What Remains of Shariati's Legacy?

The subject of this talk is an attempt to find a provisional (and every answer is provisional) and, as far as possible, fair answer to this question: “What remains of Shariati’s legacy in our time?” By Shariati’s legacy, I mean all the authentic written or transcribed works of his that are available to us today, and by remaining, I mean whether Shariati’s views, methods, approaches, and problems still serve to untangle that aspect of our practical difficulties which is rooted in theoretical problems, or whether his views, methods, approaches, and problems have today, entirely or to a very great extent, taken on the color of obsolescence, ineffectuality, and belonging to a bygone era, and no longer serve any purpose other than for the history of thought. Undoubtedly, this question is, firstly, a reaction to the words of those who have decreed the end of Shariati’s era (and this is the passive aspect of this question), and on the other hand, it arises from the necessity of epochal questioning (and this is the active aspect of this question). By “the necessity of epochal questioning,” I mean that any question which does not serve to solve our practical problems in our own time is an instance of knowledge that does not benefit, and the wise person is one who—and in the words of Imam Ali in the Sermon of the Pious, the devout person as well—devotes their ear to hearing beneficial knowledge (wa waqafū asmā‘ahum ‘alā al-‘ilm al-nāfi‘ lahum) and seeks refuge in God from useless knowledge. Thus, we refer to the views of any person through the lens of our own epoch and its needs, and we take provisions from them for solving practical problems whose solution requires theoretical insight. Now we wish to know whether there still exists, in Shariati’s views, methods, approaches, and problems, something path-opening, insight-giving, and inspiring for untying the knots of theoretical problems whose resolution aids in solving our practical difficulties. Before attempting to answer this question, a necessary and essential preamble is required, and that preamble is that philosophical epistemology and anthropology teach us that every human being is a child of their own time, and their understanding of themselves, the world, God, and other human beings draws sustenance from the axioms of the era in which they live. Every understanding is temporally and spatially bound, and an understanding that is, through and through, purified of the lived time and lived space of the understander and the axioms of their epoch does not exist, and if it did, it would not be a human understanding. Incidentally, this scientific achievement of humanity, which some have considered heretical, is, from a religious perspective, precisely the negative aspect of Tawhid (lā ilāha). That is, that aspect of Tawhid which says that the human being is not God, meaning the Absolute, and all human attachments of the human being are also not God, and all are condemned and destined to limitation, and this decree includes human thoughts as well. Philosophical reflection has now placed at our disposal the reason why human views and findings are not absolute, and has set a seal of confirmation upon the negative aspect of the doctrine of Tawhid. Thinkers can ultimately enter into a critical dialogue with the axioms of their time and subject them to critique, but one who is absolutely, or to a great extent, unaffected by their own day and age will not be called a thinker. Therefore, being influenced by one’s time is not, in itself, a sign of deficiency in a thinker’s work; rather, the deficiency can lie where an individual accepts or rejects the axioms of the time and the commonplaces of their era without hesitation and critique. Now, keeping this preamble in mind, we say that Shariati is by no means an exception to this rule, nor can he be, and like any other human being, his views, method, approach, and problems are influenced by the axioms of the time, era, and place of his life. So, if today we live in a different era, or at least our era is not entirely identical to his (and the latter is more accurate), and this era has brought us other axioms, methods, approaches, and problems, it is no wonder that when reading Shariati’s works and legacy, we do not feel the affinity that those present at Hosseiniyeh Ershad in the forties and fifties [1960s and 1970s] and the readers of his works in that era felt with him. Now, in light of these explanations, we can reconstruct our initially posed question as follows: In our era, which is different from Shariati’s era, or at least not entirely identical to it, do there still exist concerns and problems that also existed in Shariati’s time? The answer to this question appears to be affirmative. The second question: Can Shariati’s answers addressing these concerns and problems common to us and his era still be illuminating, insight-giving, and inspiring for us? Also, is his method of dealing with these common problems still defensible? The answer to these two questions also appears to be affirmative to some extent. What will be said from this point onward is a very concise and cursory attempt to illustrate those shared concerns and issues, and to demonstrate instances of the claim that Shariati's answers and his concerns are probably still illuminating and inspiring for us. Shariati himself divided his collected works into three sections: Islamology (Islamiyat), Social Studies (Ejtemaiyat), and Desert Writings (Kaviriyat). We begin with the Desert Writings. In the Kaviriyat, Shariati primarily addresses the existential and inner, mystical aspect of human existence. In this category of his writings, he is influenced by Islamic mysticism and the philosophy of existentialism; he himself had said that he is a mystical existentialist, and of course, his work is not devoid of conceptual and substantive innovations. The main concern in these writings, which are penned in a magical and enchanting prose, is the deep human pains that are always and in every era the companion and confidant of the introspective and self-examining human: What can eliminate the anxiety and dread of living? What is the meaning of life? How can one put an end to loneliness? What brings felicity? Who am I? And in this abode of desolation, what is to be done and to whom/what should one turn for refuge? Does Shariati's Kaviriyat still have something to say now? The answer seems to be positive. Shariati's Desert Writings can still be a source of inspiration for those grappling with such existential questions. One can disagree with the answers. One might even say that Shariati does not provide answers but rather pours oil on the fire of questions, intensifying its sparks and flames, and in this way, with the language of silence, says that in this realm, "the going is the arriving." But whatever the case may be, his Kaviriyat is an inspiring source for the existential concerns of the wayfarers in this realm. Now we arrive at the Social Studies. Shariati's views on this subject can be divided into two parts: the negative and the affirmative. Shariati's overarching concern in the Social Studies is attention to modernity, its complications, and our relationship with it. Shariati had astutely realized that the most important social event that has occurred for us Iranians in the last one hundred and fifty years is the arrival of modernity and modernization in Iran. He had well understood, and living in Europe had further impressed this upon his eyes and heart, that the world's terrain has changed and a new era has begun. This era, although bearing some similarities to the age of ancient Greece, resembles no other age. On the other hand, he had realized that we Iranians had played no role in the formation of this immense transformation. We Iranians have been on a historical holiday for several centuries, and now that we are gradually returning from this holiday, we see that the immense transformation, by the force it possesses, imposing its mark on everything and everywhere, is crashing down upon us and submerging us, with our ancient history and tradition, within itself. What is to be done? On the other hand, we are confronted with our ancient national and religious heritage, with which many Iranians still live and have no intention of parting with today or tomorrow, and this newly arrived, uninvited guest, namely modernity, is coming like a flood, uprooting and carrying away. In this foundation-destroying flood of modernity, are there things worth preserving? If the answer is yes, can those things be preserved against the tempest of modernity? By what method? At what cost? It can be boldly said that this problem of Shariati's is still, with full force, our problem as well, and our thinkers are still trying to find an answer and a way. In response to the aforementioned question, Shariati, with his own understanding of it, considered religion a valuable heritage within tradition that must be preserved in the flood of modernity. (In the explanation of the Islamology section, we will briefly explain his understanding of religion). In the negative part of the Social Studies, Shariati critiques modernity and tries to bring to light what he considered the destructive fragments of modernity. For example, some of his critical views on the consequences of the modern age include: the critique of scientism, i.e., the notion that modern science is the solution to all human problems; the critique of assimilation, i.e., the attempt of modern civilization to mass-produce a standardized human being for the modern age and the new West, and to absorb and dissolve all cultural differences and diversities of non-modern societies under the pretext of progress and modernization; the critique of colonialism, the exploitation of the material and human resources of backward countries under the pretext of developing their lands and granting them the blessings of the modern age; the critique of alienation; the critique of the materialist schools of the modern age and the emphasis on the point that the materialist schools of the modern age, which ignore the boundless, truth-seeking dimension of human existence, do not bring inner happiness to humanity; the critique of capitalism, which, through the expansion of consumerism, the rule of money and wealth, the growth of the rich class, and the deepening of the gap between rich and poor, increasingly undermines social justice; the critique of the individualism of the modern age, which leads to egoism and self-centeredness; the critique of the nihilism latent in the modern age, which is rooted in the negation of the Absolute, and following this negation, humanity itself could not take the place of God, and Nietzsche's Übermensch, who was supposed to replace God, turned out to be a straw man, and as a result, the world became empty for human beings. In his critiques of modernity, Shariati is influenced by a mystical, monotheistic perspective and also by leftist, mostly socialist, thought. By constructing a synthesis of monotheistic mysticism and leftist thought, he critiqued modernity and its consequences. Shariati's critiques of modernity, even with the end of the global dominance of the left over the intellectual sphere, remain alive and relevant. Although his economic views seem less defensible today, his critiques of the anthropological and socio-political consequences of the emergence of the modern age remain alive and, with new formulations, are defensible. Today, neoliberals and neo-Marxists powerfully raise and pursue similar critiques. In Shariati's view, for our society to witness individual and social well-being and happiness, it needs modernity, but an endogenous modernity, not an imported and exogenous one. A modernity that emerges from within tradition, because the possibilities of tradition have not yet been exhausted. This insight of Shariati is now, in various forms, endorsed by many Iranian intellectuals, both religious and non-religious. For example, Soroush, based on his understanding of Iranian society, firmly believes that if modernity is to take root in Iran, it must certainly become clear to Iranian society that it will not conflict with religion and religiosity. Dr. Tabatabai believes that the cause of our backwardness is the rigidity of tradition, and injecting imported modernity into the body of our dead and frozen tradition—something he believes even religious intellectuals do—does not help to renew Iran. Dr. Abbas Milani also believes that traces of Iranian modernity existed in the works of our poets and sages, such as Ferdowsi and Saadi, and they can be used to build an Iranian modernity, and Dr. Mirfetros believes that the seeds of Iranian modernity exist in pre-Islamic wisdom. The common point among all these views is the emphasis on the point that modernity in contemporary Iran must spring from within Iranian tradition, and exogenous modernity will not contribute to Iran's well-being; rather, like Reza Khan's attempts at imported and exogenous modernization of Iran, it will be met with fundamentalist and reactionary responses and will further delay efforts to modernize Iran. And now, Islamiyat. In the negative aspect of his Islamiyat, Shariati critiques religion. But his difference from non-religious intellectuals in this matter is that by separating religion from religious understanding, he critiques religious understanding and considers religion itself to be authentic, absolute, and unchangeable. In this way, he separates his path from non-religious intellectuals, and on the other hand, by permitting the critique of religious understanding, he also separates his path from traditional believers, for whom historical understandings are sacred. For an example of the separation between religion and religious understanding in his works, read: "Revelation, the collection of what has been sent down, is a fixed, scientific, and unchangeable reality, and it is our knowledge of this reality of the Quran and our type of perception, understanding, interpretation, action, practice, and propagation that must evolve and develop according to the evolution and change of humanity and the differences in the conditions of systems and needs" (M.A. 7/ p. 179). This separation, which gave legitimacy to religious intellectualism because it preserved both the critical aspect of religious intellectualism—critique being an essential component of intellectualism—and its religious nature, was later pursued by other religious intellectuals, such as Abdolkarim Soroush, and took on a more theoretical form. Soroush has acknowledged his debt to Shariati in his theory known as the “Theoretical Contraction and Expansion of the Sharia,” which results in the separation of religion from religious understanding: Shariati, in his critique of the common understanding of religion—which in his view is the understanding of the clergy and the official custodians of religion—distinguishes between liberating Islam and Islam that stifles liberation. Now, by explaining liberating Islam, we enter the affirmative part of Shariati's Islamology. Liberating Islam is an Islam that places complete emphasis on Tawhid (monotheism). In Shariati's view, Islam truly has but one principle, and that is Tawhid. Based on his particular method, Shariati extracts Tawhid from being a philosophical, abstract, and theoretical principle—that God is one and not two, and that philosophical proofs are then brought to establish it, and one must believe in it or else be an infidel. In his view, Tawhid is first posed in the realm of social objectivity. From this perspective, Tawhid, in his view, means that no one should worship anyone else, because worship is exclusively reserved for God. Tawhid means that no one should fear anyone, because everyone's destiny is in God's hands. Tawhid means that no individual has preference over another, no group over another group, and no class over another class, because all are from one father and mother. Tawhid means that no power, in the name of political, spiritual, or economic power, should dominate, because all powers and governments, in all their forms, belong exclusively to God. In a word, Tawhid, in his view, means that no human being, under any pretext, has the right to act as God in the realm of politics and society; and acting as God means absolutizing oneself, one's group, and one's idea. And nothing but despotism is extracted from this absolutism. In his effort to indigenize modernity, Shariati gives a religious hue to the struggle for freedom and against despotism, which until then had a non-religious leftist color, and his interpretation of Tawhid is the guiding principle for this endeavor. His understanding of Tawhid clearly differs from the Tawhidology of traditional believers. They never considered despotism to be practical polytheism (shirk) and unbelief (kufr) (the late Naini is an exception in this regard). Their monotheistic sensitivities manifested, for example, in declaring the mystical notion of "Unity of Being" (Wahdat al-Wujud) to be non-monotheistic, and in its Sunni narrative, in deeming the Shiite practice of visiting the graves of the Imams to be non-monotheistic. Their understanding of Tawhid and instances of shirk was confined to these limits, and remains so. Shariati transformed the principle of Tawhid from an abstract principle—which, whenever it entered society, manifested in the form of fatalism, submission to destiny, intensification of sectarian differences, and deepening of ossification—into an anti-oppression, anti-despotic, and progressive principle, and he was, of course, influenced by Iqbal Lahori in this conception. In his understanding of Islam, Shariati emphasized the understanding of the Quran and the history of Islam—that is, the very two aspects that were, and are, absent from the traditional understanding of Islam. It can be boldly claimed that the general principles of his Islamology, consistent with the understanding briefly expressed here, can still serve as a guide and illuminator for those who wish to remain Muslims but have also accepted the legitimacy of the new age, even with an uncritical approach. Today, too, we, just as in Shariati's time, are confronted with an understanding of religion that stifles liberation, and modernity in the age of globalization continues to absorb non-Western worlds, and our problem is still Shariati's problem, and his answers, to a large extent, with a new exposition and re-reading, remain illuminating and inspiring for us. .

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Author: Yaser Mirdamadi

Published in Ham-Mihan newspaper

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