Much Ado About Nothing

Post-writing Introduction: This piece, along with other writings by several philosophy researchers from various academic institutions, was submitted to Shargh newspaper to assess the scholarly competence of Abdolhossein Khosropanah. Due to page limitations, it was decided that the articles would be published over several issues, and for the first issue, after the removal of a piece on Abdolhossein Khosropanah's plagiarism penned by Amirhossein Khodaparast, three articles by three other authors were published on the Thought page of Shargh newspaper on February 24, 2018. The publication of the remaining articles was first delayed by the newspaper for reasons that are almost known, and then cancelled. In the meantime, analyses were written based on the presupposition that the examination of Khosropanah's scholarly record was carried out solely by philosophy researchers belonging to a single institution and with sinister, mysterious objectives. Based on this presupposition, strange conclusions were also drawn about the hidden hands behind the scenes, conclusions that were entirely devoid of truth. After the publication of those three articles in Shargh newspaper and the publication of the plagiarism article on the Sedanet website , Khosropanah and others wrote pieces in cyberspace which, insofar as they related to the content of those four articles, were considered their natural right. But alas, in the midst of this, Mr. Khosropanah lost control of his pen and launched vulgar attacks on Twitter against one of the authors, who was the child of a martyr. The writer of these lines defers the examination and evaluation of the responses given to those four articles to another occasion and presents below the detailed version of his submission to Shargh newspaper.

The Difficulty of Critiquing the Project of Islamizing the Humanities

For one who lives in the present day and hears the daily news of scientific and research activities and budgets in the humanities in general and in the field of philosophy in particular, speaking about the dimensions of the project of the Islamization of (human) sciences is probably tedious. But perhaps for a potential reader who reads this text in another era and does not live in this atmosphere, mentioning what their predecessors experienced may not be inappropriate.

The project of Islamizing the university, curricula, professors, etc., has been pursued under various titles over the past four decades, but this project underwent an important turn at one point. The turn occurred when academic institutions, from universities to research centers, moved beyond the elite stage and reached the stage of mass production, a time when every small neighborhood and town had a large university or research institute. In this time of abundance and plenty, two events took place. One was that many who were not originally from the university entered the academic system. Of course, this entry was not of the kind of adding ordinary members to this system. Some newcomers struck up the tune that academic environments had until then been West-oriented and West-struck, and that it was necessary to cast a new design within them and transform them into institutions for defining and strengthening the "insider" identity against the "other"[1]. The second was that the number of humanities students had now greatly increased following the overall rise in student numbers, and this point became salient for those who considered the existing humanities unsuitable for the country: why should the country incur such costs and, with its own hands, waste its budget on corrupting the future generation? These factors, and of course others, caused the emphasis to shift from Islamizing the "university" to Islamizing "knowledge" itself.

A look at the statements of many advocates of the project to Islamize the (human) sciences shows that this project is, in its essence, “identitarian,” meaning that it seeks to emphasize the “us” versus “them” (Westerners) dichotomy and thereby provide “us” with an identity in opposition to “them.” The claim is that we are self-sufficient and self-reliant in everything, even in the content of the (human) sciences, and that in addition to agriculture, economy, and industry, we can also supply the content of the sciences we need—content that is fundamentally different from the content of conventional sciences. The anti-Western nature of this program and its need for support from governing institutions is something explicitly pointed out in many writings on this subject; for example, Abdolhossein Khosropanah has said: “Religious science or the Islamization of knowledge is one of the approaches to confronting the modern West…” (“Explanation and Analysis of the Theory of Knowledge by Guardianship,” Methodology of the Humanities, no. 71, 1391, 10) and “One of the concerns of the Islamic Republic of Iran system and Islamic scholars goes back to the category of religious science. The Cultural Revolution Headquarters, which today is referred to as the Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution, sought to devise solutions regarding the Islamization of universities and sciences at the beginning of the revolution’s victory; unfortunately, after nearly three decades, it is still limited to sloganeering, and the motivation for producing religious science has been extinguished” (“Pathology of the Denial of Religious Science,” Islamic University, no. 2, 1387, 88).

But critics of this project face several problems and concerns in expressing their critiques. First, criticizing something that bears the adjective “Islamic” in its title is no easy task. Second, at least in some cases, what the advocates of this project have said is so simplistic that, as that noble critic put it, it lies “prior to critique.” Finally, engaging with such statements inadvertently amounts to fanning the flames of that identitarian project based on distinguishing us from others, which, in the view of some critics, seems fundamentally indefensible. In such a situation, the critic constantly faces the dilemma of whether to fulfill their scholarly duty in critiquing sometimes confused statements or their moral duty not to reinforce the belief that we are a breed apart in today’s world.

The author of these lines has chosen a middle path in critiquing Abdolhossein Khosropanah’s statements on the Islamization of the human sciences: first, to analyze the discourse governing one of his relatively lengthy writings on the subject (“The Wisdom-Ijtihadi Model of the Human Sciences,” Javidan Kherad, new series, no. 19, Summer 1390, 29-66). In this piece, which is relatively more comprehensive than other instances, he has presented his accepted model in a journal of which he was the managing editor. The aim of this discourse analysis is to show in what world the author lives, what his notions and presuppositions about science, philosophy, and academic work are, and what conceptions he has of himself. Such an undertaking in analyzing writings related to identitarian projects is perhaps more important than analyzing the claims of those texts. Then, in the second part, it will address some of the text’s claims and offer substantive critiques.[2]

The Author’s Lifeworld

The Us/Them Dichotomy

As mentioned, the project of Islamizing the human sciences relies in many cases on creating an us/them dichotomy. Regardless of the debate about the precision of such a distinction and its degree of success in managing the country’s affairs and policymaking, it seems that the academic and even seminary tradition has been that in the realm of science, and especially in the context of philosophy—a discipline whose practitioners consider themselves followers of reason—what is the focus of attention and discussion is the content of arguments and discourses, not their belonging to sometimes meaningless and sometimes imprecise categories such as Western/Eastern, secular/religious, and so on. In many parts of the text under consideration, the author clearly shows that such labels and titles are more important to him than the content of statements, and he considers merely labeling a system or philosophy as Western sufficient reason for rejecting it, or merely labeling a position as Islamic sufficient reason for accepting it.

در ادامه، تنها به چند نمونه از چنین دوگانه‌سازی‌هایی اشاره می‌کنیم.[3] «نگارنده این الگو را در ذیل جریان عقلانیت اسلامی ... با بهره‌گیری از نظریه فلسفه فلسفه اسلامی و حکمت خودی (حکمت نوین اسلامی) تعریف کرده است. جریان عقلانیت اسلامی درصدد است تا با تأسیس حکمت نوین اسلامی، یعنی حکمت خودی و توسعه فلسفه اسلامی به عرصه‌های فلسفه‌های مضاف به علوم و امور، نظام موضوعات فلسفی جامعی را به دست آورد» (30)، «علم ... در فلسفۀ غرب به معنای «باور صادق موجه» است. علم در فلسفه علوم تجربی با رویکرد پوزیتیویستی ... به علومی اطلاق می‌شود که با روش تجربی و حسی تحصیل شده است» (31)، «فلسفۀ اسلامی به سبب غنایی که دارد، بسیاری از مباحث هستی‌شناختی، معرفت‌شناختی و ... را در بر دارد» (38)، «معرفت در معرفت‌شناسی اسلامی، اعم از معرفت در نگاه معرفت‌شناسان غربی یعنی: باور صادق موجه است» (40)، «دین مبین اسلام بر این پیش‌فرض‌ها تأثیرگذار است و همچنین به سبب کامل بودن دین مبین اسلام و غنای فلسفه اسلامی، بسیاری از پیش‌فرض‌های علوم انسانی در دین اسلام وجود دارد. ... همچنین آموزه‌های اسلامی قابلیت این را دارد که در عرض پارادایم‌های غربی در علوم انسانی، روش‌شناسی خاصی به نام روش‌شناسی اجتهادی را عرضه کند» (46)، «اشکالی که مدل‌های گوناگون عقلانیت در تاریخ تفکر اسلامی داشته‌اند این است که هر یک از آن مدل‌ها، یا عقل‌گرای محض یا تحت تأثیر تجربه‌گرایی غرب، تجربه‌گرا یا نص‌گرای صرف یا شهودگرایی مطلق شده‌اند. عقلانیت اسلامی ناب، هیچ یک از این چهار روش را به‌تنهایی و به‌طور مطلق و محض نمی‌پذیرد» (51)، «جامعیت اسلام، بیانگر مکتب رفتاری و اجتماعی است که از نظام انسان‌شناختی و نظام ارزشی اسلام به دست می‌آید» (53)، «پارادایم‌های فلسفی سکولار عبارت از عقل‌گرایی، تجربه‌گرایی، فلسفه استعلایی، پوزیتیویسم، اگزیستانسیالیسم، پدیدارشناسی و فلسفه تحلیلی است» (59).

همیشه راه سومی هست

نویسنده چنان سخن می‌گوید که گویی به بصیرت‌هایی مهم دست یافته است، بصیرت‌هایی که پیشینیان به‌کل از آن غافل بوده‌اند. از این‌رو، خود را مؤسس و بنیان‌گذار راه‌ها و نگاه‌ها و نظریه‌های زیادی می‌داند (از جمله «حکمت نوین اسلامی» که نمونه‌اش در بخش قبل آمد). اما با نگاهی به آنچه او دستاوردهای خود در این وادی می‌شمارد نکته‌ای جالب آشکار می‌شود. الگوی تکرارشونده این است که نویسنده دو موضع مختلف و احیاناً متناقض را که پیشینیان دربارۀ موضوعی اتخاذ کرده‌اند، اغلب بدون دقت کافی، ذکر می‌کند و آنگاه بدون اینکه دریافته باشد چرا قبلاً کسی سعی نکرده است یک «واو» ساده میان آنها بگذارد و موضع ترکیبی سومی درست کند، مدعی می‌شود نگارنده موضع مختاری دارد که عبارت است از اینکه هم حق با طرف اول است و هم با طرف دوم. چنین است که در بسیاری موارد نویسنده با ساده‌انگاری می‌پندارد این راه سوم و ارزان‌قیمت همیشه در دسترس است و لابد پیشینیان عقلی ناقص داشته‌اند که امری به این بداهت را درنیافته‌اند. البته ذکر این نکته لازم است که در تاریخ فلسفه فیلسوفان بزرگی نظریۀ خود را از راه تلفیق دو موضع ازپیش‌موجود ساخته و پرداخته‌اند. اما چنین تلفیق‌هایی نیازمند شناخت دقیق مواضع پیشین، عرضۀ راهکاری برای رفع تناقض میان آنها و سپس ساخت پیکره‌ای سازگار از معارف است. آنچه در مقالۀ مورد اشارۀ ما انجام شده است فرسنگ‌ها با چنین ظرافت‌هایی فاصله دارد و در بیشتر موارد اقدامی مکانیکی است در چسباندن دو نظریۀ متعارض به یکدیگر بدون تفطن به اینکه اگر کار به این سادگی بود لابد میان پیشینیان هم انسانی باهوش یافت می‌شد.

در ادامه، تنها به چند نمونه از چنین عطف متعارض‌هایی اشاره می‌کنیم.[4] «نگارنده به همین منظور تلاش کرده است تا تعریف فلسفه را از دانش احکام وجود به دانش احکام «وجود انضمامی انسان» تغییر دهد» (39)، «معیار شناخت از نظر نگارنده، نظریه «بداهت نظام‌مند» یا «مبناگرایی منسجم کارآمد» است» (40)، «نگارنده به بسترگرایی واقع‌گرایانه در علوم انسانی رفتاری و اجتماعی معتقد است» (42)، «نگارنده در تدوین حکمت نوین اسلامی تلاش کرده تا تمام فلسفه‌های مضاف به حقایق را با رویکرد اسلامی در حکمت خودی مطرح کند» (47)، «اعتقاد نگارنده بر این است که در علوم طبیعی و انسانی دینی باید از روش نقل دینی یعنی قرآن و سنت نیز بهره برد. ما می‌خواهیم به این‌جا برسیم که علاوه بر سه روش تجربه و عقل و شهود، وحی نیز در روش‌شناسی علوم تجربی و کشف واقع و فایده، نقش مؤثری دارد» (49)، «معیار صدق، معیاری است مرکب از بداهت، انسجام و کارکرد که به صورت طولی از بداهت شروع می‌شود و به انسجام و در نهایت کارکرد نظریه می‌انجامد» (51)، «نگارنده بر این باور است که علاوه بر به‌کارگیری نظریه بداهت و در طول آن، استفاده از نظام منسجم معرفتی، باید در طول آن‌ها، از نظریه فایده‌گرایی بهره برد» (54)، «روش مطلوب نگارنده، عبارت از روش‌شناسی اجتهادی است. این روش‌شناسی با بهره‌گیری از روش‌های کمی و کیفی همراه با مکتب رفتاری، اجتماعی می‌تواند به شناخت در علوم انسانی دست یابد» (55).

جهان مبهم اصطلاحات

نویسنده در جای‌جای متن، خصوصاً زمانی که از اصطلاحات نظام‌های فلسفی رایج و بالاخص از اصطلاحات مربوط به فلسفۀ علم استفاده می‌کند، نشان می‌دهد که درک درست و دقیقی از این اصطلاحات ندارد و به یکی از مهارت‌های اصلی دانشجویان فلسفه که تلاش برای ایضاح مفهومی است مجهز نشده است. او ناشیانه اصطلاحات را، حتی گاه جای هم و به‌اشتباه، به کار می‌برد. این ضعف در فهم اصطلاحات کلیدی سبب می‌شود درک او از نظام‌های فکری در بسیاری موارد سطحی و ناقص بماند و آنچه او به عنوان خلاصۀ مکتبی فکری نقل می‌کند یا حرفی پیش‌پاافتاده یا آشکارا نادرست باشد. احتمالاً همین نکته است که سبب می‌شود او به‌راحتی بتواند به استراتژی همیشه راه سومی هست متوسل شود.

In what follows, we will point out only a few examples of such muddled thinking.[5] “For Hume, a pattern expresses a regularity. On this basis, a pattern in technology means a model or a set of rules by applying which one can produce something or a part of something. A cookie cutter or a design pattern in architecture or computer science are considered examples of patterns” (34-35), “Explanation can be divided into two types: idealist and realist explanation. Idealist explanation is a kind of explanation that does not seek to discover reality and only attends to the function and utility of phenomena. Realist explanation, like empiricism and rationalism, is a kind of explanation that seeks to discover reality” (41), “According to formalist methodology, space and time have no effect on the identification of phenomena, and by knowing the appearance of a phenomenon and using universal laws, one can discover the phenomenon. For example, the location of iron has no effect on its expansion due to heat. Hence, science is unified, and there is no difference in methodology between all empirical and human sciences. Individuals such as Francis Bacon, John Locke, John Stuart Mill, and Popper are realist formalists. They are realists because they believe that various methodologies lead human beings to reality, and they are formalists because temporal and spatial contexts play no role in knowledge. Second. Contextualist methodology: According to this methodology, space and time have an effect on the identification of phenomena ... Adherents of this type of methodology do not accept the unity of sciences and believe a distinction must be made between the human and empirical sciences. The author believes in realist contextualism in the behavioral and social human sciences” (42), “Paradigms are incommensurable ... From Kuhn’s perspective, if a paradigm can answer more questions and solve more puzzles, it replaces the previous paradigm” (43), “The critical school ... combined explanation and interpretation and valued quantification and qualification” (44), “In the author’s belief, when we observe the history of scientific theories, we realize that some propositions of the empirical sciences are revelatory of reality; however, their revelatory nature is confirmatory, and induction and experience cannot prove the discovery of reality. Like the composition of water from oxygen and hydrogen; some other propositions of the sciences are theoretical terms and there is no method to prove their representation of reality, they are propositions that merely answer some scientific questions, such as the theory of gravitational forces ... Some propositions are realist and others are instrumentalist and only solve the practical problems of scientists” (48), “It is worth mentioning that in using instrumental presuppositions and applying mathematics, one should not suffice only with the functions used in the natural sciences. The human being is a free-willed creature who engages in behavioral and social activities along the divine will. So the equation: y=f(x), where y only represents the dependent variable, f represents the function rule, and x represents the independent variable, is not sufficient for explaining human social behaviors and activities. Anthropology needs a new equation and, in addition to the two components x and y, requires two other components, namely z and e. x represents the Almighty God, y represents the human being and human will, z represents the constraints of society and nature, and e represents the goal”[6] (55-56), “Modernism is rationalist and empiricist and believes in epistemic realism ... although it does not accept revelation” (63).

The Conception of the Academic Article

Every author, in the course of presenting their material, through the choice of what to include in the article and what to leave out, the references they cite, the manner of referencing sources, the classifications offered, the role and contribution they claim for themselves in advancing the discussion, the contribution they grant to others in advancing the discussion, and the degree of certainty or hesitation they place behind their claims, demonstrates what conception they have of the genre of academic article writing, to what extent they understand its difference from other genres such as lectures and oratory, what kind of beings they assume their audience to be, and overall, where they see their own position in the world of science (at least within the domain of the problem under investigation).

The article in question is very interesting in this respect. First, the author tries to show that he knows a great many “things” and can talk about all these “things” in a single article. In this article, just a few of the topics that are briefly touched upon are as follows: the nature of science, the nature of paradigm, the nature of model, the nature of religion, the process of knowledge production, absolute and relative philosophy, types of schools in the methodology of the humanities, types of paradigms in the humanities, modern methods (!), postmodern methods (!), ijtihadi methodology, the philosophical system of Islam, science-related presuppositions, religion-related presuppositions, epistemology-related presuppositions, the anthropological system of Islam, the value system of Islam, the behavioral and social school system of Islam, the methodological system, Tylor’s theory of animism, Skocpol’s theory of revolutions, Nikki Keddie’s theory of revolution, Foucault’s theory of revolution, Hobbes’s political theory, and so on. Yet all of these “things” are dealt with only in passing, and in many cases incorrectly. Amidst many of these passing references, the author also claims that all predecessors have erred regarding the issue and that his third way is an original and chosen position. Mentioning just one example of what is said about Foucault in the article—without any citation whatsoever—and how these statements are taken to support the author’s idea suffices: “Foucault’s theory of revolution: To explain the Islamic Revolution of Iran, he considers one of the prominent characteristics of Iranian society to be its Alavid nature. Hence, Foucault identifies Shi‘ism and spiritualism as one of the prominent features of that society. Therefore, a society that is Shi‘a and spiritualist cannot accept a modernist system that lacks spirituality. The result is that the Islamic Revolution of Iran stood against the Shah due to spiritualism and the Shi‘i spirit ... Mr. Foucault, due to his inclination toward postmodernism, stated that spiritualism caused the emergence of the revolution. The result is that every theory depends on its methodology and presuppositions” (58).

But the manner of citation in this article and the sources cited are another story altogether. Many of the citations are formal and imprecise. For example, at the end of the sentence “Science ... in Western philosophy means justified true belief” (31), a reference is given to Jonathan Dancy’s English book An Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology, page 22. Leaving aside the inaccuracy and the conflation of the two concepts of science and knowledge in this sentence, it is clear that, firstly, no one even slightly familiar with philosophy—let alone Dancy—would claim that “in Western philosophy” we have such a definition, because Western philosophy has hundreds of branches, schools, and thinkers. Secondly, the tripartite definition of knowledge is now common knowledge, and every introductory epistemology book, including Dancy’s, tries to show the student what has happened to it with the introduction of the Gettier problem and whether this definition is still defensible or not. On the other hand, sometimes when a point requires a citation, its source is nowhere to be found. For instance, just as one example, on page 33 we read that the word paradigm is derived from a certain Greek word and appears in Plato’s works. Clearly, such a claim requires citing a primary or secondary source, neither of which is provided. Another phenomenon is bulk citations. Again, just for one example, on pages 33 and 34, the author speaks for more than a page about the concept of paradigm without any citation, and then at the end, in footnote number 11, suddenly cites five sources simultaneously, including page numbers.

The author’s fondness for classification is also interesting. The classifications presented are generally the epitome of confusion, disorder, and chaos, and sometimes neither the basis of division is clear nor the reason for such distinctions. One example is on page 59: “Secular philosophical paradigms consist of rationalism, empiricism, transcendental philosophy, positivism, existentialism, phenomenology, and analytic philosophy,” and another example on page 43, which first speaks of paradigm, then we arrive at framework, and then at method: “Existing frameworks in the humanities are categorized into three types: philosophical framework, school-based framework, and methodological framework. The methodological framework, in one division, is divided into two types, modern and postmodern, and each is divided into sub-branches. Modern methods consist of the explanatory method, the interpretive method, and the critical method, and postmodern methods consist of: the discursive method, the post-structuralist method, and the philosophical hermeneutics method, and so on. Modern methods emerged when the legitimacy of the church-state underwent a crisis, and postmodern methods took shape after the First and Second World Wars, when the crisis of modernism materialized.”

The last quotation also reveals something else. The written text resembles a collage, a collection of notes and clippings that the author has gathered from various sources. These materials appear one after another without having taken coherent shape in his mind or language, and the author's role in many instances is to add "then," "therefore," and "consequently," and then to connect these fragments to one another. It is interesting that sometimes what he presents as the conclusion of the preceding section was not at all present in the material discussed (for example, see page 35, what comes after "The upshot of the matter is that..."). Such a cut-and-paste method is familiar to the writer of these lines, who has repeatedly seen it in the theses of students who have not grasped the material but have merely taken notes and, without knowing the weight and importance of each note or where to deploy it, have strung the writings together. Of course, in this article, the author occasionally sets aside the trembling of hand and pen and, conflating the scholarly article with the sermon, adds things of his own, by virtue of access to "the truth of matters," in the language of command and decree: "The truth of the matter is that one must use both quantitative and qualitative methods in understanding human behavioral and social phenomena. Therefore, neither explanatory nor interpretive paradigms alone suffice for understanding the theories of the human sciences" (54-55).

The Taboo of Thought

Another interesting phenomenon is visible in the author's lifeworld. There is something that the author, time and again, relevantly and irrelevantly, without ever having defined it or stated its harms, warns the reader against. This is the author's red line, and the white lines of the text suggest that it was apparently written to find a way to escape this devastating calamity: relativism. Among other places, on pages 32, 42, 49, 51, 53, 54, and 64, the author repeatedly claims that his view does not lead to relativism, or that a certain theory is rejected because it leads to relativism. Regardless of the fact that we do not know what relativism means from the author's perspective, and that he likely has an excessively simplistic understanding in defining this concept, perhaps defining it as "whatever anyone says is correct," one might ask why, in the project of the Islamization of the human sciences, relativism receives so much attention rather than the text of religious verses and traditions. In the second part, we will point out whether the author has ultimately managed to avoid relativism in his proposed scheme or not.

A Misconception of the Human Sciences

It is interesting to examine what image and conception of the human sciences the author has in mind when he claims to be Islamizing them. In various places in the text, the author explains that what exists today under the name of the human sciences (what he calls the realized human sciences) consists of three components: "The realized human sciences can be considered a three-sided triangle[7], one side of which ... describes the realized human being, and another side expresses the desired human being; this desired human being is derived from a specific anthropology. The third side of the human sciences consists of the recommendations that seek to bring the realized human being closer to the desired human being. These recommendations are derived from the legal and ethical system" (32). It is evident that such a definition, which was probably formulated with an eye toward jurisprudence as one of the Islamic human sciences, is neither comprehensive nor exclusive, nor even a roughly accurate description of reality. The author, of course, does not explain exactly what he considers the human sciences to be, but if we take anthropology (ethnography), for example, as one of the common and accepted human sciences, it in no way (at least in its current and prevalent trends) provides a description of the desired human being, and a fortiori, makes no recommendations for bringing the existing human being closer to the desired one. As it happens, if anthropology were to measure the tribe it studies against the criteria of its own civilization and culture, it would commit a categorical error. In archaeology, history, linguistics, political science, and so on, as established branches of the human sciences, one or more of the above components are absent. The same is true even in the behavioral and social sciences such as environmental studies, communications, geography, information science, library science, public relations, and so on.

Rhetorical Devices of the Text

By the rhetorical devices of a text we mean the methods, tricks, and tools by which the author seeks to cover up the argumentative and substantive weaknesses of their discourse and to persuade the reader that they have received a sound statement, or that they need not worry about its correctness and precision. By scrutinizing the rhetorical devices of a text, one can discern what image and conception each author has of themselves or wishes to construct (for instance, paternal, authoritarian, humble, a lover of truth, one who has attained the truth, etc.) and what kind of beings they assume their audience to be (for instance, beginners, in need of guidance, thinkers, experts, etc.).

It is interesting to point out two interrelated rhetorical devices in the writing under discussion. One is resorting to a discourse that is managerial and seemingly erudite, but generally devoid of precision, in which the terminology and literature favored by managers and common among politicians and executives are used, and through the deployment of chic, ceremonial terms, the weakness of the speaker's argument is meant to be concealed. This literature is abundantly found today in high-level documents and the speeches of executive managers. Just as one example, on page 56 we read: "Using interrogative presuppositions derived from theories and events: If we can extract more questions from the various events and theories of the age, more answers can be extracted. Using semantic presuppositions: The philosophical, anthropological, axiological, and doctrinal systems of Islam help the researcher so that questions derived from interrogative presuppositions can be answered with the help of instrumental presuppositions. The undesirable presuppositions that must be avoided are the imposed semantic presuppositions derived from secular systems, which are considered obstacles to understanding reality and will not answer the problems of Islamic society."

The second device, which, as it happens, also belongs more to the domain of managers, document drafters, and policymakers than to philosophers, is the use of diagrams and charts to provide a model. In the conclusion section of the article on pages 60 and 61, there are two full-page diagrams, in one of which the hierarchy of knowledge in secular systems is depicted, and in the other, the same hierarchy in the ḥikamī-ijtihādī model. These are diagrams that visually and practically show the stages of knowledge production, from the philosophical system to the production of the human sciences, in an algorithmic, step-by-step manner. Extracting such deliverables from philosophy is highly regarded by policymakers and budget allocators, who generally come from engineering and medical fields themselves and constantly ask what the human sciences are good for and what their "output" is. Employing the terminology of management disciplines (in all their branches) and industrial engineering in all domains, including the philosophical and theoretical, is a way that the audience of policymakers and budget allocators have found to sell their wares and secure funding for them. A detailed exposition of this phenomenon is beyond the scope of this writing, but its signs are readily visible in this text.

The Text's Claims

In the second part of this piece we will take a brief look at some of the substantive problems and difficulties of the project of the Islamization of the (human) sciences in general, and one problem with the article under consideration in particular. The first point is what the intra-religious basis for the Islamization of the (human) sciences is. There is, in principle, no reason that if we attach the prefix “Islamization” to any object, concept, or activity and speak of its Islamization, this entire project should be Islamic and acceptable to Islamic law. Perhaps the core teachings of Islam would caution us against uttering, employing, and pursuing a project called “the Islamization of astronautics.” The mere presence of the title “Islamic” in the name is no proof of its being Islamic. What is interesting, however, is that someone like Khosropanah, who wears the garb of religion, is more concerned with it not being relativistic than he is worried and anxious about whether such a scheme is monotheistic, Islamic, or lawful, or at least mentioning its intra-religious documentation in the margins of his speech. Without wishing to adopt a position, the author makes this minimal claim: it is not self-evident that the Islamization of the (human) sciences is itself an Islamic act, and justifying its Islamic character requires, at the very least, intra-religious documentation. If, as the advocates of this scheme claim, such a task is an urgent need of society, and if we consider Islam to be a comprehensive and eternal religion that has made provisions for all important human needs, then Khosropanah ought to have devoted a part of his writing to his primary specialty, namely the jurisprudential and religious examination of the matter, rather than to an incomplete and truncated review of all methodological frameworks in the social sciences, which lies outside his area of expertise.

The second point concerns the difference between Islam and Islamic civilization. Khosropanah’s emphasis in this article (for instance, page 47) is on using Sadra’s Transcendent Theosophy as a source for Islamization. Elsewhere, mention has also been made of Ibn Arabi’s thought system, the views of Iranian mystics, or the opinions of Avicenna and Suhrawardi. Here we are faced with a dilemma. If Islamization is to be carried out by referring to Islam, then its sources would, in principle, be the Quran, Hadith, and at most the Sirah, to which apparently no reference is seen in the text under review and which are secondary for the Islamizers. On the other hand, if our source is to be the heritage of Islamic civilization, then firstly it is not clear whether this heritage is itself Islamic or not, since, for example, the reception of Mulla Sadra’s work by jurists and his contemporaries indicates that the acceptance of his thought system in the Islamic world was no simple matter. The second point is that if the heritage of Islamic civilization in its broad sense is to be used, why, for instance, should the views of the multitude of Ash‘ari theologians be excluded from this circle? How and on what basis is the heritage of Islamic civilization to be sifted so that only that which is compatible with the accepted thought system in our society emerges from it?

اما نکتۀ سوم که بیشتر به متن مورد بررسی ما مربوط است دوگانگی و دوپارگی آشکاری است که در آن به چشم می‌خورد. مدعای اصلی خسروپناه در این نوشته، با حذف تمام زوائد و حاشیه‌های نامربوط و اصطلاح‌سازی‌ها، دو سخن اصلی است. پارۀ نخست چیزی است که آن را بخش سنتی نوشته می‌نامیم و اگرچه نویسنده ادعای تأسیس و ابداع در آن را دارد، عمدتاً برگرفته از تلقی‌ای است که بسیاری از فلاسفۀ مسلمان از نحوۀ کار و شکل‌گیری علم و فلسفه داشته‌اند، یعنی نوعی نگاه بداهت‌محورِ مبناگرایانه. خسروپناه این نگاه را (در صفحات 53 و 54) ذیل عنوان «رئالیسم شبکه‌ای» (نمونه‌ای از کلام پرطمطراق و نامگذاری نامناسب) در بخش «نظام روش‌شناختی» چنین شرح می‌دهد: عالم یا فیلسوف ابتدا کار را با بدیهیات اولیه آغاز می‌کند، سپس از آنها برخی بدیهیات ثانویه را استخراج می‌کند. بعد، بر مبنای این دو دسته امور بدیهی به گزاره‌ها و معارف نظری دست می‌یابد و چنین گزاره‌هایی را از بدیهیات اسنتناج می‌کند. در نتیجه، به منظومه‌ای از معارف صادق و منسجم دست می‌یابد. آنگاه با مبنا قرار دادن این منظومه سراغ گزاره‌هایی که از این منظومه قابل‌استنتاج نیست می‌رود و بر حسب اینکه آنها با این مجموعه هماهنگ‌اند یا با اهداف آن همخوانی دارند یا کارآیی و فایده دارند دربارۀ آنها تصمیم‌گیری می‌کند که آیا آنها را به منظومۀ خود بیفزاید یا نه. جدا از مشکلات مندرج در این پیشنهاد، از جمله ابهام در مرحلۀ آخر که باید دربارۀ هماهنگی و همخوانی و فایدۀ گزاره‌هایی غیر قابل‌استنتاج از یک مجموعه تصمیم گرفت، این پیشنهاد در بهترین حالت شکل توسعه‌یافتۀ نگاه مبناگرایانه و بداهت‌محور به نحوۀ شکل‌گیری معارف است: ما کار را از گزاره‌ها و احکام بدیهی (در هر شکلی از بداهت، اولی یا ثانوی) آغاز و معارف دیگر را از آنها استنتاج می‌کنیم و کاخ علم را بر مبنای آنها می‌سازیم. با این تبصره که تکلیف آنچه قابل‌استنتاج نیست از راه به‌کارگیری ملاک‌هایی مانند هماهنگی، همخوانی با اهداف و فایده‌مندی قابل‌تعیین است (نمونه‌ای از استراتژی همیشه راه سومی هست). سنتی بودن این پاره در همان تمرکز بر شروع از بدیهیات آن است. پیش از ادامۀ بحث ذکر این نکته خالی از لطف نیست که اگر کسی در حوزۀ علوم عقلی و تجربی بتواند ادعا کند که کار نظریه‌پرداز با بدیهیات آغاز می‌شود (که نمی‌شود!)، در حوزۀ علوم انسانی چنین ادعایی به‌غایت غریب است. مثال‌های خسروپناه در انتهای مقاله و تصریح مکرر خود ایشان دال بر این است که در این علوم پیش‌فرض‌ها و منظرهای نظریه‌پرداز دخیل‌اند و اصولاً آدمیان حقایق جهان اجتماعی را از پس عینک تعهدات و پیش‌فرض‌های اجتماعی، ایدئولوژیک، طبقاتی، جنسیتی و ... می‌بینند. عجیب است که چگونه نویسندۀ مقاله هم چنین نگاهی دارد و هم فکر می‌کند نگاه مبناگرایانه و بداهت‌محور را می‌توان حفظ کرد.

اما پارۀ دوم که آن را مدرن می‌خوانیم و خسروپناه مجدداً ادعای تأسیس در آن را دارد پیشنهادی است که احتمالاً به واسطۀ خواندن آرای دکتر مهدی گلشنی در باب تأثیر نظام‌های متافیزیکی بر نظریه‌پردازی در علوم تجربی به نوشته‌های خسروپناه راه یافته است. در اینجا بر نقش و اهمیت پیش‌فرض‌ها در کار علم‌ورزی (دست‌کم در علوم انسانی) تأکید می‌شود. طبق این تلقی، پیش‌فرض‌های نظریه‌پرداز در مواقع مختلف بر کار او اثرگذارند. اصولاً به همین دلیل است که خسروپناه علوم انسانی رایج در غرب را سکولار می‌داند، چرا که در آنها پیش‌فرض‌هایی سکولار در باب انسان وجود دارد. در مقابل، پیشنهاد ایشان جایگزینی این پیش‌فرض‌ها با چندین پیش‌فرض اسلامی در باب انسان و جهان و ارزش‌ها و ... است. به عبارت دیگر، خلاصۀ این بخش از سخن آن است که آنچه محقق و نظریه‌پرداز بدون استدلال و در مقام امر مفروض و نقطۀ شروع علم‌ورزی قبول می‌کند بر نظریه‌پردازی او اثر دارد. حتی بالاتر اینکه «دینی بودن پیش‌فرض‌ها، روش‌شناسی را دینی می‌کند و روش‌شناس دینی به نظریه‌های دینی در حوزۀ علوم انسانی می‌انجامد» (50). در اینجا صحت و دقت چنین تلقی‌ای را بررسی نمی‌کنیم و برای ادامه یافتن بحث آن را می‌پذیریم.

Now let us see whether these two parts are compatible with one another and whether they give off a whiff of relativism or not. The first point is that these two conceptions present two entirely different and perhaps contradictory pictures of how knowledge is produced, and placing an “and” between them will not solve the problem. The first says that the starting point for constructing knowledge is self-evident propositions. This means, first, that there are things called self-evident matters, and second, that they are such that reason, regardless of all differences including differences in presuppositions, can reach agreement upon them. In other words, in this scheme there is no place for the perspective and position of the theorist, and it is not the case that he views the world from a particular point, a point of view that makes some things self-evident to him and others non-self-evident, whereas if someone else viewed the world from another perspective, he might consider the first person’s self-evident matters non-self-evident and his non-self-evident matters self-evident. The starting point in the traditional conception is firm and agreeable: self-evident propositions. Whereas in the second conception, the use of the term self-evident is rightly avoided and presupposition is used instead. A presupposition is that which I, for the time being and provisionally, for various reasons including the perspective from which I view the world, consider the starting point of inquiry and in no need of argumentation, and I may not even be aware of its existence, while these same matters may not be among my colleague’s presuppositions. It is even possible that for me, at another time, my current presuppositions become problematic and need to be re-examined. In this way, the certainty and firmness that exists in a self-evident matter is by no means present in a presupposition, and the awareness we are expected to have of self-evident matters as a starting point does not apply to presuppositions. Speaking of the self-evident belongs to the traditional view of the system of knowledge, in which reason is the criterion for everything, the matters of the world are unambiguous and clear, and they can be known by the light of reason. At the opposite point, speaking of presuppositions belongs to a more recent view, in which reason has become an individual, contingent, historical, and evolving matter, which itself has dark and unargued points (presuppositions) that may not be shared among different intellects. Khosropanah has once again sought to overcome this duality by resorting to the “both this and that” strategy, whereas these two are not easily reconcilable, and each offers a completely different proposal regarding the architecture of knowledge and the manner of its construction.

Now let us ask whether his scheme has truly been able to demolish the suspicion of relativism. Relativism can be defined in various ways, but one definition, which happens to be accepted by defenders of relativism, is to contrast it with absolutism.[8] In the domain of knowledge, absolutism means the claim that there are judgments whose attribution of truth and falsity is not dependent on any perspective, position, or context, and like self-evident propositions, everyone, with any framework and perspective, can in principle reach agreement about them; an absolute agreement that will never be subject to revision. By adopting the traditional part of Khosropanah’s writing, one can be an absolutist, according to this definition. But an epistemic relativist is someone who believes that the attribution of truth and falsity to all epistemic items is always dependent on and relative to a specific position and perspective, and that with a change in this position and perspective, our epistemic judgments about truth and falsity may change. The modern part of Khosropanah’s writing happens to be consonant with such a view: what the Western theorist arrives at by taking his own presuppositions for granted is true and justified within that framework and from that perspective, but from the perspective and framework of someone who does not hold those presuppositions (the hypothetical Khosropanah), their truth and justification is open to question. It is not enough to constantly repeat, like Khosropanah, that I am a realist and I think my knowledge corresponds to reality. The opposing theorist may also think he is a realist and his judgments correspond to reality. Here, the relativist believes that the claim to realism by both sides is an internal claim that is, again, examinable within the framework of the perspective they have adopted. In a word, it seems difficult for someone like Khosropanah to speak of the possibility of alternative human sciences and at the same time consistently claim not to be a relativist but rather an absolutist. (Let us note that the opposite of relativism is absolutism, not realism.)

Moral of the Story

در پایان ذکر یک نکته خالی از لطف نیست. پیشنهادی در حد الگوی حکمی-اجتهادی خسروپناه، با این بضاعت فکری و محتوایی که بدون هیچ اغراق تنها به بخش‌هایی از آشفتگی‌های آن اشاره کردیم و خوانندۀ دقیق خود باید تمام سطور آن را بخواند تا در سرگیجه‌ای غریب غرق شود، مدت‌ها است از جانب ایشان در همایش‌ها و سخنرانی‌ها و نشست‌ها و مصاحبه‌ها و پروژه‌ها و پایان‌نامه‌ها و اخیراً در تلگرام و توییتر تکرار و تکرار و تکرار می‌شود. خسروپناه در مصاحبه‌ای دربارۀ الگوی پیشنهادی خود گفته است: «من این نظریه را در بین 80 نفر از اساتید کشورهای مختلف از جمله آمریکا، کشورهای شمال آفریقا و کشورهای شرق آسیا و سایر کشورها با ادیان و گرایش‌های مختلف مذهبی در مالزی مطرح کردم. خوشبختانه این نظریه در آنجا با اقبال عمومی مواجه شد و اکثر اساتید بر این باور بودند که این نظریه می‌تواند در علوم انسانی مورد استفاده قرار گیرد و راهگشای بسیاری از معضلات این رشته باشد.»[9] این نقل‌قول گویای حقیقتی جالب است. اینکه خسروپناه همچنان در پس ذهن خود تأیید «دیگران» را مهم‌تر و وزین‌تر از تأیید «ما» می‌داند و اگرچه طرحی برای جدایی هویت علمی ما از دیگران درافکنده است، اما به اقتضای واقعیت جهان پی برده است که برای اطمینان یافتن از علمی بودن نظریه‌ای باید آن را به جامعۀ علمی (که امیدواریم این 80 نفر از اعضای آن باشند) عرضه کرد. این همان وضعیتی است که ایشان در پروژۀ فکری خود به آن گرفتار است. ایشان در نهایت دریافته است که برای پرهیز از علوم انسانی رایج باید به ابزاری مفهومی متوسل شود که برخی از متفکران همان علوم انسانی چندین دهه پیش مطرح کرده‌اند: جدی گرفتن نقش پیش‌فرض‌ها در علم‌ورزی. خسروپناه نه این هنر را داشته است که چنین مفهومی را به‌درستی شرح دهد، نه توانسته است جایگاهی مناسب در نظام فکری خود برای آن فراهم کند و نه توانسته است بحث‌های مربوط به آن را گامی به جلو پیش ببرد. اگر یکی از این شقوق محقق شده بود و خسروپناه تنها نکوشیده بود از ابزار مفهومی خود به عنوان وسیله‌ای برای تفکیک هویتی ما از دیگران سود جوید، آنگاه سخن او راه خود را می‌گشود و نیازی به تکرار و حمایت بیرونی نداشت.

[1]. برای نمونه، در ابتدای انتصاب عبدالحسین خسروپناه به ریاست مؤسسۀ پژوهشی حکمت و فلسفۀ ایران در دومین دورۀ ریاست‌جمهوری محمود احمدی‌نژاد در سال 1390، در مطلبی با عنوان «عملیات هوابرد فلسفی» چنین نوشته شد: «این انتصاب البته حاوی پیام‌های مهم‌تری نیز هست؛ این که نظام اسلامی در جهاد نظری (نرم) با شاکله‌ی علم مدرن در حمله به خط اول علوم انسانی متوقف نمانده است و پا به عمق جبهه‌ی دشمن در علوم فلسفی نهاده است و بعید نیست که در عرض این جبهه نیز به سراغ علوم پایه، علوم پزشکی و پس از آن برود. ... این انتصاب به ساده‌گی به معنای توسعه‌ی راه‌برد عملیات نرم نظام اسلامی از درگیری جبهه‌ای با علم مدرن به کشاندن نبرد به عمق مناطق اشغالی است؛ و در میان همه‌ی پادگان‌های فلسفه‌ی اشغال‌گر مدرن (دانش‌کده‌ها و پژوهش‌کده‌ها) انجمن سلطنتی فلسفه بهترین آماج بود.» https://goo.gl/BFhxvC

[2]. آشکار است که آنچه در پی می‌آید در حکم نقد سایر نگاه‌ها و رویکردها به اسلامی‌سازی علوم (انسانی) نیست.

[3] . در سراسر این متن، آنچه از مقالۀ مورد نظر نقل می‌شود عیناً از همان مقاله گرفته شده است و انواع نادرستی‌های ویرایشی، نگارشی و محتوایی از نویسندۀ اصلی است.

[4] . شرح اینکه چرا در هر کدام از این موارد گذاشتن «واو» به‌راحتی میسر نیست مجالی فراخ‌تر می‌طلبد و در بسیاری موارد دلیل آن برای خوانندگان آشنا به فلسفه آشکار است.

[5] . بار دیگر، شرح محتوایی این بی‌دقتی‌ها و میزان انحراف آنها از تعاریف و اصطلاحات رایج برای خوانندگان آشنا به فلسفه ملال‌انگیز خواهد بود.

[6] . بدون شک این نقل‌قول دربارۀ نیاز به اضافه کردن دو متغیر z و e به انسان‌شناسی برندۀ جایزۀ «تمشک طلایی» در این مقاله است!

[7] . با مثلث دو ضلعی اشتباه نشود!

[8]. For example, see.

Bloor, David, ‘Epistemic Grace: Antirelativism as Theology in Disguise’, Common Knowledge (2007) 13 (2-3): 250-280.

[9]. https://goo.gl/5NtwCx

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Much Ado About Nothing

A Critique of the Project of the Islamization of the Humanities, the Case of Abdolhossein Khosropanah

Hossein Sheykh-Rezaee

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