beautiful is something which is regarded as beautiful. That is, it is considered or deemed beautiful.

For example, they say grass must taste sweet to the mouth of a goat. What is tasty grass? Grass that goats find tasty. You can say there is a pain in my elbow, but I do not feel any pain. Pain is that which is perceived as pain. It is meaningless to say my hand hurts, but I feel no pain. Illness is not like this. You might be sitting here and consider yourself healthy, while you are afflicted with cancer. Pain is something that a person considers to be pain.

Question: Was it based on this same reasoning that Nagel, in that famous article, rejected the materialist?

Answer: Yes. That is correct. And we must provide subjective definitions for many human affairs and cannot provide an objective definition for them. We cannot say what pain is. What is it in itself? We only know what is considered pain. What is considered suffering. We cannot say I am suffering, but I do not feel it myself. Pain is that which is considered pain. Suffering is that which is considered suffering. Beauty is that which is considered beautiful and ugliness is that which is considered ugly. If a beauty queen were brought here, everything could be measured, legs, waist, head, etc... And we have no doubt in those measurements. But ultimately one of us will say she is very beautiful, and another will say no! She is not beautiful. It is possible that one of us abstracts beauty and another does not abstract beauty. Therefore, we cannot judge absolutely whether this lady is beautiful or not; absolutely, it is meaningless. It may be beautiful to me and not beautiful to you. Some have extended this to ethics as well and said that a right action is what a human being considers right. A wrong action is an action that a human being does not consider right.

Question: The human type or the human individual?

Answer: It varies. Some adhere to multical tralism. That is, they believe in multiculturalism and say that if the members of any culture consider something good, it is good for them, and if the members of another culture consider that thing bad, it becomes bad for them. Some apply this assumption to society and say that if society considers this good, it is good, and if it does not consider it good, it is not good, and so on. Some have brought it lower, that is, to the individual. They said whatever a human being considers a right action is right, and whatever they consider a wrong action is a wrong action. Some have also applied this to all of humanity, meaning they have said that wrong is what all human beings in all times and places consider wrong. This is still subjective. Despite the fact that all human beings in all of history are the subject of discussion, it still becomes subjective. Because wrongness became dependent on being considered not right, being deemed wrong, being regarded as wrong. These definitions are very complex and are very much subject to doubt and skepticism. Here, I will raise one of its linguistic doubts for you. But this is a linguistic doubt, and if one realizes it, they will see that this problem is not very important. I said, define right. They say, that which someone considers right. Because right was used on both this side and that side. Because in definition, we do not consider circular definitions incorrect. That is, if a concept is used in both the definiens and the definiendum, that definition is a circular definition. If you had said right means that which someone considers good, this problem would not have arisen. Because here good was used and there right was used. But if you said right means that which someone considers right, your definition is circular. But it seems the circularity is linguistic. Regarding beautiful, if you had said that which someone finds pleasing, this problem would not have arisen. Because there you had used pleasing and there beautiful. But if you said beautiful means that which someone or some people find beautiful, you used it in both the definiens and the definiendum, and your definition is circular. This is why some have said that subjective definitions are all wrong, all are erroneous.

Question: Can we say that subjective does not apply to substances and primary qualities and is only used in secondary qualities?

Answer: And secondary qualities. That is, a class monitor is someone whom the members of the class regard as the monitor, or a president is someone whom the public regards as president—verbs denoting perception, like “regard” in English, consider, deem, recognize. In the view of some, this is a circular definition, but in my view, this circularity is linguistic. That is, in reality, this problem does not exist. But in any case, some have said that these definitions are not defensible. Yet, apparently, even if they are not defensible, we still have no choice but to define some things in this way. All secondary qualities are like this. For example, the meaning of “scholar” is not that someone considers him a scholar. It is possible for someone to be a scholar and for no one to consider him a scholar. The same goes for “teacher.” But “professor” differs from “teacher.” If someone says, “I am a professor, but no one considers me a professor,” then “professor” no longer has meaning. The same applies to “president.” In short, there are some concepts for which we can provide subjective definitions, and purely objective definitions of them are not possible.

8. Causal or Genetic Definitions

The eighth type of conceptual definitions is causal definitions, which we call Causal definitions or genetic definitions or Genetic definitions.

Whenever you define something and confine yourself to the cause or causes of that thing, this is called a genetic definition. For example, someone says, “Define money,” and we say, “A means that saves us from the difficulties of barter transactions.” This is indeed a definition of money, but by way of the cause of money, that is, the reason for the emergence of money, the motive to escape from barter or in-kind transactions, goods-for-goods, or commodity-for-commodity transactions. Or, at some point, someone asks you, “What is government?” and you say, “Government is an institution that emerged to secure order, security, and welfare.” That is, a motive caused government to come into being. Here, too, you have defined government, but by way of the cause that led to the emergence of government. Here, the concept of government itself has not been defined; only the cause or causes that might lead to the emergence of government have been defined. In the social sciences, many definitions fall into this category, whether we approve or not, whether we like it or not. Ultimately, in the social sciences, very often when they want to define something, they refer us to the cause, causes, and genesis or formation of that thing. By social sciences, I mean sociology, economics, politics, and other social sciences. But if you pay close attention, you will notice that in many places where we have this type of definition, instead of pinpointing and stating what the definiendum is, we mostly point to the causes and factors of the definiendum’s coming into being. We call these genetic or Genetic definitions.

9. Functional or Consequential Definition

We have another type of definition that is the exact opposite of this, namely, definitions that point to the effects and results of a thing, which we call consequential or functional definitions, or Consequential definitions, or Functional definitions. That is, in these definitions, we point to the effect, result, and function. For example, we said, “What is the definition of the institution of the family?” and we say, “The institution of the family emerged to make sexual relations healthy.” Well, here they are stating the function of the institution of the family and saying that this is the effect and result of the institution of the family. If someone asks, “What is a telephone?” we say, “It is a device that makes it possible to hear the voice of another person from a distance.” This is the function, effect, and result of the telephone.

Question: Are effects and results also relevant in instrumental definitions?

Answer: In instrumental definitions, effects and results are also at issue, but the difference is that in instrumental definitions, the distinction between instrument and function is that an instrument belongs to the category of ends, whereas a function belongs to the category of results, and I have said before that end and result differ. Of course, it would have been better if, when I discussed instrumental definitions, I had discussed functional definitions at the same time. I have an end for which I employ an instrument to achieve it. But sometimes a phenomenon comes into being. When it comes into being, it has effects and results that are the effects and results of that phenomenon, which we never necessarily considered with our end in mind.

Question: When end and result coincide, what is the outcome?

Answer: The coincidence of end and result pertains to the realm of human action, not the realm of definition. That is, it is only in our human action that sometimes the end coincides with the result and sometimes it does not. We cannot say whether the object itself had its end coincide with its result or not, because ends belong to humans, and it is the human who has an end in performing an action. If the result that this action leads to is the same as that end, we say that success has been achieved here and that end and result have coincided. In other words, humans have ends; phenomena do not have ends. Therefore, when humans do something, it is to achieve an end, and if the result of the action is also that same end, then the coincidence of end and result has occurred, which does not then extend into the definition. So these functional or consequential definitions should be placed alongside instrumental definitions, as this is also a type of definition.

10. Persuasive Definition

One type of definition is persuasive definitions. These were first discovered by Stevenson, the famous moral philosopher. He discovered a type of definition called persuasive definitions. In persuasive definitions, a person moves from the phenomenon to the concept in order to make us interested in the phenomenon itself. For example, there are systems in the world that are democratic systems; we may not be fond of any of these democratic systems. To make us interested in this democratic system, a person says it is a system where the people have control over their own destiny. When one hears this definition, one likes it. For this reason, it is called a persuasive definition, evocative, in that it persuades you that you are dealing with something good. That is, through a definition, you turn away from the dissatisfaction you have. We very often have many such persuasive definitions. In the mold of this definition, we have made it more beautiful. In reality, this is a kind of elevation or sublimation of the thing.

A Single Definition as an Instance of Several Types of Definition

We have mentioned seventeen types of definition, but sometimes a single definition is an instance of two types of definitions. For example, a single definition is both an instance of the third type and an instance of the eleventh type. That is, these definitions are not mutually exclusive and can be coextensive or co-referential. In persuasive definitions, in order to reduce a person's dissatisfaction with the instances, we present the concept as more beautiful than the instances actually are. These exist in abundance in the social sciences. When Stevenson discovered these definitions, he discovered them mostly in ethics, but later other philosophers of logic realized that these definitions have applications in other areas as well.

11. 12. Ideal and Mathematical Definition

Similar to these definitions are those we refer to as ideal or idealizing definitions, or ideal or idealized definitions. These are definitions that describe an object in the best possible form we would like it to have. The difference from the previous type was that in the previous type, there was a kind of dissatisfaction with the instances, and in order to reconcile our interest with the instances, a persuasive definition was made. Here, however, there is no dissatisfaction with the instances. It is entirely possible that no instance yet exists. But when they want to formulate a definition, they define it ideally. For example, the socialist society, when Marx wanted to define it, did not exist, but he provided an ideal definition. He said a socialist society is one in which it takes from each according to his ability and gives to each according to his needs. In reality, nothing existed for us to say we were dissatisfied with its instances, but this definition is very ideal. Or, for instance, in defining a liberal society, they say it is a society in which whatever pleases you is at your disposal. This is very ideal. In fact, it wants to say this society is a society based on pleasure. We call these ideal definitions. The difference between these definitions and persuasive definitions is that it is not assumed that there are dissatisfying instances; rather, no instance yet exists. In one respect, these definitions are akin to evaluative definitions, and in another respect, to mathematical definitions.

If you look closely, you will see that mathematical definitions, in one respect, resemble ideal definitions, and in another respect, evaluative definitions resemble ideal definitions. Firstly, mathematical definitions are ideal definitions. Of course, this statement is not true of all mathematical definitions, but generally speaking, mathematical definitions are idealizing definitions. It is impossible for you to have a sphere in the external world. That is, for an object to exist such that all points on its surface are exactly the same distance from its center. The more you refine your measuring instruments, the more you see that distances that previously seemed equal are now unequal. But in mathematics, you define the sphere in an ideal way; you define a sphere that has no realization in the external world ideally, and you say a sphere is a volume where all points located on its surface are at one distance from a single point, even though no such thing exists. If you run your hand over a sphere, you will see that even under your skin you feel these ups and downs. So they are not at one distance, even if they are made like a ping-pong ball. For example, when you run your hand over a ping-pong ball, you see that it is smooth, but if you put it under a microscope, you will see how many ups and downs it has. No sphere can exist in the external world. Or take triangles; when you go to a workshop similar to a lumber mill, you say, do you have a triangle? The carpenter immediately points to a set square and says, here is a triangle. In common usage, this is also accepted as a triangle, but we know that the three sides of a triangle must be three straight lines. When you run your hand over a set square, you see it has protrusions and indentations. It is impossible for you to create a triangle in the external world. This is regarding volumes, where we have volume in the external world, but surface, line, and point, according to definition, do not exist. Because in the natural world, every object has three dimensions, and if it has three dimensions, then certainly every object in the natural world is a volume. In the natural world, we have no two-dimensional phenomenon to say that a surface also exists. We have no one-dimensional thing to say that a line also exists. We have no zero-dimensional thing to say that a point also exists. The natural world is the world of three-dimensional objects. We have no two-dimensional, one-dimensional, or zero-dimensional objects. Yet, despite all this, in geometry we define the point, line, and surface, and we also define surfaces. Like the rhombus, parallelogram, square, and so on. We have a rough, crude conception of the external world and the real world, and we idealize it, and we call that idealized form a square, a rhombus, and then we define it. If we are not an Einstein, we have accepted up to this point that we have three dimensions in the external world, and we want to say that only volumes have the power of realization in the external world, and surfaces, lines, and points have no possibility of realization in the natural world, and whatever definitions we provide of these are idealized definitions.

اما نکته دوم این بود که حجم‌ها هم که وجود دارند، طبق آن تعریفی که گفتم وجود ندارند. مثلاً علی‌الاصول مشکلی وجود ندارد که کره یا مثلث یا مکعب به صورت سه بعدی در عالم بیرون وجود داشته باشد. اما فی‌الواقع وجود ندارد. پس در باب سطوح، نقاط و خطوط می‌گوییم علی‌الاصول امکان ندارد. impressible امکان ندارد. در باب احجام می‌گوییمin practice امکان ندارد. عملاً امکان ندارد چیزی مکعب مستطیل باشد و همه سطوحش به اندازه هم باشند. هر چقدر هم مکعب را دقیق بسازند، باز یکی از سطح‌هایش با سطح دیگر فرق می‌کند. جینز (Jeens) گفته بود شما اگر با ذره‌بین نگاه کرده باشید، می‌بینید که بالا و پایینی سطح تخم‌مرغ، از زمین بیشتر است. این‌قدر این‌ها با هم متفاوت است. مگر قله هیمالیا با کف دریا چقدر فاصله دارد؟ مثلاً 16 کیلومتر. این 16 کیلومتر نسبت به زمین چیزی نیست. 16 کیلومتر از بالاترین نقطه تا پایین‌ترین نقطه. اما اگر بالا و پایینی‌های تخم‌مرغ را در نظر بگیرید، می‌بینید نسبت به کل تخم‌مرغ چقدر تفاوت دارد. تا این‌جا حرف‌های من نسبت به هندسه صادق بود، اما راجع به حساب صادق نیست. تعاریف حساب، idealized نیستند. مثلاً وقتی ما عدد پنج یا عدد P را تعریف می‌کنیم، عدد صحیح، حقیقی یا اعداد موهوم را تعریف می‌کنند، این‌ها تعاریف idealized شده‌ای نیستند، اما معمولاً تعاریف ریاضی را یک نوع تعریف می‌کنند. می‌خواهم بگویم سخنی را که در باب هویات هندسی صادق است را به هویات حسابی هم تسّری می‌دهند و می‌گویند این‌ها صورت‌های idealized شده است. می‌توانیم بگوییم مثلث، صورت idealized شده است، اما عدد پنج، صورت idealized شده چیزی نیست. اعداد یا مجموعه‌ها، صورت idealized شده چیزی نیستند، اما کلاً در کتاب‌های فلسفه منطق معمولاً تعاریف ریاضی را در یک category جای می‌دهند و می‌گویند تعاریف ریاضی صورت idealized شده چیزی است که در عالم می‌بینیم. از این جهت شبیه تعاریف آرمانی‌اند که قبلاً بیان کردم، اما تعاریف آرمانی یک شبیه دیگری هم دارند که آن تعاریف ارزش داورانه است.

13. معرف احساسات است

این‌ها تعاریفی‌اند که در آن مُعَّرَف احساسات و عواطف خود را نسبت به مُعَّرَف در تعریف می‌گنجاند. مثلاً مارکس گفته دین افیون توده‌هاست. و وایتهد گفته دین همان ارزش‌های اخلاقی است وقتی به آسمان شعله می‌کشد. اولی تعریف ارزش‌داورانه خیلی منفی و دومی تعریف ارزش‌داورانه خیلی مثبت از دین است. در هر دو تعریف، احساسات و عواطف و هیجانات شخص نسبت به دین وجود دارد. آقای دین Deen که تعریف بسیار مهمی را از دین، در یک کتاب کلاسیک خیلی مهم ارائه داده است، و نزدیک به چهارصد تعریف را از دین بررسی کرده، ما در همه این تعاریف چهار مشکل در تعریف دین داریم و بنابراین معتقد شد ما تعریف مشخصی از دین نداریم. او به این نتیجه رسید که این تعاریف یا جامع افراد نیستند، یعنی جوری صورت گرفته که همه دین‌های جهان را شامل نمی‌شود. یا مانع اغیار نیستند، یعنی جوری تعریف شده که لیبرالیسم یا مارکسیسم هم می‌شود دین. او می‌گفت بعضی از تعاریف از دین، ارزش‌داورانه مثبت و بعضی ارزش‌داورانه منفی است، او می‌گفت این تعاریف ارزشمند نیستند.

سوال: این‌جا منظور از ارزش کدام یک از ارزش‌های چهارگانه است؟

جواب: هم ارزش‌های زیبایی شناسانه، هم ارزش‌های حقوقی و هم ارزش‌های اخلاقی و هم ارزش‌های دینی و مذهبی.

مثلاً تعریف آقای مصباح از آزادی یک نمونه خوب است. ایشان می‌گوید آزادی یعنی ولنگاری. یعنی هر مردی بتواند روی هر زنی دست بگذارد و بالعکس. این خیلی ارزش‌داورانه است. این تعاریف خیلی فراوانند. یا پلورالیسم یعنی هیچ حتمی وجود ندارد و همه چیز به یک میزان ناحق است. بعضی از این تعاریف، نامطلوب تلقی می‌شوند، اما این‌که این‌ها در کتاب‌ها می‌آیند به این خاطر است که شخص فکر می‌کند تعریف دیگری امکان‌پذیر نیست و بعداً راجع به ممکن و مطلوب بودن تعاریف توضیح خواهم داد.

14. تعاریف انتزاعی

There is a category of definitions that we call abstract definitions. If we take abstraction to mean the same as abstract, then we can call them abstract definitions. In abstract definitions, when a person wants to define a concept, they gather the instances of the concept and then disregard their points of difference and include their points of commonality in the definition. All biological definitions are like this. How do we define a dog, cat, rabbit, or butterfly?

For example, when we want to define a butterfly, we consider all instances of butterflies and then disregard their points of difference, such as the size and colorfulness of their wings. Then, if one, two, three, four elements remain that are common among them, they say this is a butterfly. Since the time of the famous botanist Linnaeus, who in a sense must be called the master of biology, came to prominence, we must say that, in one interpretation, all these definitions became like this. For this reason, we call these definitions abstractive. That is, we have abstracted or separated the thing from its points of difference. We call these definitions abstract, meaning we have detached the thing from those features in which that thing has no similarity or commonality with other things of the same name. For instance, someone tells you to define a coin. Well, coins have various alloys. Some are thick, some are thin, some have two colors, and some have one color. If you take these points of difference from the coins and abstract them away and pay attention to what is common to all of them, that becomes the definition of a coin. This is different from the essential definition we presented in all essentialist definitions; here, we only look at the phenomenon. In essentialist definitions, we consider the Nomen of the thing, but here we consider its phenomenon. However, the phenomena that a thing possesses, many of them differ from one another.

But every thing has some phenomena that are not like this. So, in essence or essential definitions, we pay attention to the Nomen of the thing. That is, we have nothing to do with the phenomena and, for example, we say what the essence of water is and have nothing to do with its wetness, liquidity, coldness, or clarity. In this type of definition, we deal with the phenomenon. We see that this water shares n phenomena with other waters of the world, but does not share in the rest of its phenomena. We include these n commonalities in the definition, whereas in essentialist definitions we wanted to bring the Nomen, we wanted to bring the essentials and things related to the Nomen of the thing.

Those essentialist definitions are a priori, and these are a posteriori definitions. Here, we look at the phenomena of water and see that some of the phenomena of water are common with other waters of the world. We include these in the definition of water.

15. Descriptive Definitions

The next definitions are those we interpret as descriptive definitions. We have a description in the Russellian sense, and all concepts are descriptive in this meaning because it is done through concepts. He said we have Knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by definitions. Knowledge by description was through concepts. All definitions are through concepts, and that is not what is meant; when description is mentioned, it means definitions by which, when you know them, you recognize the thing concisely, even if you do not know it in detail. Descriptive definitions are concise definitions, not detailed definitions, and these have their uses. For example, suppose you live in an area where there are no more than four types of vegetation. I mention the name of one of these four and do not recognize it. Now you want to make this plant known to me. It is sufficient only to say something in its description so that I do not confuse it with the other three, and as long as I can distinguish it, that is enough. This is called a concise definition.

Question: Is the condition that its instances be limited?

Answer: Yes. Its instances must be known.

Concise and Detailed Definition According to the Ancients

Our predecessors distinguished between a summary definition and a detailed definition. They said that if we do not know water and want to know it, we must go to instances of water—but how do we tell which are water? This was something Avicenna raised: he said that in order to recognize instances of water, we must go to the instances of water. If we do not know what water is, we do not know what counts as an instance of water and what does not. If we know what counts as an instance of water, that means we have recognized water; and if we do not know what counts as an instance of water, how can we go looking for instances of water? Or suppose someone wants to know foxes. Should all the foxes in the world gather in the Nevada desert so we can see what their common features and points of difference are? Now if a dog comes among the foxes, we realize that it lacks such-and-such a feature of foxes. Well, if we know foxes and do not let the dog among them, that means we have recognized foxes; and if you have no knowledge of foxes, why do you not allow the dog to enter their group? Perhaps this creature is also a fox. Avicenna said that we have a summary knowledge of foxes, but we do not have detailed knowledge. We have some vague notions in summary, but we do not have this detailed knowledge. Then, when all the foxes have gathered in the desert, we acquire detailed knowledge of them. Avicenna distinguished between summary knowledge and detailed knowledge, and naturally between summary definition and detailed definition.

Well, the ancients had a series of discussions about whether Avicenna's view is correct or not. And they called those definitions descriptive—Avicenna's summary definitions, which he said enable us to distinguish this tree from other trees. But among extensional definitions—those that deal with concrete external objects—I also referred to distinctive definitions and differential definitions. The difference between these descriptive definitions and those differential definitions is that in those definitions we define the external object itself, whereas here we are defining its concept; and this is also a type of definition, these being summary definitions and not detailed definitions, which we call descriptive definitions.

16. Network definition

We have a sixteenth type of definition, which they call network definitions. These are definitions in which n concepts are defined using one another, and thus they take on a circular character; yet, for all that, there is no avoiding them. The ancients, were they here, would reject these definitions because they considered them circular, since n concepts arise by referring to one another and a circle is created. But today it is sometimes said that there is no alternative to network definitions. These definitions are inevitable. The ancients condemned many things in theory and also abandoned them in practice. But today there are some things that are condemned in theory, yet are not abandoned in practice. The ancients used to say that a single negative particular refutes a universal affirmative. If one human being is found who is not a thinker, it takes away from us the proposition 'All human beings are thinkers.' They say that as soon as a negative particular appears and refutes a universal affirmative, one must cease to assert it. Today it is accepted that a negative particular refutes a universal affirmative, yet they are still used in the sciences. For example, we say that every body expands in volume due to an increase in temperature, but ice at a certain temperature is not like this. Water is also not like this, meaning between zero and four degrees Celsius it decreases in volume. Why? Because they say that merely one, two, or three exceptions do not cause us to abandon a general rule. We must find a more general or better rule than this one, and then abandon the former. That is, they accept in theory that a universal affirmative is refuted by a negative particular, but they say we will not abandon our universal affirmative and insist that you must deliver a better universal affirmative to us. Why? Because science cannot advance without universal affirmatives. Unless a law is found that covers the previous law and also covers the exceptional cases, only then will we abandon our previous law. In the same way, when the ancients considered imperfect induction invalid, they abandoned it in practice. Today, too, they say imperfect induction is invalid, but as long as we have not found perfect induction, we cannot abandon our imperfect induction. One of these cases is network definitions. Network definitions are also circular, and the ancients said that a circular definition is invalid. Today, too, they say: Yes! It is invalid. But since we have no other definition, there is no alternative. Because we have no non-circular definition that serves our purpose, we make do with these very circular definitions. For instance, in systems of thought, definitions are generally circular. You cannot define the foundations of Marxism without recourse to circularity. Just as the main concepts of Islam cannot be defined without committing circularity.

Look at the books of Izutsu. The definitions he derives from the Quran are all network definitions. In the definition of taqwa, one must include the definition of iman. And in the definition of iman, one must include the definition of taqwa. When these networks emerge, they truly advance us in knowledge, even though the definition of each part of the network is carried out by means of the other parts of the network, and the definitions of the other parts of this network are also carried out by means of this part.

Quine greatly valued these network definitions and said we have no choice but to have network definitions, even though they are theoretically circular. Similar to network definitions are holistic definitions. In holistic definitions, when we are unable to define a part, we consider it as part of a whole and define this part by relying on the other parts of that whole. For example, we might not be able to define a minister. We consider a larger whole called a ministry, then we define the minister by resorting to the other members of the ministry and say the minister is the human member of the ministry who takes orders from no one in the ministry. Or we define a class monitor. First, we consider a whole called a class—of course, I do not mean a classroom, but rather the English word 'class.' Since we translate both the same way, we consider the monitor as a subset of the class and say the monitor is the human member of the class who, within that whole, bears the responsibility of supervising the other members. These are called holistic definitions. These definitions are widely used in applied sciences. That is, in disciplines that are, in my view, precisely techniques, not sciences—like medicine or management, which are techniques, not sciences. However, physiology is a science, anatomy, hematology, and neurology are sciences. Psychology, sociology, and economics are also sciences. But management uses these to steer a group toward a specific goal. In disciplines that have an applied aspect, meaning they are techniques and not sciences, these types of definitions are very commonly used.

*Some Points Regarding Definition

Definability and Undefinability

These were the seventeen types of conceptual definitions. Regarding definitions—whether definitions pertaining to words, definitions pertaining to external concrete objects, or the recent seventeen types pertaining to concepts—there is a point: is everything definable or not? There are three views on this matter. One is whether everything—by 'thing' I mean broadly words, external concrete objects, and concepts—is definable or not. Here, there are three positions. The first position is that everything is definable. The next position is that nothing is definable. Another position is that some things are definable and some things are not definable.

The Truth Value of Definitions

The second discussion is whether definitions have truth value or not. That is, can definitions be attributed as true or false, and can we say this definition is a true definition and that definition is a false definition? Many believe that definitions do not have truth value, and I also believe this. Why? Because I believe truth and falsehood can be attributed to propositions, and definitions are not propositions. In other words, truth and falsehood can be attributed to judgments, but definitions do not give us judgment; they give us conception, and conception cannot bear truth or falsehood; rather, judgment can bear truth or falsehood.

The Coextensiveness of Some Types of Definitions

The third discussion is whether the various types we mentioned for definition are coextensive with one another or not. That is, can a definition, from among the definitions we mentioned, be an instance of types three and five? Or an instance of types eight and eleven? The answer is yes, and these types are not mutually exclusive.

The Place of Definition

The next discussion is whether definitions should come at the beginning of the work or at the end. Here, there are two views. One view says definitions should come at the beginning of the work, and the other view says definitions should come at the end of the work. I myself believe definitions should come at the beginning of the work and not at the end. When I say 'work,' I mean broadly study, research, and teaching.

The Virtue of Brevity in Definition

Another discussion is whether definitions must be concise or whether conciseness is not the art of definition. Is being brief the essence of definition? Or is it not necessary for a definition to be concise and can it be lengthy? The prevailing view is that conciseness is the art of definition and the most concise form of definition is the best type of definition.

Tautological and Analytical Definition

Another discussion is whether a definition is tautological? And is a definition a tautology or not? Some say every definition is a tautology. But some say there are definitions that are definitions, but are not tautological.

The Usefulness or Harmfulness of Definition

The final discussion is whether definition is a useful endeavor or not? Many have said that definition is not useful at all, and incidentally, these are the same people who say that definers are pedantic or pedantic. That is, everything is clear enough for us to talk to each other. But I believe definitions are entirely useful, indeed, they are necessary.

The Definability of Definition Itself

Do you remember the first discussion, where I said some claimed everything is definable, some claimed nothing is definable, and some claimed some things are definable and some things are not? But is definition itself definable? Is definition itself capable of being defined? It seems that definition itself is not definable, and this is certain. Suppose you tell me to define definition. I then provide a definition. But as soon as you want to reject it, I say, why do you want to reject it? Do you even know what definition is, that you would reject my definition by referring to it? Suppose you do not know what the definition of definition is; then you must accept any definition of definition that I offer. This is why some philosophers of science have said that at least definition itself is indefinable.

Question: Meaning that definition itself cannot be defined, but it defines other things? Like God, who cannot be known, but through whom other things are known?

Answer: Yes. Except that discussion pertains to ontology, and this discussion pertains to epistemology.

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Audio file of "The Seventeen Types of Conceptual Definition"

PDF file of "The Seventeen Types of Conceptual Definition"

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