اندیشهفلسفهخردگفتگوحکمتمعناپرسشفرهنگ
The relationship between ethics and politics, sacred spirituality within the framework of rationality, religious explication, and the moral ruling on blasphemy and apostasy are the central themes of Dr. Abolghasem Fanaei's articles in this collection.

In this post, we intend to gradually upload all the articles by Dr. Abolghasem Fanaei.
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Abstract: In recent months, a number of Iranian thinkers, intellectuals, and journalists have subjected their views on the relationship between ethics and politics to public scrutiny by publishing notes and articles. This article seeks to demonstrate that, contrary to most of these stances, one cannot issue a general verdict on the relationship between ethics and politics. Certain types of ethics pertain to politics in a specific sense of the word and should form the basis of political decision-making and action, while other types of ethics should not play a role in the realm of politics.
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Defining spirituality is difficult, and there is no consensus on the precise meaning of this term. Part of the disagreement over its exact meaning stems from differing views on the relationship between "spirituality" and "religion" or "religiosity." Some proponents of spirituality see it as an alternative to or replacement for religion, while others consider it the "innermost essence of religion" or the "core of religions." The interpretation of spirituality that will be elaborated in this series of notes has three distinct characteristics: first, it is "religious"; second, it is "God-centered"; and third, it has a "rational" framework. By sacred spirituality, we mean a religious spirituality within the framework of rationality.
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Abstract: "When criticizing and rejecting or accepting a claim, can/should one take into account the personality/motive of the claimant in putting forward that claim, or not?" There are three theories in response to this question. (1) The first theory says: "Such an act is always a fallacy," (2) the second theory says: "Such an act is never a fallacy," and (3) the third theory says: "Such an act is a fallacy in the context of inquiry/acquiring knowledge through reason, but it is not a fallacy in the context of imitation/acquiring knowledge through testimony." If taking into account the personality/motive of the claimant is a fallacy, then naturally avoiding such an act will be obligatory according to the dictates of reason/ethics. But if this act is not a fallacy, it will be permissible and/or obligatory according to the dictates of reason/ethics. This article, authored by Dr. Abolghasem Fanaei, critiques the first two theories and defends the third.
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As you know, God has many names. But one of the very important differences between God's names and the names we humans give to persons or things is that God's names are "with the named," whereas our names may be "with the named" or may be "without the named." In other words, our names are merely names; they may have a meaning, but that meaning may have no relation or correspondence to the nature and characteristics of the thing upon which we bestow that name, whereas God's names are not merely names. Rather, each of His names expresses a "description" of His true attributes and points to a dimension or aspect of His nature or His characteristics. God's names are, in fact, God's "attributes"; and God's attributes are truly His own attributes, not attributes of another being metaphorically ascribed to Him, nor constructs of the human mind projected onto God through projection. These attributes are, in fact, God's "virtues," and therefore worshipping God is the worship of all virtues.
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An event or phenomenon can be explained in various ways. Among the different types and varieties, scientific explanation, philosophical explanation, and religious explanation are considered the most important. In this article, we will first provide a definition of explanation, and then compare these three types of explanation with one another, demonstrating that these explanations are not reducible, interchangeable, or replaceable. Furthermore, by citing diverse evidence from religious texts, we will show that religious explanation is, in fact, the most important religious doctrine and teaching and, in a sense, the essence of religion, and that the prophets fundamentally came to correct human beliefs regarding religious explanation and to teach the correct method of religious explanation. Distinguishing these three types of explanation from one another will help us discover the domain of religion and resolve the conflict between science and religion. In addition, we will briefly point to other fruits that follow from religious explanation.
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Abstract: This article, organized into four parts, seeks to resolve some of the ambiguities and misunderstandings surrounding the ethical ruling on insult and apostasy, and the punishment for these two acts. The main questions examined here are as follows: (1) Is insult ethically permissible/right/justified, or forbidden/wrong/unjustified? (2) Is this particular speech/particular song/caricature or particular act an instance of insult or not? (3) What is the punishment for an ethically unjustified act? (4) What is the punishment for insult, provided we accept its unjustifiability? (5) Is insulting sacred things apostasy? (6) Is the punishment for apostasy death?
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Abstract: In the first part of this article, after (1) introducing the discussion, we examined the following questions: (2) What is the subject of the ethical ruling on insult? (3) Is insult absolutely unjustified from an ethical standpoint? and (4) What are the ethical arguments in favor of the unjustifiability of insult? In this part, we will address the following questions: (5) What is the relationship between the 'unjustifiability of insult' and the 'right to insult'? (6) What is the relationship between the 'unjustifiability of insult' and the 'right to freedom of expression', and the 'right to be wrong'? and (7) What is the meaning of 'sacred' and 'sanctity'?
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Abstract: In the first and second parts of this article, after (1) introducing the discussion, we examined the following questions: (2) What is the subject of moral judgment concerning insult? (3) Is insult absolutely immoral? (4) What are the moral arguments in favor of the immorality of insult? (5) What is the relationship between the "immorality of insult" and the "right to insult"? (6) What is the relationship between the "immorality of insult" and the "right to freedom of expression," and the "right to be wrong"? and (7) What is the meaning of "sacred" and "sanctity"? In this section, we will address (8) a critique of the opponents' arguments.
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In the first, second, and third parts of this article, after (1) introducing the discussion, we examined the following topics: (2) the subject of moral judgment concerning insult, (3) the absoluteness or conditionality of the insult that is morally wrong, (4) moral arguments in favor of the wrongness of insult, (5) the "wrongness of insult" and the "right to insult," (6) the wrongness of insult and the right to freedom of expression, and the wrongness of insult and the right to be wrong, (7) the meaning of "sacred" and "sanctity," and (8) a critique of the opponents' arguments. In the final part of this article, we will examine the following topics: (9) the meaning of apostasy, the manner of its realization, and how it is proven, (10) the moral punishment for insult and apostasy, (11) the relationship between insult and apostasy, and (12) whether Shahin Najafi's song is an instance of insult and apostasy.
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Q&A with Dr. Abolghasem Fanaei Khorasan Newspaper | Issue No. 18152 | 26 June 2012
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The history of Karbala has two pages, one green and luminous, the other black and dark. From one perspective, Karbala is an "exhibition of human crimes." The atrocities committed there are unparalleled or nearly unparalleled and, in a sense, constitute a crime against humanity. But the history of Karbala has another page as well; a golden and glorious page, full of beauty and splendor, a page that is an exhibition of moral virtues, the embodiment of the highest human excellences. It is the manifestation of the transcendent self of humanity. It is a book, indeed a moral school. It tells us how to live and how to die.
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Abolghasem Fanaei: The occasion calls for a discussion about the character of the Master of the Free, Imam Hussein, and the most important event of his life, namely the incident of Karbala. Much has been said about both his character and the analysis and explanation of the Karbala event, and interested friends are more or less familiar with the literature that has developed around these two subjects. I, too, had the opportunity many years ago to offer an ethical explanation of Imam Hussein's political action. I do not intend to repeat my own words or those of others here. Rather, I would like to use this opportunity to interpret one of the sayings attributed to him.
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Abolghasem Fanaei: Muslim jurists typically believe that jurisprudence replaces ethics and has essentially come to make Muslims independent of ethics. But in my view, this problem stems less from the relationship between ethics and Sharia than from the dominant conception in Islamic culture about this relationship and, consequently, from the dominant conception about the relationship between the science of ethics and the science of jurisprudence. That is, in my opinion, the majority of Muslims, both jurists and non-jurists, lack a clear and refined understanding of the connection and relationship between religion/Sharia and ethics.
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Abolghasem Fanaei: In this series of articles, I will examine the role of religion in violence. As far as I know, those who believe that religion plays a role in the emergence of violence in human relations and human society argue for this belief in two different ways. Let us call these two arguments, respectively, (1) the "argument based on the history of religiosity" and (2) the "argument based on religious texts." The argument based on the "history of religiosity," which is sometimes loosely called the "history of religion," says that this history is bloody, meaning that religious people throughout history have committed violence against their co-religionists and fellow human beings, and this violence originates from religious teachings.
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Interview of Gofteman-e Olgu with Dr. Abolghasem Fanaei: It seems that with the passage of years since the victory of the revolution and the establishment of the Islamic system, the difficulties of simultaneously securing people's worldly and otherworldly well-being are gradually becoming more apparent. Due to Islamic scholars being in the position of managing Islamic society and dealing with the objective needs of the people, the discourse has now moved beyond the level of political thought and reached the model of statecraft. In fact, the Islamic Republic must demonstrate in practice, as an Islamic system, what differences it has in terms of the model of progress and style of statecraft compared to others.
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If you were to give your intellectual project a name, what name would you choose? Religion within the framework of ethics? Sacred spirituality? Abolghasem Fanaei: If we consider ethics to be a branch or subset of rationality and/or spirituality, I prefer the name "Religion within the Framework of Rationality and Spirituality," but if we consider it to be something independent of rationality and spirituality, the name "Religion within the Framework of Ethics, Rationality, and Spirituality" is more appropriate and expressive for this project.
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The first article was published by Soroush Dabbagh at a time when, in his objectively/impersonally citable writings and lectures, Mostafa Malekian had said nothing about the absolute impossibility of combining “religiosity and rationality,” and had only spoken of the impossibility of combining traditional, institutionalized “historical” religion with full, complete modern rationality. Malekian’s documented, objective, and referable claim (not Malekian’s personal/undocumented/non-objective claim and private discussions)—which, in the book “Tradition and Secularism” and Malekian’s conversation with Shargh newspaper in those days, concerns the impossibility of combining historically institutionalized religion and modern rationality in its entirety, which is argumentative rationalism. According to Malekian’s view at that time, combining a certain level of religiosity with a certain level of rationality is entirely possible. This is because he considers both religiosity and being modern to be gradational, and deems only a specific type of religiosity—namely, complete, traditional, historical religiosity—to be incompatible with complete modern rationality. In other words, according to Malekian’s account, only a specific type and level of religiosity is incompatible with the complete level of modern rationality. Fanaei’s first critique of Dabbagh, entitled: “On the Essence of Religion and the Essence of Modernity,” was published in such a context. After this critique, Soroush Dabbagh delivered a lecture on the same subject at the University of Mashhad, in which he formulated his positions in a more revised and modified manner. Abolghasem Fanaei also wrote a critique of this second, modified version, entitled “From Dogmatism in Religion to Dogmatism in Philosophy,” in which, again, his main criticism is the overlooking of Malekian’s correct account in his objective writings and documents. At present, in Mostafa Malekian’s objective writings, Malekian’s former opinion exists in an objectively citable form with a stronger flavor, under the title of the impossibility of the “absolute” combination of rationality and religiosity, which, in terms of content, is the same as Soroush Dabbagh’s initial account of Malekian at a time when Malekian had apparently not made any objective, citable statement on this matter.
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Abolghasem Fanaei | Ayin Magazine | Esfand 1385 | Issue 6 On the Essence of Religion and the Essence of Modernity (First Response)
Abolghasem Fanaei | Ayin Magazine | Shahrivar 1386 | Issue 8 From Dogmatism in Religion to Dogmatism in Philosophy (Second Response)
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Discussion5 comments
خسته نباشید ممنون به خاطر این مطلب مفید
با سلام کاربر محترم، سید مسعود بنده هم کامنت شما را ذیل "نگاهی به فتاوای یوسف صانعی در حوزه ی حقوق زن" خواندم هم اینجا؛ متأسفانه به سبب شتابزدگی، آکنده از لغزشهای تایپی و نامفهوم بود.
از زحمات صدانت بینهایت سپاسگزارم !
بسم الله بااحترام برنظرات اندیشمندان محقق معارف بشری بخصوص روشنفکران دینی که تلاش برانطباق معارف دینی را با مدرنیته می نمایند اما بر دلایلی من معتقدم مه عرصه دین وفرهنگ بشری جداگانه بایستی تحلیل وبررسی گردد ومتفمزانی که سعی دارند این دپ مسیر معرفت را با نگرش انسانی تبیین نمایند درعمل دچار اعوجاج در معارف دین می شوند اگرچه معارف دینی را می توان درمتشابهات با معارف انسانی تعریف کرد ولی کلیت آنها جداگانه باید بررسی گردد وتداخل معارف اشتباه است حوزه وعرصه دین با فاکتورهای خود قابل دریافت عقلانی می باشد با استدلال های حوزه خود ووقتی متفکران با تعصب دینی می خواهند معارف دبن را در حوزه تغکرات انسانی ارائه نمایند معرفت دینی را از جایگاه اصلی خود خارج می کنند مثلا ارزش اخلاق در معرفت بشری جایگاه والایی دارد وانسان اخلاقی انسان تایید شده متفکران است ،حال وقتی روشنفکر دینی می خواهد این معرفت ارزشی اخلاق را در دین نشان دهد بعثت پیامبر را هم به آن معطوف می نماید بعث لاتمم مکارم الاخلاق ،درصورتیکه صریح کلام الله لیعبدون است ونه حتی لیعرفون وبندگی اگرچه تناقضی با مکارم اخلاقی ندارد اما مکارم اخلاق جایگزین تقوا نمی شود وتقوا با مکارم اخلاقی یکی نیست واصلا در دین بابی چداگانه بنام اخلاق معنایی ندارد وتقوا انطباق عمل بر رضای خداوند است اگرچه می فرماید قدانزانا عایکم لباسا یواری سواتکم وریشا ،که گویای دست یافتن انسان به اررش های اخلاقی است که مایه فخربشری است اما لباس التقوی ذالک خیر ،ذلک من ٱیات الله ،لعلکم یذکرون 26 الاعراف ونفی ارزش های اخلاق نمی کند اما ارائه معرفتی بنام تقوا را آیه الهی بیان می دارد متاسفانه درهم شدن دو معرفتی که عرصه آنها جدا وفاکتورهای آنها نیز اختصاص بخود دارد باعث اعوجاج در مسبر معارف دینی می شود ودر مثال هرم مازلو اگر این تفکیک را ما در عرصه دین ببریم همه آنرا بهم می ریزد ودر حوزه دین قابل تحلیل وتمیز نیست بسیاری دیگر نیر همچنین پس عرصه دین بایست جداگانه وبا مشخصات خود بررسی گردد تا بتوان در آن موحد ومجاهد ومتقی را تبیین نمود سخن بسیار است سیدمسعود 95/1/26
البته منظور آقای فنایی این نیست که هر جز دین قابل سنجش اخلاقی است. اما نکته دیگر این است که آقای فنایی برخلاف خیلی دیگر از نواندیشان دینی قصد سازگاری دین و مدرنیته را ندارند. بلکه ایشان فکر میکنند که دین در چهارچوب اخلاق است(نه مدرنیته) و هر حکم غیراخلاقی غیر دینی است.