Hossein Hooshmand's article “Why Are More Equal Societies More Efficient?”

Why Are More Equal Societies More Efficient?

Hossein Hooshmand | Researcher in Political Philosophy

Source: Mashq-e No

Industrialized countries are wealthy enough; economic growth in these countries has advanced to the point where it can improve material conditions for the general populace. Despite this, disadvantaged individuals not only suffer from very poor living conditions but their health is also at risk of ruin. There is abundant empirical evidence that inequality has very serious effects on the physical and mental health of those who have little share of wealth and possessions. Inequality leads to unhealthy, unhappy lives and shortened lifespans. It causes violence, addiction, and so on. It destroys the relationships of people who are born in the same society but into different socio-economic classes and erodes social trust. It fuels rampant consumerism, which will ultimately devour the resources of this planet.

In general, the quality of life of all citizens is profoundly affected by economic inequalities. Some research indicates that the growth of socio-economic inequalities in the last three decades has been the most important source and origin of a multitude of diseases and social crises in the contemporary world.¹ In one of the most important of these studies, namely the book The Spirit Level: Why More Equal Societies Almost Always Do Better, Richard Wilkinson—who has researched health policy for forty years—and Kate Pickett, an epidemiology specialist, by examining and analyzing extensive data and information from sources such as the UN, the World Health Organization, the World Bank, and the U.S. Census Bureau, demonstrate that the evidence against inequality is so immense and widespread as to be undeniable.

Their data and information reveal a wide range of social problems and disorders, especially in the field of health and well-being, which stem from economic inequalities. By examining the index for evaluating quality of life, or well-being, or deprivation based on the aforementioned data, they show that there is a strong correlation between the level of economic inequalities and their social outcomes. This research shows that in Japan and the Scandinavian countries (Denmark, Sweden, and Norway), the gradient of this ratio is remarkably low, but in the USA, England, and Portugal, this gradient is unfavorably high. Canada, Australia, and continental Europe are in a moderate position.

National wealth or per capita income of individuals does not matter much in the aforementioned index. For example, the USA is one of the wealthiest countries and has a large number of individuals with very high per capita income, yet it has the lowest level of life expectancy among developed countries. The level of violence, and especially homicide, is catastrophic. Crimes involving violence have the strongest correlation with the level of inequality. Particularly among young people who lack the education and essential economic resources to achieve a desirable social status and attain full citizenship, the daily experience of living in the lowest strata of society fuels their growing anger and resentment.

This research shows that not only the poor, but all members of society are affected by inequality. According to this research, the relationship between inequality on the one hand, and the poverty of physical and mental health and social crises on the other, is so profound that it cannot be described as coincidental. Many people in the USA and England—where deep and widespread economic inequalities exist—are afflicted with mental and emotional problems and suffer severely from poor mental health.

Wilkinson and Pickett describe unequal societies as dysfunctional. One of the dire outcomes this research points to is that in countries like the United States and England, economic and social inequality has become so institutionalized that a quarter of their population is mentally and emotionally ill. This kind of economic growth and development is highly unbalanced, and if we were to borrow from medical language, we could say this mode of economic growth is nothing but a malignant form of it. In this book, the approach of some psychologists who believe that the mental health of many individuals affected by poverty can be easily treated through cognitive behavioral therapy is seriously criticized. The authors of this book say that consumerism, alienation, anxiety, isolation or exclusion, and feelings of estrangement and loneliness are consequences of social and economic inequality, and therefore, they cannot be addressed through individual solutions. In other words, such problems do not have merely individual solutions. Social crises are rooted in the fundamental structure of society. The most important lesson this book teaches is that societies with greater equality always perform better, meaning they are more efficient. The aforementioned points call us to reflect on the theory of social justice or distributive justice.

What is Social Justice?

Often, the general public thinks they know what justice is and what must be done for justice to be realized. They (perhaps in accordance with the knowledge and expertise they possess) are either staunch defenders of social justice or opponents of it. However, their understanding of justice is very cursory and rudimentary. Apart from the general public, political activists, too, often have neither the time nor the motivation to think about justice, due to being involved in partisan rivalries or trusting the ballot box. Therefore, most people, when encountering political and social issues, rely and depend on that same elementary and simple understanding of their own. When people encounter extreme poverty or marginalization, or when they see a film or a photo of the miserable lives of the poor, they think of social justice. They might say, with emotion or anger, that the poor and their families, like others, should have food, clothing, and shelter, and they may protest against this cycle of poverty, meaning its perpetuation from generation to generation. But they lack a theory of social justice to show that the sufferings and hardships of the deprived and the poor are the result of multiple, intertwined evils, and to explain how they can be effectively remedied?

If someone studies these issues more specifically (for example, having been educated in political philosophy), then they might take the problem of social justice or distributive justice seriously. The problem of justice is meaningfully raised when individuals believe in values such as these: the moral equality of all human beings, the need of all people for a set of basic liberties, the dependence of these liberties on certain material things (such as wealth and income), and that the state must secure and guarantee their distribution among the members of society. The aforementioned values and beliefs explain the necessity and foundations of distributive justice for egalitarian liberals. These beliefs show that the theory of distributive justice is tied to fundamental questions about the individual, society, and the state.

The idea of social justice or distributive justice is a controversial concept that has been central to political debates over the past two centuries. Four dominant currents of thought have emerged in the academic and intellectual sphere of the West that, for different reasons, reject or diminish the concept of distributive justice. These currents are:

1_ Reactionaries: From figures such as Mandeville, Malthus, Burke, and Townsend to social Darwinists and neoliberals. They oppose any kind of state subsidy for the poor and believe that the concept of distribution is not inherent in justice. They hold that hunger is useful and efficient in motivating the poor and call for the repeal of the Poor Law. Townsend said: “The poor are not like other people; they are exceptional beings, inherently insolent, wicked, and ill-natured, suited for menial and base work.” The same idea can be seen in Herbert Spencer. In fact, the substance of this argument is reconstructed in various forms from time to time and deployed against the welfare policies of states.

2_ Positivists: They seek to eliminate moral language from all social sciences and want to analyze social issues from a purely scientific perspective rather than a moral one. For instance, A. J. Ayer said: concepts such as the social contract and the general will cannot withstand even a minute of logical analysis, and he knew of no substitute for them. Positivists reduce the problems of political philosophy either to disagreements about facts—which must be resolved in the social sciences—or to the subjective expression of emotions—which are fundamentally non-rational. Thus, only the logical analysis of concepts remains. Consequently, they are incapable of offering any theory of social justice.

3_ Marxists: They too call for the abolition of moral language, and particularly justice (rights, etc.), though not for scientific reasons. Many Marxists believe that justice is not only not the primary virtue of social institutions, but that in a good society there is fundamentally no need for it. Justice becomes necessary when the background or context requiring justice, or the Circumstances of Justice—that is, conditions that create a kind of conflict of interest—exist; then, principles of justice are considered a solution to this conflict. These circumstances and contexts are of two kinds:

a) Conflicting goals b) Limited material resources. If people differ in their goals or are afflicted by limited resources, then conflict of interest (or claims of rights) inevitably arises. Marxists claim that if we can eliminate either of these two factors that create conflict—namely, conflicting goals and limited resources—then we will have no need for a theory of legal equality (or justice); indeed, its absence would be better than its presence. In Marx's view, despite the fact that justice helps resolve conflicts, it leads to the creation of other conflicts or causes the degradation of the natural sense of sociality in individuals. Marx says that given the conditions of the capitalist world, justice is unfortunately a necessity, but in the ideal society (i.e., communist society), with the existence of abundance of resources, it is an obstacle.

Marx's negative approach to justice is rooted in his broader outlook. Marx believed that communism would eliminate the need for most of the concepts and categories belonging to liberalism, including rights, tolerance, electoral democracy, rival political parties, the rule of law, and the free market. The aforementioned concepts have a therapeutic aspect for social, cultural, material, and epistemological crises that a day will come when one can be rid of all of them. Marx envisioned a society free from scarcity, conflicts of economic interest, and ethnic and racial divisions. Such a society would have no need for the institutions that the liberal state has created to treat and resolve these problems. Moreover, in Marx's view, engaging in moral debates about these institutions is nothing but a distraction from the real issue, namely the inevitable revolution of the proletariat. A consequence of Marx's negative approach to ethics and social justice has been that until recent years—with the exception of the analytical Marxism current—no serious commitment to developing a normative theory of justice has emerged within the Marxist tradition.

4. Utilitarians: They have no problem with moral language but reduce all morality to a single principle: pleasure, happiness, or well-being. Moreover, utilitarians believe that the good of the individual must be subordinated to the good of society; Jeremy Bentham says that “there is no right which, when its abolition is advantageous to society, cannot be abolished and annulled.” If we consider the fundamental issue of justice to be the defense of individuals against being sacrificed for any kind of overarching social good, then utilitarians leave little room for the virtue of social justice. Hence, despite the fact that Bentham and especially John Stuart Mill, followed by Sidgwick, paid serious attention to a kind of welfare program for reducing poverty, the foundations of utilitarian ethics are incapable of providing a defensible theory of distributive justice.

The Theory of “Justice as Fairness”

From the beginning of the nineteenth century until the second half of the twentieth century, serious works in political philosophy belonged to one of the aforementioned currents, all of which lacked a reasonable theory of justice. John Rawls (1921–2002)—the most prominent political philosopher of the twentieth century—with the publication of A Theory of Justice (in 1971), organized the crude and conflicting insights about the just distribution of benefits and advantages that had existed over the previous two centuries and, for the first time, provided a precise and clear account of distributive justice.

Rawls breathed new life into moral philosophy—after the attacks against it by Marxists and positivists—and caused ethical systems (i.e., thinking about values and norms) to gain new vitality and prosperity. He believed that ethical systems are the product of human society and have emerged to solve the problems of collective life. From Rawls’s perspective, an ethical system is useless if it cannot provide a plan for resolving contentious issues. In other words, an ethical system is fruitless unless it provides a kind of decision-making process.

However, Rawls warns moral philosophers that they should not imagine they can provide solutions for all the moral problems that arise in human life; he says: “The resolution of the problem of social justice—that is, the justice that applies to the basic structure of society—will be easier than the resolution of difficult cases in everyday life.” He adds that if justice is resolved in the basic structure of society, it will also help resolve everyday moral problems and crises (such as isolation and exclusion, addiction, distrust, divorce, etc.), or at least their severity and difficulties will be lessened.

The Subject of Justice: The Basic Structure of Society

Unlike common ethical theories that are focused on the moral evaluation of individuals’ conduct and character (ethics), John Rawls, by proposing the theory of “justice as fairness,” addresses the moral evaluation of the basic institutions of society. His focus and emphasis on social justice stems from the insight that ethical knowledge (ethics) is increasingly incapable of explaining important aspects of modern societies. Such societies fuel large-scale social problems (such as inequality, poverty, and unemployment) that can be better addressed through institutions than through the analysis of individuals’ morals or reciprocal behaviors.

The superiority of institutional ethical analysis is better understood in the economic sphere, that is, where we encounter inequalities and deprivations such as poverty and unemployment. Prevailing ethical theories, by urging individuals to give charity, call for the alleviation of such deprivations. However, adherence to positive moral duties (i.e., benevolence and helping others)—especially in Anglophone countries—is very rare or entirely absent. In these countries, individual ethics is largely based on negative duties, that is, not harming others. Hence, in contemporary societies, it is beyond the will and capacity of individuals to expect them to arrange their daily economic relations in such a way as to avoid worsening the situation of poverty and unemployment in society. Any moral directive for this purpose may only induce feelings of guilt in individuals, while not alleviating the sufferings of the deprived and the poor.

Rawls says that the main factors behind inequalities, deprivations, and issues such as poverty, unemployment, and the environmental crisis are the basic institutions of society. These institutions have two characteristics: a) they possess coercive power, b) they have a pervasive and profound impact on our lives. Hence, he emphasizes that our moral thinking and attention must focus on the design, organization, and reform of the institutional order or the basic structure of society, not on the behaviors and omissions of society's members. This approach places a specific responsibility on each of us as citizens of modern society: the responsibility to participate in the establishment and implementation of a just institutional order for society. Considering society—as a system of fair cooperation among free and equal citizens—what are the most appropriate principles governing the basic structure of society?

The Principles of “Justice as Fairness”

Rawls has sought to offer a conception of justice to limit the scope of political, social, and economic inequalities. He says that as long as we do not take fundamental steps toward limiting (or reducing) socio-economic inequality, or cleanse the course of political affairs from such inequalities, enterprises and individuals who possess superior power and status will—despite formal equality in the electoral system—seize control of our lives. Rawls adds that because every individual's life depends on cooperation with others, individuals should not, by virtue of luck and good fortune, claim a greater share of the collective output. Hence, any just economic system must minimize the range of differences in people's type and level of life that result from differences in their natural talents and endowments. We must put an end to the theory that the economic system is an arena for the competition of innate and racial talents and skills (or the domain of superior genes' dealings) and is designed to reward the fortunate and agile. For our economic life is part of a fair system based on social cooperation that must provide and guarantee an acceptable standard of living for all citizens. He says, “All social values are to be distributed equally unless an unequal distribution is to everyone's advantage.” But, for inequality to be to everyone's advantage, it must necessarily benefit those who have enjoyed less of the resources of wealth and income.

In the book “A Theory of Justice,” Rawls attempts to reconcile the values of classical liberalism with the egalitarianism of socialism. The conjunction of liberty and equality is expressed in the following dual principles:

1_ According to the first principle, which concerns “equal basic liberties,” all citizens possess the right to the maximum equal individual and political liberties. These liberties include freedom of conscience and thought (including religious freedoms), the right to political participation, freedom of assembly, and the right to judicial justice. Rawls states that any theory of justice must give priority to basic liberties. The term “basic liberties” expresses a set of social conditions necessary for the development and full exercise of individuals’ rational and moral capacities throughout their lives. Hence, this category of liberties cannot be violated or restricted under the pretext of defending society’s values. The first principle also includes equal political opportunities, which negates the influence of the powerful and wealthy in the political realm. According to this principle, citizens with sufficient motivation for political activity should not be deprived of the right to political participation due to a lack of financial means.

2_ The second principle in Rawls’s theory of justice has two parts. The first part is “fair equality of opportunity,” which entails limiting the scope of social and economic inequalities. This principle requires that access to positions and jobs be equally available to all citizens. The principle of fair equality of opportunity states that individuals with the same motivations and skills, regardless of their social class, should have equal chances and opportunities to attain social and economic positions and offices. In other words, the attainment of high socio-economic offices and positions should not depend on the backgrounds and circumstances into which individuals are born and raised.

Despite the fact that the first part of the second principle states that all citizens should have equal opportunities in obtaining economic and government jobs, we may still witness economic inequalities in society. This is because, even if individuals have equal opportunities, some of them, due to possessing innate talents and skills, can advance themselves in the arena of economic competition. Suppose two groups of people: the first group consists of individuals with extraordinary innate talents, and the second group includes individuals deprived of brilliant talents. Individuals in both groups work hard, but their benefits and achievements from their labor differ, and this difference inevitably has profound and widespread effects on their type and level of life. The problem arises from the fact that the difference in the fruits of people’s labor is rooted in talent and other natural endowments of human beings in the lottery of life. Rawls asks: should some people live better than others merely because of differences in innate talent and skills?

In response to this issue, Rawls proposes the second part of the second principle, namely the “difference principle,” which entails maximizing the economic expectations of the least advantaged social groups. This important principle requires that any just economic system minimize the range of differences in people’s type and level of life that result from differences in natural talents and abilities. The difference principle does not lead to radical equality or uniform equality, i.e., the leveling of incomes. For example, it is digestible and acceptable to this extent that a surgeon’s income be higher than that of a simple laborer, but the theory of justice requires that such inequalities not lead to the worsening of the situation of the least advantaged or deprived individuals in society. In other words, Rawls seeks to have the economic system arranged in such a way that, in its structure, priority is given to the lives of the least advantaged or most deprived members of society.

A correct understanding of the difference principle depends on considering it in connection with the preceding principles; because these principles carry significant distributive consequences that include basic rights and liberties, as well as constraints on wealth and income to ensure fair equality of opportunity. In this respect, it can be said that the central issue of distributive justice is determining limits on the optimal use of private property. According to the neoliberal or libertarian view, individuals should exercise the right to personal property regardless of the extent to which this right affects the freedom, and generally the lives, of others. In contrast, Rawls emphasizes that the right to personal property is acceptable only within the framework of preserving individual dignity and autonomy. Hence, the absolute right to private property is not counted among the inherent rights of persons and, therefore, is not considered a precondition for the development of citizens' moral and intellectual capacities.

Thus, the principles of "justice as fairness" are egalitarian: the first principle is that of equal basic liberties, and the second principle encompasses equality of opportunity and the setting of an equality threshold (=the difference principle). The difference principle—which concerns maximizing the economic expectations of the least advantaged individuals and social groups—articulates the most important component of Rawls's theory of distributive justice. Rawls says that differences in desert should not be a basis for differences in the distribution of social advantages. The reason for this is that individuals' deserts are the product of factors for which they are not responsible. In fact, a large part of individuals' ability or capacity to achieve success in society is the product of family background, education, and other environmental factors that some individuals possess and others do not. These are factors in whose creation individuals play no role. Rawls goes even further and says that individuals' innate (or natural) talents, which lead to vast differences in their standard of living, are not of their own making. We are simply born with such talents, and therefore, individuals' luck or fortune should not become a factor for enjoying more social advantages. The final step in Rawls's argument is that even differing efforts should not be the basis for differences in rewards. Rawls says that the motivation and degree of effort individuals exert are themselves an important function of environmental factors and natural talents. Therefore, even differences in individuals' efforts are often the result of differences in circumstances and contexts for which individuals have no role or responsibility.

The Social Contract

In order to defend the two principles of justice, Rawls rethinks the "social contract" tradition of Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, and Kant. According to this tradition, the most correct method for organizing a society is for its members to reach an agreement about it in a hypothetical situation. In this regard, Rawls asks us to imagine a hypothetical state he calls the "original position," in which we choose the principles of justice governing society. It is assumed that in the initial situation, individuals as free and equal persons can engage in fair social interaction and can also, as autonomous individuals, choose the meaning and end of their own lives. In such a situation, any distinguishing factor between persons such as race, gender, religion, and class position plays no role in our conception of justice. This is because we are fundamentally behind a "veil of ignorance" regarding these distinctions, meaning we are completely unaware of them. Behind this veil of ignorance, all the attributes that distinguish us from one another vanish, and only our inherent common capacities as free and equal individuals remain.

Rawls believes that in an “original (or initial) position,” individuals would choose his two principles of justice. Suppose that in such a position (and behind the veil of ignorance), you wish to select principles and rules to regulate social relations. You do not know what social position you will occupy, but you consider yourself morally obligated to live according to the principles you choose. For this reason, you want the rules governing society to be such that they are acceptable to all members, regardless of their social standing or status. Rawls says that the two principles of “justice as fairness” provide precisely this guarantee. These principles state that the determined social rules and regulations can be accepted by all free and equal members of society. This is because the said principles guarantee basic liberties and fair equality of opportunity for all, and secure an acceptable standard of living, even for those in the least advantaged social position.

The theory of “justice as fairness” is a liberal interpretation of social justice, because it gives priority to the maximum of basic liberties; liberties that enable individuals to freely act upon their moral-religious beliefs, decide upon their values, and choose the type and manner of life they desire. This theory also emphasizes a market based on free competition—as opposed to a state-controlled market. Rawls’s theory of justice is a democratic theory because it requires that the basic institutions governing society guarantee equal basic rights—including the right to political participation—for all citizens, and also provide them with equal opportunities in education and employment. This theory is egalitarian, because in addition to preserving and securing equal basic liberties and fair equality of opportunity, it entails maximizing the benefits and advantages for the least advantaged members of society.

۱- Michael Marmot, Status Syndrome: How your Social Standing Directly Affects Your Health (Holt  Paperbacks, 2005).