Between Democracy and Truth: A Critique of the Theory of Toleration

Meysam Badamchi: As we shall see, Malekian's theory is above all a theory about which beliefs citizens in an ideal society should, on the basis of truth-seeking, not tolerate, and which beliefs they should, on the basis of justice-seeking, support the rule of democracy, toleration, and the ballot box. Malekian's theory rests on the assumption that citizens have two fundamental moral obligations: an epistemological obligation to make certain truth, or what he calls the actual objective truth, the basis of their individual and collective lives, and a justice-seeking obligation to make democracy the basis of adjudication between themselves and others when certain truth is not established. At the end of the article, I will critique Malekian's theory of toleration in light of certain concepts drawn from Rawls's political liberalism. . .

Between Democracy and Truth:

Mostafa Malekian's Theory of Toleration and Its Critique

Meysam Badamchi[1]

"To be honest: I have never commented on political matters with willingness, eagerness, or heartfelt interest, and have only done so when I have seen myself morally obliged to comment, which is when a political matter has clear effects and consequences on people's psyche and morality. For instance, violence or manifest deception clearly target the psychological and moral health of citizens. But apart from violence, which is the most heinous form of violating human freedom, and deception, which is the ugliest game with human theoretical rationality, I leave everything else that happens in the world of politics to its own people."

Mostafa Malekian, "The Restless Spirit of an Intellectual", interview in the May-June 2012 issue of Andisheh Pouya, pp. 25-26

Mostafa Malekian is one of Iran's renowned intellectuals of the last two decades, whose most original achievement in the realm of thought can be considered the theory of "Rationality and Spirituality." He also has a theory concerning toleration and political secularism that has received less attention and is therefore the subject of this writing. As we shall see, Malekian's theory is above all a theory about which beliefs citizens in an ideal society should, on the basis of truth-seeking, not tolerate, and which beliefs they should, on the basis of justice-seeking, support the rule of democracy, toleration, and the ballot box. Malekian's theory rests on the assumption that citizens have two fundamental moral obligations: an epistemological obligation to make certain truth, or what he calls the actual objective truth, the basis of their individual and collective lives, and a justice-seeking obligation to make democracy the basis of adjudication between themselves and others when certain truth is not established.[2] At the end of the article, I will critique Malekian's theory of toleration in light of certain concepts drawn from Rawls's political liberalism.

From the Division of Beliefs into Objective and Subjective to a Theory for Toleration and Political Secularism

To explain his theory, Malekian, from an epistemological standpoint, divides human beliefs into two broad categories: objective[3] or āfāqi beliefs and subjective[4] or anfosi beliefs[5]. By objective or āfāqi beliefs, Malekian means beliefs that can be assumed to be valid for all human beings and for which "the assumption of the existence of irrefutable proofs is not impossible" ("The Theoretical Foundations of Toleration," p. 116). And by subjective or anfosi beliefs, he means, in direct contrast, beliefs that cannot be assumed to be valid for all human beings and for which "the assumption of the existence of irrefutable proofs in their favor is impossible" (ibid.). The distinguishing difference between objective and subjective beliefs is that for determining and discerning the truth or falsehood of the first category, a criterion, standard, measure, scale, or arbiter that is agreed upon by all human beings, both proponents and opponents of those beliefs, and by referring to which disputes and conflicts can be resolved, is conceivable; however, in the case of the second category, such an assumption is inconceivable. For example, the propositions "This particular object is red" or "Tehran is located north of Isfahan" (i.e., direct observational propositions), or "The sum of the angles of a triangle is 180 degrees" (i.e., necessary propositions in mathematics and logic), or "The speed of light is 300,000 kilometers per second" and "There is oxygen on that planet which is 500 billion light-years away from us" (i.e., scientific propositions), or "Parviz is older than his father" (i.e., a false verifiable proposition) are objective, whereas the propositions "The apple is not a tasty fruit," "The color blue is the most beautiful of colors," "Saadi's poetry is more heartwarming than Hafez's poetry," are instances of subjective propositions. It should be noted that an objective proposition is not necessarily true and can be false (like the proposition "Parviz is older than his father").

The important point is that in the case of objective propositions, we believe in the existence of intersubjective truth (even if this truth is not currently available to us, meaning it pertains to potential objective beliefs), but in the case of subjective beliefs, truth and falsehood are entirely personal, subjective, and non-intersubjective, meaning they differ from one individual to another. Some epistemologists have considered reference to memory as the criterion for the intersubjective objectivity of a proposition, some reference to reason, some sensory perception, and some introspection; but in any case, when a proposition is objective, one can believe in its intersubjective truth or falsehood (Malekian, "The Theoretical Foundations of Toleration," 117; compare with Malekian, "Secularism and Religious Government," pp. 255-256).

Objective beliefs are themselves divided into two categories: A- Objective beliefs for which the scale for determining and discerning their truth or falsehood not only exists theoretically and potentially[6], but is also practically and actually[7] accessible in the "current state of human sciences and knowledge." B- Objective beliefs for which the scale for determining their truth or falsehood exists only theoretically and potentially, but the current state of human sciences and knowledge is not such as to allow us practical and actual access to it. For example, the propositions "There is life after death," or "There is oxygen on that planet which is 500 million light-years away from us" belong to this group of objective beliefs that are potentially verifiable but actually unverifiable. We call the objective beliefs of category A "actually objective beliefs," and the objective beliefs of group B, "potentially objective beliefs."

In Malekian's analysis, from an epistemological perspective, only disputes over actually objective beliefs can be resolved, and potentially objective beliefs and subjective beliefs always remain points of contention among believers; that is, "one must embrace pluralism in the realm of proof and knowledge (not in the realm of reality and fact) regarding potentially objective beliefs, and absolute pluralism concerning subjective beliefs." ("The Theoretical Foundations of Toleration," p. 118).

The result of the above categorization, along with the two fundamental moral duties of "truth-seeking in the realm of theory" and "justice-seeking in the realm of practice," is the theory of toleration that Malekian formulates as follows:

Suppose an opinion is expressed by an individual, regarding which we are to decide whether to tolerate or not tolerate it. If the opinion expressed belongs to the category of actual objective beliefs, then after investigation—that is, after referring to the criterion or scale that determines the truth or falsity of beliefs from an epistemological standpoint—either its truth or its falsity will be established. In this case, "truth-seeking, in the first instance, requires not only that we tolerate the expression of that opinion, but that we adopt the opinion itself; and in the second instance, it requires not only that we do not adopt the opinion itself, but that we also do not tolerate its expression" ("The Theoretical Foundations of Toleration," p. 121). This is because, in Malekian's view, "truth-seeking is above toleration." However, if the opinion expressed is among potential objective beliefs or subjective beliefs, in Malekian's view, the moral duty of truth-seeking has no such requirement, because we do not possess a criterion or scale, based on the consensus of epistemologists, by referring to which we could determine the epistemological preferability or inferiority of this belief compared to beliefs incompatible with it. In such a situation, "the epistemic status of this belief is equal to the epistemic status of all beliefs contrary or contradictory to it, and preferring any one of them over another has no rational basis." (ibid.) Here, justice-seeking and the principle of rejecting preference without a preferrer, as one of the instances of justice-seeking, requires that no potential objective or subjective belief be made the basis of decision-making without being exposed to the people's vote. (ibid., p. 121; "Secularism and Religious Government," 251)

In other words, if the belief in question is an actual objective belief that is false, "benevolence toward fellow human beings," which obligates us to the "[moral] duty of reducing the amount of public ignorance and error," requires that we use "rational and moral methods" to prevent the holders of that belief from sharing it with others. This is because, in Malekian's view: "Silence regarding methods of belief-formation that are not based on understanding and reasoning, but rather benefit from various kinds of rumor-mongering[8], brainwashing, mind-bending, psychological warfare, indoctrination, and suggestion—the comprehensive title for all of which is deception—is contrary to benevolence for fellow human beings." (ibid., 122-123)

Nevertheless, if the opinion being expressed is an actual objective belief that is true, we must not only tolerate its expression but also adopt it as part of our own beliefs; and if the opinion being expressed is among potential objective beliefs or subjective beliefs, we are morally obligated to tolerate all efforts made to convince others of those beliefs and to act based on the standards of democracy for decision-making. ("The Theoretical Foundations of Toleration," 122)

Malekian also applies the explanations given above to the realm of legislation. Non-toleration in the legislative realm, in his view, means that legislators give legal form to a way of life that, in their own opinion, is the desirable way of life, and demand that all citizens adopt that same way of life and punish deviation from it. On this basis, he concludes that actual objective beliefs, whether true or false, must, without any reference or attention to public opinion and the votes of citizens, either necessarily be made the basis of legislation (if they are true), or necessarily be disregarded by legislators (if they are false). But regarding other beliefs, that is, potential objective beliefs and subjective beliefs, in Malekian's view, the citizens of the society, whom any benefit or harm from the implementation of laws affects, must be consulted, and any belief that gains the agreement of all or the majority of citizens should be given legal form. That is, "in the case of actual objective beliefs, truth-seeking requires not referring to public opinion, and in the case of potential objective beliefs and subjective beliefs, justice-seeking requires referring to public opinion." (ibid., p. 124) From this discussion, Malekian draws this important conclusion: "Democracy, in this sense, is the result of toleration in the legislative realm, and the only type of government to which we have an epistemological-moral obligation." (p. 124)

The important point is that, except in mathematics, logic, parts of the natural empirical sciences, very small parts of the human empirical sciences, and very small parts of the historical sciences, we do not deal with actual objective beliefs and reports. ("The Theoretical Foundations of Toleration," p. 126)

In another classification explaining his theory, Malekian divides beliefs into three broad categories according to their content: first, ontological beliefs[9], that is, beliefs concerning particular things (such as Socrates or this microphone), or relations (such as the father-son relation or the distance between two cities), or events (such as the death of Spinoza), or states of affairs (such as Saadi having written the Golestan), or sets (such as the set of white flowers), and the like. Second, axiological beliefs[10], that is, beliefs about which things have intrinsic value, i.e., are desirable in themselves and for their own sake, which things have instrumental and means value, which things have contributory value[11], and similar matters. Third, deontological beliefs[12], that is, beliefs, for instance, about what we ought or ought not to do, morally or legally, insofar as we are fathers or mothers, or hold a particular job or profession. (“Theoretical Foundations of Toleration,” 119) It is clear that within religious beliefs one can also speak of ontological, axiological, and deontological beliefs. By combining what was said earlier with this classification regarding religion, Malekian arrives at a model for religious toleration and political secularism, and writes:

“Among [religious] ontological beliefs, those concerning life before worldly life, life after worldly life, and realms beyond the natural world are, in Malekian’s epistemological view, counted among potentially objective beliefs. Among [religious] axiological beliefs, again based on that consensus, those concerning intrinsic values fall under subjective beliefs, and among [religious] deontological beliefs, those relating to moral duties are certainly not actually objective” (ibid., 125). That is, because the majority of religious propositions are not among actually objective beliefs, they cannot serve as the basis for government unless the majority of citizens in a society decide, through a public vote, to make them the basis of their government. This, in turn, is a kind of defense of political secularism, that is, not basing government on religion in the absence of a majority request.

Malekian’s claim that most religious ontological, axiological, and deontological propositions are not actually objective is empirical-historical, and this means that, in his view, empirical and historical study shows that the majority of the aforementioned religious beliefs have not, so far, resulted from an irrefutable and decisive proof. In other words, studies show that some of our most important and grandest religious and moral beliefs, concerning questions such as “Where have we come from?”, “Where are we going?”, “What have we come for?”, “Is there another world or worlds beyond nature or not?”, “Does God exist or not?”, “Does the universe have a purpose?”, “Is the world-system a moral system or not?”, “What is the meaning of life?”, and “What ought we to do?”, none can be accepted as actually objective, and on this basis, politically, one must rule in favor of toleration regarding these propositions (“Theoretical Foundations of Toleration,” 125).

If someone objects to this view from a faith-based perspective and says that religious people receive the answers to such great questions through religion and need not provide another independent reason for their answers, because whatever is in the sacred religious and denominational scriptures is true, Malekian will respond to this statement by saying: “The speaker of this statement … has placed the burden of proving three claims upon their own shoulders: first, the epistemological authority of the words of the person or persons to whom the sacred religious and denominational scriptures are attributed; second, the historical reliability of these scriptures themselves; and third, the hermeneutical validity of the understanding they have had of the propositions in these scriptures; and none of these three claims are among actually objective claims, but rather all three are among potentially objective claims.” (“Theoretical Foundations of Toleration,” p. 126) On this basis, it can be claimed that Malekian’s theory of religious toleration is founded upon a kind of moderate skepticism.

One of the ambiguities of Malekian's theory is that it is not made precisely clear who the agent of toleration is: citizens or the state? On the one hand, he considers his theory applicable to decision-making in the legislative domain, where the primary actor is logically the state; yet on the other hand, he also writes: "It is true that those who study, research, and reflect upon toleration sometimes speak as if they expect toleration from individuals, from various social groups, and from the government and the state; however, it seems that, in reality, only persons can be tolerant or intolerant. Ultimately, the tolerant or intolerant act can manifest as speech, action, or the enactment of socio-legal laws and regulations (whether political, economic, judicial, penal, or international)." (The Theoretical Foundations of Toleration, p. 120) Apparently, Malekian has no problem with considering the state as an agent of toleration, provided that we consider the state ontologically constituted by individuals. In any case, the lack of a precise distinction between the state and individuals is not without influence on his lack of distinction between the locus of actions in the public/political and social/private spheres, which will be pointed out in the concluding section.

Secularism and Religious Government?

We said that Malekian's theory of toleration is at the same time a defense of political secularism, according to which religious government (that is, a government in which collective decisions are made based on the ontological, anthropological, and deontological beliefs of a specific religion) is permissible only if the majority of society, due to their religiosity, wishes to accept the rule of subjective or potentially objective religious propositions—which, incidentally, includes many jurisprudential and Sharia rulings—in the public sphere as the basis for collective decision-making. In other words, when the majority of individuals in a society say: 'Although we know that religious beliefs are not actually verifiable and there is no evidence for their truth or falsehood, we are attached to these beliefs and want to make those very beliefs the basis of government in our society,' then, according to the requirements of justice-seeking, one can have a religious government that does not conflict with secularism in this specific sense. However, it is very important to note that the durability of such a type of religious government lasts only as long as it has public opinion behind it. As soon as the majority of people say they no longer want religious government, religious government can no longer be maintained ("Secularism and Religious Government," pp. 257-258; compare with "The Theoretical Foundations of Reformism," pp. 41-42).[13] According to this theory, the legitimate model of religious government can also be called religious democracy, with the emphasis that, apart from this, Malekian considers all other formulations of religious democracy paradoxical and instances of deception. ("The Ethics of Reform" in Our Destiny, Our Prudence; 94-97)[14]

Malekian's theory of religious toleration and political secularism can be formulated in the following argument:

First premise (the moral-belief premise) – Individuals are morally obliged, based on the moral duty of truth-seeking, to exercise toleration regarding potentially objective and subjective beliefs.

Second premise (the epistemological-historical premise) – The consensus of epistemologists shows that the majority of religious propositions are either potentially objective or subjective, and accordingly, disagreement about them will always exist.

Third premise (the egalitarian/justice-seeking premise) – Individuals must be considered equal in terms of their power to influence collective decisions. The basis for decision-making must be the vote of the majority.

First conclusion (political secularism) – (In the absence of a request by the majority of society) Truth-seeking dictates that the vast majority of religious propositions, except for a few actually objective religious propositions, be subject to toleration and not serve as a basis for establishing a government.

Second conclusion (religious government) – (If we have a society where half plus one believe a specific religion should be the basis for collective decision-making) Egalitarianism/justice-seeking dictates that the society's public decisions be made based on religious propositions.

A Critique of Malekian's Theory of Toleration

Malekian is a creative philosopher whose theories possess a unique originality. In his theorizing, he is an imitator of no one, and the pinnacle of his intellectual project can be considered the theory of rationality and spirituality, which we did not address in this note. Those interested know that rationality and spirituality is, above all, a project concerning the ethics of belief and action in the individual sphere and civil society, and it seems that in his theory of toleration and political secularism, Malekian has extended certain elements of his theory of rationality and spirituality, particularly the moral duties of truth-telling and the reduction of pain and suffering, to the domain of politics.[15] Nevertheless, it appears this extension has not occurred without problems.

The main problem with Malekian's theory of toleration is that it conflates the position of action in the private sphere[16] or civil society with the position of action in the public sphere[17] or political domain.[18] Rawls, in Political Liberalism and especially the theory of public reason, has shown well that the position of agency in the public sphere and civil society is not the same, and each has its own requirements.[19] In Rawlsian terms, a theory of toleration based on the division of propositions into potentially and actually objective and subjective—that is, Malekian's theory—is a comprehensive[20] and controversial doctrine that cannot serve as the basis for action and consensus for the public sphere of democratic politics. According to political liberalism, principles of justice in the public sphere must be expressed solely in a political language, meaning a language that can be accepted by the maximum number of individuals with diverse and varied comprehensive doctrines.

It seems that what virtuous citizens are duty-bound to resolutely pursue in terms of truth-seeking is truth in the private sphere or civil society, that is, when we are in our solitude and privacy, or gathered together in the family or friendly or professional civil associations in civil society. In the same vein, the idea that democracy must be based on the pursuit of justice as the foundation of our decision-making becomes meaningful above all in the actions of the public sphere, and one cannot ascribe a determinate meaning to referring to the ballot box in the private sphere, when we are alone and in our existentialist solitude.

The conclusion is that, despite Malekian's neglect and in accordance with political liberalism, different types of rationality are necessary for the individual sphere and the political sphere: a maximalist theory of rationality, such as the theory of rationality Malekian presents in Rationality and Spirituality and which manifests in his theory of toleration in the division of propositions into potentially and actually objective and subjective, is a maximalist or comprehensive theory of rationality that is entirely applicable to the private sphere or civil society. Conversely, in the political or public sphere, adhering to a kind of minimalist public reason based on reasonableness is sufficient for decision-making, and it is not necessary to resort to stronger theories of rationality upon which consensus among the citizens of a democratic society is very difficult (such as Malekian's epistemological theory of toleration) for decision-making in the political sphere. According to political liberalism, in the public sphere, we must either make reasonableness alone the basis of collective decision-making and set aside truth (Rawls's view), or permit truth to enter politics only in a minimal sense, which we call political truth (Joshua Cohen's view).[21][22] According to political liberalism, it is necessary to consider truth-seeking as part of the concept of the good for virtuous citizens in their private sphere, and in the public sphere, to resort to less controversial concepts such as justice, reasonableness, and public reason.

Part of this problem seems to me to be rooted in Malekian’s psychologism and political quietism. In an interview with Samina Rastegari in the May–June 2012 issue of Andisheh Pouya, a passage from which was cited at the beginning of this article, Malekian, emphasizing the theory of the primacy of culture, says: “I firmly believe that all our problems and difficulties have psychological and moral roots. Even if our social institutions lack the structure they ought to have, it is because the people involved in those institutions are psychologically or morally unhealthy, or both, and have defects and flaws. The more I probe, the more I see that there is no social problem, including political ones, that does not, through one, two, three, or several intermediaries, lead back to a psychological or moral problem. In this respect, the two subjects of mental health and moral perfection are of the utmost importance to me” (“The Restless Soul of an Intellectual,” p. 25). In other words, Malekian’s formulation of the primacy of culture—that the main root and foundation of all of a society’s problems is culture, and the rest are superstructural problems—seems to be tied to a failure to distinguish between the public sphere and civil society.

In closing, it is worth briefly mentioning Malekian’s critique of Richard Rorty’s political thought, which took the form of Malekian’s article “The Priority of Philosophy over Democracy,” written in response to the translation of Rorty’s article “The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy” during Rorty’s visit to Iran in 2004.[23] Although Malekian’s critique contains salient and important points, it is not free of a misunderstanding of Rorty’s aforementioned article, which, as it happens, is also Rorty’s commentary on Rawls’s political liberalism. The author does not agree with Rorty’s anti-metaphysical reading of Rawls, but neither does he consider Malekian’s reading of Rorty to be flawless. In response to Rorty, Malekian rightly emphasizes that, especially in countries like Iran where the democratic tradition is not strong, there is a serious need for a philosophical defense of toleration (p. 199), and he asks Rorty—who believes that the defense of liberalism does not require a philosophical foundation—what he would have to say to a fundamentalist in an Islamic country where the democratic tradition is not yet strong enough, who claims that one should not be tolerant and that opponents should be dealt with violently. Rorty has only two options: either, without entering into rational discussion, arbitrarily and high-handedly demand that human beings continue to move toward becoming ever more liberal-democratic; or attempt philosophical debate and seek to defend the epistemic and moral rightness and justifiability of liberal-democratic toleration. Both paths are undesirable for Rorty—for the first path is a disregard for, and an insult to, the spirit of toleration that Rorty himself supports, and the second path requires recourse to philosophical anthropology and the adoption of a theory of human nature from which, as Malekian has explained, Rorty shies away. (Malekian, “The Priority of Philosophy over Democracy,” pp. 187–188) These criticisms of Rorty’s anti-metaphysical view and his reading of Rawls are entirely valid, but a point in Rorty’s commentary on political liberalism that Malekian overlooks in his rebuttal—and which, as noted above, is also the affliction of his own theory of toleration—is that introducing comprehensive and controversial philosophical doctrines and strong conceptions of truth into public politics (which should not be conflated with political activity in civil society) can lead to factionalism and division in a democratic society and prevent consensus, and for this reason it should be avoided as much as possible in the public sphere (I stress again, not in the sphere of civil or private society).

[1] This article is part of an extensive chapter on Malekian’s political thought and social ethics, which will soon be published in English in the author’s book Post-Islamist Political Theory: Iranian Intellectuals and Political Liberalism in Dialogue. In that chapter, in addition to the discussions in this article, Malekian’s theory of rationality and spirituality, as well as his thought on the virtues of citizens in a democratic system, are also expounded.

[۲] Malekian has expounded his theory particularly in these works: “The Theoretical Foundations of Toleration” in Rahi be Raha’i (A Way to Deliverance), Nashr-e Negah-e Moaser, 1381, pp. 113-126; “Secularism and Religious Government” in Sonnat va Secularism (Tradition and Secularism), Serat Publications, 1381, pp. 245-265; “The Theoretical Foundations of Reformism” in Taqdir-e Ma, Tadbir-e Ma (Our Destiny, Our Prudence), Nashr-e Negah-e Moaser, 1389, pp. 21-34. The most precise account is presented in the article “The Theoretical Foundations of Toleration,” and I have relied on it more than the others.

[۳] Objective

[۴] Subjective

[۵] In this essay, I have used the terms objective and subjective, and their Persian equivalents, interchangeably.

[۶] in principle

[۷] in practice

[۸] propaganda

[۹] ontological

[۱۰] axiological

[۱۱] contributory value

[۱۲] deontological

[۱۳] Another important point is that in a legitimate religious government, according to Malekian, the religious propositions that people want to serve as the basis for decision-making in their collective life must correspond to the interpretation they themselves hold and desire of those propositions in the religion, not the interpretation of the rulers. Malekian gives the example that suppose leaders, during a religious revolution, ask the religious people whether they want the justice of Ali or not, and the people’s answer is yes. But if later, in practice, something becomes the basis for collective decision-making that is contrary to what the majority of the people understood by the justice of Ali, that government is not legitimate. To prevent such an occurrence, Malekian even recommends the creation of an institution or mechanism to ensure that what the people voted for in the name of religion corresponds with the interpretation that is now manifested from those votes at the stage of implementation (“Secularism and Religious Government,” p. 258).

[۱۴] Given Malekian’s interest in Kierkegaard, the nineteenth-century Danish existentialist thinker, one of the sources of his thought regarding the subjectivity of many religious propositions can perhaps be found in Kierkegaard’s philosophy of religion. For Kierkegaard, the subjectivity of religious propositions not only does not conflict with their truthfulness, but is a requirement for their being true. See the article “Subjective is Truth,” written by Søren Kierkegaard and translated by Mostafa Malekian in Sayri dar Sepehr-e Jan: Maqalat va Maqulati dar Ma’naviyat (A Journey in the Sphere of the Soul: Articles and Discourses on Spirituality), Negah-e Moaser, pp. 19-48. If Malekian wishes to speak within an intra-religious framework, he can, like Kierkegaard, believe that there are two types of true propositions: subjectively true propositions and objectively true propositions. Objectively true propositions are intersubjective, and subjectively true propositions are faith-based. Most true religious propositions are subjectively true, and since the foundation of government must be intersubjective propositions, they cannot serve as the basis for government. With this analysis, Malekian’s thought would not conflict with considering religious propositions true in the subjective domain.

[۱۵] For an exposition of these duties, see Mostafa Malekian, “Taqrir-e Haqiqat va Taqlil-e Mararat” (The Expression of Truth and the Reduction of Suffering), in Rahi be Raha’i (A Way to Deliverance), pp. 9-33, Nashr-e Negah-e Moaser.

[۱۶] private

[۱۷] public

[۱۸] On the distinction between the political sphere and the sphere of civil society, see Part Two, Chapter Nine of this work: Will Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy, OUP, 2002. This work has been translated into Persian by the author in collaboration with Mohammad Mobasheri and is scheduled to be published soon by Nashr-e Negah-e Moaser.

[19] See especially chapter six and the introduction to the 1996 edition of this work: John Rawls, Political Liberalism, Columbia University Press, expanded edition, 2005. Rawls’s Political Liberalism has recently been translated into Persian by Musa Akrami and published by Nashr-e Sales.

[20] comprehensive

[21] See Joshua Cohen, “Truth and Public Reason”, Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vo. 37, No. 1, 2009.

[22] Perhaps Malekian, in his own defense, would say that he advocates scientocracy in a democratic society, and that by the truth that must not be compromised in a democracy he means scientific truth and nothing more. But this claim, too, does not necessarily seem defensible given the developments that have taken place in the philosophy of science since the time of the logical positivists. For instance, Popper holds that we can be more certain of the falsehood of some scientific statements through their falsification than we can be of the truth of scientific statements; or Kuhn and Feyerabend extend a kind of relativism regarding the concept of truth to the domain of science as well. On Popper, see The Logic of Scientific Discovery; on Kuhn, see The Structure of Scientific Revolutions; on Feyerabend, see Science in a Free Society.

[23] See Mostafa Malekian, “The Priority of Philosophy over Democracy,” Naqd, Khordad-Mordad 1383; pp. 167-192.

Richard Rorty, “The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy” in Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth, Cambridge University Press, 1990, pp. 175-196. This article has been translated into Persian by Khashayar Deyhimi in a book titled The Priority of Democracy over Philosophy and published by Tarh-e Now.