Abstract

The present study examines the relationship between Pascal's Wager and the rationality of traditional religiosity. The question is whether, assuming the validity of Pascal's Wager, one can infer the rationality of traditional religiosity from it; or whether, on the contrary, Pascal's Wager is detrimental to the rationality of traditional religiosity and is logically incompatible with it. To this end, after expounding Pascal's Wager and providing a definition of traditional religiosity, the relationship between the two is discussed in two sections. The conclusion of this study is that Pascal's Wager not only fails to prove the rationality of traditional religiosity, but this argument, assuming its validity, is incompatible with traditional religiosity.

Introduction

One of the arguments put forward regarding belief in the existence of God is known as "Pascal's Wager" (Palmer, 1393: 523). Blaise Pascal was a 17th-century French mathematician, physicist, and philosopher. His argument belongs to the category of pragmatic (Khosravi Farsani and Akbari, 1390: 6), precaution-based, and utility-based reasons (Zadyousefi and Saeedimehr, 1394: 44; Khosravi Farsani and Akbari, 1390: 7).

In this category of reasons, the existence of God in the actual world is not argued for; because the presupposition is that the reasons presented for God's existence have flaws and cannot prove God's existence. Pragmatic reasons are advanced with the aim of providing rational justification for our belief in God's existence; that is, they argue that although God's existence has not been proven in the actual world, believing in God's existence is beneficial or expedient, and for this reason, such a belief is rational (Zadyousefi and Saeedimehr, 1394: 44).

In this research, we aim to examine the connection and relationship between the Wager argument and traditional religiosity, whose definition will follow. It is necessary to note that the main goal of the research is not to examine the validity of Pascal's Wager; rather, it is to examine whether, assuming its correctness, it can be used to prove the rationality of traditional religiosity or not. In other words, we want to see whether the Wager argument proves the rationality of traditional religiosity, fails to prove it, or, on the contrary, is logically incompatible with it.

To this end, we will first expound Pascal's Wager. Then we will provide a definition of traditional religiosity. Subsequently, we will attempt to determine the connection and relationship between the two. In this context, we will discuss two issues: one is whether the Wager argument has the capacity to prove the rationality of traditional religiosity or not. The other is whether this argument is compatible with traditional religiosity or not.

Pascal's argument has many opponents and proponents, and extensive discussions have formed around it. It has been said that in terms of fame and controversiality, this argument is the main rival of Anselm's ontological argument (Khosravi Farsani and Akbari, 1390: 7). Nevertheless, as far as we have investigated, no research has been conducted with the question of what connection and relationship the Wager argument, assuming its validity, could have with traditional religiosity.

Of course, a well-known objection has been raised in response to Pascal's argument, known by names such as the "many gods objection" (Palmer, 1393: 534-535), the "many claimants objection" (Palmer, 1393: 534-535), the "multiple gods objection" (Zadyousefi and Saeedimehr, 1394: 44), and the "many claimants critique" (Khosravi Farsani and Akbari, 1390: 13). This issue has a strong connection and similarity to the first part of our research; the difference is that in this objection, the main question is the rationality or irrationality of belief in God (Palmer, 1393: 534-537; Zadyousefi and Saeedimehr, 1394: 43-66; Khosravi Farsani and Akbari, 1390: 13-19); whereas here we are discussing the rationality of traditional religiosity; furthermore, unlike the above objection, we have not objected to the argument and have proceeded with the discussion assuming its correctness. In any case, we have not found the more central subject of this research, which appears in its second part, in any study; that is, proposing the possibility that Pascal's argument is incompatible with traditional religiosity.

The importance of discussing this argument and its relation to traditional religiosity lies in the fact that, firstly, Pascal’s reason has gained great importance and fame and has been controversial. Secondly, the overwhelming majority of the religious practice their faith in the manner of traditional religiosity. Thirdly, the foundations of traditional religiosity have always been a subject of discussion and dispute, and it is essentially for this reason that they have turned to pragmatic reasons such as Pascal’s reason, considering the theological foundations of the truth of religions to be unprovable or disputable.

Pascal’s Wager

The wager argument is known by Pascal’s name because he was the first to present a detailed formulation of it; however, this argument has a much longer history and, in the Islamic religious tradition, has also been reported from the Shia Imams. For example, it has been narrated from Imam Sadiq and Imam Reza that in a conversation with an atheist, they argued as follows: If God does not exist, both you and I will be saved; but if God exists, I will be saved and you will perish (Kulayni, 1407 AH: 1/78).

Also, to prove the rationality of belief in the Hereafter, Muhammad al-Ghazali explained this argument by citing examples and then narrated a hadith similar to the above hadiths from Imam Ali (Ghazali, 1964: 188-189). Michael Palmer, author of the book About God, has pointed to this argument of Ghazali and did not consider the wager argument to be unique to Pascal (Palmer, 1393: 523).

In any case, Pascal’s formulation of this argument is as follows:

On the question of God’s existence, we are compelled to choose one of these two options: God’s existence or God’s non-existence, and there is no third way. Since reason is incapable of proving either of these two options, we are, in fact, placed in a wager where we must bet either on God’s existence or on His non-existence. Now we must see which of these two options it is rational to bet on. If we choose God’s existence, we must sacrifice our life in this world for the Hereafter and give up certain worldly pleasures to attain a probable, permanent good; that is, life in paradise in the world to come. If we choose God’s non-existence, we will enjoy the pleasures of this world; but if God exists, we will lose eternal happiness in the Hereafter.

Betting on the first option is rational; for we all accept that someone compelled to participate in a wager acts rationally if they risk one life to gain three lives; whereas here we have an option that offers us far more than one life; namely, an infinite life. Therefore, here too it is rational to wager our finite worldly life against an infinite life. Nor is the objection valid that losing the certain, present life of this world for the enjoyment of a probable, deferred life is not rational; for in any gamble, one risks something certain to attain what is probable, without this being considered irrational (Pascal, 1393: 595-599).

Traditional Religiosity

Religiosity has been examined through various approaches, and different perspectives and classifications have been presented about it. For instance, from the standpoint of religiosity’s position vis-à-vis modernity, Mohsen Kadivar has categorized it into three types: traditional, traditionalist, and reformist (Kadivar, 1385). Regarding the relationship between Islam and religiosity, Mostafa Malekian has spoken of three types of religiosity: fundamentalist, modernist, and traditionalist (Malekian, 1378: 12-13). In another division, Abdolkarim Soroush has also divided religiosity into three types: “expedient (teleological), epistemic, and experiential” (Soroush, 1378: 22).

Here, without regard to the proposed classifications and definitions, we look at religiosity from another angle; from the perspective of the position the religious individual takes regarding different religious laws and the nature of the relationship they establish with religious teachings. From this viewpoint, we see that a type of religiosity has existed from the distant past to the present day, which has been the most common and well-known of religiosities, and because of this long history, we call it traditional religiosity.

This traditional religiosity has two important and inseparable features: The first feature is that in this religiosity, it is believed that only one specific religion and law is the true one (Sobhani, 1385: 38-44, 90; Motahhari, 1384/1: 277). Mohammad-Taqi Mesbah Yazdi, in defense of this idea, says: “From the perspective of Islam (and many other religions), there is only one correct religion, and the rest of the religions are false.” (Mesbah Yazdi, 1392: 93) Jafar Sobhani has also written:

Recently, some claimants of intellectualism say that all revealed religions are equal in terms of validity at all times, and the implication of this is that at any given time, several true religions exist and a person can accept whichever religion they wish at any time... Such a grand claim is not only unsupported by reason, but abundant evidence testifies to its weakness (Sobhani, 1385: 38-39). Pluralism, in the sense of the truth of all laws and the cause of salvation and deliverance for everyone at all times, is in no way correct, and the reasons presented in this regard are completely weak and baseless (ibid., 1385: 90).

In contrast to this feature, there is another type of religiosity in which attention to a specific religion and focus on it is not emphasized; rather, it is recommended to benefit from the teachings of all religions, denominations, philosophers, and mystics (Malekian, 1383). This religiosity can be called selective religiosity. A form of this type of religiosity is seen in Mostafa Malekian’s theory of “Rationality and Spirituality.” He writes:

We should not deprive ourselves of the spiritual blessings of any religion or denomination. Truth and reality are not bound by place, and therefore have no East or West, nor are they bound by time, and consequently, have no new or old. Truth and reality are the lost object of us humans, and we have the right, and indeed the duty, whenever and wherever we find it, regardless of whether it is new or old, Eastern or Western, to embrace it and cherish it; just as falsehood, whether new or old, Eastern or Western, must be rejected and negated (ibid., 1381: 246).

The second feature of traditional religiosity is that within it, one must have complete submission or commitment to the teachings of the religion and law deemed to be true; that is, one must unquestioningly adhere to all the propositions present in the sacred texts of that religion and law, even if there is no reason for submission to those propositions apart from the fact that they appear in the religious sacred texts (see Motahhari, 1384/21: 167).

Morteza Motahhari, a proponent of this view, has written: “Submission means that we should not be such that we refuse to act upon a command until we have discovered its wisdom. We must be submissive; meaning that we must act upon every command proven to be from religion, whether we have understood its wisdom or not” (ibid.).

In contrast to this feature, too, lies any form of critical religiosity. In the critical approach to religious propositions, adherence to religious propositions is not solely because those propositions appear in the religious sacred texts; rather, there is also a reason external to the religious sacred texts. In this view, religious teachings are evaluated, and only if they possess rationality are they acted upon (Malekian, 1381: 277; Mojtahed Shabestari, 1384: 77-78).

The Inability of Pascal’s Wager to Prove the Rationality of Traditional Religiosity

As we said in the explanation of Pascal’s Wager, this argument is presented on the assumption that the existence of God is not provable. The goal of the Wager argument is to prove, based on the rational rule of prudence, that one must believe in God. The analysis implicit in this argument is that there are probabilities such as the existence of God, the afterlife, heaven, and hell, and reason, taking these probabilities into account, dictates that one must be prudent and believe in God so that, in the event God exists, we do not lose an eternal good (heaven) and do not fall into eternal suffering (hell).

This argument has faced objections. Michael Palmer, in a book translated into Persian as دربارهٔ خدا (On God), has discussed its flaws in detail (Palmer, 1393: 533–551). But here we assume that Pascal’s argument is correct in proving the rationality of belief in the existence of God. Therefore, of the two options it presents to us—namely, the existence of God and the non-existence of God—the non-existence of God is set aside, and only the option of God’s existence remains. Now we want to see whether, from the rationality of belief in the existence of God, we can conclude that traditional religiosity is also rational or not.

It is clear that the answer to this question is negative, because Pascal’s wager only proves that one must have faith in God; but it does not say which God one must have faith in, which law one must choose, and how one must practice religion. Whereas in traditional religiosity, first, one must choose a specific law, and second, one must adhere to its teachings in a devotional manner.

Therefore, the wager argument, in order to prove the rationality of traditional religiosity, cannot be presented in this simple form of “either God exists or God does not exist”; rather, it must be formulated as follows:

1- Either there is no God

2- Or there is a God, there is an afterlife, and that God is such that if we do not adhere to His law, He will deprive us of His paradise in the afterlife and punish us, and the law we wish to adhere to is the law of this very God.

If we present the argument in this form, we fall into the fallacy of “false dilemma,” because we have assumed that the paths before us are limited to these two options; whereas this assumption is incorrect, and we have more than these two options at our disposal. For there are other conceptions and possibilities concerning God and His law that must be added to the options of the wager (Palmer, 1393: 534–537).

For example, it is possible that there is a God, there is an afterlife, and that God is such that if we do not adhere to His law, He will deprive us of His paradise in the afterlife and punish us, but the law we wish to adhere to is not the law of this God. This very possibility adds many options to the two options above, because many religions exist, such as Christianity, Islam, Judaism, Hinduism, and Buddhism. Moreover, each of these religions also has various denominations and sects, each of which possesses its own specific law.

For instance, the religion of Islam is divided into the two major denominations of Shia and Sunni. The Shia denomination itself has three major sects: Twelver Shia, Ismaili, and Zaidi. The law of the Twelvers, in addition to the teachings of the Prophet, also includes the teachings of the Twelve Imams. The law of Ismaili Shia encompasses the teachings of Imams other than those of the Twelver Shia and is itself divided into several branches. The law of Zaidi Shia also differs from Ismaili and Imami law and has its own branches. Some of them accept the imamate of Abu Bakr and Umar, and some do not believe in these two.

And these are only the existing sects of Shia. Some Shia sects, such as the Kaysanites and the Waqifites, have disappeared, and logically, it is possible that one of them was the true one. The Sunni denomination has the same situation and includes various branches. For example, the Takfiri sect of the Sunnis sees the circle of disbelief and polytheism as wide and the circle of faith as narrow, while its other sects do not.

Beyond this, apart from the existing official religions, there are other possibilities and conceptions concerning God and His law; among them, it is possible that God’s law is such that in it, the religious and the non-religious are rewarded and punished only to the extent of the time they lived in this world; or it is such that in it, those who have not sincerely entered the true law are not punished—that is, those who have examined the reasons for the truth of God’s law but have not found them convincing.

Taking these possibilities into account, the rationality of wagering on the second option of the wager argument—which says there is a God, an afterlife, a heaven and a hell, and the law we are considering is the law of that God—is not proven; because by doing so, we have invested in something that

Firstly, it is no longer one of two options with a fifty-percent probability; rather, it is merely one of many possible options. It is therefore not rational to eliminate the other options and wager on that one in order to attain something whose probability of occurring is very slight.

Secondly, it is world-denying and defers the reward to the hereafter; whereas belief in some alternative options allows greater enjoyment of this world, and with belief in them, we have more freedom and comfort. For instance, belief in a just God whose law does not punish those who have not sincerely believed means we are neither deprived of worldly pleasures nor do we lose the opportunity for paradise in the hereafter.

Thirdly, against this probable option, there are many probable options that, just like this one, say that if we do not believe in them, we will be punished. So the law to which we adhere may not be God's law, and we know that there are many religions, sects, and denominations that are rivals to the law we are considering, and by not adhering to them we may be tormented.

Therefore, by accepting the option considered by the wager argument, we are also taking a risk and exposing ourselves to potential danger. Such an action causes us to lose worldly pleasures and possibly suffer the torment of hell. For example, if the Islamic law is true, a Hindu individual who has renounced many of life's enjoyments and subjected himself to hardship is not among the saved in the hereafter. Consequently, he has lost both this world and the next.

Not to mention that some rival options to the one considered in the wager seem more probable than it. An example of these is the option that says God is too just to torment those who, despite investigation, have not found justified reasons for the truth of His law, or too just to punish humans for longer than the time they transgressed that law in this world. These assumptions are intuitively more acceptable than the God considered by the wager argument, who inflicts infinite torment in the hereafter if we do not believe in Him for any reason.

The Incompatibility of Pascal's Wager with Traditional Religiosity

In the previous section, the relationship between Pascal's Wager and traditional religiosity was examined under the assumption of the wager argument's validity, and the conclusion reached was that this argument cannot prove the rationality of traditional religiosity. In other words, the wager cannot prove that the requirement of prudence is to be religious in a traditional manner.

Now we want to say that the wager argument is also incompatible with traditional religiosity; that is, not only is traditional religiosity not the requirement of prudence, but on the contrary, based on this argument, prudence dictates that if an individual wants to be religious, they should not be so in a traditional manner. In other words, reason says that in case of doubt about the foundations of a religion, if an individual wants to be religious, the requirement of prudence is not to have complete commitment to its religious teachings; rather, they should evaluate the teachings of that religion and make commitment to them contingent upon verification.

Let us remember that, as we said before, the discussion here concerns an individual for whom the theoretical foundations of traditional religiosity have not been proven, or who has doubts about all or some of these foundations. In other words, when we say traditional religiosity is contrary to prudence, this judgment is specific to a time when there is doubt about the fundamental beliefs of a specific religion. Therefore, if we have accepted the fundamental beliefs of a religion, the judgment differs, and essentially Pascal's Wager argument finds no occasion to be raised.

Now, to prove the incompatibility of the wager argument and traditional religiosity, we present two arguments. In these two arguments, because we have accepted the validity of Pascal's Wager, we have assumed these propositions: that there is a God, that there is a hereafter, and that God, in the hereafter, will torment those who have not adhered to His law. First, we explain some of the premises common to both arguments. Then we formulate each argument separately:

1- The conception that the overwhelming majority of religious believers have of God is that God possesses three attributes: omniscience, omnipotence, and pure goodness. It seems everyone accepts that if God has these three attributes, then if He has legislated a law for human beings, in this law there is no teaching contrary to the dictates of reason and morality. In other words, this God never commands us to accept a belief against which we have evidence. Nor does He ever command us to perform an immoral act.

2- In the religious teachings of all religions, there are theoretical propositions against which we have rational evidence; such as the existence of the seven heavens, that human beings are descended from a single pair, namely Adam and Eve, and the geocentric theory. There are also practical propositions that appear immoral; that is, they recommend or permit an immoral act; such as discrimination between men and women in family and social rights (including the issue of polygamy and the difference between men and women in inheritance and blood money), and the permissibility of slavery.

Of course, if we have already accepted the truth of a religion, we grant its sacred religious texts epistemological authority. Hence, we interpret the non-rational and non-moral teachings of that religion in a sense that is not incompatible with reason and morality; but here, because the assumption is that the truth of the law we wish to adhere to has not been proven, we cannot do such a thing; rather, we must employ the method we use in the context of any other text; that is, to interpret such propositions in the sense that is ordinarily understood from them.

In other words, with the presupposition that the foundations of a specific religion have not been proven, we must employ the method in understanding the meaning of its propositions that we use in understanding the meaning of the propositions of other religions, as well as in understanding non-religious propositions, such as the writings of philosophers. Just as there we attribute the meaning ordinarily understood from a proposition to it and make it the criterion for assessing that proposition, sometimes objecting to it and sometimes accepting it, here too we must do the same. Therefore, we have no reason to interpret the non-rational and non-moral propositions present in sacred religious texts with meanings that are not, at first glance and ordinarily, understood from them.

3- As we said in the definition of traditional religiosity, in this type of religiosity one must adhere to the theoretical and practical teachings present in the sacred religious texts; it makes no difference whether, for believing or acting upon them, we have a reason apart from the sacred religious texts or not. Theologians who advocate traditional religiosity say that even if there is a proposition in the sacred religious texts against which scientific or rational evidence rules, that scientific evidence must be considered invalid; because science is limited and conjectural (Misbah Yazdi, 1392: pp. 149-151).

With these explanations, it is now time to formulate the arguments, which are as follows:

Form of the First Argument

1- God has three attributes: omniscience, omnipotence, and pure goodness (Premise 1).

2- God has legislated a religion for human beings: "God's Law" (Premise 2).

3- God punishes those who act contrary to this law (Premise 3).

4- (Conclusion of 1 and 2) In God's Law, no teaching contrary to the dictates of reason and morality can exist.

5- In the sacred texts of all religions, there are teachings contrary to the dictates of reason and morality.

6- (Conclusion of 4 and 5) The law present in the sacred texts of each of the religions contradicts and conflicts with God's Law.

7- In traditional religiosity, one must have dogmatic adherence to the sacred religious texts.

8- (Conclusion of 6 and 7) In traditional religiosity, one must act contrary to God's Law.

9- (Conclusion of 3 and 8) God punishes traditional religious believers.

10- (Conclusion of 9) Traditional religiosity is contrary to rational prudence.

11- Pascal's Wager is founded on rational prudence.

12- Therefore (Conclusion of 10 and 11) Pascal's Wager is incompatible with traditional religiosity.

Form of the Second Argument

1- God has three attributes: omniscience, omnipotence, and pure goodness (Premise 1).

2- God punishes some people in the afterlife (Premise 2).

3- (Conclusion 1) God opposes any non-rational and non-moral decree.

4- (Conclusion of 2 and 3) It is more probable than other possibilities regarding the scope of God's punishment that it includes individuals who adhere to decrees contrary to reason or morality.

5- In the religious teachings of all religions, there are theoretical propositions contrary to the decree of reason and morality.

6- In traditional religiosity, one must adhere to all the teachings present in the sacred religious texts.

7- (Conclusion of 5 and 6) A requisite of traditional religiosity is adherence to some propositions contrary to reason and morality.

8- (Conclusion of 4 and 7) It is more probable than other possibilities regarding the scope of God's punishment that it includes traditional religious believers.

9- (Conclusion of 8) Traditional religiosity is contrary to rational prudence.

10- Pascal's Wager is founded on rational prudence.

11- Therefore (Conclusion of 9 and 10) Pascal's Wager is incompatible with traditional religiosity.

Summary and Conclusion

The main question of the research was whether Pascal's Wager, assuming it is valid, can prove the rationality of traditional religiosity or not, and rather works to its detriment. The wager argument stated that in the matter of God's existence, two options lie before us: either there is a God or there is no God. In this case, reason dictates that the precautionary measure is to believe in God's existence so that in the afterlife, we do not lose the possible eternal bliss and do not fall into possible eternal torment. In defining traditional religiosity, it was also mentioned that this type of religiosity has two characteristics: first, it holds the belief that only one specific religion and law is true. Second, one must have complete commitment to all the teachings present in that law.

The relationship between Pascal's Wager and traditional religiosity was examined in two parts: in the first part, we said that in using the wager argument to prove the rationality of traditional religiosity, we fall into the fallacy of false dilemma; because we consider only two options as probable: one is that there is no God. The other is that there is a God, there is an afterlife, and that God, in the afterlife, grants eternal blissful life to those who have entered His law and subjects others to hell, and the law we wish to adhere to is the law of this very God.

While there are many other possibilities; including the possibility that God does not punish those who have not sincerely believed in His law; also the possibility that the religion and law we have chosen is other than God's religion and law. We said that considering the existence of numerous religions, denominations, and sects, merely by taking this possibility into account, the options before us become far more than two. The conclusion of this discussion is that Pascal's Wager does not have the power to prove the rationality of traditional religiosity.

In the second part, we reached a conclusion beyond that of the first part, which was that Pascal's wager argument is also incompatible with traditional religiosity; meaning that if we wish to accept it, we cannot simultaneously adhere to some requisites of traditional religiosity, such as the necessity of complete commitment to all teachings present in the law; because this argument relies on rational prudence, whereas it was proven that assuming doubt in the fundamental beliefs of a religion, rational prudence dictates non-complete commitment to the teachings of that religion.

References

1- The Holy Quran (1376). Translated by Mohammad Mahdi Fooladvand, Tehran: Office of Studies in Islamic History and Teachings.

2- The Holy Bible, translated by Ilam Publications.

3- Khosravi Farsani, Abbas and Reza Akbari (1390). "A Critical Examination of Pascal's Wager Argument in Proving the Existence of God," in: Philosophical-Theological Researches, No. 3.

4- Pascal, Blaise, (2014). “Pascal: The Wager,” in: Palmer, Michael, On God, translated by Na’imeh Pourmohammadi, Tehran: Elmi va Farhangi Publishing Company, first edition.

5- Palmer, Michael (2014). On God, translated by Na’imeh Pourmohammadi, Tehran: Elmi va Farhangi Publishing Company, first edition.

6- Zadiyousefi, Amir Hossein and Mohammad Saeedimehr (2015), “Pascal’s Wager and the Problem of Multiple Gods,” in: Essays in Philosophy of Religion, no. 2.

7- Sobhani, Ja’far (2006). Religious Pluralism, Qom, Imam Sadeq Institute, second edition.

8- Soroush, Abdolkarim, (1999). “Varieties of Religiosity,” in: Kiyan, no. 50.

9- Ghazali, Muhammad (1964). Mizan al-Amal, edited by Sulayman Dunya, Cairo: Dar al-Ma’arif, first edition.

10- Kadivar, Mohsen, “The Interplay of Islam and Modernity” (2006). On: The Official Website of Mohsen Kadivar, publication date: 17 Mordad 1385, accessed on 13 Farvardin 1402.

11- Kulayni, Muhammad ibn Ya’qub (1407 AH). Al-Kafi, edited and corrected by Ali Akbar Ghaffari and Muhammad Akhundi, Tehran: Dar al-Kutub al-Islamiyyah.

12- Mojtahed Shabestari, Muhammad (2005). Reflections on a Humanistic Reading of Religion, Tehran, Tarh-e No, second edition.

13- Mesbah Yazdi, Muhammad Taqi (2013). The Relationship between Science and Religion, Qom, Imam Khomeini Education and Research Institute Publications, second edition.

14- Motahhari, Morteza (2005). The Collected Works of Martyr Professor Motahhari, Tehran, Sadra, seventh edition.

15- Malekian, Mostafa (1999). “A Word on the Nature of the Relationship between Islam and Liberalism,” in: Kiyan, no. 48.

16- Malekian, Mostafa (2002). A Way to Liberation, Tehran: Negah-e Mo’aser Institute, second edition.

17- Malekian, Mostafa (2004). “The Crisis of Spirituality; Components of the Spiritual Life,” on: Sedanet Website, accessed on 13 Farvardin 1402.