A Philosophical Analysis of 'the Believer's Understanding', Not the Essence of Religion

Farhang-e Emrooz: Rasoul Rasoulipour is the dean of the Faculty of Literature and Humanities at Kharazmi University. He holds a PhD in Philosophy of Religion from the University of Pune, India, and a postdoctoral degree from the Center for Philosophy of Religion at the University of Notre Dame, Indiana, USA. He teaches in the fields of old and new theology (kalam), philosophy of religion, logic (classical and mathematical), Christian theology, etc., and during his study period at the University of Oxford, England, he collaborated with Professor Richard Swinburne, and from 2007 to 2010 in America, he conducted studies with Professor Alvin Plantinga, one of the renowned figures in Christian philosophy and theology.

* One of the criticisms raised against the philosophy of religion is that this discipline is fundamentally unconcerned with religious devotion and was originally an engagement of the modern world with Christianity. Therefore, it is not an issue for our country. Do you agree with this view or not?

Any judgment about the state of the philosophy of religion in the country goes back to our familiarity with its definition—what the philosophy of religion actually is. Based on our definition, we can then say what its current state in our country is like. Is it good or bad? Should it exist or not? You see, there is initially a difference between the philosophy of religion and new theology (kalam-e jadid). What has been proposed in our country from the beginning, and raised by intellectuals like Mr. Abdolkarim Soroush, were discussions under the title of new theology. In other words, it was a kind of new problematics in the realm of beliefs and responding to new issues, which led to the formation of new theology. The definition of new theology goes back to the definition of theology itself, which is "the defense of religious teachings." If this theology is philosophical, it is a rational defense of religious teachings, and if it is transmitted (naqli), it is a narrative defense of religious teachings; that is, a theologian is very simply defined as a defender. A theologian means someone who is a defender of religious beliefs.

But the philosophy of religion is completely different. The philosophy of religion is the philosophical analysis of a phenomenon called religion, in which we do not have that qualification of defense or the condition of defense. In theology, we do; that is, someone called a theologian is typically seeking and striving, whether rationally or through transmitted sources, to defend religious teachings. But in the philosophy of religion, no.

We have second-order knowledges that take a historical and methodological look at a series of human sciences and examine their ends. These three are, in fact, considered the foundations of the philosophy of science. The philosophy of religion is one of these branches of second-order knowledge or Meta Science. Instead of coming into the realm of first-order knowledge and talking about the teachings, we ask: a phenomenon called religion, with these teachings and in this manner, what is it after? And we analyze whether it has been successful in its goals or not? Are its methods sound or are they flawed? And what has happened to it in history?

The first book I remember being translated in this field in the country and gaining attention was John Hick’s Philosophy of Religion, translated by Mr. Behzad Saleki in 1992. This book was a turning point for entering into the discussions of philosophy of religion. We had an experience of new theology (kalām-e jadid), which in the theological tradition we call familiarity with new doubts and responding to new doubts—the task of the new theologian. But someone who is a philosopher of religion comes and philosophically analyzes the phenomenon called religion, examines its strengths and weaknesses, investigates the reasons for and against it, and does not aim at defending it or making their inquiry conditional on ultimately leading to religiosity or the consolidation of religious beliefs. The discipline of philosophy of religion is ‘unconditional’ (lā be-sharṭ) as to whether religion is consolidated, its foundations strengthened or not. In any case, the conditions in our country are somewhat mixed; that is, in classes called new theology, we teach philosophy of religion, and in classes called philosophy of religion, we teach new theology.

* Of course, there are many shared subjects and issues between them.

Yes, there are shared subjects, but the goal is different. If the course title is, for example, ‘Examining New Theological Issues,’ the ultimate aim of that class is to answer and defend against all the new issues that have been challenging for religious doctrines. But if it is a philosophy of religion class, the challenges are examined, the reasons of religious believers and adherents are also examined, and the professor likely presents the strengths and weaknesses that exist or the reasons that have been raised against these reasons, but in no way considers themselves committed to proving, at the end of that discussion, a doctrine such as theism, prophethood, or the necessity of a doctrine called the resurrection.

* Dr., one of the groups opposing philosophy of religion holds the view that engaging in philosophy of religion is playing on the field of modernity; that is, they say the approach of philosophy of religion, from the angle that religion becomes an object and we interrogate it, belongs to modern thought. Do you accept such a view?

This again goes back to what we mean by religion—that is, what our definition of religion is in the phrase ‘philosophy of religion.’ Look, when we say philosophy of religion, we mean the philosophical analysis of religious knowledge. We do not come to philosophically analyze religion itself or the essence of religion. So if something has been objectified, it is religious knowledge (as one of the disciplines of the humanities); that is, it is considered as one of the forms of knowledge that has circulated among humans. There is physics, and we have philosophy of physics. There is mathematics, and we have philosophy of mathematics. We also have a discipline in the humanities under the title of religious knowledge; that is, a set of religious teachings that have taken the form of knowledge and science and are discussed in universities and higher education institutions. So we are not discussing religion; we are examining the knowledge of Allameh Tabatabai, the knowledge of Mulla Sadra, the knowledge of John Hick, the knowledge of Aquinas, and so on.

* So when we say religion, we do not mean revealed religion, nor realized religion, but merely our understanding of religion?

Yes, that is, we examine the prevalent understandings among theologians. For example, Mr. Swinburne, in proving the existence of God, has used natural signs or natural theology. In reality, we come to analyze natural theology, which is itself a human approach to the issue of theism and the use of human knowledge in proving the existence of God. Even if we discuss God, we are examining the knowledge of a certain philosopher, or the definition of a certain scholar, or the account of a certain scientist regarding God; we are not analyzing God Himself. From this perspective, they should not worry that we are playing on the field of modernity or turning religion into a plaything. We must either accept that religion is a form of knowledge that can be discussed in academies, or not. If we do not want to introduce it as an academic discipline into the university, that is a different matter. But as soon as you turn discussions under the titles of theology and Islamic studies, or Islamic philosophy and wisdom, or Islamic theology into an academic discipline, the nature of the university is to examine the theories that have been presented. In truth, philosophy of religion is the philosophical analysis of the believer’s understanding of religious doctrines.

* Is it necessary for philosophers of religion themselves to have an inclination toward or an understanding of religion; that is, to have tasted the flavor of religion?

No, those who are skeptics or atheists philosophically analyze the beliefs and understanding of the faithful. For example, a person named Anthony Kenny is an agnostic. He was previously a Christian theologian and teacher, but became a skeptic. He philosophically analyzes a believer like Alvin Plantinga or Richard Swinburne and critiques their arguments for proving the existence of God or theism. It is not necessary for him to be a theist himself. When he analyzes, he cannot analyze atheists; he must analyze those who have a religious understanding.

* A group in the country has moved toward establishing discussions under the title of Islamic Philosophy of Religion. I want to ask you whether establishing such concepts is even appropriate and necessary?

Yes, in my opinion, there is no problem with it. Sometimes we discuss religion as a general phenomenon, for instance, what arguments theists have presented for proving the existence of God. We say, for example, Hinduism said this, Islam said that, and so on. At other times, we come to specifically philosophically analyze the doctrines of the religion of Islam and the understanding of the doctrines of the religion of Islam. Here, we are studying the Philosophy of the Islamic Religion. We have similar discussions at Oxford as well. Mr. Swinburne himself was the chair of the Philosophy of the Christian Religion. There is no problem with this. Sometimes you discuss it generally, and sometimes you say we want to philosophically analyze a specific religion like Judaism or Christianity, which becomes the Philosophy of the Christian Religion or the Philosophy of the Islamic Religion.

* One of the professors of philosophy of religion recently said that we have practically had nothing called philosophy of religion in the country until today. Whatever there has been, has been theology. Do you agree with this view?

He says we have not had philosophy of religion and have had theology. The correct way to put it is to say we have had kalām. Theology means the study of God, whereas we want to do philosophical analysis. We do philosophical analysis both in rational kalām and in philosophy of religion. However, there, we do philosophical analysis committed and conditioned on reinforcing beliefs; here, we do philosophical analysis unconditionally; it may happen, it may not. But in modern kalām, it has been made clear to the professor, the atmosphere, the syllabus, and the student that in this class, religious doctrines are meant to be reinforced. In my opinion, setting theology against philosophy of religion is not correct. If you want to use a term in opposition to philosophy of religion, you should use modern kalām. Perhaps what he meant was that we still do not have that free philosophical analysis in our country. Wherever we talk about miracles or religious experience, it must ultimately lead to strengthening theism. If this is the case, we can say that we are not philosophizing in the sense of the rational analysis of religion, but rather we are seeking to reinforce our religious belief foundations.

* A group is also upset with the results or outcomes of philosophy of religion; that is, they say the output of our universities in the field of philosophy of religion involves very serious skepticism or serious unanswered doubts; meaning this very philosophical approach you mention has been created to some extent, but ultimately, as believers, they have not been able to satisfy themselves. Therefore, the output of our universities in the field of philosophy of religion has become worrying. Do you consider this concern valid?

Those who are worried about the output of the philosophy of religion discipline were also worried about the philosophy discipline in the past. Essentially, the nature of philosophy qua philosophy is that you have untamed reason, you are free, you have no red lines in discussion, and you conduct rational analysis. If sufficient evidence is provided, you believe; if sufficient evidence is not provided, you do not believe. For this reason, those who have presuppositions do not find it pleasant for you to do philosophical work, because philosophical work is fundamentally not work conditioned and committed to theism. I think those who lament philosophy of religion today are the same ones who lamented the philosophy discipline yesterday.

* Regardless of the criticisms, what is your overall analysis of the atmosphere of philosophy of religion in the country?

I believe that we really do not yet have philosophy of religion in the country in that serious form. Because the professors who teach are all theists, or predominantly theists, and in fact they are teaching modern theology; that is, they raise the new issues, doubts, and challenges facing religion and answer them. They analyze less, and their aim is more to respond to those challenges.

Because they themselves have presuppositions, they do not philosophize; in class, they are mostly theologizing and defending. This is a reality in our society. I do not wish to make a value judgment; this is how the reality of our society is. Those who have said that we do not have philosophy of religion in its true sense are right, because the professors who teach here are theist professors. We do not allow an atheist professor to come and discuss. The professors who teach in our universities are, as a rule, religious professors and theists. For this reason, when this discussion is raised, they unconsciously move towards reinforcing those doctrines. So it can be said that the dominant atmosphere in our country is not that of philosophy of religion, but rather the atmosphere of propounding modern theology.

We are still very far from the wish of Martyr Motahhari that in the faculty of theology, Marxism be taught by a Marxist. The atmosphere of academies should be such that someone who does not believe in God, not as a faculty member, but at least in the form of a free-thinking chair, finds an opportunity and has a discussion. Let them come and say I do not believe in God and these are my reasons. For example, let them state the views of Freud, Nietzsche, Marx, Lenin, and Bach regarding religion, analyze them philosophically, present their own reasons, and on the other side, let someone come and critique those reasons; that is, to express the weakness of the reasons raised against religion, not that their aim be to prove God in that session. That becomes a discussion within the framework of philosophy of religion.

* A number of professors described the positive points of philosophy of religion as a common dialogue with the world and said that philosophy of religion can be a common language and a vehicle for a common dialogue with the world. Can such a thing be accepted?

If we are discussing academically, in the academy we have a standard language. Standard language means that all the disciplines taught are not disciplines that possess sanctity; rather, the possibility of their critique, scrutiny, refutation, and denial exists. This is the standard language of academies. If this is the case, we can analyze Christianity, Islam, Judaism, Eastern religions, or even human schools like liberalism and existentialism. This is that common language based on which we can engage with what is happening, for example, in a European, African, or another Asian country. But if, because we are Muslims, we are to discuss our own Islamic teachings as the true and superior religion, then our language will differ from the language of the academies.

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A Philosophical Analysis of 'the Believer's Understanding', Not the Essence of Religion

Farhang-e Emrooz's Conversation with Rasoul Rasoulipour

Source: Farhang-e Emrooz Monthly, Year 3, Issue 13, Mehr 1395 [October 2016]

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