Baruch Abroody's Article 'A Second Reflection on Ethics and Religion'

A Second Reflection on Ethics and Religion

Author: Baruch Abroody[1]

Translator: Hassan Miandari[2]

Source: Naqd va Nazar, 1377, Nos. 1 & 2

Many people believe that ethics, in one way or another, requires the support of religion. One of the many implications of this vague and ambiguous claim[3] is that there are certain moral truths that are true solely by virtue of the truth of certain religious truths. In particular, the truth of certain claims about the rightness (or wrongness) of a particular action depends on the truth of certain religious claims to the effect that God wants us to perform that action (or to refrain from performing it). This view, in principle, grounds certain parts of morality on the will of God. Philosophers have generally disagreed with such claims. And there is an argument (whose ancestor is an argument in the Euthyphro[4] [On Piety]) that has been advanced with the intention of demonstrating the invalidity of such claims. The line of reasoning goes like this: proponents of that claim have reversed the order of things. The rightness (or wrongness) of a particular action is not because God wants us to perform that action (or to refrain from performing it); rather, God wants us to perform that action (or to refrain from performing it) for another reason, which is the real reason for the rightness (or wrongness) of that action for us. For if the matter were as the proponents of the said claim depict it, moral truths would be based on the arbitrary wishes[5] of God concerning what we ought to do (or refrain from doing), and this is problematic. I wish to re-examine this issue and show that the matter is far more complex than philosophers have usually supposed. I want to show that: (a) the general argument presented in the Euthyphro is not as convincing as is commonly thought; and (b) when that religious claim is applied to specific moral issues, the Euthyphro argument becomes even less convincing. For claims concerning the will of God can be supplemented by other theological claims.

1

Let us begin with a closer examination of the argument. The argument in question can be formulated as follows: (1) Let us assume that act A is right (or wrong) solely because God wills that we perform it (or refrain from performing it). (2) This willing by God that we perform A (or refrain from performing it) must have a reason; a reason that does not itself involve God's willing that we perform A (or refrain from performing it). (3) Therefore, that reason must be the reason for the rightness (or wrongness) of A. (4) Hence we have a contradiction: (1) is false, and either there is no act that is right (or wrong) because God wills that we perform it (or refrain from performing it), or if such an act exists, God's willing it is not the sole reason for its rightness (or wrongness). What can be said in defense of (2)? The basic thought behind it seems to be this: if God wills that we perform A (or refrain from performing it) but has no reason for that willing independent of the act of willing itself, then His act of willing would be arbitrary, and this entails an imperfection in Him. But God is a perfect being; therefore, He must have a reason for willing that we perform A (or refrain from performing it), a reason independent of His willing. Now, it is not entirely clear that this reason is valid; for it is not obvious that performing an arbitrary act (even an arbitrary act of willing) entails an imperfection in the agent.[6] But let us set this issue aside for now and turn to the crucial step (3). It is clear that step (3) must be based on a principle similar to this[7]: (Transitivity) If P because of Q, and Q because of R, then P because of R. Two points should be noted about this principle. First, if we wish to use this principle in the context of our discussion, it must cover the various sorts of cases in which we say "because of." After all, there are considerable differences between cases where we make a claim of the form "A is right (or wrong) because God wills that we perform A (or refrain from performing it)" and cases where we make a claim of the form "God wills that we perform A (or refrain from performing it) because of R." For only in the latter type of case does "because of" express a reason for willing. The second point is that this principle has serious problems. Zayd might go home because his wife asked him to, and his wife might have asked him to go home because she wanted to go out with him; yet it is entirely possible that he does not go home because his wife wants to go out with him. Thus the principle needs modification, and it is not clear that it can be modified in a way that preserves the inference from (1) and (2) to (3). Nevertheless, let us assume that this can be done. Our argument also faces this difficulty: God's willing that we perform A (or refrain from performing A) is not the sole reason for the rightness (or wrongness) of that act; another part of the reason is that He is our Creator and we are obligated to obey Him. And when we consider this whole reason, the argument collapses. After all, the Euthyphro argument would then proceed as follows: (+1) Let us assume that act A is right (or wrong) solely because God wills that we perform it (or refrain from performing it) and He is our Creator and we are obligated to obey Him. (+2) This willing by God that we perform A (or refrain from performing A) must have a reason; a reason that does not itself involve God's willing that we perform A (or refrain from performing A). (+3) Therefore, that reason must be the reason for the rightness (or wrongness) of A. (+4) Hence we have a contradiction: (+1) is false, and either there is no act that is right (or wrong) because God (who is our Creator and whom we are obligated to obey) wills that we perform it (or refrain from performing it), or if such an act exists, God's willing it is not the sole reason for its rightness (or wrongness). And even if we assume that the principle of (Transitivity) is correct, (+3) does not follow from (+1) and (+2). It is clear that proponents of the Euthyphro argument must resist this move.

چگونه مى‏توانند چنین کنند; سر راست‏ترین حرکت آنها این است که منکر دخل اخلاقى این واقعیت گردند که خداوند خالق ماست، و مدعى گردند که حتى اگر او خالق ما هم باشد، هیچ وظیفه‏اى نداریم که از خواسته‏‌هایش اطاعت کنیم و بنابراین، دلیلى که در (+1) آمده، نمى‏تواند دلیل درستى (یا نادرستى) الف باشد. آیا این حرکت پذیرفتنى است; لحظه‏اى راجع به وظیفه ویژه اطاعت از خواسته‏هاى والدینمان تامل کنید.[8] چرا ما این وظیفه را داریم؟ آیا به این دلیل نیست که آنها ما را خلق کرده‏اند؟ و چون چنین است، به نظر مى‏رسد که دست کم در برخى موارد موظفیم تابع خواسته‏هاى ایشان باشیم. بنابراین، خالق ما بودن مى‏تواند پاره‏اى از دلیل براى انجام (سرباز زدن از انجام) الف باشد; اگر پاره دیگر دلیل این باشد که الف خواسته خالق ماست. و اگر قضیه در مورد والدینمان از این قرار است، چرا در مورد خداوند نباشد؟ حالا چگونه مدافعان استدلال اوثیفرون مى‏توانند بگویند که این واقعیت که خداوند خالق ماست، به علاوه واقعیات دیگرى در مورد خواسته‏هاى او، نمى‏تواند دلیلى براى انجام (سرباز زدن از انجام) فعل الف باشد؟ حامیان استدلال اوثیفرون در برابر این دفاع از (+1) به چند طریق، با مقبولیتهاى مختلف، مى‏توانند اشکال وارد کنند. ایشان ممکن است‏بگویند: (الف) ما هیچ وظیفه ویژه‏اى نسبت‏به والدینمان نداریم; (ب) انجام دادن (انجام ندادن) آنچه والدین ما از ما انجام دادن (انجام ندادن) آن را مى‏خواهند بخشى از وظایف خاصى که ما نسبت‏به آنان داریم نیست. (ج) وظایف ویژه ما نسبت‏به والدینمان به خاطر کارى غیر از صرف خلق ما مى‏باشد، که آنان انجام مى‏دهند و خداوند انجام نمى‏دهد; بنابراین وظایف ویژه ما نسبت‏به والدینمان هیچ ربطى به صدق (+1) ندارد. [9] اما حامیان استدلال اوثیفرون حرکت دیگرى مى‏توانند انجام دهند. به جاى آن که به (+1) اشکال وارد کنند، مى‏توانند استدلال بدیل آتى را بر ضد آن بیاورند که این حسن اضافى را دارد که به اصل (تعدى) متکى نیست: (+1) اجازه دهید فرض کنیم که فعل الف تنها به این دلیل درست (نادرست) است که خداوند از ما مى‏خواهد آن را انجام دهیم (از انجام آن سر باز زنیم) و او خالق ماست و ما موظفیم از او اطاعت کنیم. (+2) این خواست‏خداوند که الف را انجام دهیم (از انجام آن سرباز زنیم) باید دلیلى داشته باشد; دلیلى که متضمن خواست‏خداوند که الف را انجام دهیم (از انجام آن سرباز زنیم) نمى‏باشد، و به خودى خود دلیل درستى (نادرستى) الف است. (+4) بنابراین تناقضى داریم: (+1) کاذب است، و یا هیچ فعلى نیست که به خاطر خواستن خداوند (که خالق ماست و ما موظفیم از او اطاعت کنیم) که انجامش دهیم (از انجامش سرباز زنیم) درست (نادرست) باشد، یا اگر چنین فعلى وجود داشته باشد تنها دلیل درستى (نادرستى) آن، خواستن خداوند نیست. البته اشکال این حرکت آن است که متکى به فرض بسیار قوى (+2) مى‏باشد، و حتى اگر براى اجتناب از مساله فعل خواستن[10] دلبخواهى، حاضر شویم که (+2) را بپذیریم، به نظر مى‏رسد که دلیلى براى پذیرفتن این قوى‏تر (+2) با فرض اضافى‏اش راجع به انواع دلایلى که خداوند براى فعل خواستنش دارد، نداریم. بنابراین به طور خلاصه، آن استدلال سنتى که درستى یا نادرستى افعال نمى‏تواند بر خواسته خداوند مبتنى باشد، بر مقدمات مشکوکى استوار است، و وقتى این اندیشه را به آن مى‏افزاییم که ما به دلیل این که خداوند خالق ماست، وظیفه داریم از خواسته‏هایش تبعیت کنیم، وضع بدتر مى‏شود. اما قضیه به همین جا ختم نمى‏گردد; زیرا دلایلى وجود دارد که برخى حقایق اخلاقى خاص از طریق ویژه‏اى مبتنى بر این اندیشه هستند که خداوند خالق ماست. بنابراین به ملاحظه این موارد خاص مى‏پردازیم.

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Let us begin by considering some issues concerning property rights. What is inherent in a person's ownership of a piece of property, in a person's right to a piece of property? It seems, to some extent, that although an individual cannot use it to violate the rights of others, they can, if they wish, use it in a way that benefits them, even if others are harmed. There is no doubt that this distinction is not clear-cut; for there are cases where it is difficult to judge whether someone's rights have been violated or whether they have merely been harmed.[11] But for our purposes, the aforementioned distinction is sufficiently clear. How does someone come to own something? One picture that seems appealing is this: if there is a physical object that belongs to no one, and if someone comes along and does something with it (mixes their labor with it), then the said object comes to belong to them.[12] They can thereafter transfer their property to another in some way, and after this transfer, that other person acquires the property rights to it. In fact, today, transfer is the most common way of acquiring ownership. But in this picture, all property rights are ultimately based on these initial acts of acquisition, through mixing one's labor with unowned objects. Of course, this picture faces several well-known difficulties.[13] First, what right does an individual have to take an unowned object for themselves[14] and thereby deprive all of us of the right to use it? And second, does the act of mixing one's labor with that object give them property rights to the [whole] original, unowned object, or merely rights to the products of their interaction with that object (if there are any products)? But for now, we will set these questions aside and assume that something like this conception is correct; for the question we want to address is whether, in light of any theological truth, we should make a change to it or not. And the obvious presupposition of this picture is that if there exists something that comes to be owned by humans, then at least at one time in human history, there was an unowned thing that someone could make their own by mixing their labor with it. But suppose that existence was created by a personal God. Then it could well be argued that all of existence belongs to Him and that there never was and never is anything unowned. Now, suppose further that this Creator allows humans to use, for their own purposes, that with which they mix their labor; but with the restriction that this use should not cause great harm to others (even if these individuals' rights are not violated). In other words, suppose that this Creator allows people to use His property, only if they comply with some of His wishes. Then, are humans not obligated to do so, or at least obligated either to return that property or to comply?[15] So, in summary, if God, the Creator, truly asks us not to use the things of this world in certain ways, this imposes moral restrictions on property rights that would not otherwise exist. Now that we have reached this point, let us introduce the idea of stewardship[16] in ownership. We say that an individual has stewardship ownership over something only if the previous owner gave it to this individual, with restrictions on how to use it, and/or with obligations regarding how to employ it. Now, what I was arguing for is the idea that if certain theological beliefs are true (such as that God created existence, but allows humans to make what is in it their own, on the condition of observing the restrictions and obligations He sets), then humans will have stewardship rights over what they possess, not property rights. And if that is the case, then there will be moral truths (about the restrictions and obligations that possessors must follow)[17] that would not exist if these theological beliefs were not true. Therefore, here we have a set of moral claims whose truth or falsity depends on the truth or falsity of certain theological claims. The question we must now address is whether the Euthyphro argument, even if valid in general, can be used against the claim we are examining. In this context, what would that argument look like?

بنابر قاعده، سیر استدلال چنین خواهد بود:
("1) اجازه دهید فرض کنیم که حقوق مالکیت محدودیت‌هایى دارد، و این محدودیت‌ها تنها به دلیل اعمالشان از جانب خداوند (که به ما مالکیت استخلافى زمین را داده) وجود دارند.
("2) محدودیت‌هایى که خداوند اعمال کرده، باید دلیلى داشته باشد; دلیلى که متضمن این خواست‏خداوند که تابع آن محدودیت‌ها باشیم، نیست.
("3) بنابراین آن دلیل باید دلیل تبعیت ما از آن محدودیت‌ها نیز باشد.
("4) بنابراین تناقضى داریم: ("1) کاذب است، و یا هیچ محدودیتى وجود ندارد، یا دلیل دیگرى براى وجود داشتنشان هست.
چنانکه در بخش پیش دیدیم (وقتى که (’1) تا (’4) را بررسى مى‏کردیم) حتى اگر("2) و اصل (تعدى) را بپذیریم،("3) از ("1) و ("2) به دست نمى‏آید. حال، حتى اگر آنچه را که در بخش پیشین از پذیرفتنش اکراه داشتیم (یعنى این که (’1) اشکال دارد; زیرا صرف این واقعیت‏که کسى ما را خلق کرده، هیچ دلیل اخلاقى‏اى براى ما جهت پیروى از خواسته‏هایش نیست.) بپذیریم، هنوز هیچ دلیلى نخواهیم داشت که به طور مستقل به ("1) اشکال کنیم. زیرااگر دارایی‌هایمان به مالکیت استخلافى باشد، آنگاه به یقین موظفیم که از خواسته‏هاى کسى که به ما استخلاف داده، پیروى کنیم; و اگر واقعا خداوند عالم را خلق کرده باشد، آنگاه به یقین چنین به نظر مى‏رسد که مالکیت دارایی‌هایمان استخلافى است که در نهایت‏خداوند به ما داده است.
این نکته را بدین ترتیب هم مى‏توان بیان کرد: حتى اگر صدق اصل (تعدى) را بپذیریم، نه(’3) و نه ("3) از مقدمات پیشین در استدلال‌هاى مربوطشان، به دست نمى‏آیند. زیرا ادله‏اى که براى این ادعاهاى اخلاقى ارائه مى‏شود، متضمن حقایق کلامى دیگرى، علاوه بر خواسته خداوند برخى امور راست. حال، مدافعان استدلال اوثیفرون، ممکن است‏بکوشند که با دلایل مستقلى به ("1) حمله کنند، اما در تصور این که دلایلشان چه خواهد بود، دشوار است. بنابراین چنان مى‏نماید که برخى حقایق کلامى چون به وجود و گستره حقوق مالکیت مربوطند، با برخى حقایق اخلاقى مرتبطند.
به طور قطع، مدافعان استدلال اوثیفرون، مذبوحانه استدلال زیر را تکرار خواهند کرد:
("1) اجازه دهید فرض کنیم که حقوق مالکیت محدودیت‌هایى دارد، و این محدودیت‌ها تنها به دلیل اعمالشان از جانب خداوند (که به ما مالکیت استخلافى زمین را داد.) وجود دارند.
(×"2) محدودیت‌هایى که خداوند اعمال کرده، باید دلیلى داشته باشد; دلیلى که متضمن این خواست‏خداوند که تابع آن محدودیت‌ها باشیم، نیست، و به خودى خود دلیل بر این است که ما چرا ما باید تابع این محدودیت‌ها باشیم.
("4) بنابراین تناقضى داریم: ("1) کاذب است، و یا چنین محدودیت‌هایى وجود ندارد، یا دلیل دیگرى براى وجود داشتنشان هست.
اما گام (×"2)، شبیه گام (×’2) در بخش پیشین، توصیه کردنى نیست. حتى اگر خداى کاملى [باشد]، براى این که از ما بخواهد افعال خاصى را پیشه کنیم و، به طریق اولى، براى اعمال برخى محدودیت‌ها بر افعالمان، باید دلایلى داشته باشد. معلوم نیست که چرا این دلایل باید شرط بسیار قوى موجود در انتهاى (×"2) را واجد باشند.

3

در بخش پیشین، لوازم این اندیشه کلامى را که خداوند خالق، صاحب گیتى است، براى مساله حقوق مالکیت، بررسى کردیم. کسانى فکر کرده‏اند که این اندیشه، لوازمى براى مساله اخلاقى جواز خودکشى هم دارد.[18] ما در این بخش این احتمال را مى‏کاویم. استدلال لیبرالى براى جواز خودکشى، خیلى پیش از اینها در فایدون [ جاودانى روح] به صراحت آمده است: ... گاهى براى کسانى مرگ بهتر از حیات است. و احیانا به نظر شما عجیب مى‏آید که کسانى که مرگ برایشان مزیتى به حساب مى‏آید، حق نداشته باشند به خودشان سود برسانند، بلکه مى‏بایست صبر کنند تا کس دیگرى این خدمت را در حق آنها روا دارد.، ( 62 A) [19] البته این اشکال که شاید آن فرد وظایف به غایت مهمى بر عهده داشته باشد، که اگر خودکشى کند، نمى‏تواند آنها را برآورد، و به همین دلیل است که خودکشى براى او نادرست است، فایده‏اى ندارد. زیرا براحتى مى‏توانیم بحث را منحصر به مواردى کنیم که فرد چنین وظایفى ندارد یا به مواردى که مى‏تواند ترتیبى دهد تا وارثانش آن وظایف را برآورند. و علاوه بر این، چنین استدلالى در واقع تنها نشان مى‏دهد که فرد نباید در انجام وظایفش مسامحه کند، و[لى] نشان نمى‏دهد که خصوص خودکشى چه اشکالى دارد. خود افلاطون این استدلال براى خودکشى را نمى‏پذیرد (گرچه او فکر مى‏کند فرد مى‏تواند به محکومیت‏به مرگ تن در دهد) و براساس این که ما مملوک خدایان هستیم، با خودکشى مخالفت مى‏ورزد. استدلال او چنین است: اگر یکى از بندگان شما بدون اشاره شما که مى‏خواهید بمیرد، خودش را از بین ببرد، آیا شما عصبانى نخواهید شد و اگر وسیله‏اش را داشته باشید، تنبیه‏اش نخواهید کرد... بنابراین اگر شما این گونه به آن بنگرید، فکر مى‏کنم نامعقول نباشد که بگوییم ما نباید به زندگى خویش پایان دهیم، تا زمانى که خداوند الزاممان کند; شبیه آنچه اکنون با آن مواجهیم.، (62 C) [20] [اگر] از غرابت این اندیشه که فرد باید، اگر بتواند، آنهایى را که در از بین بردن خویش موفق گشته‌‏اند، تنبیه کند (به تفکیک از این اندیشه معقول‏تر که فرد باید آنهایى ا که صرفا کوششى در این جهت کرده‏اند، تنبیه کند) بگذریم، اندیشه‏اى که افلاطون ابراز مى‏دارد این است که حقوق مالکیت‏ خدایان شامل ماهم مى‏‌شود; و این که بنابراین ما هیچ حقى نداریم که بدون اجازه ایشان خود را از بین ببریم. [21] مواردى وجود دارد که بسیارى از متدینان مى‏خواهند خودکشى را مجاز بدانند. یکى از این موارد[22]، حالتى است که فرد براى پرهیز از انجام اجبارى فعل بسیار بدى، خودکشى مى‏کند. مثلا، در سنتهاى دینى بسیار زیادى، خودکشى را براى پرهیز از ارتداد در اثر شکنجه، حتى کارى تحسین برانگیز مى‏شمارند. مورد دیگر، خودکشى براى پرهیز از فاش کردن اسرارى، تحت‏شکنجه، است که باعث کشته شدن بى‏گناهان بسیارى مى‏شود. آیا این استثناها را مى‏توان با استدلال علیه خودکشى، آشتى داد؟ به نظرم مى‏رسد که بله، مى‏توان. آخر ایراد اصلى به از بین بردن خودمان این بود که ما حق نداریم این کار را بدون اجازه صاحب خویش، خداوند، انجام دهیم و متدینان بخوبى مى‏توانند این ادعا را بیفزایند که خداوند پیشتر (شاید از طریق وحى) اجازه این موارد را داده است. آشکار است که از استدلال اوثیفرون نمى‏توان علیه این ادعا، که در حال بررسى‏اش هستیم، استفاده کرد. آخر، مقدمه اساس نخست[23]، این ادعا خواهد بود که: (’’’1) اجازه دهید فرض کنیم که ما نمى‏توانیم جان خویش را بگیریم، تنها به این دلیل که ما مملوک خداوند هستیم، که ما را خلق کرده است، و از ما نمى‏خواهد که این دارایى‏اش را از بین ببریم. آنگاه حتى اگر بیفزاییم: (’’’2) نخواستن خداوند از ما که چنان کنیم، باید دلیلى داشته باشد; دلیلى که متضمن این خواسته‏اش نیست; نخواهیم توانست که حتى با فرض اصل (تعدى) به این نتیجه اساسى برسیم که: (’’’3) بنابراین آن دلیل باید دلیل این هم باشد که چرا ما نباید جان خویش را بگیریم. تردیدى نیست که مى‏شود استفاده از مقدمه (×’’’2) نخواستن خداوند از ما که چنان کنیم، باید دلیلى داشته باشد; دلیلى که متضمن این خواسته او نیست. و به خودى خود دلیل این است که چرا ما نباید جان خویش را بگیریم. را به جاى (’’’2) در نظر بگیریم، ولى این هم مقبول‏تر از (×’2) و (×’’2) نیست. همچنین نمى‏توانیم به سادگى به (’’’1) اشکال کنیم، آنچنان که به (’1) کردیم.

حتى اگر ما وظیفه نداشته باشیم که به خواسته‏هاى کسى که ما را خلق کرده، فقط به دلیل خلق کردنمان، گوش کنیم، وظیفه داریم که دارایى دیگرى را از بین نبریم; و اگر خداوند ما را خلق کرده باشد، آنگاه شاید ما دارایى خداوند باشیم. حال که به اینجا رسیدیم، مى‏توانیم ملاحظه کنیم که مساله بیش از صرف منع خودکشى است. زیرا اگر ما دارایى خداوند هستیم، آنگاه شاید وظیفه داشته باشیم که هرچه را که او مى‏گوید انجام دهیم، و آنگاه شاید بتوانیم به ادعاهاى کلى خویش در ابتدا راجع به اخلاق باز گردیم و این ادعاى احتمالى را در نظر بگیریم که: (’1#)افعال براى ما درست (نادرست) هستند تنها در حالتى که و تنها به دلیل این که خداوند، که ما را خلق کرده و صاحب ماست و بنابراین وظیفه داریم از او پیروى کنیم، از ما مى‏خواهد که آنها را انجام دهیم (از انجام آنها سر با ز زنیم). بنابراین ادعاهاى کلانى به این نکته وابسته‏اند. به‏رغم تمام آنچه ملاحظه کرده‏ایم، معلوم نیست که این استدلال علیه خودکشى (و به طریق اولى، علیه ادعاى کلى‏ترى که هم الآن مطرح ساختیم) کارگر باشد. در مورد حقوق مالکیت، اندیشه اساسى این بود که خداوند، که عالم را خلق کرده، صاحب همه چیز است، و این ادعا به نظر واجد تناقضى نبود. اما در اینجا، در (’’’1)، اندیشه اساسى این است که خداوند، به دلیل خلق ما، صاحب ماست. و شاید کسى مستقیما به (’’’1) اشکال کند که واجد تناقض است. آخر، آیا معقول است که موجودى عادل مطلق باشد و صاحب یا مالک انسانى باشد؟ آیا این کار ناعادلانه نیست; کارى که نمى‏توان به نحو معقولى به عادل مطلق نسبت داد؟ ارزیابى این اشکال مشکل است. تردیدى نیست که اشکال به برده‏دارى دقیقا این است که ما فکر مى‏کنیم عادلانه نیست که انسانى صاحب انسان دیگر باشد; انسان دیگرى را دارایى خود بشمارد. اما آیا براى خدا هم ناعادلانه است، او که بى‏نهایت فوق ما و خالق ماست، که صاحب انسانها باشد؟ این سؤال را مى‏توان چنین هم مطرح کرد: آیا برده‏دارى به این دلیل ناعادلانه است که درست نیست انسانى صاحب انسان دیگرى باشد (که در این حال، هر دو استدلال، هم علیه خودکشى و هم علیه ادعاى کلى، با فرض این که ما مملوک خداوند هستیم، پا برجا باقى مى‏مانند); یا به این دلیل که درست نیست انسانى مملوک باشد، دارایى باشد (که در این حال، هر دو استدلال به دلیل ناسازگارى درونى فرو خواهند ریخت)؟ متدینان در خیلى مواقع، شق نخست را انتخاب کرده‏اند; [24]و چون یافتن دلیلى براى ابطال عقاید متدینان مشکل به نظر مى‏رسد، نتیجه‏اى که احتمالا باید بگیریم این است که ادعاهاى کلامى براى صدق یا کذب ادعاهاى اخلاقى راجع به خودکشى، و شاید براى مسائل بسیار زیاد دیگرى، مدخلیت دارند.

4

One issue remains about which it is often claimed that theological beliefs concerning the will of the God who created the world influence the truth of moral beliefs regarding that issue. This is the moral issue raised by vegetarians. At least some vegetarians argue as follows: our usual assumption [as humans] is that, except in certain very specific cases, it is wrong to take the life of an innocent human being. Yet we usually see no objection to taking the lives of members of many other species [animals] in order to use their bodies for food, clothing, and so on. Let us call these common moral views the conventional intuition. Now, the vegetarian argues that defending this conventional intuition is difficult. What characteristics do humans possess that members of other species lack, and how do these characteristics justify the sharp moral distinction present in the conventional intuition?
I think no one would deny that there is a gradation of perfection among different species, and most people would accept that this leads to a gradation of rights. While no one objects to killing a mosquito for causing minor annoyance, many would object to killing a dog for the same reason. The vegetarian says the interesting point is that when we reach humans, the conventional intuition grants them many rights (including a strong right to life), even though there is no sufficiently decisive biological difference between these species to warrant this decisive moral difference. The vegetarian concludes that we must therefore reject the conventional intuition and grant many of these rights (especially the right to life) to members of many animal species.
The vegetarian argument draws strength from the fact that the conventional intuition is about species. After all, within the human species itself, there are extremely diverse cases (infants, the severely mentally disabled, those near death) who lack many of the more subtle human characteristics, yet the conventional intuition accords them far greater rights than are usually given to animals. This makes it much harder to believe that there are characteristics which (a) all humans possess, (b) no animal possesses, and (c) justify the moral distinctions drawn in the conventional intuition. The vegetarian concludes: therefore, we must reject common sense.
This vegetarian argument has a religious response, which is as follows: When God created the world, He intended that humans use certain other species for food, clothing, and the like. Of course, God did not give humans absolute freedom to do whatever they wished with these creatures. For instance, they must not treat them cruelly. But because of God's intention, humans can and should obtain food, clothing, and the like from these creatures for themselves. This view is implicit in the following story from the Talmud:[25]
A calf was being led to slaughter, when it broke away, hid its head under the rabbi's robe, and cried out in terror. The rabbi said, "Go, for this you were created." (B. Metzia[26], 85a)
Again, it is quite clear that the Euthyphro argument is not effective against the claim we are examining. The argument is:
(""1) Humans may take the lives of other animals to obtain food, clothing, etc. from their bodies, solely because God, who created the world and owns everything, intended that they do so.
And even if we accept that:
(""2) His intention that things be so has a reason; a reason that does not involve His intention. And even if we add the (transitivity) principle, we do not reach the fundamental conclusion that:
(""3) This reason must also be the reason why we are permitted to take the lives of animals to obtain food, clothing, etc.
The fundamental objection to this claim again goes back to the internal consistency of (""1). Let us assume we have no problem with the religious claims discussed in the previous section; let us assume there is no objection to the idea that God owns us. So, by assumption, even if we are swayed by this vegetarian argument, we will see no objection to God also owning animals. Yet even so, we might still object to (""1). For its assumption is essentially that God's property rights extend so far as to permit the life of the owned being in question to be taken by others—indeed, that He has arranged matters so that this is done. And is this consistent with the idea of a perfectly just being?

آخر، حتى در نظامهاى برده‏دارى روشنفکرانه، اجازه نمى‏دادند تا مالک جان برده اش را بگیرد (یا بگوید دیگران بگیرند). بنابراین، آیا عظمت‏خدا واقعا بدین معناست که او حتى چنین کارى را مى‏تواند بکند؟ ما در اینجا با محدودیتهاى این اندیشه که همه چیز ملوک خداوند است، زیرا او خالق همه چیز است، سر و کار داریم. وقتى که آن را در مورد اشیاء بى‏جان به کار مى‏بریم، مى‏بینیم که مى‏تواند لوازم مهمى براى مساله حقوق مالکیت داشته باشد. اگر به کار بردنش در مورد انسانها را بى‏اشکال بدانیم، مى‏بینیم که مى‏تواند (دست‏کم) کاربردهاى مهمى براى مساله جواز خودکشى داشته باشد. اگر اکنون آماده باشیم تا کاربردش را آن طرف تر ببریم، مى‏تواند به عنوان پاسخى براى استدلال گیاه‏خواران درباره حیوانات و حق حیات آنها به کار آید.

5

In one sense, this article is a commentary on the verse from the Psalms that “The earth is the Lord’s, and everything in it.” We have tried to show that this idea can have important ethical implications, and that it is therefore incorrect to suppose that there is no moral claim whose truth or falsity depends on the truth or falsity of theological claims. But, of course, this is not the only theological belief that may have ethical consequences. On other occasions, we will address other theological beliefs.

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Notes:

[1] I consider it my duty to thank David Rosenthal for his many insightful comments on the first draft of this article. (The translation of the article A Second Reflection on Ethics and Religion, by Mostafa Malekian, has been collated with the English text of the article.)

[2] Hossein Miandari was born in 1965. He received his M.D. from the University of Tehran in 1990 and his Ph.D. in philosophy from the Iranian Institute of Philosophy in 2010. His main areas of research are moral philosophy and the philosophy of biology.

[3] Other possible implications are: (a) we come to know the truth of certain moral truths because we have come to know the truth of certain religious truths (perhaps God, through revelation, has made known to us the rightness of an action); and (b) because of the truth of certain religious truths, we have a reason to do what is right (perhaps if we do it, God will reward us). We do not address these claims in this article.

[4] We do not address the question of what exactly the argument presented in the Euthyphro is in this article. On this issue, see: R. Sharvy, "Euthyphro 9d - 11b", Nous 1972, from which my presentation of that argument is influenced. [Euthyphro is the name of one of Plato's dialogues, which appears in The Collected Works of Plato, translated by Hassan Lotfi and Reza Kaviani, Kharazmi Publications, Volume 1, pp. 235-259. —Ed.]

[5] arbitrary

[6] This is a claim that authors in the Calvinist tradition would certainly deny. For example, Jonathan Edwards writes thus about salvation and eternal damnation: It is fit that God should order whatever he pleases. Because of his greatness and glory (which renders him infinitely above all), it is fit that he should reign, and that his will should take place in everything. [Jonathan Edwards (Hill and Wang: 1935) p. 119]

[7] Of course, it could be based on a weaker principle, which applies only in cases where “X” is the willing of an agent for something. But all the objections we will raise also apply to this weaker principle.

[8] The analogy between obedience to God’s will and to our parents’ will is based on a discussion in the Talmud [Talmud: the collection of religious and civil laws of Judaism, the most important religious book after the Torah. (Gavahi, Dictionary of Religions). —Ed.] (in the Mishnah [Tractate: sections of the Jewish Mishnah; there are a total of 65 sections or tractates in the Mishnah. Ibid. —Ed.] Kiddushin (30b)) that we have a duty to honor our parents.

[9] Of these three moves, the third seems the most reasonable. But the religious can well respond: let us grant that our special duties to our parents are due to other facts of the parent-child relationship (e.g., the manner of raising and caring for children, etc.). God bears the same relations to all His creatures, and therefore they still have a special duty to obey Him.

[10] [This term is rendered in our theological lexicon as “arbitrary will.”]

[11] One such case is this: let us suppose I have built a high wall at the back of my property, thereby depriving your yard of sunlight. There is no doubt that you have been harmed, but have I deprived you of a right?

[12] See, for example: Chapter 5 of the Second Treatise of Civil Government, John Locke.

[13] See, for example: Chapter 3 of the First Memoir, What is Property?, Proudhon.

[14] [“Appropriate” is called “ḥiyāzat” in Islamic jurisprudence.]

[15] If the individual is aware of these wishes before using the property, then it seems he is obligated to follow them. But if he was not aware, and if they turn out to be strange or arbitrary, then perhaps he has only a weaker duty, and then only from the time he becomes aware of those wishes. (I have chosen the term istikhlāf, inspired by verse 7 of Surah al-Hadid.)

[16] stewardship

[17] It goes without saying that these limitations differ in different theological systems. Of course, the systems most relevant to current discussions of property rights are those whose limitations oblige the individual to take into account at least the interests of others, not just their rights.

[18] Cf. Holland, in “Suicide,” in Moral Problems, ed. Rachels (Harper and Row: 1971), has discussed other connections that the moral issues of suicide have with theological issues.

[19] In the period works of Plato, mentioned in footnote 3, vol. 1, p. 488.

[20] Ibid., p. 489.

[21] Plato makes a very strong assumption here: that we never have the right to destroy another’s property without his permission. Whether he could arrive at a weaker view such that the argument remains intact, and if so how he could, is not something we can address here.

[22] For an examination of such cases, see the view of Rabbenu Tam, which appears in the Tosafoth commentaries [Tosafoth: additions or supplementary material on Rashi’s commentary on the Talmud, written in the 12th and 13th centuries CE. (Gawāhī, Glossary of Religions). —Ed.] on the Talmud, Mishnah Avodah Zarah 18a.

[23] Note that the duty to heed the wishes of the property owner is stronger here than in the previous case. Even if his wishes are strange or arbitrary, we have no right to ignore them and destroy the property.

[24] Evidence of this meaning is the Talmudic saying (Kiddushin 22b) that people should not sell themselves as slaves to others; for God would object thus: "They are My servants, and not servants of servants."

[25] Of course, the rabbi was punished for his answer, but as the text makes clear, it was solely because he showed no compassion, not because his answer was unreasonable.

[26] B. Metzia.

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Download the PDF of Baruch Abroody's article, "A Second Reflection on Ethics and Religion"

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