Theoretical Foundations of Human Rights

Human rights occupy a monumental place in the historical trajectory of human thought. It can be boldly claimed that no text in the contemporary era has generated such convergence and consensus around adherence to itself, and one can scarcely find a tablet that has articulated such simple, clear, explicit, and distinct principles for the protection of the beloved peace of humanity.

But what is this nobility that prioritizes the value of a human being over the acquisition of their soil? What is this resolve that sees truth not as its own, but as akin to itself, and what is this detachment that deems what it denies itself as impermissible for others?

To answer the above questions, which triumphantly raise the banner of human rights atop the peaks of human thought, one must know what a right is, how it becomes manifest, and what constitutes it.

The Concept of Right

Right and rights have been used in various senses, such as social regulations (law), reward and wages (salary), and human right (right). When we speak of human rights, we mean the latter sense of right and rights. In fact, the meaning of this right is the inherent dominion of a human being over another, a degree of ownership and authority, an individual and collective privilege that the law grants to the individual, and through which the individual can impose their will on others in their social relations and oblige them to observe these minimums. Fundamental human rights, that is, the rights upon which the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is founded, have several characteristics:

• These rights are fundamental, meaning they are a prerequisite for the enjoyment of other human rights.
• These rights are individual, and their point of departure is respect for the individual, differing from law, which can be repressive and collective.
• These rights are minimal, meaning that all the pillars and relations for life in human societies do not emerge from them; rather, they oversee the manner in which society itself is formed.
• These rights are absolute; the purpose of these rights is the human being, so as long as the human being (in its most general sense) benefits from them, they hold authority for humans.

Fundamental human rights are of several types: The right to liberty: guaranteed will, freedom in its broadest form, but not only for oneself, but for all human beings. The right to immunity: guaranteed possessions (life, property, etc.) based on the mere fact of having them. The right to power: the guaranteed legitimacy of a political system based on the participation of all citizens in its creation and direction.

In fact, it is through the observance of such minimal yet fundamental rights that other rights among humans, such as contractual rights, find the opportunity to be honored, and the foundations of an authentic and dignified human life are built.

But how do fundamental human rights become manifest? In the history of ideas, three types of defense of the theory of fundamental rights have been proposed: the "social contract" theory of Hobbes-Locke, the "moral duty" theory of Kant-Rawls, and the theory of "absolute divine goodness." To reason about the third part, that is, the theory of absolute divine goodness, we will remain faithful to the substance of human rights and will not enter into theological discussions specific to particular religions (despite knowing that at least the Abrahamic religions share a common foundation). Instead, we will consider God in the broadest sense and the human being in its most general form, and examine the relationship that the absolute goodness of God necessitates for human society.

Social Contract:

Consider a situation in which three things are absent: valid law, a power to protect the laws, and an impartial judge. Let us call this situation the "state of nature." It is obvious that in the state of nature, everything is permitted; everyone rises against everyone else; sometimes theft is permitted if it benefits me; sometimes killing is permitted if my feelings have been hurt. Ultimately, this situation leads to a war of all against all. It is obvious that this situation is "natural, but not rational." A rational individual sees this situation and desires those three missing things, knowing that they can only be achieved through government, that is, a construct that is "rational but unnatural." The government desired by the rational individual has a fundamental and general law:

همه دارند بر علیه هم می جنگند، پس عقلانیست که بخواهیم برای بشریت در همه حال حافظ صلح باشیم. برای حفاظت از صلح، از پاره ای اعمال ارادی که قبلاً آنها را انجام میدادی درگذر، اگر دیگران نیز حاضر باشند همانند تو، دست بدان اعمال نزنند. پس حق از منظر هابز، همان سلسله اختیارات و داشته هاییست که انسان در گسترده ترین حالت می تواند از آنها برخوردار باشد. این توافق همه انسان ها برای حفظ صلح بشری در وضعیت طبیعی و نخستین خواهد بود و نه بیشتر از آن! در واقع هیچ کس دوست ندارد بمیرد، پس چرا زندگی حق همه انسان ها نباشد؟ هیچ کس دوست ندارد مالش مورد دستبرد واقع شود، پس چرا صیانت از اموال حق انسان نباشد؟ هیچ کس دوست ندارد اراده او را دیگران جهت دهند، پس چرا آزادی حق اساسی برای زندگی توام با صلح در این کره خاکی نباشد؟

تکلیف اخلاقی:

کانت می دانست که جوامع مختلف اصول اخلاقی مختلفی دارند، برخی کاری را درست دانسته و برخی نادرست می دانند. این شهود زمانی اهمیت می یابد که اراده شخصی یا ملتی در تعارض با اراده دیگر اشخاص یا ملت ها قرار گیرد تا آنچه را از صلح باقیست، یک شبه بر باد دهد. پس کانت یک نگاه به تفاوت ها داشت و چون صلح انسانی دغدغه ی راستین او بود، او را ناچار می کرد به جستجوی شباهت های جوامع و انسان ها با نظام های اخلاقی مختلف باشد. در واقع کانت در پی آن بود که ببیند می تواند از دل این احکام و ارزش های متفاوت، یک بن-مایه ی مشخص و مشترک استخراج کند که خود منبع و مرجعی برای داوری در مورد اخلاقی بودن سایر احکام باشد یا نه؟ جواب کانت به این سوال مثبت و آن بن مایه مشخص از نظر او مفهوم "حسن نیت و اراده ی خیر(good will) " است. این عقل است که اراده خیر را درون ما ایجاد می کند و آن را برای تمامی اعمال در تمامی زمان ها پوششی اخلاقی می پوشاند. در واقع اراده خیر، همان عزم نسبت به ادای "تکلیف اخلاقی" است. مشخص است که تکلیف با تمایل متفاوت است؛ چرا که انجام کاری زمانی از روی تکلیف و اخلاقی است که هدفی به جز خود تکلیف نداشته باشد، در صورتی که ضرورت تمایل، معمولا در خارج از ما و اراده ی خیر ما قرار دارد. بگذارید مثالی بزنم : مسئول دانشگاهی را در نظر آورید که با دانشجو خوش برخورد است، اگر این خوش برخوردی از روی ادای تکلیف باشد، قائم به هیچ نفع و نتیجه و پاداشی نیست، یعنی او با دانشجو برخورد خوبی دارد، چون باید با دانشجو خوب برخورد کرد. (نفس اخلاقی بودن عمل او در خود عمل نهفته است). اما در صورتی که از این خوش برخوردی اضافه حقوقی دریافت کند، این خوشبرخوردی او دیگر ارزشی اخلاقی ندارد چرا که هدف او انجام تکلیف اخلاقی خویش نیست، بلکه ارضای تمایل او نسبت به کسب یک مشت پول بیشتر است. پس تا اینجا حد و حدود اخلاقی بودن از نظر کانت مشخص شد، چیز دیگری که مشخص است این است که کانت از اخلاق شروع می کند و به حقوق ختم می کند، یعنی راه رسیدن به حق، از تکلیف اخلاقی می گذرد. اما این ادای تکلیف اخلاقی چگونه می تواند نمودی عینی بیابد؟ به گونه ای که همه بتوانند به طور بسیار مشخص آن را مراعات کرده و بر مبنای آن اخلاقی بودن یا نبودن کاری را داوری کنند؟ رمز این رابطه در فلسفه اخلاق کانت در مفهوم "حرمت و احترام (respect)" نهفته است. احترام به یک چیز، نه تمایل به آن است، نه عدم تمایل به آن. این احساس احترام چیزیست که طوفان های زمانه و تمایلات شخصی و سیاسی هیچ اثری بر آن نمی گذارد و جزئی جدانشدنی از اراده کسی است که در پی امر اخلاقی و ادای تکلیف است. احترام احساسی است بی غرض که در آن نه مدح است نه ذم، نه ترس است نه تهور، نه مستوجب پاداش است نه مستلزم تاوان، ما حتی با احترام به کسی او را تحسین نمی کنیم، بلکه احترام به او از این جهت است که او را نیز تابع تکلیفی اخلاقی می یابیم و در اراده خیر با او مشترکیم. در واقع صرفاً به علت انسان بودن او، زنده بودن او و اراده او در پیگیری امر نیک و خیر است که به او احترام می گذاریم و این احترام، در واقع احترام به خود ماست، چرا که ما نیز در همه این ها با هم مشترکیم، همه ما انسانیم. لازمه اخلاقی بودن جهان یا جوامع انسانی، کلیت دادن به قانون عمومی اخلاقی یا همان احترام است. به عبارت دیگر نمی توان جامعه ای، یا جهانی داشت که بی احترامی نسبت به انسان فراگیر است و نام آن را مدینه فاضله انسانی نهاد. پس ضرورت وجوب احترام در کلیت دادن به آن است، پس :

Always act in such a way that you would want the maxim of your action to become a universal law, so that humanity is the end of your action, not merely a means to your end.

In fact, one must not act in such a way that lying, stealing, breaking confidences, killing people, etc., become permissible, because this would be tantamount to prescribing the same for such horrific acts to be committed against ourselves, since we would be challenging the will directed toward the common human good. In fact, from such duties, which have one regard for human dignity and another for human peace, "right" is born:

Every moral duty brings with it rights.

If I must not take anyone's life, this moral duty of mine, based on the universal moral law, gives rise to a right for all human beings, and that is the "right to life." If I must not plunder the property of others, I have, in fact, granted others the right to livelihood and the immunity of ownership. Here, two types of imperatives must be distinguished:

Hypothetical imperatives: These are imperatives whose end lies outside the imperative itself. The form of these imperatives is: If . . . you ought to . . . . For example: You ought to take the plane! Naturally, the reason why accompanies it, so the above imperative is conditioned by the proposition if you want to reach your destination faster. Categorical imperatives: These are imperatives whose end is inherent in the imperative itself. The form of these imperatives is: You ought to . . . . For example: You ought to respect human life! The reason why for this imperative is inherent in the imperative itself: respect for the human being. In other words, in these imperatives, the human being is both the moral agent and the moral end. Human rights are an accompaniment to categorical duties. Therefore, they are for human societies with human moral agents and have no end other than the human being and respect for him. Another practical way to eliminate any form of discrimination is the use of the concept of the veil of ignorance (curtain of veil) in John Rawls's philosophical system. Suppose you are disembodied, formless souls and have not yet been born, but you want to legislate for your life after birth before being born. You cannot say that black people should be deprived of certain rights, because after birth you might become black; you cannot want the rights of women to be trampled upon in relation to men, because with a fifty percent probability, you yourself might be of the female gender after birth. Thus, the veil of ignorance guides us to the two principles (maxim) of liberty and equality, both of which are the essence of fundamental human rights.

The Absolute Goodness of the Divine:

God is absolute goodness; it is far from absolute goodness that goodness would not flow and permeate throughout all of creation and His system of creation. In other words, an absolutely good and absolutely benevolent being creates good creatures through good means. But how can the existence of so much evil and ugliness in this world be explained? Why is the capacity for evil in human beings so high? Are we not the artifacts of an entirely good Creator? So how is it that from an entirely good being, an ugly-natured artifact has been created? There is no choice but to say that within this human will and freedom, from which ugliness and harshness also sprout, a "good" is hidden that would not exist in its absence. In fact, freedom is something good, and the human being is the god of their own actions, a god not entirely good. Therefore, God considers human freedom good, regardless of the good it brings forth or the evil it produces. It is up to human beings to safeguard it and consider it good. Thus:

God created all human beings equal and granted them a will directed toward good things. This inherent goodness within the human being must never be challenged, for that is the very essence of evil. To challenge the human being and their will is to oppose the goodness of God.

It is evident that by surveying the scriptures of the Abrahamic religions, one can also find strong theological support for the above ideal. Just as the classical thought of human rights was an outcome of the individualistic Lutheran-Christian ethics that illuminated the path for the humanist pioneers of 18th-century Europe. What has been expressed is a glimpse of the unrewarded and unthanked striving of thinkers who, over thousands of years, have smoothed the arduous and undulating path toward perpetual human peace and pointed the way to its followers. May its pure mantle be protected from the dust of conventional political ignorance, the inevitable dogmatism of culture, and the accepted historical deviations, and may it shine brightly upon the preambles of the laws of all the world's countries, especially those afflicted by despotism.

=================================================== References: 1- Universal Declaration of Human Rights 2- Kant's Critical Philosophy, Dr. Karim Mojtahedi 3- Leviathan, Hobbes, Ney Publishing 4- Second Treatise of Government, John Locke, translated by Shahram Arshadnejad