Migration of Iranians

A significant number of Iranians are either dreaming of migration or taking steps toward it. Some have already obtained their visas and will soon leave their homeland. In organizations and companies, universities, and among friends and acquaintances, there are many people who have already left, or whose spirits have left while they remain here, living in limbo between staying and leaving.
 
Understanding the causes and motivations behind this phenomenon is important. Some say that such a phenomenon does not require research or reports because everything is already clear; to some extent, they are right. But research and reports express what we see and feel in the language of data, numbers, and measured realities. They prevent denial, issue warnings, and call for action.
 
The report presented here, titled “Iranian Migration: Causes and Motivations,” is the outcome of a study conducted in Tir 1402 (June–July 2023). I published a summary of this report in the form of a podcast for دغدغه ایران in autumn 1403 (2024); and now the complete report is presented here.

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Summary of Findings

The main characteristics and findings of this study, based on the analysis of 11,157 questionnaires distributed and completed online between 30 June and 11 July 2023, are as follows:

1. Nineteen percent of the questionnaire respondents (2,116 people) are individuals who have migrated and are living outside Iran;
81 percent (9,041 people) responded to the questionnaire from inside Iran.

2. Only 16.7 percent of respondents living in Iran do not think about migration at all. Nearly the same proportion (15.1 percent) not only think about migration but have also taken practical steps toward it.

3. Among the 2,116 people who have migrated and answered the questionnaire from outside Iran, 20.8 percent intend to return.

4. The majority of those whose migration has become certain or who have taken practical steps toward migration (between 50 and 60 percent) work in Iranian organizations and companies. Therefore, it is entirely natural that migration creates pressure on the supply of human resources for Iranian companies and organizations.

5. An individual’s attitudes toward broad variables such as “assessment of the economic situation,” “view of Iran,” and “the benefits of migration for personal life” have a much greater impact on migration decisions than variables related to the person’s workplace organization.

6. As people’s age increases, they become closer to the option “I do not think about migration,” while higher education and income strengthen the options of taking steps toward migration. The most valuable human capital is currently migrating.

7. Although the three variables of age, highest educational degree, and respondent income are factors influencing migration decisions, their impact is very limited. Variables related to respondents’ attitudes toward broad economic issues and the benefits of migration for their personal lives remain the main factors explaining migration decisions.

8. Iranian migrants, when they were working in Iranian companies and organizations, had a greater sense of distributive justice compared with those currently working in organizations and companies inside Iran.

9. The average sense of distributive justice among those migrants who left the country from the beginning of 1397 (March 2018) onward is significantly lower than among those who migrated before 1397.

10. The level of perceived threat regarding job security differs significantly between migrants who left after 1396 (March 2017) and those who migrated before 1392 (March 2013). In other words, as we approach the end of the 1390s decade, the average feeling of threat arising from a lack of job security has increased.

11. Those who migrated after 1396 evaluate the share of organizational factors in their migration decision as significantly greater than those who migrated before 1396. The closer we get to the final years of the 1390s decade, the greater the role of organizational factors becomes in the migration decisions of those who have left.

12. Groups who migrated before 1392 and between 1392 and 1397 have similar assessments of both economic and social conditions. However, the assessment of the third group—those who migrated after 1397—is more negative than that of both other groups.

13. Only 1.7 percent of respondents have a positive assessment of the quality of the relationship between people and the government.

14. Those who migrated before 1392 have the lowest average score regarding “the benefits of life abroad for personal life.” The difference between this group and the two groups of those who migrated between 1392 and 1399 and those who migrated after 1399 is significant. The second and third groups do not differ significantly from each other; more importantly, the third group—those who migrated after 1399—assesses the benefits of migration for personal life more positively than all three other groups.

15. The strongest perception of the benefits of migration for personal life is found among the fourth group, namely those who migrated after 1399.

16. The closer the respondent’s migration date is to the present, the more negative their view of Iran becomes.

17. The closer individuals are to leaving the country through practical steps or finalized migration plans, the younger they tend to be.

18. The most positive assessment of the economic situation belongs to the group that has migrated and intends to return. This group assesses the economic situation significantly more positively than all other groups. Those who have migrated and do not intend to return also have a more positive assessment of the economic situation compared with all groups inside the country.

19. The assessment of social conditions among those inside Iran who have taken practical steps toward migration is even more negative than that of those who have migrated and do not intend to return.

Mohammad Fazeli and Bahram Salavati

Azar 1403 (November–December 2024)