Hossein Dabbagh's essay “Which Ethical Theories Can Inform Politics?”

Which normative ethical theory is suitable for politics is a question that occupies the minds of many moral and political philosophers. In this short essay, I will attempt to take a brief look at the common ethical theories in moral philosophy and test their weight for bearing the burden of politics. I personally believe that the history of Iranian intellectualism, as experience shows, has neglected the theory of moral contractualism.

1- Pluralistic deontology (such as the ethics of David Ross or Thomas Nagel) can be a suitable theory for politics. This theory states that, firstly, there are various self-evident moral principles, and secondly, we can acquire intuitive knowledge of them. Of course, there is no doubt that the degree of reasonableness of this theory depends on the multiple moral principles that the philosophers of this theory propose. It seems that any list of these principles must at least, firstly, be sensitive to “respect for the autonomy of persons”: secondly, try to take distributive-economic and retributive justice into account, and finally, improve the welfare of people, especially the citizens of one's own country. What John Rawls referred to as “intuitionism” was nothing other than this pluralistic deontology. In his famous 1971 book, A Theory of Justice, he suggested that the important options in political philosophy are intuitionism (pluralistic deontology), utilitarianism, and social contract theory.

It is generally stated in criticism that pluralism in ethics is like saying everything and saying nothing. When a person is faced with a heap of moral principles where the final judgment is not definitive, it is as if they were given nothing from the start. In response, various things can be put forward, but what suffices for the present writing is that this deficiency is a common occurrence and almost most normative ethical theories are accused of it and suffer from it.

2- Ethical utilitarianism has a difficult path ahead to become reasonable in politics, for two reasons: one is that it does not place “autonomy” as a main component of people's welfare (sometimes utility overrides autonomy), and the other is that it is a single-level, single-layered theory: that is, it has only one utilitarian principle: the principle that in a specific situation, an action is moral if it maximizes utility and benefit in that situation and minimizes pain and suffering. Rule-utilitarianism, in contrast, is not like this and is multi-layered. In the sense that at the first level, it posits the fixed and monistic principle of utilitarianism, and then in the lower layers, it incorporates derived moral principles such as justice, fairness, equality, welfare, entitlement, etc. The important difference here is that for rule-utilitarians, in a specific moral situation, an action is moral if it maximizes benefit and minimizes pain and suffering in a way that it becomes a rule.

This claim of utilitarians seems crude when they say that every decision the government makes should be based solely on the calculation of the benefits of various options. Because, firstly, such a method is very time-consuming and costly, and secondly, calculation errors can occur frequently. Thirdly, people need to be able to guess what the government will do. Most of us start a business when we know the government will not, for example, take our shop from us, or impose a huge tax without notice, or block our contracts without reason, and so on. Fairness dictates that we have a reasonable guarantee from the government, and we will not have such a guarantee if the government makes decisions through benefit calculations, because it is possible that in some situations, greater benefit might require the government to take and confiscate our shop, or levy a huge tax on us, or change labor laws in a strange way, and so on. The only hope we can have to lend reasonableness to the utilitarian approach to politics is where we employ the interests of the nation to pre-evaluate laws, economic policies, and types of contracts. After that, every separate decision of the government must be consistent and fit with those laws, policies, and the general framework chosen by utilitarian evaluation.

3- Contractualism, whose name reveals its content, has been much elaborated in moral and political philosophy by figures such as Derek Parfit, Rawls, and his student Tim Scanlon, and has of course attracted many critiques. It seems that in the literature of contemporary moral philosophy among Iranian intellectuals, the theory of moral contractualism has received little attention. Most intellectuals of our land are familiar with Hobbesian contractualism, and because they find Hobbes's position very radical, they have abandoned it. In his famous book, Leviathan, Hobbes defends the theory of the social contract. He believes that since “man is a wolf to man,” they do not deserve democracy; therefore, the government (state or monarch) must decide for them, and this is accomplished through the social contract. This social contract is made between two parties: one between the citizens and the state-government, and the other among the citizens themselves, for Hobbes did not believe humans possessed a moral conscience. However, we must not forget that in the twentieth century, great efforts were made to revive contractualism. For instance, in his book A Theory of Justice, John Rawls breathed new life into contractualism by proposing the method of reflective equilibrium. The method of reflective equilibrium states that although there are self-evident, intuitive moral principles, these principles can be revised and adjusted when they encounter other principles. This method can help us achieve justice. After Rawls, in his 1981 book What We Owe to Each Other, Scanlon defines and advances contractualism in terms of reasons rather than “ought.” He believes that moral principles must be defined in terms of reasons: meaning that a wrong act, for him, is an act prohibited by reasonable principles that no one could reasonably reject. In other words, an act is wrong if it is disallowed by reasonable principles, and these principles could be rejected by someone with a reason. Scanlon holds that this account of contractualism can pave the way for democracy, as the element of critique is prominent within it.

However, in his 2011 book On What Matters, Derek Parfit speaks of Kantian contractualism and aims to promote it. While he acknowledges and affirms Scanlonian contractualism, he attempts to develop it. Parfit believes this development occurs through linking contractualism with the Kantian model, meaning that reasonable moral principles must be capable of being universalized and becoming a rule. This Kantian contractualism, in Parfit's view, can bring us justice and freedom.

There are also some other philosophers, such as Alan Thomas (a student of Bernard Williams) in his 2006 book Value and Context, who instead of the term contractualism, speak of something called contextualism in politics and deem it justified. Contextualism means that while one can name various fundamental moral principles, these principles take on different colors in different moral contexts. Contractualism and contextualism can be considered more or less similar, with the difference that contractualism is a theory in normative ethics, whereas contextualism is a discussion in metaethics and falls under the topic of moral epistemology.

4- Another normative ethical theory can be considered virtue ethics. Virtue ethics can hardly bear the burden of political philosophy. Virtue ethicists believe that in ethics, the moral act and action are not as important as the moral character of the virtuous individual. Hence, it can be said that highlighting the element of “moral character” for politics not only solves no problem but adds to it. For finding the right character for politics is itself another, more significant dilemma that is not easily resolved. Among those who have risen to defend virtue ethics in politics is Rosalind Hursthouse (a student of Philippa Foot). She has written articles on this subject, but they have not been received favorably by other philosophers. Overall, it can be said that virtue ethicists have little to say about politics, do not involve themselves in this matter, and leave this arena to other ethical theories.

If this short essay has accomplished two things, it has been successful: first, to show that consequentialism alone cannot bear the heavy burden of politics, because consequentialism, in order to succeed, needs to marry other ethical theories such as contractarianism or deontology. Second, this essay explains that pluralistic deontology (Rawlsian intuitionism) and Scanlonian reason-based contractarianism are two good alternatives for political engagement. The author believes that despite the differences found in the appearance of these two theories (one pluralist and the other monist), both can amicably become family alongside one another. For both, in one way or another, promote a kind of contextualism in their epistemology. In his weighty book, Parfit attempts to provide a combination of Kantian deontology, Scanlonian contractarianism, and rule-based consequentialism.

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An essay by Dr. Hossein Dabbagh

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